

OC CASIONAL PAPERS

Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security

9

DEMOCRATIZING SOUTHERN AFRICA: CHALLENGES FOR CANADIAN POLICY

*By Heribert Adam
and Kogila Moodley*

JUNE 1992

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NUMBER NINE

June 1992

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Graphic Design:
Spencer, Francey, Peters
Ottawa/Toronto

Printed and bound by:
MOM Printing
Ottawa

Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data

Adam, Heribert
Democratizing Southern Africa: challenges for
Canadian policy

(Occasional papers; no. 9)
Includes bibliographic references.
ISBN 0-662-19775-5
DSS cat. no. CC293-3/9E

1. South Africa — Foreign relations — Canada.
2. Canada — Foreign Relations — South Africa.
- I. Moodley, Kogila. II. Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security. III. Title.
- IV. Series: Occasional papers (Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security) ; no. 9.

DT1105.C2A33 1992 327.680971 C92-099707-4

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many colleagues and friends on three different continents provided insights, advice and criticism at various stages of this study. Foremost among our longtime South African friends we benefitted from many animated conversations with Hermann and Annette Giliomee, Jenny and Alex Boraine, Wilmot James and Julia Teal, André and Marita du Toit, Vincent and Rose Mapai, Pieter and Ingrid LeRoux, Helen Zille and Johann Maree, Michael and Mary Savage, Oscar Dhlomo, Solly Benatar, Anne-Hilge and Jannie Gagiano, Jairam Reddy, Millie Pimstone, Milton Shain, and Simon Pimstone. The unforgettable weekend in the Swaziland mountains with Jane and van Zyl Slabbert together with the many other shared lodgings in Rondebosch, Plett and Pender Island deserve special mention.

In Germany, we frequently clarified our theories with Theo Hanf, Jochen Bergmann, Wilke and Margot Thomssen and Fritz Sack; in the US, with the provocative maverick Pierre van den Berghe, whose encyclopaedic brilliance remains relatively unrecognized in the discipline; in England, with veteran journalist Stanley Uys and, in Israel, with the "humanist hard-liner" Moetti Tamarkin.

In Canada, we used many times as critical sounding boards, Hamish Dickie-Clark, Ron McLean, the late Kesval Chetty, Tony Williamson, Michael Goldberg, Rick Johnston and Doug Anglin. Cranford and Renate Pratt generously read three chapters of a first draft and promptly responded with a barrage of criticism. We could not have asked for more thoughtful copy-editors than Jenny Penberthy and René Weideman. George Pavlich, Carla Spinola, Grant Wildi and Kanya Adam greatly

assisted with library research and data collection. The end product would not be in a presentable state without the meticulous attention of Anita Mahoney and Janice MacLellan who patiently processed ever changing drafts. Dan Birch, Vice President Academic and Provost at UBC, and Bob Brown, Dean of Arts at SFU generously agreed to our release time in addition to providing many resources of their offices.

Most past and current External Affairs officials in Ottawa and Pretoria collaborated willingly, some reluctantly, one bearing the title, "Head, Historical Section, Academic Relations Divisions," not at all. He did not see fit "to enable you to use our controlled access procedure to consult files dealing with events after the end of 1984," unlike the US administration where a collection of 2,500 previously classified documents dealing with US-South Africa relations up to 1989 has just been published. We, therefore, relied heavily on personal interviews with key insiders which provided a fresher and more nuanced, but perhaps also more biased view than sanitized documents. Our thanks are due to the interviewees in South Africa and Canada who repeatedly allowed themselves to be sounded out on sensitive experiences.

Finally, Bernard Wood not only conceived of and sponsored the study through his *Canadian Institute of International Peace and Security*, but at all times supported our research with his astute counsel. Of course, we alone bear responsibility for the design and final outcome of the project.

Our daughters, Kanya and Maya, will be relieved that the seclusion of their parents has ended and dinner-table conversations promise more exciting themes. Hopefully, we have not turned them entirely off academic careers.

Vancouver, B.C.
April, 1992

Heribert Adam
Kogila Moodley

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Canadian policy has set out to assist democratic transformation and development in South Africa. At times imaginative, though not always consistent, it went beyond punitive measures and boycotts in the battle against Apartheid. In reality though, Canada's intervention has made little difference to South African developments. However it has contributed to Canadian self-definition and international credibility.

In three main parts, this analysis (1) sketches the historical record of Canadian policy toward South Africa. It outlines some of the controversies and speculates about the functions and background of a surprisingly activist policy by a conservative government. (2) It probes the competing political forces in the ongoing South African transition, assesses the prospect of democratic success or failure and describes the ambiguous impact of Canadian efforts on the recipients in the white and black communities. (3) In the light of this critical evaluation, the study reflects on possible changes, new foci, or even withdrawal of Canadian involvement from the Southern Africa region of the post-apartheid era.

The study represents a critical think-piece rather than advocacy of a particular policy. It argues that developments in South Africa are widely misunderstood, even by informed policy makers. Public opinion abroad applies popular stereotypes of violent tribalism or false colonial analogies. The personality cult surrounding Mandela and the accolades accorded de Klerk have romanticized a conflictual relationship and personalized it into a literal black-versus-white conflict. Yet Mandela and de Klerk need to be demystified in order to achieve a sober assessment of the

interests behind them and a detailed knowledge of their interacting constituencies. Adam and Moodley aim at the hidden reality beyond the pious resolutions and public posturing. They lay bare some of the social conditions and constraints under which these leaders act and thereby contribute to a more nuanced understanding of Southern Africa.

A most puzzling question remains as to why a Canadian conservative government with a corporate constituency should pursue a Southern African policy so radically different from its former colonial mentor, Britain. Not only did Ottawa genuinely clash with the Thatcher government, it usurped the moral leadership on this issue in the Commonwealth. While the Trudeau liberals, contrary to their image, would not let morality interfere with profits, most Canadian Tories, again contrary to expectations, pushed a much more activist stance on Apartheid. Whether intentional or not, a major function of anti-apartheid activism was to define Canadian identity rather than affect the South African power equation. The more Canada became economically and culturally integrated into the empire to its South, the more the Apartheid issue lent itself to asserting a symbolically vanishing sovereignty and gaining Ottawa international credibility.

To assess the impact of Canadian and Western involvement on its targets in Southern Africa is a difficult, if not impossible task. Well-reasoned claims about the decisive effects of sanctions on the policy shifts of the de Klerk government are contradicted by equally sharp counter-claims about the influence of other more significant factors, such as the changing world scene, developments within Afrikanerdom, and heightened domestic resistance. However, without doubt, sanctions induced a sense of isolation. South Africa was ostracized by the world. On the basis of survey data, this study probes, probably for the first time, the way in which South African whites deflected outside criticism through a variety of rationalizing self-deceptions and how politicised blacks perceived Canadian support both positively with praise and negatively with scepticism. The chapter on "Images of Canada" among South Africans also reveals deficiencies in the way in which the Canadian stance is communicated.

It is now conventional wisdom that the efforts needed to dismantle Apartheid pale in comparison with the task of dealing with Apartheid's legacies. This volume reinforces the crucial emphasis, spelled out in many well-researched documents, on human resource development through innovative education programmes for a new civil service culture and non-racial management. The shift from aid to victims abroad to training programmes at home proves cost-effective as well as politically necessary. However, Adam and Moodley argue against too partisan an application of assistance in favour of any one of the movements or organizations. If the goal of Canadian policy is to bring about a negotiated accommodation in South Africa, then all legitimate political actors must be included in a successful political settlement. The task of outside intervention is not to select winners or losers in an intense ideological contest but to facilitate democratization and strengthen civil society as a whole.

Canadian involvement is contingent upon and should respond to the specific and ever changing political currents in South Africa. In the transition from confrontation to negotiation, the outcome of a potential accord is not predetermined. Although a widening consensus on constitutional and economic visions has emerged between the ANC and the government, the prospects of peace depend on more than the designs of leaders. The continuing political violence serves as a reminder that the social conditions and unofficial ideologies can wreck any official accord.

Adam and Moodley's comprehensive analysis also covers in depth such controversial topics as Winnie Mandela, the ANC-South African Communist Party alliance, Inkatha and the causes of political violence. The authors sketch options for a Western post-cold war foreign policy toward Southern Africa as a whole. They outline neglected areas of development assistance, such as professional policing, AIDS education, women's rights, low-cost housing and tourism. The romanticism with socialist experiments in Southern Africa is as critically probed as the recolonization of bankrupt frontline states through IMF structural adjustment programmes. Underlying the tough and hard-nosed realism is Adam and Moodley's optimistic assumption that African leaders have

learned the lessons of pragmatic coexistence. Whether the remarkable South African compromise, however, will result in a genuine democracy or a National Party-ANC patronage system remains to be seen. A most likely outcome is the ANC in government but the current establishment retaining power.

CONDENSÉ

La politique canadienne a pour objet de favoriser l'instauration et l'épanouissement de la démocratie en Afrique du Sud. Parfois novatrice, mais pas toujours cohérente, elle est allée au-delà des sanctions et des boycotts dans la lutte contre l'*apartheid*. En réalité, l'intervention du Canada n'a pas changé grand-chose à la situation sud-africaine. Toutefois, elle a aidé le Canada à se définir et lui a conféré une certaine crédibilité à l'échelle internationale.

La présente analyse est composée de trois grandes parties : 1) elle trace les grandes lignes de l'histoire de la politique canadienne relative à l'Afrique du Sud et de quelques controverses s'y rapportant, et les auteurs s'y interrogent sur les fonctions et le contexte d'une politique étonnamment militante adoptée par un gouvernement conservateur; 2) elle examine les forces politiques rivales dans le contexte actuel de transition en Afrique du Sud; elle évalue les perspectives de succès ou d'échec de la démocratie et décrit l'incidence ambiguë des efforts du Canada sur les bénéficiaires des communautés blanches et noires, et 3) à la lumière de cette évaluation critique, les auteurs réfléchissent aux changements possibles, aux nouvelles orientations, ou même au terme de la présence du Canada en Afrique australe, une fois l'*apartheid* aboli.

Plutôt que de défendre une politique particulière, l'étude invite à la réflexion critique. Elle soutient que les événements qui se produisent en Afrique du Sud sont très mal compris, et ce, même par les décideurs. À l'étranger, l'opinion publique applique les stéréotypes populaires du tribalisme violent, ou fonde son jugement sur de fausses analogies colonialistes. Le culte de personnalité dont M. Mandela fait l'objet et les

témoignages d'approbation à l'endroit de M. de Klerk ont romancé une relation conflictuelle, et c'est ainsi que le conflit entre noirs et blancs a été littéralement personnifié. Il faut pourtant démystifier ces deux personnages pour arriver à évaluer objectivement les intérêts qui les motivent et à bien comprendre le fonctionnement des groupes qu'ils représentent. M. Adam et M^{me} Moodley tentent de révéler la réalité cachée derrière les résolutions pieuses et l'attitude adoptée en public. Ils mettent à nu certaines des conditions et des contraintes sociales où ces deux dirigeants agissent et, ce faisant, ils favorisent une compréhension plus nuancée de l'Afrique australe.

Une question laisse encore les auteurs très perplexes, à savoir : pourquoi un gouvernement conservateur canadien, qui préconise des méthodes collectives, adopte-t-il une politique sur l'Afrique australe si différente de celle de l'ancienne mère patrie, l'Angleterre ? Non seulement y a-t-il eu un véritable désaccord entre Ottawa et le gouvernement Thatcher, mais les Conservateurs ont également donné le ton moral au sein du Commonwealth. Contrairement à leurs habitudes, les Libéraux de M. Trudeau n'ont pas laissé la question morale l'emporter sur les profits; presque tous les membres du gouvernement Mulroney, contre toute attente également, ont défendu une position anti-*apartheid* beaucoup plus militante. Cette position, que cela fût voulu ou non, a eu pour principal effet de définir l'identité canadienne plutôt que d'influer sur le jeu des forces en Afrique du Sud. Plus le Canada s'intéressait aux dossiers économique et culturel de cet empire de l'hémisphère sud, plus la question de l'*apartheid* lui permettait d'affirmer sa souveraineté symboliquement en voie de disparition et augmentait sa crédibilité dans le monde.

Il est difficile, sinon impossible, d'évaluer l'incidence de l'intervention canadienne et occidentale sur les objectifs visés en Afrique australe. Les déclarations réfléchies concernant les effets décisifs des sanctions sur le revirement de position du gouvernement de Klerk s'opposent à celles, tout aussi vives, qui portent sur l'influence d'autres facteurs plus importants, comme les changements s'opérant dans le monde, les développements se produisant à l'intérieur du royaume afrikaner et la résistance interne accrue. Toutefois, que les sanctions aient suscité un

sentiment d'isolement ne fait aucun doute. L'Afrique du Sud était contrainte par le reste du monde. Fondée sur des sondages, l'étude tente d'expliquer, probablement pour la première fois, comment les blancs d'Afrique du Sud écartaient les reproches venant de l'extérieur en justifiant leur aveuglement de diverses manières, et pourquoi les noirs politiquement engagés percevaient l'appui du Canada tantôt favorable, tantôt défavorable, tantôt avec scepticisme. En outre, le chapitre sur la façon dont le Canada est perçu par les Sud-Africains (*Images of Canada*) montre aussi que notre pays ne sait pas toujours bien expliquer sa position.

Aujourd'hui, tous admettent que les efforts nécessaires pour démanteler l'*apartheid* ne sont rien comparativement à ce qu'il faudra accomplir pour faire face à l'après-*apartheid*. Le rapport souligne l'importance cruciale, exposée dans de nombreux ouvrages bien documentés sur le développement des ressources humaines grâce à des programmes d'éducation novateurs, d'entreprendre une réforme de la formation publique et d'instaurer un système de gestion non raciste. Cesser de laisser les victimes à l'étranger pour instaurer des programmes à peu à peu d'aider l'intérieur du pays, voilà qui s'avère financièrement avantageux et politiquement nécessaire. Toutefois, M. Adam et M^{me} Mosley sont une mise en garde contre les programmes d'assistance par le biais d'un mouvement ou à un organisme particulier. Si l'objectif de la politique canadienne en Afrique du Sud est d'amener les parties à un compromis politique, tous les intervenants légitimes sur la scène politique doivent participer aux efforts faits en vue d'un règlement fructueux. Il ne s'agit pas d'un concours d'idéologies intense duquel certains sortiront vainqueurs et d'autres perdants, mais plutôt d'un effort visant à favoriser le processus de démocratisation et à renforcer l'ensemble de la société civile.

L'action du Canada en Afrique du Sud doit évoluer en fonction de courants politiques précis et d'une conjoncture en perpétuel changement. Pendant le passage de l'affrontement à la négociation, il est impossible de prédire quels seront les résultats d'une entente possible. Même si les conceptions de l'ANC et du gouvernement en matière constitutionnelle et économique se rapprochent de plus en plus, les

espèce de paix ne reposent pas uniquement sur les intentions des dirigeants. La violence politique persistante nous rappelle que les conditions sociales et les idéologies non reconnues risquent d'arrêter toute entente officielle.

Dans leur analyse exhaustive, M. Adam et M^{me} Moodley traitent également en profondeur de questions aussi controversées que les actions de M^{me} Winnie Mandela, l'alliance conclue entre l'ANC et le parti communiste sud-africain, l'Inkatha et les causes de la violence politique. Ils donnent un aperçu des options de l'Occident quant à sa politique étrangère envers l'Afrique australe en général, au lendemain de la Guerre froide. Ils passent en revue les domaines négligés par les programmes d'aide au développement, comme les forces officielles de maintien de l'ordre, l'éducation sur le SIDA, les droits de la femme, les logements à prix modique et le tourisme. L'idéalisme des expériences socialistes en Afrique du Sud est examiné d'un oeil aussi critique que la recolonisation des États ruinés de la ligne de front par le biais des programmes d'ajustement structurel du FMI. L'hypothèse optimiste des auteurs selon laquelle les dirigeants africains ont appris ce que suppose la coexistence pragmatique met en évidence le dur et strict réalisme de la situation. Toutefois, reste à savoir si le remarquable compromis sud-africain mène à une véritable démocratie ou à la pratique du népotisme par le *National Party* et l'ANC. On peut probablement s'attendre à ce que des membres de l'ANC fassent partie du gouvernement, mais la classe dirigeante actuelle conservera le pouvoir.

INTRODUCTION: METHODOLOGICAL
APPROACHES AND POLITICAL VALUES

*"The most repugnant form of lying is to tell,
all of it, whilst hiding the soul of facts."* —
Breiten Breitenbach.

Canadian policy has set out to assist democratic transformation and development in South Africa. At times imaginative, though not always consistent, it went beyond punitive measures and boycotts in the battle against Apartheid. In reality though, Canada's intervention has made little difference to South African developments. However, it has contributed to Canadian self-definition and international credibility.

In three main parts, this analysis (1) sketches the historical record of Canadian policy toward South Africa. It outlines some of the controversies and speculates about the functions and background of a surprisingly activist policy by a conservative government. (2) It probes the competing political forces in the ongoing South African transition, assesses the prospect of democratic success or failure and describes the ambiguous impact of Canadian efforts on the recipients in the white and black communities. (3) In the light of this critical evaluation the study reflects on possible changes, new foci, or even withdrawal of Canadian involvement from the Southern Africa region of the post-apartheid era. In short, the three parts of this study deal with the *past* of Canadian policy, the *present* of South African current developments and the *future* of Canadian responses.

The study represents a critical think-piece rather than advocacy of a particular policy. We argue that developments in South Africa are widely misunderstood, even by informed policy makers. Public opinion abroad applies popular stereotypes of violent tribalism or false colonial analogies. The personality cult surrounding Mandela and the accolades ac-

ceded de Klerk have romanticized a conflictual relationship and personalized it into a literal black-versus-white conflict. Yet Mandela and de Klerk need to be demystified in order to achieve a sober assessment of the interests behind them and a detailed knowledge of their interacting constituencies. We aim at the hidden reality beyond the focus reiterations and public posturing. We wish to lay bare some of the social conditions and constraints under which these leaders act and thereby contribute to a more nuanced understanding of Southern Africa.

We originally intended to cover the entire region in depth. However, the overwhelming dominance of South Africa together with the unresolved political developments in many frontline states have led us to sketch only general trends in other parts of the subcontinent and to focus more fully on the politics of the post-apartheid state. Regardless of who is in power, South Africa resembles the US in economically dominating its neighbours. With the political objections removed, a common market in an economically interdependent region would be an obvious and advantageous choice for Southern Africa. Only if the industrialized South acts as an engine of growth in the rest of the region and accords favourable terms of trade, investment and development assistance to its *war-torn* neighbours, can a speedy turnaround be realistically expected.

At the end of the 20th century it should no longer be necessary to argue the case against racial privilege in whatever guise. The tragic record of suffering and destruction by that grotesque Verwoerdian experiment of social engineering is too self-evident to deserve refutation or even condemnation. It seems time to substitute sober analysis and strategic pragmatism for moral outrage. Yet a striking feature of Canadian writing and NGO pronouncements on South Africa is moral self-righteousness. Most Canadian academics in the field outbid each other in little more than strong partisanship. An influential Toronto journal (*Southern Africa Report*) regularly heaps abuse on Ottawa and asks after years of responsive anti-apartheid efforts: "Can we any longer afford to be polite towards the Canadian government and its minions regarding this country's South Africa policy?" (SAR, January 1992).

In our view, the South African issue should not be reduced to a morality play, where self-acclaimed purity and rhetorical radicalism are the main issues at stake. This debate has exhausted itself in fruitless accusations about "Canadian government machinations" on the one side and, on the other, dismissive claims that critics on the left lack information and are ideologically biased. Both remain trapped in their prejudgments. Even though strong values are important in guiding analysis and policymaking, they ought not to be allowed to blind or encourage mere self-serving partisanship. Too much wishful thinking has misled foreign South Africa observers. Instead of predicting events, they have simply fitted them into predetermined static categories.

The Canadian debate on South Africa during the 70s and 80s was preoccupied with collusion with Apartheid and moral purity. Most advocacy groups devoted only a mere fraction of their energy to equally sophisticated reasoning about strategic developments in South Africa itself. Invariably the Apartheid state was treated simply as a monolithic racist entity, beyond the pale for most activists and too contaminated for strategic involvement. This led to major shortcomings in existing studies, particularly since the normalization of South African politics has increasingly eroded the simple dichotomy of oppressors and victims. It is this lacuna that the present study attempts to address.

Apartheid critics have mostly focused on its undoubted brutality. But in addition to brutality there has always been paternalistic benevolence as well. This benevolence, from corporate charity to the caring feudalism of conservative farmers, oiled the system and helps to explain why it lasted so long. The focus on brutality is mostly concerned with victims who are assumed to play no active part in history. Yet this victimology needs to be balanced by descriptions of how the seemingly powerless survive, give meaning to their lives and act upon their circumstances. We intend, therefore, to ground moral conclusions much more in the unique local context and, by so doing, perhaps remove some preconceived notions with which an overreported conflict is nevertheless misunderstood. In short, we want to emphasize the rich texture and unreported ironies and contradictions which the usual unnuanced reasoning on Apartheid misses.

We do not shy away from ambiguity and the grey tones which partisan reporting avoids. We are argumentative rather than uncontroversial, refusing to be governed by what is fashionable, inoffensive and politically correct. Canadian policy pronouncements on South Africa are often distinguished by a high degree of bloodless abstraction that preserves the statesmanlike posture of the day, but fails to name the passions and irrationalities that drive political actors. We would like to probe the underbelly of this public discourse and record the unspeakable, regardless of whom it offends or benefits. In our view, this approach calls for the expression of strong opinions without being opinionated. As long as these judgements are supported by reasoned evidence, they should be self-evidently persuasive rather than offensive.

Violations of taboos can of course be easily misunderstood. In this respect, we reject one likely criticism from the outset: our analysis is not anti-ANC. Precisely because we consider the ANC and Mandela to be the key players in the future South Africa, we focus our scrutiny on them. They should not stand above criticism, notwithstanding the undoubted moral stature of Mandela and the essential legitimacy of the popular ANC claims. A solidarity based on critically engaging the progressive forces, rather than blindly applauding them, ultimately serves the cause of liberation better, even if some feelings are bruised in the process. Independent academic analysis cannot allow itself to be fashioned by the exigencies of a political cause, even if it is a progressive one.

Only blind ideologues would not recognize the stature of Nelson Mandela, his statesmanship, realism, pragmatic wisdom and remarkable moderation after a life as victim of state brutality. Even as he is now "idolized" and "lionized" around the world, few living persons deserve such dubious honour more. As long as he himself remains relatively unaffected by the personality cult of a global Mandela industry, the hype may even assist the South African reconciliation, both financially and symbolically. Without the reassuring Mandela symbol, fewer whites would embrace negotiations. Pretoria may have delayed liberalization longer, and fewer blacks would trust the process. At present, Mandela is crucial in preventing further black fragmentation and ensuring a semblance of tactical unity, but most important of all, a fragile nonracialism.

Once Mandela loses support, negotiations are in serious jeopardy. However, the personalizing focus on Mandela that remains the hallmark of foreign political consciousness about South Africa, overlooks that the ANC consists not only and not primarily of Mandela.

Unfortunately a tendency has developed to endorse at face value everything the ANC says about itself. Critics who normally scrutinize every word of an official view for its hidden motives and camouflaged reality, often muffle their critical voices when dealing with progressive forces. It is our opinion that the best expression of solidarity emanates from a sympathetic, but candid criticism. Cheerleaders seldom further the cause.

Regarding Canadian policy, a most puzzling question remains as to why a Canadian conservative government with a corporate constituency should pursue a Southern African policy so radically different from its former colonial mentor, Britain. Not only did Ottawa genuinely clash with the Thatcher government, it usurped the moral leadership on this issue in the Commonwealth. While the Trudeau liberals, contrary to their image, would not let morality interfere with profits, most Canadian Tories, again contrary to expectations, pushed a much more activist stance on Apartheid, perhaps not primarily for moral reasons. Whether intentional or not, a major function of anti-Apartheid activism was to define Canadian identity rather than affect the South African power equation. The more Canada became economically and culturally integrated into the empire to its South, the more the Apartheid issue lent itself to asserting a symbolically vanishing sovereignty and gaining Ottawa international credibility.

Middle-power multilateralism contrasts sharply with super-power imposition of military and economic might, particularly during the cold war. A post-cold war foreign policy is freed of many ideological constraints. A future Western policy towards Africa need no longer treat African governments as pawns in an imagined cold war game. The end of the cold war with the disappearance of the Soviet Union as an international actor signals both new opportunities as well as grave dangers of benign neglect for African regions. Marginalized former

frontline states risk being recolonized through structural adjustment programmes of the World Bank or falling under South African economic domination in the post-apartheid era.

To assess the impact of Canadian and Western involvement on its targets in Southern Africa is a difficult if not impossible task. Well-reasoned claims about the decisive effects of sanctions on the policy shifts of the de Klerk government are contradicted by equally sharp counter-claims about the influence of other more significant factors, such as the changing world scene, developments within Afrikanerdom, and heightened domestic resistance. However, without doubt, sanctions induced a sense of isolation. South Africa was ostracized by the world. On the basis of survey data, our study probes, probably for the first time, the way in which South African whites deflected outside criticism through a variety of rationalizing self-deceptions and how politicized blacks perceived Canadian support both positively with praise and negatively with skepticism. The chapter on "Images of Canada" among South Africans also reveals deficiencies in the way in which the Canadian stance is communicated. We establish the broad record of some imaginative Canadian involvement in South Africa but also point out potential improvements and new directions.

It is now conventional wisdom that the efforts needed to dismantle Apartheid pale in comparison with the task of dealing with Apartheid's legacies. Our report reinforces the crucial emphasis, spelled out in many well-researched documents,¹ on human resource development through innovative education programmes for a new civil service culture and non-racial management. The shift from aid to victims abroad to training programmes at home proves cost-effective as well as politically necessary. However, we argue against too partisan an application of assistance in favour of any one of the liberation movements or organizations. If the

1 Particularly informative and comprehensive in this respect are two recent reports to be reviewed later (see Chapter 7, II), Commonwealth Expert Group, *Human Resource Development for a Post-Apartheid South Africa*. London: Commonwealth Office, 1991 and IDRC, *Economic Analysis and Policy Formulation for Post-Apartheid South Africa*, Mission Report, August 1991, Ottawa: IDRC.

goal of Canadian policy is to bring about a negotiated accommodation in South Africa, then all legitimate political actors must be included in a successful political settlement.² The task of outside intervention is not to select winners or losers in an intense ideological contest but to facilitate democratization and strengthen civil society as a whole.

The discourse on reform or revolution increasingly sounds like an academic exercise that bears little relationship to reality. The Left has always falsely assumed that South Africa represents the only developed, capitalist country "which is not only 'objectively' ripe for revolution but has actually entered a stage of overt and seemingly irreversible revolutionary struggle."³ The reformist agenda, on the other hand, was falsely predicated on selective cooption as the most effective method to buy off dissent and prevent political equality. A third alternative, transformation through negotiation politics, corresponds with neither revolutionary nor reformist hopes. Its outcome does not leave the status quo intact, as reformists expect, nor does it result in a reversal of power relations, as revolutions imply. It grants all major forces a stake in the outcome.

In a violent stalemate, each side is too weak to impose its will on all contenders. A negotiated resolution would culminate in a historic compromise in which all parties gain more than they would lose by continuing the confrontation. As a minimal criterion of such resolutions, the adversaries agree to continue the contest politically according to constitutional rules. In a more substantive sense, the historic compromise will most likely leave economic power largely in the hands of the present establishment while political power will increasingly pass into the hands of the formerly disenfranchised. Negotiations concern the precise terms of such a deal. To achieve consent to an exclusively constitutional competition in the future, the major forces must be satisfied, above all, with the military and legal security guarantees resulting from the talks. In other words, the conflict will not come to an end with a settlement, but will be contested in another arena. That makes the post-apartheid

2 Paul M. Sweezy and Harry Magdoff, "The Stakes in South Africa," *Monthly Review*, April 1986.

constitution more than a reflection of current power relations and defines the methods of future competition.

Canadian involvement is contingent upon and should respond to the specific and ever changing political currents in South Africa. In the transition from confrontation to negotiation, the outcome of a potential accord is not predetermined. Although a widening consensus on constitutional and economic visions has emerged between the ANC and the government, the prospects of peace depend on more than the designs of leaders. The continuing political violence serves as a reminder that the social conditions and unofficial ideologies can wreck any official accord. Therefore we probe the prospects of accommodation by analyzing the major political actors and ideological currents, the constituencies and strengths behind the conflicting claims.

For example, instead of categorizing the political violence with the shallow label of an ANC/Inkatha power contest inflamed by state agencies, a deeper probe of the dynamics of the urban-rural divide and the hostel cultures can explain the daily atrocities far better. Only if foreign policy is sociologically informed beyond the journalistic headlines and political fashions can it expect to address the underlying problems.

In this sense, we define our report more as a think-piece than a prescriptive account of what ought to be done and how. We focus on intriguing and controversial political dimensions of Canadian involvement rather than its technical implementation, for which there are better experts than two political sociologists. Above all, we subject Canadian policy always to critical and comparative questioning rather than accepting its wisdom as given.³

³ A senior External Affairs official found the comparative evaluation of the Canadian effort "not at all useful." Instead, it was suggested, that Canadian involvement should be evaluated in terms of how effective it is in achieving stated Canadian policy goals (Interview, 25/9/91). While such a narrower in-house focus is not to be neglected, it assumes that Canadian policy goals are beyond comparative questioning. We do not share this implicit view of Canadian policy as sacrosanct, and maintain that the Canadian goals and foci themselves could benefit from a critical comparative evaluation.

I. POLITICAL APPROACHES

While we write about foreign policy formulation for policymakers we also write as academics for peers with similar academic interests. It may, therefore, be useful to situate our approach more clearly within the vast literature on South Africa and sketch our relationship to the existing research. The recent literature on South Africa may be classified crudely into four categories: (1) The vast majority of publications are *descriptive* accounts or running commentaries on fast moving events, mostly written by journalists. Moving narratives by perceptive authors often contribute valuable insights, particularly when written by such skilled hands as Joseph Lelyveld (1985), Allister Sparks (1990) or Rian Malan (1990). Academics can learn a lesson in clarity of expression, particularly when the descriptive accounts extend beyond a synthesis of *Weekly Mail* reports or a summary of *SouthScan* news. Nonetheless, journalistic writing mostly substitutes gripping immediacy and texture for theoretical and historical sweep. While some journalists humble many academics by their analytical insights, they often miss significant theoretical aspects when they confine themselves to the mere recording of events.

Equally deficient in this genre remains the focus on personalities as the movers of history. They are often combined with a tendency to pathologize the South African conflict, such as when analysts refer to "the mad scientist Verwoerd," (*Southern Africa Report*, May 1991, 11). Comparisons between de Klerk and Gorbachev abound and the books on the Mandela's life, love, and trials still proliferate. Most of the personalizing accounts add a richness and flavour that abstract conceptualizations of social formations, classes and structures usually lack. However, characterizations of individuals cannot fully explain why a development did or did not happen. While individual outlooks and idiosyncrasies that result from personal histories undoubtedly inspire and shape the style and sometimes even the course of politics, political leaders always act within massive constraints. Leaders are effective only when circumstances are ripe. Therefore, political analysis is most valuable when it focuses foremost on the social conditions and the forces that propel or circumscribe individuals rather than on their personal characteristics.

(2) Many publications constitute polemics in the best sense. Histories of protest and activism are mostly *accusatory* accounts. Their authors aim at advocacy, which easily turns into a propagandistic exercise. The Mulroney government is condemned or praised according to one's political position. Writing on South Africa by certain authors becomes utterly predictable even if significant policy shifts call for a fundamental reevaluation. Nothing has changed in the Apartheid state; Apartheid is only dead when its legacy of inequality has been removed, is the refrain of that pseudo-radical critique.

(3) Less partisan but equally one-sided are many *prescriptive* accounts. They offer with great persuasion detailed "solutions," be they a free market in a Swiss canton system (Louw and Kendall, 1986), a Japanese "high road" (Sunter, 1987), or a more sophisticated analysis of power-sharing in a consociational grand coalition (Lijphart, 1985) or a particularly suitable system of alternative voting (Horowitz, 1991). Similar single preoccupations used to dominate a vast Marxist literature, concerned with changing modes of production and the various crises of capitalism. Only recently have analysts on the left begun to address the current and future transformation more systematically (see Gelb, 1991) instead of mainly chronicling conquest, exploitation and heroic resistance struggles. Conceptually more diverse liberal authors mainly preoccupy themselves with a rich history of oppression and manipulation, often to the extent of ridiculing or despising "backward" Afrikaners caught in mythologies (L.M. Thompson, 1985). Most Canadian activists in the anti-apartheid church network also fall into this group, characterized above all by a moral outrage that frequently leads to wishful thinking and normative insistence.

(4) In their search for incremental progress and the politically feasible rather than the elusive grand design, pragmatically oriented authors move into an *analytical* realm of strategic debates. We would like to align our work with this approach and add a good dose of eclecticism. Politically we write as social democrats who are emotionally on the side of the underdog but lack the enviable certainty of orthodox Marxists or liberal moralists about the best solution. Social democrats usually aim at the second-best compromise and therefore are distrusted by ideologues

of the left and neoconservatives alike. However, with the conclusion of the cold war and the demise of firm ideologies, history has not ended but has instead become more fluid and amenable to pragmatic solutions. When the former staunchly "socialist" governments of Mozambique and Zimbabwe embrace structural adjustment programmes and free market policies; when Afrikaner nationalists, on the other hand, allow a thoughtful Stalinist like Slovo to appear regularly on their state-run television and even forge an alliance with a self-described Marxist-Leninist Party; when the former Apartheid ideologues renounce their racial exclusiveness and the leading African nationalists advocate inclusive policies of sharing instead of turning the tables—who is to say who betrayed whom?

The social science tradition of predicting gloom and doom in the name of perpetual crises or the deficiencies of human nature overlooks the self-fulfilling danger that such predictions promote the deplored conditions. It also eludes the basic fact that people learn and adapt. Radicals deliver witty, cynical, despairing commentary but have thereby reconciled themselves to their marginality in influencing the course of events. Equally trapped, however, are the perpetual optimists who naively claim linear progress by ignoring its obstacles; mere exhortations substitute for sober evaluation.

The most sophisticated social science position that avoids both pitfalls has been best elucidated by Habermas' Theory of Communicative Action. Communicative rationality with common understanding as its goal does not aim at a false consensus dictated by power relations. With the focus of philosophy shifted from consciousness to communication, actors' interpretations of the world are discursively negotiated through reasoned argumentation. Although Habermas fails to specify how conflicting claims of validity are adjudicated or how the force of the "better" argument is decided, his emancipatory project holds out the greatest promise for common meaning. Beyond the abdicating relativism of the postmodernists, modernity is retained as a universal potential, constructed not to totalize but with the ability to particularize. We write in the spirit of this vision.

II. RESEARCH METHODS

This study is based on a critical evaluation not only of the literature about Canadian-South African relations but also the vast body of social science work on South Africa itself. Although residents in Canada since 1968, we have actively participated in this policy debate through several publications. *Modernizing Racial Domination* (1971) developed the concepts of a "pragmatic oligarchy" and a "democratic police state" when most writers assumed the irrationality of a fascist-like Afrikaner racism. The possibility of internal liberalization and reformist adaptation was further explored in *Ethnic Power Mobilized* (1979), co-authored with Hermann Giliomee. It traced the rise and fall of Afrikaner power not in Calvinist ideology or frontier isolation from the Enlightenment but in the changing conditions of the SA political economy. At the height of revolutionary fervour we published the revisionist *South Africa Without Apartheid* (1986) that predicted and argued the case for the negotiations that are now current and accommodation in a common, economically interdependent consumer society. Our scepticism towards the widely predicted revolutionary outcome provoked strong rejection by those who believed in the likelihood and feasibility of socialist transformation of racial capitalism. At the same time, an unexpectedly warm letter from Pollsmoor prison in 1987 revealed that Mandela had read the book. So had two cabinet ministers. The fact that our theoretical studies were taken seriously by both antagonists in the fierce ideological battle was to us a cherished vindication of the idea that an academic analysis can make a practical contribution towards shaping perceptions of alternative policies. History did not seem the inevitable unfolding of predetermined antagonistic class or racial forces but far more open-ended and susceptible to intelligent intervention by progressive actors.

In this spirit—against the backdrop of the repressive 1970s and 80s—we tried to make a contribution. In the 1960s we had both taught at universities in South Africa where K.M. was born and educated and where our extended family still lives as part of the Indian community in Durban. After being harassed by the Security Police, forced into exile and refused visas in the 1970s we nevertheless persisted, and eventually succeeded in upholding the right to visit our family in South Africa.

During regular annual visits in the 1980s we continued our field research as insiders rather than as outsiders. During 1986/87 at the height of P.W. Botha's emergency, H.A. was acting director of the Centre for Intergroup Studies at the University of Cape Town and our daughters attended a local high school. K.M., who was attached to the Faculty of Education, addressed parent meetings and teachers groups as frequently as her academic classes. In July 1989 she gave the annual keynote address to the Teachers Association of South Africa in Durban. Similarly, H.A. was invited to address groups throughout the country from the "Young Presidents Club" of corporate millionaires to the Trotskyite New Unity Movement in Bellville on the Cape flats. These wide interactions over several years gave us insights into South African attitudes and social conditions that inform this analysis.

Since the inception of this study in July 1989 we have spent 10 months in Southern Africa over the course of three visits (July - August 1989 and 1991 and January - July 1990), based at the University of Cape Town. In addition to the group discussions on South African politics, we individually conducted 87 personal, structured interviews with a variety of South African politicians, journalists, academics, community leaders, union activists and businessmen on South Africa's relations with the outside world and on reactions to Canadian policy as well as sanctions measures in general. These interviewees included six ANC executives, seven cabinet ministers as well as the former state president P.W. Botha at his retirement home in George. In addition, two research assistants made tape-recorded interviews with 26 key individuals in the legal profession and opinion-makers on the Afrikaner right-wing. These tapes were later transcribed. H.A. participated as one of the few foreigners at the historic ANC-Afrikaner meeting in July 1987 in Dakar, led by F. van Zyl Slabbert and Alex Boraine, and at a similar IDASA sponsored conference with Soviet academics, SACP and ANC executives and liberal Afrikaners in October 1988 in Leverkusen, Germany. Together with contacts from numerous other conferences on South Africa around the world, we developed a network of friends and acquaintances all over the ideological divide whose opinions have greatly informed this analysis. In addition to the personal interviews, we corresponded with eight Western embassies in South Africa and approximately 50 other individuals.

als. These were people we had not met previously, from whom we gathered specific impressions about Canada as recipients of Canadian assistance, or as visitors to the country, or in some other capacity.

After we had organized a day-long panel of experts at CIIPS in Ottawa on October 26, 1989, we conducted similar interviews, partly in person, partly over the phone, with individuals in Canada engaged with Southern Africa. We benefited from a second CIIPS sponsored workshop at the University of British Columbia on November 16, 1991 to which we had invited a broad cross section of Canadian academics, government officials and NGO representatives. There, three preliminary chapters of this report received frank criticism and induced us to differentiate and sharpen our interpretations. Additional interviewees included Ivan Head, the foreign policy advisor of Pierre Trudeau, Stephen Lewis, Roy McMurtry, Bernard Woolf, Walter McLean, Paul Martin, Ed Broadbent, foreign affairs critics of the federal parties, ambassadors to South Africa, officials in External Affairs, current and former Canadian embassy staff in Pretoria, NGO officials and academics. Twelve individuals from business and lobbies with South African interests, including the presidents of the Canadian Exporters and the Canadian Importers Associations were also interviewed either by one of the authors or by our research assistant. Four meetings took place with the South African ambassador to Canada and his staff during 1989-91. H.A. participated in three round table sessions with the Hon. Joe Clark at External Affairs between 1985 and 1989.

Several hundred black students at the Universities of the Western Cape and Durban-Westville were surveyed in different years by means of a written questionnaire in a classroom situation, as were mainly white business executives taking management courses at the Graduate School of Business at the University of Cape Town. The identical questionnaire tapped political preferences, knowledge and opinions on topics of national concern and revealed deep cleavages in attitudes between the two groups. The results were fed back to the respondents at UCT, and four focus sessions were subsequently conducted on the topics surveyed. Our more qualitatively oriented surveys were supplemented with various opinion polls by commercial firms in South Africa. A systematic content

analysis of the mainstream and alternative press in South Africa was conducted simultaneously.

The South African survey research was duplicated on a smaller scale in Canada through an analysis of all public opinion polls on South Africa, conducted by various organizations. During the Fall of 1991 we commissioned a Gallup poll on Canadian attitudes toward sanctions in the transitional period and on Canadian perceptions of the ongoing political violence in South Africa. A selected content analysis of Canadian press reporting, mainly in the *Globe & Mail*, was conducted.

Apart from these conventional research methods we engaged in participant observation of relevant events both in Canada and particularly in South Africa. We attended dozens of political meetings, rallies, funerals, political trials and workshops in order to add rich atmospheric texture to our readings and formal interviews. On one occasion we were both teargassed and, for some time, could barely open our eyes. At the huge reception rally on the hot Sunday afternoon of Mandela's release on February 10, 1990, we ducked police bullets in a stampeding crowd in front of Cape Town's city hall. We frequently visited war-torn Natal, including the devastated countryside around Pietermaritzburg where on one occasion a Democratic Party monitor and a Zulu-speaking local M.P. introduced us to warlords, comrades and missionaries. A week later, attendance at an international conference on "Security and Cooperation" in Maputo allowed a stark appraisal of the ultimate disintegration of the Mozambiquan state, brought about by a mixture of deliberate South African destabilization, government ineptness and indigenous banditry in one of the poorest areas of the globe.

The vivid memories of hundreds of encounters and discussions in Southern Africa and elsewhere inform this analysis at least as much as the abstract reasoning of ivory tower academics. We make no apologies for our strong views and biases which, of course, all analysts exhibit, whether explicitly or implicitly. All knowledge is socially and historically shaped and the contingent character of the so-called social "sciences" has long been exposed. This may explain our scepticism when some of our Canadian colleagues pontificate about transformation and

the need for sacrifices in the South Africa where our relatives live. Reconciliation and negotiation remain the priorities although the economic restructuring of a skewed racial capitalism cannot be put off indefinitely. Comparative measures of material inequality reveal the highest value (0.68 Gini coefficient) recorded anywhere in the world. In as much as economic transformation and redistribution implies further destabilizing confrontation, it has to be postponed in order to save something to be transformed. The less outsiders now interfere in negotiation or try to impose their solutions or choose their winners and losers, the better for the domestic legitimacy of the outcome. In any case, the West-centric bias about political developments in Third World societies in general hardly equips moral imperialists of all hues to render their counsel. The particularities of historical experience, rather than universalist formulae or false analogies with developments elsewhere, will most likely guide the South African antagonists. Context-sensitive historical analysis is called for.

Celso Furtado, one of the leading economists of Latin America, has argued in his "Obstacles to Development in Latin America" (1970) that the vast political problems in developing countries reflect historical situations different from those the presently industrialized states have passed in the early phases of their development. He describes these different conditions as "beyond the ideological rationales derived from the experience of classical capitalism" (XXV). Furtado insists that solutions must be developed in the affected countries themselves. A similar situation pertains to the socio-political experience of South Africans. What passes as a democratic compromise will depend on South African consensus rather than on international, let alone Canadian, norms. We may hope that the two will coincide but a hope is neither a prediction nor a moral stipulation.

1. CANADA AND SOUTH AFRICA SINCE 1961

"I have gone there and seen, you big loudmouth. Have you been there? You keep your mouth shut till you go and learn for yourself, you professional bleeding heart." — John Crosbie, House of Commons Debate, 10.2.1981.

Ever since Diefenbaker led the move to secure South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth in 1961, official Canadian relations to the new republic have been strained. Beneath the foreign policy establishment, however, stood a reservoir of popular sympathy for kith and kin empire loyalists as well as for Afrikaners, glorified among the non-English for brave anti-colonial resistance in the Boer War, reinforced by General Smuts joining the Allied war effort against Hitler and later the US defence of South Korea. This sympathy did not include support for Apartheid policies. While outwardly empathetic to the suppressed blacks, Canadians also looked at racial conflict as some kind of foreign disease, best avoided by distance and non-involvement. Right through the liberal Trudeau period, minor business continued as usual between the parts of the two countries with a shared British background and similar frontier traditions.

I. LIBERAL CONTRADICTIONS: THE TRUDEAU YEARS

Trudeau's *Foreign Policy for Canadians* (Canada, 1970) spelt out "social justice" as well as "economic growth" as one of its six policy themes. When justice conflicted with profit, the guidelines were explicit in recommending "better than normal opportunities for trade and investment in the growing economy of South Africa" (19). At the same time, the policy maintained the long-standing Canadian responsiveness to ethical issues by condemning Apartheid in strong words: "On what possible scales can Canada's revulsion for the immoral inhuman indignity of Apartheid be overbalanced by the returns from less than one-half of one percent of these countries' total foreign trade?" However, Canada

was quite prepared to disregard the stated "revulsion" and "to trade in peaceful goods with all countries regardless of political considerations" (19).

The numerous critics of this betrayal of liberal principles (see above all C. Pratt, 1984; Redekop, 1986; T.A. Keenleyside, 1983) have pointed to the hypocrisy of the adherence to narrow corporate interests, particularly in a situation of negligible gains. A similar argument has been used by advocates of continued Canadian economic involvement: prohibiting insignificant Canadian trade with South Africa would be both ineffective and counterproductive, and, in the absence of universal sanctions, unenforceable. For two decades, during the 1970s and 1980s, the stale debate between the two sides has advanced little, particularly since the impact of enacted sanctions measures is inconclusive. An overview of the historical record can, therefore, shed little new light on an old controversy. Nonetheless, it can illuminate the process of policy formation, and the diverse roles of special interest groups, public opinion and outside developments in shaping new constellations that now relegate the sanctions to the past.

The Trudeau government did make gestures of disapproval of Apartheid, including some administrative measures designed to restrict economic relations. However, these were generally contradictory and ineffectual. For example, the 1963 voluntary embargo on the sale of military equipment was extended in 1970 to cover spare parts. At the same time, the transfer of military technology and even Canadian investment to South Africa's burgeoning arms industry was allowed. The Canadian firm Space Research that exported shells and superguns to South Africa was only prosecuted several years later, after Canada's 1977 support for a mandatory arms embargo against Pretoria. Only in 1977 did Canada withdraw its active promotion of trade by closing its Cape Town and Johannesburg consular offices. More significant seemed the prohibitions against financing and insuring trade with South Africa by the government's Export Development Corporation (EDC) in the same year, although EDC continued export insurance from another corporate account (Pratt, 1984:92). The newly announced Canadian code of conduct for firms operating in South Africa was the weakest

among all the national codes. Since it did not include mandatory reporting, let alone penalties for non-performance, most of the 25 Canadian firms ignored the code until an administrator was later appointed and his report submitted to parliament. Why has a liberal party with a cosmopolitan ideology, committed to equity and justice in addition to the class interests of its constituency, nonetheless pursued a non-activist policy towards the unique institutionalized racism of a country in which it had little stake?

In the experience of Ivan Head (Personal Interview, 10/2/91), the foreign policy adviser of Pierre Trudeau and occasional personal emissary of the Prime Minister to South Africa at the time, Trudeau was strongly influenced on the issue by Nyerere and, to a lesser extent, by Kaunda. Initially both were more concerned with colonial Mozambique and Rhodesia than with South Africa. Nyerere is said to have viewed South Africa as too strong and too large a problem, to be dealt with only once the more pressing and less complex Rhodesian issue was out of the way. With hindsight, Ivan Head agreed with this assessment. He explained the absence of Canadian economic sanctions against South Africa in the 1970s by the greater focus on the Portuguese territories, Rhodesia and later Namibia. That explanation nonetheless begs the question as to why South Africa as the main supplier of the illegal Smith regime was exempted from international sanctions. Moreover, the Canadian voting record in the UN indicated a consistent refusal to support challenges to Portugal's claims to represent Angola, Mozambique and Guineau-Bissau, right up to the overthrow of the Salazar regime in 1974. Canada was only prepared to pledge general support for the UN in its effort to bring an end to colonialism but usually abstained when its NATO ally Portugal was singled out for lack of cooperation. It was Canadian policy not to support any UN resolutions endorsing armed struggle which linked Zionism with racism, or which condemned friendly countries, such as Portugal, by name. The policy was firmly established that Canada would not deal directly with or provide aid to African liberation movements. Whatever "timid aid programme" (C. Pratt, quoted in *TCLSAC*, 1978:35) was allocated to NGOs, would only be allowed to go to narrowly defined "acceptable humanitarian projects." Canada's record in general and its prohibition of assistance to African liberation

organizations using or advocating violence in particular, stood in marked contrast to the more forthright and activist policy of the Scandinavian countries, and even to the Carter administration's emphasis on human rights.

In 1977, the publicity surrounding the human rights profile of the Carter presidency together with the Soweto upheavals spurred a major review of Canadian policy. Donald Jamieson, External Affairs Secretary of State, announced in December 1977 that the government would "phase out all its government-sponsored, commercial-support activities in South Africa." He hinted at further measures since the government was putting "the whole South African situation under review." Detailed investigations of the post-1977 Jamieson initiatives conducted by Pratt (1983), Keenleyside (1983) and Tennyson (1982) have unanimously concluded that they were "of little consequence to Canadian relations with South Africa" (Keenleyside, 1983:465). In an illuminating commentary on the lengthy written response by External Affairs to a brief by the Task Force on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility, Cranford Pratt (1983:497-525) demonstrates how spurious measures were carried out largely as a public relations exercise. Pratt (1983:521-23) finds in the extensive evidence from several documented cases a pattern of "a minimal and spiritless compliance to a narrow reading of the letter of Canada's international obligations to adhere to an arms embargo." He charges that the government "has retreated significantly from the expected consequences of its 1977 policy statement" and that it has adopted a legalistic interpretation of its obligations "while nevertheless presenting itself as an active opponent of South African racism." There is a wide consensus that the Trudeau policy on South Africa was long on rhetoric and short on action.

Paradoxically it was left to the Conservatives, despite their "ideological kinship" (Redekop, 1986:3) with Reagan and Thatcher, to do something as opposed to *saying* something about Apartheid. One academic observer (Nossal, 1988:13) concluded that the policies of Mulroney "seemed to overturn or abandon the cautious and anti-sanctionist approach that had been the mark of each post-war government up until 1984." Others expressed greater scepticism and viewed the new stance

as a more sophisticated continuation of strong rhetoric now backed by greater financial assistance in the region, in order to placate critics of the ongoing Canadian involvement with the Apartheid state. One academic went so far as to state at the end of 1985 that "there is a danger that its (Canada's) foreign policy will be as problematic as that of the white regime itself" (Shaw, 1985:23).

II. THE RECORD OF THE MULRONEY PERIOD

During the first year of the Tory ascendancy, no indication of an activist policy towards South Africa emerged. The first attempt to formulate new foreign policy in the green paper *Competitiveness and Security: Directions for Canada's International Relations*, published in May 1986, devoted only one paragraph of platitudes to South Africa. Subsequent chapters will explore in detail why the Mulroney administration departed from the long-standing liberal caution of keeping aloof, the roles played by key individuals, how the entrenched bureaucratic opposition against anti-Apartheid activism was overcome, who bore the costs and who benefitted from the new direction. For now, it suffices to recall the escalating crisis in South Africa itself during the mid-1980s which led even traditional conservatives to appreciate the prediction that Apartheid was fostering revolutionary radicalism. Far from holding the line against communism, as Pretoria portrayed itself, the Apartheid state was increasingly seen as paving the way to Soviet expansion. This strand of conservative reasoning was compatible in its advocacy of active involvement with the longstanding left critique of an unreformable Apartheid state.

In the first year of the Mulroney government the relatively tiny but vociferous chorus of NGOs, journalists and academics inveighed against Ottawa, in typical formulations by Timothy Shaw (1985:22-23) for "sitting on the fence over South Africa" and for "responding too little too late to the whirlwinds." Shaw suggested moving our mission in South Africa to a neighbouring Commonwealth capital because South African behaviour "should put paid to lingering claims that South African verligtes [reformers] were bent on reforming apartheid." Shaw, like the majority of observers from abroad, ruled out the internal liberalization

process that had its early origins behind the intransigent facades of Vorster and Botha and which culminated in de Klerk's formal abolition of Apartheid laws. The foreign analysts echoed ANC strategies in ridiculing "non-violent change in a situation of official coercion as idealistic in the extreme" (Shaw, 1985).

Beginning in mid-1985 with a series of unexpected measures to express Canada's impatience with the lack of reform by a literally bankrupt oligarchy, official policy began to emphasize disassociation with the Botha regime. The new stance culminated in the Prime Minister's October 23, 1985 UN speech:

Canada is ready, if there are no fundamental changes in South Africa, to invoke total sanctions against that country and its repressive regime. More than that, if there is no progress in the dismantling of Apartheid, relations with South Africa may have to be severed absolutely.

The chronology of the various measures announced during the next five years allows an evaluation of how far this promise has been met, particularly when compared with the Trudeau period.

CANADIAN-SOUTH AFRICAN RELATIONS 1961-91

A CHRONOLOGY OF CANADIAN ACTIONS AGAINST APARTHEID

1961	Canada under Diefenbaker supports expulsion of South Africa from Commonwealth.
1963	Voluntary arms embargo is announced.
1972	Funding of sporting links is banned.
1977	Canada joins mandatory UN arms embargo. Trade promotion is downgraded. Sporting contacts are restricted.
1978	Code of Conduct for Canadian firms in South Africa is established with voluntary reporting on compliance.
1980	Termination of preferential tariff treatment accorded to South African goods under the Canada-South Africa Trade Agreement of 1932.

- 1985** **JULY**—Sales of sensitive technology to the South African government and its agencies are included in the Canadian application of the UN arms embargo. Canada also applies the voluntary UN embargo on imports of South African arms.
- Canada-South Africa Double Taxation Agreement is abrogated. The insurance to Canadian exporters to South Africa by the Export Development Corporation is terminated and the use of the Programme for Export Market Development for South Africa is cancelled.
- A voluntary ban on the sale of South African gold coins is introduced. Toll-processing of Namibian uranium is terminated.
- Public guidelines limiting sporting contacts are announced. Official contacts, especially in military, police and intelligence areas are restricted and monitored.
- SEPTEMBER**—A special fund of \$1m (with increases of \$0.5m each subsequent year) is established to provide through NGO's support for political detainees and their families.
- A voluntary ban on new loans to the South African government or its agencies is introduced and extended to the private sector in August 1986. A voluntary ban on the sale of petroleum and petroleum products to South Africa is announced.
- All air-links between Canada and South Africa are banned, although Canada and South Africa did not have scheduled direct passenger flights.
- A national register of anti-Apartheid measures by Canadians is set up.
- OCTOBER**—Commonwealth Meeting at Nassau. Canada participates through Archbishop Ted Scott in the newly established "Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons, (EPG) to encourage negotiations.
- 1986** **MAY**—A \$7m bilateral education assistance programme is launched. The EPG mission is abandoned after South Africa bombs capitals in three front line states.
- JUNE**—The promotion of tourism to South Africa is banned. Canadian government procurement of all South African goods and services is ended; provincial governments are asked to follow suit in areas under their jurisdiction.
- AUGUST**—Commonwealth Heads of Government review the failed EPG mission in London. In response, bans are imposed on new investments in South Africa and the import of agricultural products, uranium, coal, iron and steel. Consular facilities in South Africa are withdrawn, i.e., South African pass-

port holders have to apply for Canadian visas outside South Africa. Government contracts with majority-owned South African companies are banned.

1987 JANUARY—The Prime Minister visits Zimbabwe and meets with heads of frontline states at Victoria Falls.

APRIL—\$5.8m are allocated to victims of Apartheid in fiscal year 1987/88.

AUGUST—The Prime Minister meets with Oliver Tambo in Ottawa and the External Affairs Minister visits Zambia, Mocambique and South Africa

SEPTEMBER—An additional \$1.2m is added to the \$7m Canadian education programme to date, including \$0.5m for labour education.

OCTOBER—Commonwealth Meeting in Vancouver. Under its Okanagan Programme, a Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa (CFM) is set up and chaired by Canada.

1988 FEBRUARY—First CFM meeting in Lusaka with focus on security assistance to front line states, the tightening and impact of sanctions and counter strategies against South African censorship.

APRIL—Assistance to Apartheid victims increased to \$7.8m.

AUGUST/SEPTEMBER—Second meeting of CFM in Toronto with similar focus as in Lusaka. The ban on sale of high technology items on the Export Control List is extended to private end-users in South Africa. J. Clark meets with Canadian bank representatives and secures agreement not to increase trade credits to South Africa. Canadian preference for short loan rescheduling terms is stated.

Dialogue-Fund of \$1.4m is established to assist South African opposition organisations with cross-racial contacts, political education and human rights defences. Fund increased to \$2.3m in 1991.

Canada provides nonmilitary security assistance for the protection of infrastructure projects in the front line states, including \$4m for the Nacala and Limpopo railway rehabilitation.

DECEMBER—Assistance to implement the U.N. plan for Namibian independence is announced, including \$11.9m for Canada's participation in UNTAG, election supervision, development aid and \$1m for refugee repatriation.

1989 JUNE—An extension of the July 1988 ban on South African sports persons wanting to participate in Canadian events is announced to include *all* sport-

Democratizing Southern Africa

ing contacts between Canadians and South Africans wherever they take place.

AUGUST—Fourth meeting of CFM in Canberra with focus on financial sanctions by the private sector and rescheduling of South African debts.

SEPTEMBER—Whites reelect National Party on a platform of negotiations but no surrender.

OCTOBER—Commonwealth meeting in Kuala Lumpur reaffirms sanctions until evidence of "irreversible change" in South Africa.

1990 FEBRUARY—President de Klerk announces unbanning of all political organizations and releases Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners.

MAY—The South African government and the ANC sign the Groote Schuur Minute committing themselves to a "peaceful process of negotiation."

CFM meeting in Abuja, Nigeria with focus on human resource development in post-Apartheid South Africa.

JUNE—Mandela visits Canada and addresses joint session of Parliament. The Prime Minister pledges \$5.85 in aid for repatriation of exiles.

AUGUST—The ANC agrees to suspend (not abandon) armed struggle in the Pretoria Minute in return for government concessions on security issues. Violence erupts in the Transvaal. Close to 4,000 blacks have died in ANC-Inkatha clashes and police action since 1989.

1991 FEBRUARY—CFM meeting in London adopts "programmed management" approach to sanctions, contingent on progress in South Africa.

JUNE—The last Apartheid legislation, including the Group Areas Act, the Lands Act and the Population Registration Act is repealed.

JULY—The ANC holds successful National Conference in Durban and calls for the maintenance of international sanctions.

Secret government funding of Chief Buthelezi's Inkatha is revealed ("Inkathagate") and two senior cabinet ministers are demoted.

SEPTEMBER—A Peace Accord between most major parties is signed, providing impartial monitoring of violence and rules for police conduct.

CFM meeting in New Delhi. External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall announces \$1.5m contribution to UNHCR for repatriation of South African exiles as part of the Prime Minister's pledge of \$5.85m to Nelson Mandela. CFM recommends lifting of "peoples' sanctions" but retains economic sanctions as pressure for further change.

OCTOBER—CHOGM meeting in Harare confirms lifting of peoples' sanctions and new initiatives for post-Apartheid reconstruction, particularly human-resource development.

DECEMBER—The first multi-party talks in a "Convention for a Democratic South Africa" (Codesa) are convened.

1992 MARCH—68 percent of South African whites support de Klerk's reform process in a referendum with an 85 percent turnout of voters.

Termination of preferential tariff treatment accorded to South African goods under the Canada-South Africa Trade Agreement of 1932.

Most analysts consider the enactment of the remaining Nassau sanctions after the Commonwealth mini-summit in July 1986 in London as the hallmark of the activist policy. It is said to have "lost steam" after the Vancouver summit a year later. Linda Freeman (1989:150) concludes not quite accurately: "There have been no additional sanctions since 1986." She calls the Canadian measures "mostly voluntary." Even though the mandatory ban on imports of South African agricultural products, uranium, coal, iron and steel affected more than half of Canada's trade with South Africa, a different, little-noticed shift was far more significant and indicative for the future. From the beginning of 1987, Canada finally set aside its official ostracism of the ANC as a violent, communist-controlled, terrorist movement. Ottawa began to court ANC officials and redefine them as moderates. "Canada has been able to develop a relationship of trust with the...African National Congress that it is hoped has helped to strengthen the hand of black moderates," wrote Joe Clark in a letter to the *Toronto Star* (August 28, 1987). In August 1987 the Prime Minister met with ANC president Oliver Tambo in Ottawa, the third head of a Western state after the Swedish and Norwegian Prime Ministers to do so, (excluding the US Secretary of State who had previously met with the ANC). That Ottawa and the other Western states waited so long before establishing official contacts—South African big business had set up ties with Lusaka two years earlier—showed how deeply the cold war mentality was entrenched at this time. The suggestion of working with Soviet counterparts to influence the ANC towards negotiations was inconceivable to Ottawa in the mid-1980s although

soon afterwards the American administration successfully pursued such a policy with regard to the Cuban presence in Angola.

Cranford Pratt (1990) incisively compares Canada's marked internationalism with the North-South policy of like-minded middle-powers, such as the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries. He concludes that Canada's stance, besides being less inclined toward social-democratic policies of reformist state intervention, also "has not regarded co-ordinated action with like-minded middle-powers as important to its internationalism" (Pratt, 1990:15). Pratt's explanation for this unilateralism is Canada's predilection toward the Summit Seven, admittance to which was considered a crowning success after a hard effort. His observation is confirmed by Canadian policy toward South Africa. One is struck by how little coordination has taken place with the very similar efforts of many progressive European countries, particularly the Nordic States and the Netherlands. Although the Canadian Prime Minister did attempt to interest his G7 partners in a more activist South African policy in 1987, he dropped the issue quickly after being rebuffed.

The international arena where Canada could take the lead and did co-ordinate its policy with others was the Commonwealth. Yet with the self-imposed withdrawal of Britain from Commonwealth South African initiatives and the minimal clout of most other Commonwealth members on the issue, Commonwealth anti-Apartheid actions remained largely symbolic. Only Australia and Canada could put some limited teeth behind the moral reprimand. In comparison with the G7 stances on sanctions and their power to reward or punish, Pretoria could dismiss the Commonwealth voice. For South Africa, the Commonwealth measures amounted to yet more annoying but predictable bad publicity. They could be ridiculed because the frontline states were specifically exempted from sanctions and continued trading with South Africa as a matter of survival. This allowed Pretoria to dismiss the Commonwealth, or at least to construe its white members as pandering to their hypocritical black friends. Had there been a concerted effort by all the thirty-three middle-power states in the North and South that Wood (1990) identifies, its impact on South Africa could have been greater. Above all, South Africa would have found it more difficult to circumvent trade sanctions,

if there had been a more uniform policy and co-ordinated policing beyond the ritualistic UN declarations.

The Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Harare 1991 was the test case as to how the Commonwealth would survive without an anti-Apartheid focus as the common glue. For the first time at a Commonwealth meeting, no new actions against South Africa were tabled. On the contrary, the lifting of previous sanctions formed part of the agenda. The Canadian Prime Minister had indicated a desire not to be seen as inflexible. He also preferred a free hand for Canada to move ahead unilaterally in case others blocked improved relations with a reforming Apartheid state. Now Canada took the lead in repealing some sanctions.

The CHOGM in Harare in 1991 lifted "people sanctions," namely consular and visa restrictions, cultural and scientific boycotts, restrictions on tourism promotion and the ban on direct air links which Canada never had anyway. The renewal of air links was tied to appropriate affirmative action programmes by South African Airways. The lifting of people sanctions was justified by the need to give "external support and encouragement to democratic anti-Apartheid organizations in South Africa and to permit free interaction with them." Such a rationale at this time can be questioned on the grounds that the need to assist the South African anti-Apartheid movement has always existed. If easier contact is encouraged when the movements are unbanned, external support would have been needed even more when the opposition was repressed. Furthermore, it is unclear how apolitical tourism would benefit the political opposition. Therefore, the measures must be interpreted as a reward for de Klerk's liberalization programme as well as a belated admission that the symbolic people sanctions were the least effective measures. Tourism and scientific exchanges continued via third countries; the Canadian refusal to issue entry visas to Canada in South Africa, but to do so at other Canadian missions abroad, mainly harassed the wrong people. Only the ban on sporting contacts proved effective.

CHOGM 1991 proceeded from the controversial assumption "of the crucial role sanctions had played in bringing about the changes so far"

(Communique). It adopted the ANC strategy of a "programmed management approach," linking any lifting of sanctions to progress in ending Apartheid. Thus the arms embargo is to be maintained "until a new post-Apartheid South African government is firmly established." Financial sanctions, particularly access to IMF and World Bank loans, are tied to an agreement on the text of a new democratic constitution. Other economic sanctions, including trade and investment measures, are to be lifted when "appropriate transitional mechanisms have been agreed, which would enable all the parties to participate fully and effectively in negotiations." Significantly this passage does not mention the election of a constituent assembly or even the concept of an interim government as a precondition, as the ANC had hoped. Britain's urging to restore growth to the South African economy as fast as possible found a sympathetic resonance. In any case, the lifting of Japanese sanctions at the same time and the repeal of the US Anti-Apartheid Act by the Bush administration three months earlier makes any Commonwealth holdout more a matter of principle than of practical impact. If it is true, as Bernard Wood (1990:280) has suggested (in contrast to the stated Commonwealth assumption) that "change has come to South Africa primarily for internal reasons and through the efforts of internal actors" then the fragile internal constellation should now more than ever guide external policies towards South Africa.

The uncoordinated lifting of sanctions encouraged the president of the Canadian Exporters Association, James Taylor, to warn in September 1991 that "Canadian firms are in danger of being left out in the cold" while their European and American competitors return to South Africa. Prime Minister Mulroney, whom Canadian activists had reluctantly hailed as a "fellow-traveller" of anti-Apartheid activity, was put on the spot. Canadian critics on the left predicted that "the pro-business agenda of the Mulroney government, bent, however slightly, out of round over South Africa, will now find itself fitting quite comfortably within such a global agenda" (SAR, July 1991), i.e., an agenda of IMF recolonization for South Africa. Subsequent lifting of restrictions on the export of high-tech items in January 1991 was interpreted as proof of a sham policy all along.

III. CANADIAN-SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS

As is well known, Canadian-South African economic relations have always been comparatively small. Canadian trade with South Africa fluctuated around 0.5 percent of Canadian total imports and even less of Canadian total exports. Only in the 1940s did Canadian exports to South Africa approach close to 3 percent of the total and outweigh imports by a considerable margin. Since the early 1970s the current ratios have been consistent.

Table 1
Canadian Investments In South Africa 1969-1990 (\$ millions)

Year	Amount	Year	Amount
1969	65	1980	115
1970	73	1981	239
1971	111	1982	200
1972	106	1983	189
1973	105	1984	135
1974	107	1985	105
1975	126	1986	184
1976	126	1987	135
1977	116	1988	5
1978	153	1989	10
1979	148		

Source: Canada's International Investment Position Cat. No. 67-202, published under the authority of the Minister of Industry, Science and Technology, April 1991.

Canadian direct investment in South Africa, too, amounts to well under 1 percent of total Canadian foreign investment. It has been around 0.1 percent and lower since the 1960s. Despite the lack of promotion of Canadian investments in South Africa since 1977, actual investment doubled from \$116m CAD in 1977 to \$239m in 1981 (see Table 1). Directly controlled Canadian investment in South Africa only took a dramatic drop in 1988 as a result of the divestment campaign and increased risk perception which led to the sale of major companies or their shareholdings in South Africa. Third party investment in South Africa which initially increased from \$164m in 1985 to \$508m in 1987

showed a similar dramatic decline in 1988. Canadian business had reluctantly abandoned South Africa as a high risk and a public relations embarrassment. While some of the disinvestment capital may have gone to other African states, as Table 2 suggests, most of the Canadian assets withdrawn from South Africa did not end up in other areas of the continent.

Table 2
Third Party Investment Controlled From Canada 1985-89


	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
South Africa	164	428	508	2	4
Other Africa	236	168	28	116	126

The Canadian trade figures of less than one-half percent of total Canadian imports and exports are proportionally higher when calculated from the South African side. About 2 percent of South African total exports went to Canada until recently and about 1 percent of South Africa's imports came from Canada. This means that a total embargo of Canadian-South African trade would harm South Africa comparatively more than Canada. The figures also reflect that both countries have a similar economy and are not dependent on each other. Moreover, they compete with similar products within similar markets.

The new activist Canadian policy since 1985 is not reflected in the country's trade relations until 1987. The Canadian imports from South Africa had increased from roughly \$200m in the early eighties to \$373m in 1986. However, in 1987 imports dropped sharply to \$100m and stayed at this level until the early 1990s (see Table 3). Exports to South Africa were usually 20-50 percent lower than imports. They stayed roughly at the same level of between \$100m and \$200m during the 1970s and 80s and did not show the same fluctuations as imports.

The major Canadian export item was sulphur for the South African fertilizer industry which, in turn, also supplied most of the demand in the frontline states. The bulk of the continuing imports were in the category of iron and steel products, precious stones and metals, wool, aluminium

Table 3 - Canada-South Africa Trade 1978-1990 (Millions of CAD \$)
 Source: *StatsCan, Exports by Country, Catalogue No. 65-003; Imports by Country, Catalogue No. 65-006*



and machinery or mechanical appliances. None of the imported items were vital for the Canadian economy in the sense that no other source countries or substitutes could be found. However, some of the continued South African imports would have been more expensive or their source country behind the Iron Curtain less reliable, if all trade with the Apartheid state had been outlawed.

The reluctance to restrict Canadian exports has been attributed to "in part, a certain ambivalence as to whether exports should be encouraged as a way of eroding Pretoria's foreign exchange reserves...or discouraged" (Anglin, 1989: A97). If there ever was such a calculation, it was mistaken since Canadian exports amounted to less than one per cent of South Africa's total imports and, therefore, could hardly be said to affect Pretoria's balance of payments. What seems more likely is Canada's hesitation to forfeit profits from the sales. Ottawa did not wish to offend needlessly some vociferous exporters and be accused of harming struggling Canadian firms for faraway political conditions. Thus, it proved much easier for the government to restrict imports for which other suppliers could readily be found in most cases while new markets for exports were more difficult to locate.

The 1986 sharp rise in imports to \$373m from the previous \$228m seems largely due to the anticipation of additional trade restrictions as well as the exceptional purchase of three South African Airways aircraft by Canadian Pacific. Here is a clear example of the way in which Canadian business circumvented government intentions by stockpiling more goods from South Africa. Private Canadian firms demonstrated by this action that appeals to principles and voluntary compliance did not work and only legal restrictions could achieve the desired effect. However, the sudden rise of imports from neighbouring countries, particularly Swaziland (sugar) and Namibia (which inexplicably was not subject to sanctions) also points to other circumventions of legal measures.

A similar situation had arisen earlier in Namibia where Canadian firms continued to operate despite various International Court of Justice rulings. The American scholar Richard Payne (1987) points out that, for example, Falconbridge, in partnership with the South African govern-

ment, held a 75 percent share in Oamites cooper mines, and a 25 percent share in a Namibian platinum mine until February 1987 when it sold its South African holdings. The government decision not to protect Canadian companies did not even end the importation of Namibian uranium by Eldorado Nuclear Ltd., a government owned corporation. It processed this uranium under contract with foreign utilities until July 1985 when Joe Clark ordered that all toll-processing of Namibian uranium should stop. Precise government measures that either criminalize business behaviour or substantially increase costs also account for the 50 percent decline of South African imports in 1982 from the previous \$403m to \$219m. In 1980 Canada terminated preferential tariff treatment accorded to South African products since the Canada-South Africa Trade Agreement of 1932.

The experience that mere exhortations by government are ignored by its own agencies—let alone private companies—unless backed by legal specifications, was also demonstrated by the behaviour of the Canadian Wheat Board. It increased its wheat sales to South Africa in 1986 at the very time when Prime Minister Mulroney was urging other Commonwealth states to impose stricter sanctions against Pretoria. A similar embarrassment was caused to Joe Clark during a Commonwealth Foreign Ministers meeting in Harare in 1989. The news that the Bank of Nova Scotia had underwritten a loan to Minorco, the Luxemburg-based subsidiary and foreign investment arm of Anglo America, exposed the Canadian stance as double-speak in the eyes of its African critics, although no Canadian laws had been violated. It was experiences such as those that undermined Ottawa's contention that sanctions loopholes had been plugged, and deprived it of the moral high ground.

IV. THE SANCTIONS DEBATE RECONSIDERED

The major criticism of Canada's sanctions measures from the NGOs focused on their voluntary nature and limited scope. In the words of Renate Pratt (1990:118), the first director of the Task Force on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility (TCCR): "...none of the government sanctions, which were announced with considerable fanfare, had legislative backing. They therefore lacked any means of enforcement

and proved too feeble to withstand the efforts of determined opponents to undermine them." The demand to impose mandatory comprehensive economic sanctions became a standard for morally correct Canadians, as even the conservative *Globe and Mail* (February 2, 1989) complained that the government "has not yet made a convincing argument against it." In light of Mulroney's 1985 UN speech which held out the prospect of a total breakoff of relations, anything falling short of this promise smacked of stalling or retreat.

However, the government did ban imports of South African agricultural products, uranium, coal, iron and steel. In its July 1987 brief to the Minister of External Affairs, the Canadian Council of Churches conceded that this ban "covers the bulk of imports to Canada" (Green, 1990:211) although the Council would have preferred to have the remaining imports included as well. Banning by government *fiat* was done under the legislative authority of the UN Act in the case of the arms embargo and under the "Import and Export Control Act" in the case of trade restrictions. Financial sanctions relied on voluntary compliance only and hardly needed time-consuming legislation to convince bankers to stay away, given the state of the South African economy.

Renate Pratt (1990:118) cites "the enormous surge in Canada-South Africa trade figures for 1988 and 1989" in support of her thesis that "we are left with fluffy public relations exercises designed to divert public expectations away from the promise of further sanctions in order to save face for the government and preserve the remnants of a progressive image." However, the evidence hardly bears out this blanket condemnation. The combined value of imports from and exports to South Africa amounted to \$284m in 1988 and \$307m in 1989 as compared to \$424m in 1984, \$381m in 1985, \$525m in 1986 and \$205m in 1987. The figures for 1988 and 1989, therefore, can hardly be called "an enormous surge" compared with the four previous years; at most they could be more accurately labelled a 50 percent increase over 1987 only, but could also be interpreted as a substantial decline over the 1984-86 trade figures. This does not even take into account the reminder that trade should be appropriately measured in volume rather than value. Jon Harkness (1990), who insists on this distinction, argues that the *volume* of Canada's

imports from South Africa has fallen as intended, even though their value may have risen.

It is unclear and highly controversial to what extent shifts in trade and investments were influenced by government actions, lobbying efforts, negative publicity or increased risk perceptions. Some Canadian lobbyists, be they from the churches, the unions or other NGOs, would seem to overrate their influence on government—as does the South African embassy. In determining which factors shaped government policy on South Africa, Robert Mathews (1990:171) has insisted that “international events and pressures had a far greater impact than did lobbyists within Canada.” The well-argued briefs by the TCCR, the biting critiques by academics or the ridicule by opposition MPs and editorials provided new ideas for a more activist policy and paved the way in reassuring government that it had public support in venturing into uncharted waters. However, it was ultimately the outside pressure—Canada’s standing in the Commonwealth, the failed mission of the Eminent Persons group, the need to adopt a higher visibility as a newly elected member of the Security Council together with the ever more shocking TV reports about the situation inside South Africa—that fuelled the more activist policy. Matthews’s (1990:172) laconic summary in his review of the role of the churches is worth repeating: “It is unlikely that the Canadian government would have taken the steps it did under pressure from the churches,” as the official inertia on other equally valid church interventions proved.

The great success of the Task Force on Churches and Corporate Responsibility, for example lay not in writing policy and not even in sensitizing public opinion but in pioneering the method of challenging corporate complicity on Apartheid and other atrocities worldwide. The boardrooms and shareholder meetings had to take the persistent questioning and measured briefs of respectable church people much more seriously than the predictable sloganeering of student radicals or socialist academics. With their impeccable moral claims, their idealistic vision of a more just and secure world order in which the corporate sector had important social responsibilities, the minority church representatives exercised true symbolic power. They practised the politics of embarrass-

ment. They raised the hassle factor to such an extent that even without legislation, the Canadian banks themselves established restrictions on South African loans, Alcan Canada sold its South African interests. Falconbridge sold its mine in 1983 and Rio Algom its interest in the Rössing Uranium operation in Namibia. The withdrawal was motivated both by increased risk perception and by the realization that the small South African exposure of transnationals did not warrant the disproportionate corporate energy and negative publicity.

During the Trudeau period, a simplistic dichotomy informed both non-interventionist liberals and their more radical critics. Thus the 1970 government's White Paper speaks of the "essentially irreconcilable aims of the white and black population in Southern Africa,"¹ as if a racial war were inevitably programmed. The critics of government inactivity in this confrontation similarly deny "that there are any significant liberal tendencies within these regimes which may yet transform them" (Black Paper, 1970:10). Yet the Portuguese regime was transformed by its own army only four years after this assessment was written and even the intransigent Apartheid ideologues eventually liberalized without being defeated.

Denial of the possibility of political compromise forces Canadian activists to choose sides. As moralists, they would want to support the oppressed in the predetermined confrontation, regardless of the methods employed or the consequences: "Armed resistance is justified in cases of flagrant injustice" declares the Black Paper (13), in opposition to the official rejection of the violence of the oppressed. Most moral philosophers who endorse this doctrine of a just war would qualify it with the proviso that there must be a reasonable prospect that the armed struggle does not make things worse for the victims.² If it were fairly likely that the violent resistance, no matter how just the cause, were to lead to

1 Quoted in Committee for a Just Canadian Policy Toward Africa, "The Black Paper: An Alternative Policy for Canada Towards Southern Africa," *Behind the Headlines*, 30, 1, September 1970, p.8

2 See, for example, Barrington Moore, *Reflections on the Causes of Human Misery and Upon Certain Proposals to Eliminate Them*, Boston: Beacon Press, 1969.

greater misery or even the annihilation of its initiators, that would amount not to liberation but to suicide. Yet the Canadian voices on South Africa, as represented in the *Black Paper*, do not entertain such strategic distinctions. Instead, they merely advocate a morally correct position.

Similar to the blanket endorsement of "armed resistance" by Canadian activists, total sanctions were advocated, regardless of their effects or the potential benefits which a continued Canadian diplomatic presence could bring to the disenfranchised. On the other side, the liberal government argued equally bluntly: "We do not believe that global economic sanctions against South Africa are appropriate, we do not believe that they can be effective, and we do not believe that they would promote the changes we desire in South Africa" (Mark MacGuigan in Pratt, 1983:512).

Both sides fail to take into account that some sanctions clearly assist the cause of the subordinates while others impede it. Selective sanctions could be used as levers for empowerment. For example, some investments could be clearly tied to benefiting black workers or anti-Apartheid organizations. Subject to the approval of the respective community, the powerless could be empowered with a strong bargaining tool for unions or civic organizations. (An example of a disempowering sanction is the blanket cultural boycott, particularly the refusal of American and British publishers to supply any books to South Africa.³) Such strategic reasoning was missing before 1985. It was finally introduced when Canadian

3 The president of a US publishing house replied to an author who had objected that his social science books were prohibited from sale in South Africa: "Unfortunately, we had no real choice in the matter. Some of the largest municipalities in the United States have adopted ordinances which prohibit them from buying books from publishers who sell to South Africa. In order to continue to do business with such customers, we were forced to warrant that we would not sell to South Africa. We protested their action but to no avail" (Robert Hagelstein, President of Greenwood Press, Private Correspondence, 22/2/89). The progressive Cape Town publisher David Philip described such overseas colleagues as "unwitting partners" in government's attempts to restrict the flow of thought and information. The foreign boycotters facilitate the work of the South African censor and further harm those suffering under restrictive practices. An equally senseless move was the ban of South African books at fairs abroad, when there was a simultaneous protest against the suppression of news from South Africa.

policy had exhausted its arsenal of what it considered tolerable sanctions and shifted instead toward aiding the victims of Apartheid.

In short, the Canadian arguments on South Africa by both sides during the 1970s and early 1980s reveal a preoccupation with moral stances, as opposed to a concern with pragmatic solutions. Trudeau sought to preserve trade despite "revulsion" against Apartheid. Recognizing the inconsistency, he admitted, "we should either stop trading or stop condemning" (quoted in *Black Paper*, 1970:1). His critics engaged primarily in condemning, whether they were church people or supporters of a more far reaching left programme. In this respect the Canadian Left differed from its European counterparts. For example, the German trade unions or French Communists were always ready to cut a deal with immoral regimes, provided it improved the lot of workers, both at home and abroad. Indeed, the hallmark of European Marxists, particularly Leninists, which is to manoeuvre with tactical alliances in order to advance the left cause, is alien to the North American moral thinking on both the Left and the Right. Here the world is viewed as a battle between good and evil, and Apartheid colonialism represented the epitome of wickedness. Therefore, Canada had to cleanse itself above all from all collusion. Moralists are not so much interested in a tolerable outcome as in purity. This explains the lack of strategic debates on how a negotiated compromise could be achieved. Indeed, to this day, many Canadian South Africanists suspect that any accommodation violates principles. Compromises are considered morally suspect. The distrust of a negotiated settlement is only matched by the greater dedication to the movement that exclusively represents morality. In order to understand dominant Canadian attitudes toward another country, it seems necessary to look also at factors such as immigration, tourism and media reporting in addition to the actions of policymakers and lobbyists.

V. SOUTH AFRICAN IMMIGRANTS AND CANADIAN TOURISTS

Immigrants to Canada with last permanent residence in South Africa make up between 10-20 percent of all immigrants from Africa. No racial statistics are kept, but it is safe to assume the majority of emigrants from South Africa were whites and professionals. The majority seem to have

fitted in well into Canadian society, although several have complained about Canadian nonrecognition of South African qualifications.

Table 4
Emigrants from South Africa to Canada, 1980-90

1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
1,370	1,428	993	454	321	365	938	1,845	1,672	1,558	1,079

While emigration is obviously influenced by many factors, including the changing laws of Canada, more people depart in times of political unrest, albeit with a delayed appearance in the statistics. The upheavals in the late 1970s as well as in the mid-1980s led to a marked increase in emigrants with a clear dip between 1983 and 1985. For most South Africans, Canada is terra incognita with few contacts or relatives. About 70 percent of emigrants from South Africa settled in Ontario, with B.C. and Alberta the next most popular provinces. Among South African medical doctors, Saskatchewan has become renowned as an opportunity to earn a good salary as compensation for an adverse climate. The emigre South Africans in Canada form mostly a "refugee bourgeoisie," similar to many Asian immigrants where high qualifications or substantial wealth lead to a search for political stability, personal security and better economic opportunities. Few South Africans in the 1980s departed for strictly political reasons in opposition to Apartheid. On the contrary, perhaps more were motivated by the imminent dissolution of Apartheid and the prospect of black rule. In 1988, for example, most of the South African immigrants came as independents: 1,081 out of a total of 1,672, 212 as family members, 235 as assisted relatives, 83 as entrepreneurs and only 40 as refugees. A similar pattern holds for the rest of the decade.

The frequency with which the possibility of emigration to Canada was mentioned in the focus sessions, particularly the loss of medical doctors, may justify some closer scrutiny of alternative policies. Radical critics of Canada's immigration rules have suggested a halt to the brain drain from South Africa by a drastic change of Canadian law. South African doctor Barry Kistnasamy (*SAR*, November 1991) advocates a total ban on professional immigrants by Canada:

You get the Canadian government, for instance, saying they are clearly on the side of social change in South Africa and yet they accept all our trained people. We are saying: Close the doors! Likewise the United States and Australia. Close the doors to the skill drains from South Africa. Alternatively, if you want to drain people from South Africa, there are people in the peri-urban squatter camps who would happily improve the quality of their lives and would probably want to come to Canada. They should be offered immigration.

However, Canada's immigration rules are specially designed to exploit the brain drain and not to relieve poverty. Only when the self-interest of the Canadian medical profession in guarding its monopoly is mobilized to keep newcomers from receiving a licence to practise, can the South African activist position expect a halt in the medical brain drain to Canada. A more justifiable arrangement would be an exchange relationship by which the medical bodies in both countries ensure that the numbers of foreign doctors admitted equals the number of medical emigrants. If Canadian medical students or interns were expected as part of their training to practise a year in rural South Africa or other Third World countries, the asymmetrical health provisions between North and South could also be addressed to mutual benefit. It has also been suggested in South Africa that passports or degree certificates should be withheld until the new doctor has compensated the country for the investment in his/her training through a period of service. However, ultimately a far more effective and non-punitive measure lies in ensuring better salaries and working conditions for health professionals in South Africa itself. Particularly, if career advancement were tied to community service and not only to work in the modern private setting, the country could eventually extend its excellent urban medical services into areas where it is most needed.

The heterogeneous background and mixed motivations of South African immigrants explain their relative lack of political activity, compared with other immigrant groups in Canada. A South African organized diaspora in support of their former homeland does not exist and would be overshadowed by the more broad-based anti-Apartheid groups in most major Canadian cities.

Since legal emigrants are restricted in the amount of capital they can bring with them from South Africa, many frequently return "home" for business or holiday purposes, despite the long distance. They form a part of a relatively small but constant tourist stream between the two countries. The Canadian ban on the promotion of tourism to South Africa seemed to have had a temporary impact, as the 50 percent drop in visitors from Canada to South Africa in 1986 indicates. However, by 1990 when the ban was still in effect, arrival figures had almost reached the pre-ban level. Tourism to South Africa from Canada may primarily reflect cheap charter flights and the availability of package tours. Since South African Airways together with the European IATA carriers exercised a tight monopoly over the South African routes and refused landing rights for regular charter carriers, cheaper mass tourism from North America and Europe into the Apartheid state never fully developed. However, South Africa possesses the modern infrastructure, pleasant climate and varied natural attractions for a massive expansion of tourism, particularly from Europe.

Table 5
Visitors from Canada to South Africa 1984-1990

1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
12,942	13,006	8,103	8,308	9,240	10,789	12,078

VI. CANADIAN AID AND TRADE IN THE REGION

Canadian money spent in the Apartheid-state constitutes only a tiny percentage of the aid disbursed in the Southern African region as a whole, defined here as the states of the 10 member Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC).

Canada actively supported the United Nations plan for Namibian independence. More than 500 Canadian Forces personnel and 100 RCMP officers joined the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) together with several election supervisors and technical experts. Various Canadian groups monitored the election. The Canadian contribution to UNTAG amounted to \$18m in addition to \$4m in humanitarian and development aid, especially assistance for the return of exiles and refugees.

CIDA is involved in many SADCC-defined priority sectors, ranging from assistance to rehabilitating the war-torn transportation system in Mozambique and Angola, to the energy, agriculture and telecommunications sectors. Smaller projects encompass feasibility analysis, research, training and institutional support.

Although government to government assistance to Southern Africa has nearly tripled from \$58.79m in 1980/81 to \$159.59m in 1988/89, the country to country disbursements (of which G-G assistance comprises approximately 80 percent) have remained at about 9 percent of Canada's total country to country aid disbursements.

CIDA has traditionally directed most of its aid monies in Southern Africa to Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe in that order. As of 1983 SADCC became a CIDA programming unit, reflecting, "CIDA's belief that the nine country conference is the key to the region's future, and that the countries must join together if they are to resolve their problems" (CIDA, 1984:13).

Significant aid disbursements to SADCC did not begin until 1984/85. Prior to that time, aid, "designed to promote economic liberation through coordinated development initiatives" (*ibid.*) was disbursed directly to the member countries. As of 1984/85, separate monies, in relatively substantial amounts, were allocated to SADCC itself. Nonetheless, aid disbursements on a country to country basis did not cease nor in most cases diminish.

Insofar as "SADCC has worked at identifying the areas of greatest economic dependence (on RSA) and opportunities for regional integration" (*ibid.*:14), CIDA has directed its SADCC funding to meet those ends. This has specifically resulted in a funding focus on infrastructural and human resource development. For example;

1982/83: Canada, France and Portugal participate in rehabilitation of 614 km. of railway line in Mozambique. Canada supplied steel rail and turnouts at a cost of \$20m. "This project will also benefit the hard-pressed Canadian railway supply industry" (*ibid.*).

Table 6
Government to Government Aid Disbursements in Southern Africa 1980-1990 (CAD Millions)

Country	80/81	81/82	82/83	83/84	84/85	85/86	86/87	87/88	88/89	89/90
Angola	.03	-	.03	.02	.10	.08	.10	2.94	6.00	6.99
Botswana	2.92	3.81	3.99	5.11	6.55	4.21	10.62	1.83	1.19	.75
Lesotho	3.84	4.65	3.17	2.31	2.90	2.19	2.71	3.02	2.91	2.21
Malawi	6.50	11.10	9.59	8.33	3.46	2.03	6.05	6.35	11.55	3.63
Mozambique	2.63	5.59	5.62	5.65	10.14	.18	5.19	15.39	22.69	25.51
Namibia	.01	.02	.02	.01	.06	.05	.05	.15	.20	.60
Swaziland	1.26	.95	1.23	1.64	3.08	3.05	2.06	1.46	2.21	1.55
Tanzania	29.20	25.66	30.46	30.05	40.75	24.29	43.98	32.90	40.06	30.57
Zambia	6.85	10.93	20.39	14.43	21.99	18.02	17.87	30.67	27.94	13.25
Zimbabwe	5.55	7.06	8.02	5.30	14.24	15.72	11.61	14.97	14.32	13.66
SADCC	-	-	-	.09	9.85	9.11	32.11	27.88	30.43	39.10
TOTAL	58.79	69.77	82.52	72.94	113.12	78.93	132.35	137.56	159.50	137.82
RSA	-	-	.09	.15	.30	.43	.70	2.19	3.43	3.29

Source: CIDA, "CIDA Annual Reports," Ottawa, 1984-1991.

Table 7
Canadian Trade With SADCC Countries 1970-1990 (1000s of Canadian Dollars)

Country	1970			1980			1985			1990		
	Imports	Exports	Total	Imports	Exports	Total	Imports	Exports	Total	Imports	Exports	Total
Angola	9,634	628	10,262	17,542	2,374	19,916	890	4,260	5,150	56,820	25,387	82,207
Botswana*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	2,356	2,372
Lesotho*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,563	188	2,751
Malawi	433	380	813	476	21,033	21,509	1,040	692	1,732	988	2,488	3,476
Mozambique	1,254	2,300	3,554	3,183	14,117	17,300	287	7,026	7,313	2,835	26,909	29,744
Namibia**	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13,221	2,678	15,899
Swaziland*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	28,084	747	28,831
Tanzania	4,033	633	4,666	4,777	21,751	26,528	3,704	17,251	20,955	1,103	19,955	21,088
Zambia	1	15	16	60	593	653	5,186	11,374	16,560	21,952	17,114	39,066
Zimbabwe	14	4,966	4,980	26	11,708	11,734	26	5,416	5,442	118	7,097	7,215

* Prior to 1988 Statistics for these countries were combined with those of St. Helena, British Indian Ocean Territories and the Seychelles.

** Prior to 1988 Statistics for Namibia were included in figures pertaining to South Africa.

Source: CANADA: Imports by Country 1970 Through 1990 and CANADA: Exports by Country 1970 through 1990

1984/85: \$1.7m for agricultural research system improvement; \$2.7m for technical assistance in the development of self-sustaining forestry programs; \$6m for technical assistance in transport and communication programming.

1985/86: \$13.9m designated to be spent on the development of communication systems between SADCC countries. \$2.6m for the extension of power lines in Botswana.

It is noteworthy that Canadian aid to SADCC countries in most cases exceeds the trade with Canada. On the whole, the trade is quite small with the exception of Angola and Zimbabwe. Extraordinary exceptions in the trade statistics are the huge 1990 import figures from Swaziland, Lesotho and Namibia compared to exports, which in the case of tiny Swaziland with only 700,000 inhabitants are nearly 40 times higher than exports from Canada. The Canadian "trade deficit" can easily be explained with the deceptive labelling of South African goods which was supposed to beat the trade sanctions. It is also indicative that in 1990 in the case of Zambia, Tanzania and Malawi the value of trade with Canada was roughly the same or even lower than ten or twenty years ago.

2. CANADIAN PUBLIC OPINION AND MEDIA REPORTING

Globe & Mail (February 1, 1992) headline:
"White rulers preparing to surrender power."
Comment by a leading Afrikaner nationalist:
"That's news to me!"

In his comprehensive account of Canada's diplomatic relations with South Africa published in 1982, Brian Tennyson (1982:xv) refers to "the rare occasions when South African issues have pushed their way into Canadian consciousness." The following decade surely overturned this observation and catapulted the Apartheid-state on to the front pages and evening news so frequently that at the very least it permeated into the fickle awareness of all politically interested North Americans.

I. OPINION SURVEYS

All opinion polls from the mid-1980s onwards consistently show that about two-thirds of Canadians are aware "of the troubles in South Africa involving the black population and the government." This figure rises to 82 percent in British Columbia but drops inexplicably to 48 percent in the Atlantic provinces and 44 percent in Quebec (Gallup, March 23, 1989). Asked in February 1987 whether their sympathies lie more with the black population or the South African government, 70 percent of the "aware group" opt for blacks, 6 for the South African government, 14 both or neither, 10 don't know. The same survey also tested whether the "aware" respondents believed "the South African government will eventually grant full political power to the black majority by peaceful means—or that the blacks will only achieve power by violent means?" Only one-in-four (26 percent) thought that peaceful means will gain blacks political power, while a majority (59 percent) placed their hope in force and 15 percent had no opinion. The replies reflect an emerging majority opinion behind stronger actions against Apartheid.

However, a majority of Canadians do not claim to "be familiar" with Canadian government policies and actions against Apartheid. A survey commissioned by External Affairs in September 1989 concludes that the "level of awareness of the policies...is not high." Nonetheless, Canadians recognised accurately that "Canada has stopped some, but not all trade" (69 percent) as opposed to "Canada is doing nothing" (11 percent) or "Canada has stopped all trade" (10 percent).

Table 8
Recommended Canadian Policy 1985-89

	Should Not Interfere	Maintain Relations	Cut Off Relations	Don't Know
	%	%	%	%
1985	23	47	26	4
1986	22	40	35	3
1987	20	51	28	1
1989	13	47	35	5

Source: Gallup, March 23, 1989

Dependent very much on how the questions about specific Canadian policies were formulated in the different surveys, a plurality of the general public supported the Canadian government actions while a substantial minority wanted to go much further. A radicalisation of public opinion emerges as a clear trend between 1985 and 1989. A Gallup question about the three options of (1) not interfering, (2) maintaining relations "while urging them to abandon their Apartheid policies" and (3) condemning and cutting off all relations, reveals the broad picture best. In Angus Reid Polls in 1988 and 1989, a remarkable 41/44 percent of respondents thought "we should be tougher in terms of political and economic sanctions," while 29/27 percent thought the current policy "about right," and 12 percent "already too tough." When the question mentioned that "it was revealed that Canada's trade with South Africa has increased over the past year," 51 percent advocated "tougher sanctions," as opposed to 33 percent "no" and 16 percent "unsure."

These survey results would indicate that far from leading a conservative public in militant policies, as the activist policy was frequently

portrayed, the Mulroney government lagged behind public opinion. In the same Angus Reid survey (where the questions seem to be slightly biased towards greater activism) 65 percent of Canadians favour "clear rules and regulations that Canadian business must follow" in its South African trade as opposed to 28 percent supporting "voluntary guidelines." However, only a minority of 28 percent back a "complete embargo" of trade while 63 percent advocate continued trade, albeit with restrictions. In the DEA 1988 survey 45 percent of Canadians favoured more sanctions "even if this means some Canadians will lose their jobs" (32 percent opposed). Confronted with the statement that trade "restrictions hurt the blacks more than the South African government," 53 percent still opt for restrictions. Similar results are yielded by questions on whether Canada should give financial assistance to victims of Apartheid (Yes—48 percent) and "help pay for the education of black South Africans" (Yes—41 percent). In the Reid survey, 56 percent disapprove of South African wine being sold by provincial liquor control boards (35 percent approve), "one of the largest gasoline retailers in Canada being owned by a multinational company with major interests in South Africa" (Shell) elicits 55 percent disapproval which increases to 68 percent towards Canadian banks making loans to South African subsidiaries in Europe.

The only issue on which Canadians strongly disagree with Ottawa actions and display a decidedly pro-South African view is on sports contacts. In total contradiction to the previously outlined militancy, fully 74 percent of Canadians believed in 1989 that "Canada should lift its ban on Canadian athletes competing with South African athletes, because they think "politics should be left out of sports." In short, Canadians are willing to boycott South African wines and oranges, if need be, but reluctant to tolerate interference in Springbok rugby matches, cricket, tennis or golf tournaments. In this respect the lifting of "peoples-sanctions" at the end of 1991 proved most popular.

Our own Gallup poll in October 1991 reveals much softer attitudes on sanctions in the light of developments in South Africa since February 1990. Although the ANC and Mandela at the time had repeatedly advocated maintaining or even intensifying sanctions until real changes had

occurred, only a minority of Canadians now agree with this position. There is also evidence of a much greater uncertainty than in previous surveys. The category of "don't know/uncertain/don't care," as expected, is highest among lower income groups (40 percent), housewives (55 percent), among people with elementary education only (56 percent) and among French-speaking Canadians (50 percent), as opposed to 26 percent among English-speakers. Why Quebec pays so little attention to a divided society with similar problems, albeit of a different language, warrants further study on its own. Don Munton and Timothy Shaw's (1987:11) explanation of an identical difference in an earlier survey blamed the poor "coverage of 'British' and Commonwealth subjects" in the Quebec media. With regard to similar disinterest in the Maritimes, they point to "both lower levels of education and the typically poor international coverage by the region's press."

Table 9
Canadians on Sanctions Against South Africa
Gallup Poll - National Omnibus - October 2-5, 1991

The Canadian government follows a policy of various sanctions and boycotts against South Africa. Given recent developments in South Africa, what do you think Canada should *now* do with regards to sanctions?

(N 1053)	%
End Sanctions	17.0
Relax Sanctions (i.e., end some/keep others)	17.8
Maintain Sanctions at Current Level	27.8
Intensify Sanctions Until South Africa Changes	4.9
Don't Know/Uncertain/Don't Care	32.1
Not Stated	.4
	100

Finally, it seems noteworthy that those who favour ending or relaxing sanctions in 1991 feature twice as highly (41 percent) among university and college educated respondents than persons without higher education, and they are predominantly male rather than female (42 percent against 27 percent). Whether such statistically significant attitudinal differences result from better information on South Africa or a broader

syndrome of different predispositions among subsections would require a much closer exploration than a national opinion survey can reveal.

The surveys, of course, also say little about the *intensity* of feelings on South Africa, i.e., whether the topic ranks as a relatively high priority on a persons emotive political scale or is peripheral, compared with more interesting or pressing problems closer to home.

To this end, an overview of the media reporting on South Africa seems useful, at least as far as the expression of sentiments by an intellectual elite of opinion makers is concerned. A content analysis of media coverage can reveal not only *how* public opinion originates but *why* opinions shift, and emotions wax and wane. It can also identify the biases of media reporting as well as its accuracy in reflecting a foreign reality.

SISULU IN VANCOUVER

Canada-South Africa relations at the grass-root level are full of noble intentions, contradictions and ironies. A single event on a balmy Monday evening in downtown Vancouver on September 16, 1991 captured many of these paradoxes. Oxfam-Canada had invited the Vancouver public to "a vision for a Post-Apartheid South Africa" with Walter and Albertina Sisulu at St. Andrew's Wesley Church in the shadow of the B.C. Hydro building.

Walter Sisulu, the 80 year old Deputy President of the ANC and his wife Albertina, the Deputy Head of the ANC's Women's League, are revered symbols of heroic resistance who draw large

crowds in South Africa, second only to Mandela with whom Walter Sisulu shared 25 years of imprisonment. The large Anglican cathedral however was filled with not more than 200 people in the first pews, signalling a waning interest in South African affairs in Canada. The audience comprised a motley crowd of South African exiles, loyal female church-goers, long-time political activists for various causes and our 20 students for whom a regular class had been cancelled. Establishment figures and television crews were absent among the predominantly middle-aged listeners from alternative subcultures, markedly contrasting with the immaculately attired ANC representatives. Instead Greenpeace supporters and zealous Trotskyite activists of the

"Socialist Challenge Section of the Fourth International in the Canadian State" vied for attention with leaflets celebrating the "Victory of Soviet Workers" by defeating the Stalinist Coup. A table by the Spartacus bookshop with many titles of the standard lore on South Africa and Native land claims hardly sold a copy. Nonetheless, here was the core of Canadian idealists without whom a commitment to the cause of the Third World could not have been sustained.

The grand old church had probably never before seen a leader of the self-defined Marxist-Leninist South African Communist Party enter the pulpit and with raised fist address those gathered as "comrades." "Amandhla" (power) shouted the grey-haired dignitary with a weak voice; "Awethu" (to the people) a few blacks replied nostalgically, together with a few "with-it" development workers on the hard benches below. Five Canadian women, dressed in the green-yellow-black ANC colors and billed as the "Euphonious Feminist Non-Performing Quintet" sang in beautiful Xhosa "We are the children of Africa." Chief George from the B.C. Indian Tribal Council introduced the guest with the solidarity of a fellow member of the oppressed. However, he could hardly pronounce Sisulu's name and falsely equated the Canadian

Native struggle for recognition of First Nation status and separate citizenship with the ANC goal of a unified and integrated state with a common citizenship.

The feminist choir and the promised "non-sexist South Africa" notwithstanding, Sisulu talked about "the noble idea that man should be free..., man required shelter, man required something to eat...and Apartheid racialism is a shameful mark in the history of mankind." At the end, he thanked the "Mr. Chairman," although the gathering was chaired by a woman. However, probably everyone forgave the sympathetic gentleman from another generation for his linguistic lapses but was also eager to hear from his wife. A formidable activist in her own right, Albertina Sisulu talked about the sufferings of the mothers in South Africa and the plight of the homeless children. In a near tribal speech, she assailed Buthelezi and the "so-called Zulus" and asked how could "Zulus suddenly have become so clever to use guns" without the government teaching and instigating them? And why were 5,000 Zulus dancing around the building where the peace accord had just been signed if that wasn't a threat to ignore it?

The bewildered Canadian church audience suddenly found itself in the middle of the South

African struggle antics but also felt that they were on the right side of it. They were flattered by Walter Sisulu's assertion that in jail he was inspired "by the struggle you Canadians put up for us." The audience was elated with the feeling that Canada had liberated the South African jails. \$1,140 dollars were collected in response to Sisulu's plea "to take the struggle further than it is today." After all, Sisulu had deplored "unemployment as the cancer of South African society." Few would have noticed the contradiction in his simultaneous demand to maintain

and intensify sanctions until the new South Africa is in place.

The next day's *Vancouver Sun* reported only on Sisulu's call to maintain sanctions. While Canada had just a few days before agreed to an easing of "peoples sanctions," the headline read: "Sisulu praises Canada." Typically, Albertina Sisulu was not mentioned in a single sentence. However, the paper did not fail to point out the irrelevant tribal connection: "He is also a Xhosa from the South-eastern Cape."

II. MEDIA REPORTING

Most Canadians form their opinion on South Africa from TV reports, not through reading newspapers. Researchers at the Vancouver-based Fraser Institute conducted a content analysis of television coverage of South Africa by CBC and CTV for one year, beginning 1 July 1989.¹

This quantitative account of issues covered, together with our own qualitative interpretation of randomly selected editorials and news reports in the *Globe & Mail* and some other papers and magazines, forms the basis of this overview. Of 522 stories on Africa by CBC and CTV during 1989/90, two thirds focussed on South Africa. Moreover, most Canadians also receive a substantial but unknown ratio of international news from American channels.

1 See *On Balance* (Media Treatment of Public Policy Issues), "South Africa," III:10, November/December 1990, written by Lydia Miljan and published by The Fraser Institute, Vancouver. The sample covered 136 "National," 37 "Journal," 2 "Venture," and 15 "Sunday Report" stories as well as 147 "CTV National News."

David Halberstam (*NYT*, 21/2/91, A19) has observed that the obsession with film has produced "a pretence of internationalism (a network anchorman rushing off to cover a major foreign story) which is the gloss over essential isolationism." The networks are interested in foreign news only insofar as it has a Canadian or an American angle or confirms widespread audience stereotypes. The preferred "action news" is incompatible with foreign news analysis of subtle and evolutionary change in the world affecting a long-range political agenda. So-called talking heads do not entertain. Conditioned by the networks' definitions of what is boring, the TV action focus further reinforces a political illiteracy that trivializes political debate according to its entertainment score.

With the gradual internationalizing of the South African conflict, the distorted reporting which Halberstam referred to can be identified with regard to South African reporting under five labels, illustrated with respective examples. Reports on South Africa in the Canadian media can no longer be criticised for their neglect of the topic, but, on the contrary, for their eager (1) portrayal of South Africa as a *morality play* with interchangeable *villains* and *heroes*, (2) highlighting of *violence*, *conflict* and *confrontation* at the expense of negotiation, cooperation and consensus, (3) *personalisation* of issues with *human interest stories* and foci on leaders at the expense of substantive explanations, (4) reinforcement of stereotypes through emphasis on African *tribalism*, bordering on *racism*, (5) *misrepresentation* through prejudice, imposition of local norms or misinformation with important political implications.

For years, the Western media presented South Africa as a *morality play* whose major theme was the oppression of virtuous blacks by evil whites. This necessitated their portrayal as monolithic victims and villains. The township violence and the Winnie Mandela trial shattered this easily digestible story: the oppressed blacks were suddenly revealed as neither monolithic nor altogether virtuous, with the exception of the saintly cult figure Mandela. Although most continued to blame the government and police, the stereotype of Zulu tribal warriors acting out their savage nature took over as the dominant theme in the Canadian press. "Unable to comprehend black-on-black violence after two decades of reporting black-white racial tensions, the cameras prefer to move

on to a less complicated story," comments Christopher Coker (1992:285). The audience of the morality play was further confused by the other main actor. It was difficult to decide whether de Klerk was a more cunning and shrewd version of his finger-wagging predecessor or an honest, fair player to whom even his counterpart initially attributed integrity. The favoured portrayal of fascist whites with swastikas, accusing de Klerk of treason, helped to establish an image of a reasonable man in the centre who kept the extremes apart. Unless a major event causes a dramatic shift of perceptions, the above caricature roughly corresponds to the average informed Canadian's image of South Africa in 1991. Short essays written by 275 first-year Canadian university students on the topic confirmed an image of South Africa as a geographically beautiful but problem-riddled country of sharp conflicts between opposites—especially brutal whites and victimized blacks—compared with the relative peace and harmony in multicultural Canada.

On the very day that this is written, the *Globe & Mail* (October 4, 1991) carried a five column story on its front page, headlined "Black boy set on fire, jailed in theft of television set. White South African farmer escapes with fine after being convicted of attempted murder." The CBC morning news broadcast a live story from a daycare centre in a squatter settlement where toddlers have to be protected from tear gas. In the evening news, beamed across Canada, a portrayal of "jackrolling" (kidnapping rape) was contrasted with the moral education in beautiful sounding church choirs in Soweto. Human angles on daily atrocities, easily accessible in an English-speaking exotic state with good hotels and modern facilities for journalists, combine to keep South Africa in the Canadian news.

The TV reportage of street demonstrations and police repression touched on the liberal Canadian abhorrence of violence. In previous years, the condemnation of violence had automatically referred to the sabotage and armed struggle of the liberation movements. During the latter years of Apartheid, the state itself was finally revealed as the perpetrator of violence against unarmed protesters. Therefore, blame shifted from the resistance movements to the government as the cause and instigator of violence in the first place. Canadians unwittingly

became sympathetic to the concept of "structural violence," i.e., unjust conditions against which even violent resistance is justified.

In the 1989/1990 TV stories, one-fifth of CBC and CTV overall attention focussed on anti-Apartheid protests, demonstrations and police brutality. The South African government's attempt at censoring news by restricting reporting and banning foreign TV teams had been singularly unsuccessful. Local stringers with videos took over in some cases with much better access than foreign crews and correspondents. Instead of making South Africa disappear from the world's TV screens, as Pretoria had hoped, the reporting under conditions of censorship gave the stories and underground news a special authenticity and sharp critical edge against the system. A struggle-oriented alternative press flourished inside and set the tone for most of the reporting outside. For example, the *Globe & Mail* regular correspondent Philip van Nierkerk, an astute and well-informed progressive South African journalist, writes both for the "left-liberal" and pro-ANC Johannesburg *Weekly Mail* as well as for the conservative Toronto paper. He is, however, not responsible for the headlines, selection and editing of his reports by the Toronto desk.²

Headline writers are particularly misleading because of the obvious temptation to simplify a complex constellation into a catchy phrase. For example, the *Globe & Mail* (August 2, 1991) headlines a Reuters report from Brazil about Mandela's call for an interim government: "Mandela threatens to end talks unless de Klerk resigns." At no stage did the ANC

2 It is only occasionally that van Nierkerk slips, shows bias and reports incorrectly. For example, an account of the ANC-Inkatha conflict states: "Mr. Mandela and the majority of the ANC leadership are Xhosa-speaking, although the ANC is opposed to tribalism, in contrast to Inkatha" (*G&M*, August 22, 1990). The entire ANC leadership speaks English as a lingua franca although a majority is of Xhosa origin. Having Xhosa as a mother tongue does not predispose its speakers to tribalism as the "although" implies. While the ANC since its inception has always opposed tribalism, so does Inkatha, at least rhetorically. When Defence Minister Magnus Malan was demoted to Minister of Environmental Affairs in August 1991, he jokingly commented "I have beaten the Reds, now I'll join the Greens." Nierkerk reported as "an ominous sign" that Malan was now going "to beat the Greens." A Canadian diplomat in Pretoria complained in jest that, unfortunately, press reports from the country are taken more seriously in Ottawa than diplomatic analyses.

or Mandela demand de Klerk's resignation. The patently false headline makes no sense because de Klerk's resignation would leave Mandela with nobody to talk to. Therefore, a threat to end talks unless the opponent resigns is illogical. However, the headline leaves in the casual reader the impression of a sulky, stubborn Mandela who makes unreasonable demands and is not interested in reconciliation but only in the defeat of the adversary. Quite the contrary is the case.

Mandela has stressed repeatedly that he does not advocate "black majority rule" but democracy and majority rule. Yet the *Globe & Mail* (February 1, 1992) reports a reversal of Apartheid by headlining the "step-by-step march toward black majority government." Moreover, the same story even fantasizes that the National Party "has given notice" to "surrender power to the black majority."

During 1990/1991 there was hardly any report on South Africa that did not highlight turmoil and violence. Often several accounts appeared prominently on the front page all headlining themes such as "township terror," "crisis nearing flash point," accompanied by a gruesome photograph of "a Zulu who suffered a head wound" watched by a pistol wielding police officer. This particular *Globe & Mail* edition (3/5/91) devoted altogether one full page out of three labelled "International News" to the South African conflict when in the same week 100,000 people in Bangladesh were killed by a typhoon, Kurds were starving to death by the thousands, and a cholera epidemic hit South America with little exposure in the news. Catastrophic famine in Africa received no mention at all. The unrelenting reports about political violence and demonstrations in South Africa of course also serve to draw attention away from domestic problems. On the day when striking civil servants tried to storm the House of Commons in Ottawa, the *Globe & Mail* (October 1, 1991) carried a picture about angry protesters against a new VAT tax in South Africa!

The *Globe & Mail* (May 6, 1991) in two subsequent editions carried another front-page headline, "Zulu fighters set to move into Soweto. 100,000 Inkatha on standby unless ANC quits fighting." The boastings of a minor Inkatha official were blown up in this headline although the

same story quotes Buthelezi as saying "that he was unaware of the plan to send men into Soweto. I would think that it would be a dangerous thing to do in the present tension." So as to highlight the irrationality of both ANC and Inkatha, the paper published a racist cartoon in the same edition that showed two caricatured dark figures with protruding lips (one ANC, one Inkatha) and arms in raised fists against the backdrop of a South African map, underlined by the text: "One man, one vote...one macheté, one spear, one brick, one knife, one broken bottle, one tire iron, one razor, one can of gasoline." The message of the democratic promise being ruined by "savages" was clearly spelt out by the cartoon.

A new year's editorial (*Globe & Mail*, 1/1/91) identified as one of the "cracks in the new world order" that "in South Africa constitutional talks gave way to bloodshed as blacks slaughtered blacks in the shadow of the nation's capital." The uninformed reader must conclude that negotiations have been abandoned and replaced with violence. In reality, the tragic bloodshed results from an intensification of constitutional dealings. The ANC and Inkatha jockey for the dominant place at the negotiating table by each demonstrating their strength and relevance on the streets. An agency report (*Globe & Mail*, December 16, 1991) quotes Buthelezi predicting that South Africa would be plunged into civil war, "if his tribe did not get an adequate voice" in the talks. In reality, Buthelezi had not used the controversial term "tribe" or "Zulu" but had warned against leaving "great groupings of men and women" out of the negotiation process. (See discussion in Chapter Five, V.)

The tendency to exaggerate conflict and underplay progressive consensus obviously fuels interest in a story. To read about feuds and violence sells better than news about consensus and stability. The tendency to overemphasize perpetual turmoil becomes misleading when it overshadows the emerging compromise. For example, the *Globe & Mail* (December 21, 1991) headlined a front-page story about the historic signing of a democratic accord by 16 parties at the first CODESA meeting: "Three groups refuse to sign South Africa pact. Row between de Klerk, Mandela shatters good will." Two insignificant signals of strife blow out of all proportion a comparatively minor dispute between

Mandela and de Klerk about secret ANC arms caches as well as the boycott of the historic accord by three Bantustans.

V.S. Naipaul has attributed what he calls "the calamity of Africa" to the hypocritical denial of a European colonial past. "There's the attitude that you must never say unkind things about Africa. The result is that it is sinking into famine and civil wars" (*NYT*, January 30, 1991, B3). Indeed, a nominal philo-Africanism only hides the disdain with which much of Western opinion treats the continent. The "what-do-you-expect?" attitude of commentators shows itself in the relentless reinforcement of their expectations of violence and barbarism leaving many progressive developments unreported. Instead of a balanced analysis that criticizes where policies need to be confronted and lauds where praise is due, many accounts uncritically reflect the taboos and stereotypes of its authors. This is particularly evident in the Western obsession with African "tribalism."

Many Canadians express surprise about the disunity among blacks. In an unconscious racism they assume all blacks and victims of Apartheid think alike. Alternatively, the intra-black rivalry is viewed as the emergence of tribalism. While the civil wars in Europe are considered the result of political or historical conflicts, similar antagonisms in Africa are automatically ascribed to primordial feuds of violence prone people. "The fighting in the townships is as much a tribal affair as that between Serbs and Croats," commends *The Economist* (May 16, 1991) under the heading, "Taming South Africa." Tribalism remains a hollow metaphor; nor does the analogy fit the two political conflicts. Croats aim at secession from Yugoslavia; Inkatha strives for its recognition as an equal party in negotiations for a common state. Natal-English business interests as well as Afrikaner conservatives are found among Inkatha's backers which defies the tribal explanation and points to political reasons, for which tribal perceptions are manufactured and utilised. "Taming" South Africa suggests wild animals in a circus whose "savagery" needs to be brought under control by a strong domteur.

The ANC-Inkatha conflict in particular, is predominantly portrayed as a "tribal" one. For example, an Associated Press report (*Globe & Mail*,

September 9, 1991) asserts: "Both the ANC and Inkatha oppose Apartheid but have deep tribal and ideological differences." The fact that about half of all Zulu-speaking South Africans support the ANC whose Deputy Secretary General (Jacob Zuma) is a Zulu at the very least strains the tribal explanation. Inkatha too would reject the tribal label and claims to be an inclusive movement open to all, including whites.

On September 18, 1990 the *Globe & Mail* editorialized on the various reasons for "blacks fighting blacks" and rightly concluded that the roots are deeper than the differences between the ANC and Inkatha, but pointed to the wrong roots: "For that, one must look at the contempt many blacks feel toward the Zulus, who are, after the whites, probably the most hated people in the country." The sentence contains two falsehoods. Virtually all attitude surveys during the past decades have found that most blacks carefully distinguish between whites. Disdain for "boers" in the police and civil service goes together with indifference or envy towards most white fellow South Africans and admiration for liberal or socialist white sympathisers including "Boers." Hate for whites as a group—a kind of counterracism one could easily expect—remains very rare in South Africa. Likewise, contempt "toward the Zulus" as a general black attitude is grossly misleading.

While Buthelezi and Inkatha are unpopular, and rampaging Zulu migrants are dreaded in Soweto, many inhabitants nevertheless have Zulu relatives or neighbours or are themselves of mixed ethnic origin. Virtually everyone speaks or at least understands Zulu in an urban melting pot where such ethnic labelling has become increasingly irrelevant. The two peoples with the same Nguni language origin, Xhosas and Zulus, do not have a history of war although the usual mutual stereotyping and competition for resources exists as it does everywhere. However, it amounts to historical falsification when the *Globe* (18/9/90) opines: "Few blacks have forgotten the violence with which Zulu leaders established their own state more than a century and a half ago, driving all other tribes from Natal. Most Xhosas have ancestors who were victims of bloody pogroms carried out during the 19th century." Revisionist historians have long corrected the invention of white settler historiography that the consolidation of the Shaka Kingdom (1810-1830) amounted to

"bloody pogroms." Philip Steenkamp (letter to the editor, *Globe & Mail*, October 6, 1990) articulates a widely accepted view that the destructive upheavals of the period "were more likely the result of cattle- and slave-raiding expeditions by British and Portuguese colonialists in the region." Clearly, the tribal explanation also absolves the architects of the divide-and-rule system and blames its victims.

The personalisation of the conflict has led to a widespread myth that the issue can be solved because Mandela and de Klerk "get on well with each other." Endless debates focused on the "integrity" of the two men who assured each other of their "trust." Moral categories substituted for political analysis—accusations of "dishonesty" replaced the scrutiny of underlying interests and different constituencies.

A negotiated agreement does not require trust between the adversaries who are only expected to bargain in "good faith," meaning that they are both interested in an advantageous settlement rather than in a charade of talks without agreement. In fact, distrust of the adversary would serve as a better guideline for bargaining than trust. Trust may be the outcome of successful negotiations but is never a precondition. Whether de Klerk is an honourable man or a crook is irrelevant. By personalizing a political competition into a moral relationship between two leaders the media obscures the prospects for conflict resolution and falsifies the real issues.

Just as the CBC repeats the same news broadcast every hour, instead of selecting new items, so the broadcasts tend to repeat the well-known in their South African accounts. In what amounts to an insult to the intelligence of the listeners, reports about Winnie Mandela, for example, do not fail to mention: "Mrs. Mandela is the wife of ANC leader Nelson Mandela" (CBC, February 5, 1991). The inaneity of such a sentence is worsened only by the sexist definition of the person as an appendage of her husband which alone makes the case newsworthy. The Fraser study of TV news (most of it before Mandela's release and visit to Canada) reports that "coverage of Mandela was exhaustive" and "black group leaders, other than Mandela, were given little media attention" (6)—neither were Canadian government policies and sanctions, discussed in only three percent of the networks' coverage. Needless to say, almost all

of the detailed Mandela coverage could be classified as positive or neutral, particularly since the ANC was identified as the "most frequently cited South African source," both on CBC and CTV. However, this picture changed dramatically with the emergence of the Winnie story at the beginning of 1991.

Throughout February and March 1991 most reports on South Africa focused exclusively on the Winnie Mandela trial. None of the personalizing accounts, however, mentioned the implicit irony of the proceedings: on the one hand, the ANC denies the legitimacy of the institutions of the Apartheid state, on the other hand, its officers willingly submit to the authority of the all-white courts. Winnie Mandela welcomed her trial in order to clear her name (see Chapter Five, II).

By not providing sufficient background and information on the political context of an event, many factually accurate reports can mislead the reader. Two typical examples from the *Globe & Mail* (May 20, 21, 1991) within the span of two days can suffice to demonstrate the point. One Associated Press and Reuters report under the heading "Paper Warns the ANC" relays that "South Africa's largest *black* newspaper" urged the ANC not to abandon talks with the government. The lengthy admonishment of the ANC from a supposedly powerful fellow black ally makes sense only if one knows that "City Press," although edited by blacks, is owned by the ruling National Party. In fact, the boulevard paper was created explicitly "to open channels of communication with the black masses" for the government. With this information, what looks like a surprising critique from within, turns out to be a predictable reaction from the ANC's adversary. A second Reuter's report the next day quotes at length a spokesperson for the Urban Foundation which is described as "a private think-tank on land reform." Everyone in South Africa, however, knows that the Urban Foundation, far from being an impartial think-tank, represents a business lobby set up by Anglo-American and Rembrandt to stabilize the volatile townships. Their pronouncements on land reform can properly be understood only in the context of this missing background information.

Involuntary misrepresentation is sometimes compounded by crucial misreporting of facts, based on preconceived assumptions. For example, Michael Valpy, the *Globe & Mail* (South) Africa correspondent from 1984-87 contributed a melodramatic background analysis about "racial angst" on the day after Mandela's release (*Globe & Mail*, February 13, 1990). The article written from Canada was out of date in several details and patently incorrect in one major respect. It concluded, "last night, because the South African Broadcasting Corporation did not televise his speech, they did not see the 71-year-old man speaking to them on state-controlled television, from a venue—unimaginable!—where so many white dignitaries and their retinues have promenaded on state occasions. They did not hear him appeal to his white compatriots. If they had, would fewer of them still think the clock can be stopped?"

The entire Mandela speech was broadcasted live on SABC TV, including the long waiting period at the prison gates earlier. However, precisely because of the wide publicity of the speech the initial reaction to it turned out to be the opposite of Valpy's assumption. With the ANC flag flying over the City Hall and particularly the red SACP hammer and sickle prominently displayed at the balcony, many whites reacted with unease to the new scenario. The stockmarket and Financial Rand dipped the next day, confirming a widespread political illiteracy about South Africa, particularly among foreign investors, who heard Mandela's rhetorical support for "nationalisation" but not his conciliatory appeal to "white compatriots."

It comes as little surprise that the intricate constitutional talks in South Africa are widely misunderstood in Canada, particularly where parallels are drawn with the Canadian situation. Most editorials prescriptively focus on who should win in an imagined racial conflict. Typical of this view is an editorial in the *Vancouver Sun* (September 7, 1991) on the National Party proposals which dismisses the real changes in South Africa as "rhetoric," urging the "rigorous maintenance of Canadian policy" on sanctions. Because "proportional representation...would effectively deny a winner-takes-all form of government," this voting system is denounced "as a crude strategy aimed at preserving white privilege." The writer supports "the implacable cry across the veld" for

"majority rule," as if guaranteed representation of minority parties in proportional voting were to deny majority rule. The *Sun* ignores the fact that the ANC itself proposes proportional voting or that the same system has been adopted in Namibia. The *Sun* writer inveighs against preventing "the black majority from electing a black to lead the country," which not only misinterprets the proposals which concede a black president but overlooks the party's new strategy of courting voters across the racial divide.

On the same topic an editorial in the *Globe & Mail* (December 21, 1991) incorrectly identifies an outdated dilemma as "the heart of the South African disagreement": individual rights versus group rights or "separate rooms for different racial, language and cultural groups." The National Party constitutional proposals have long ago abandoned the idea of white group protection in favour of special rights for all *minority political parties* and severe constraints on the majority party. This is not just another label for minority *racial* groups because all major parties (ANC, NP, IFP) now court members across the Apartheid divide and will need votes from all racial groups in the first one-person-one-vote election. The unresolved constitutional conflict concerns the right of the majority party to rule, versus entrenched rights of smaller parties to be included in the government and to retain veto rights over majority decisions. How far minority parties are allowed to frustrate the will of the majority party and perhaps paralyse decision-making through statutory consensus requirements, now lies at the heart of the dispute. It would not be a severe conflict if the minority could be assured of the possibility to become the majority and take over in the next election. Because entrenched racial rights would prevent this for whites, the ruling minority has moved beyond racial protection and into an open competition with its traditional adversary on the same constitutional principles.

In summary, media reporting on South Africa tends to reiterate customary images of cunning, homogeneous whites versus tribally oriented blacks. For once, Western journalists are not taken in. To their credit, they maintain their steadfast scepticism. However, their laudatory stance

is in danger of missing the emerging compromise by being fixated on past confrontation.

After the March 1992 white referendum, however, the image of South Africa became transformed from an outcast to a model to emulate. Instead of highlighting the difference, Canadian commentators suddenly stressed the likeness with "our problems". Brian Mulroney even suggested that a solution in South Africa seemed closer than in Canada which could learn from the South African spirit of accommodation. Canadian newspapers published comprehensive translation of South African constitutional concept into their Canadian equivalents. Toronto historian J.L. Granatstein (*Globe*, April 25, 1992) recommended: "The F.W. de Klerk government's recent referendum suggests how it can be done and how a hitherto intractable issue can be moved along by a government with courage. A fast, well-organized and well-financed campaign, like Mr. de Klerk's, can break the logjam." Although Barbara McDougall on a first official Canadian ministerial visit to South Africa since 30 years at the time, still refused to be photographed together with her host, the Canadian political class has long embraced de Klerk's reformism while at the same time wanting to reap the symbolical benefits of its previous anti-Apartheid activism by not antagonising the ANC.

3. DIPLOMATS IN THE APARTHEID STATE

"Canadians can help influence the policy of Apartheid. Our power is limited, but it is real."
—Joe Clark, *Letter to Canadians*, 1987.

Western embassies have entangled the leading South African activists in benign spider webs of protection, advice and surveillance. Activists are willingly caught in the friendly embrace of foreign officials, who are eager to be helpful and also knowledgeable about the latest developments. For senior diplomats, information is valuable currency and they are prepared to go to extraordinary lengths to secure contacts and the latest insider news for their next report home. Canadians, once considered slow and over-cautious, have long caught up with the techniques of cultivating contacts and beating competitors when it comes to South Africa. For example, only a few hours after Winnie Mandela was sentenced to six years in prison in May 1991, an External Affairs official in Ottawa relayed that Mrs. Mandela had sounded very up-beat on the phone and expected her appeal to last at least another year or two (Personal Interview, Ottawa, 14/5/91). Unfortunately, "he" himself could not be talked to and hopefully he would not be cracking up under the strain. With such worldwide counselling and instant diplomatic psychiatry at its disposal, the ANC finds it difficult indeed to free itself from the iron clamp of foreign sympathy and incorporation. As soon as the movement is perceived to be slipping from its designated path—such as with the ultimatum to Pretoria in April 1991 and the threat to break off negotiations—the diplomats come knocking at Mandela's door, and he can hardly afford not to open it.

In a sense, Western diplomats, with Canada certainly playing its part, act as a reality principle to both the opposition and the government. They protest human rights violations, and lend their protective presence at critical trials, funerals and demonstrations. They infuse the negotiation

process with new ideas, and prod, restrain, cajole and probe in an extraordinary intense interchange. For example, when both the ANC and Pretoria indicated that they would welcome Canadian suggestions about constitutional models in early 1990, External Affairs, after consultation with the Law Society, readily obliged by providing five Canadian constitutional and human rights consultants to visit South Africa. When the concept of a mixed economy began to replace the debate about nationalization, a leading Swedish economist was instantly contracted by foreign-funded IDASA to explain the virtues of social democracy. At the height of the ANC-government impasse about township violence in May 1991, the British ambassador Robin Renwick proposed a successful compromise for a deadlocked peace conference, now to be co-hosted by the churches.¹ Throughout the crisis Mandela has been in telephone contact with the US President and the British Prime Minister.

Until 1990, numerous conferences on South Africa took place in Europe, Africa and the US, with a majority of South African participants, both "from home" and the exile community. Canada, because of distance and the virtual monopoly of established conference organizers, did not host any of the major pre-negotiations meetings, apart from a controversial gathering on press freedom and censorship at the University of Regina in March 1989. However, Ottawa soon joined the British Council and various US agencies to bring key South African visitors for short information and good will trips to Canada. Both Walter Sisulu and Mandela were invited on the days of their release. Albertina Sisulu was asked to testify at the Toronto CFM as was Cyril Ramaphosa, the then head of the Mineworkers Union. After his release from detention and torture, Canada invited Father Smangaliso Mkhathshwa and several other prominent victims of human rights abuses. The two PAC leaders, the late Zeph Mothopheng and his successor Clarence Makwetu were also formally invited, but for various reasons did not take up the opportunity to visit. However, others not in the ANC fold, like Mamphela Ramphele,

¹ Renwick, since 1991 UK ambassador in Washington and formerly a personal confidant of Thatcher, turned out to be the leading diplomatic facilitator and initiator of new ideas with both the ANC and Pretoria during the last years of P.W. Botha's presidency, despite or because of his country's unequivocal stance on sanctions.

Saths Cooper, Joe Thloloe or Oscar Dholomo, were also on the Canadian guest list, although ANC-aligned activists predominated. This predominance is partly due to their majority support at home but it also arises because Canadian NGOs favour and prefer to collaborate with the ANC.² Attempts in the 1980s by some Canadian anti-apartheid groups to provide a platform for rivals of the ANC led to threats of boycott by ANC representatives and deep divisions in the Canadian support groups. During the Vorster and Botha regimes, foreign invitations rarely succeeded in securing passports for the invitees but at least momentarily spotlighted the human rights abuses and sent the victims the message that they were not forgotten.³

With regard to more recent invitations, one informant defined as the most crucial criteria for selection "people who have been most helpful to our Embassy in South Africa" (Interview, 17/9/1991). This consideration would make invitations a reward rather than a calculated policy instrument to influence key opinion-makers and inform the Canadian public. While a certain amount of patronage for like-minded acquaintances is probably unavoidable in the complex interaction of diplomats with local political actors—and is practiced on a much grander scale by many countries, particularly the US, UK, Germany and, recently, Japan—it must be asked whether more rational criteria for the highly-prized journeys cannot be institutionalized. It may also be appropriate to seek wider consultation among Canadian South African experts than to leave the decisions to a few Ottawa insiders. Likewise, a broader exposure of the visitors to individuals and groups across the country, together with public advertizements of their appearances beyond the circle of

2 For example, a constitutional conference hosted by the Ottawa South African Education Trust Fund (SAETF) in May 1990, aimed at forming a Constitutional and Legal Commission with a \$300,000 External Affairs grant, was geared to helping SA organizations with negotiations. According to the SAETF annual report, the South African representatives came "from the ANC, UDF, Human Rights Commission and COSATU lawyers," all organizations from the same camp and with overlapping membership.

3 Canada had too little clout with the Pretoria bureaucracy to be effective in securing much desired passports which were sometimes granted when German Foreign Minister Genscher personally intervened, or the British Foreign Office used its contacts to ensure that an activist could visit a conference in London.

selected sponsors, may fulfill the stated goal of informing Canadians about South African conditions more effectively.

Generous funding of all kinds of community activities and anti-apartheid projects proved to be the most important weapon in the battles of Western embassies for the hearts and minds of activists. Most Western embassies competed with each other in searching out worthy endeavours for assistance. Sometimes rival political parties in the donor state adopted different local clients according to perceived ideological proximity. Thus the tax-funded and party-aligned German Foundations agreed on a division of sponsorship. The CDU oriented Konrad Adenauer Foundation together with the Bavarian Hans Seidel Stiftung became heavily involved with Inkatha, and even opened an office with a permanent representative in Durban; the liberal FDP-aligned Naumann-Stiftung financed numerous conferences and other activities of IDASA; while the left-of-centre, SPD-inclined Friedrich Ebert Stiftung attempted to spend its considerable funds more on union projects, grassroots assistance, and university-based outreach programmes. Since none of the German Foundations would support the same project simultaneously, South African recipients sometimes discussed whether they should dump one sponsor in favour of a more generous one. It sometimes happened, though, that the same endeavour was supported by different countries without the donors necessarily knowing about each other's simultaneous assistance.⁴

4 A good example of multiple-donor support for essentially the same task is the Centre for Intergroup Studies in Cape Town which during the past years received ad hoc grants from the following institutions, reflecting the fund-raising skills of its director: "Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, the Barrow and Geraldine S. Cadbury Trust in England, the Algemeen Diakonaal Bureau in Holland, the Group Chairman's Fund of Anglo-American and de Beers in South Africa, Shell South Africa Ltd., the Human Sciences Research Council in South Africa, the Embassies of the United States, of Canada and of Germany, as well as the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Germany." (Twenty-Third Annual Report, 1990, p. 2). The list covers only a small proportion of sources of funding available for improved intergroup relations in South Africa. The research and public activities of one prominent progressive academic were known to be simultaneously sponsored by the Ford Foundation and the Ayatollah. The practice raises the question of whether organizations and institutions which do have ready access to corporate funding also need to be supported by Canadian public money.

Who supported what often depended on a chance personal contact between the foreign visitor and the organizational representative in South Africa. Donors selected among competing claims not according to clearly established criteria but with a wide margin of discretion. Whether the assistance looked progressive at home and could be well defended against potential critics became decisive features in selection. Sponsors also favoured established organizations with proper bookkeeping procedures although the recipients were seldom held accountable for all expenses. The more prestigious the name of the recipient, the easier and larger the support and the less the need to document the trust with specific results.

Canada followed a questionable policy against supporting any projects associated with homeland structures, which were considered South African government-supported and therefore unacceptably tainted by Apartheid. Yet it was in the impoverished rural areas that foreign assistance was most needed. For example, students from the homeland based universities were penalized by the Canadian stigmatization of their institutions, although these students, on their isolated campuses, would have benefitted even more from the foreign contact than their city-based counterparts. The Canadian stance led to the cancellation of a long-standing arrangement with the liberal Institute of Race Relations to administer the Canadian scholarship program in South Africa. The Institute refused to comply with Canadian conditions that scholarships could not be awarded to students at the four homeland universities. It considered it double discrimination and incompatible with its principles of equal treatment of all South Africans.

The Canadian policy stemmed from the fear of giving indirect recognition to the illegitimate Bantustans. However, since the independence of the homelands has never been accepted by any foreign government and the homelands were always considered parts of South Africa, this fear was unfounded. Indeed, it could be argued, as the Institute of Race Relations did, that spurning homeland students meant *de facto* recognition of the very government-imposed separation that Canadians hoped to avoid.

One of the oldest and most effective diplomatic devices to keep in touch with local politics and cultivate its leading actors were receptions and dinner invitations. These gatherings on extra-territorial ground assumed particular importance in a society where social mixing by members of different racial groups was taboo at one time. There was even a legal prohibition against serving alcohol to Africans until the mid-1970s. At the height of Verwoerdian Apartheid in the early 1960s only the Americans gave frequent multiracial parties for a liberal subculture that offered few other opportunities for formal interracial contact. South African government officials at this time would not attend gatherings where members of other racial groups were present. Therefore, the British held two racially separate receptions on the Queen's birthday. During this period the Canadians, together with the other law-abiding and etiquette-conscious European embassies, did not even bother to

A Comparison of Canadian Diplomats in South Africa With Their Colleagues From Other Embassies—by a Canadian Official

"In many respects Canadians were the most active of all in South Africa. The Swedes too had a highly activist stance—more so than us in their support of the ANC in Lusaka. However, within South Africa they often assumed a lower posture, perhaps because of their concern about being thrown out. They of course had only minimal direct contacts with the Pretoria government and thus did not make the same impact as we did in protesting directly to ministers or to senior DFA officials. The Australian posture was similar to our own but they seemed to be less generously funded in implementing various anti-apartheid programs within the country. The Americans, especially during the time of Ambassador Perkins, were

quite involved but had less success than we did in gaining acceptance by the activist community, and were probably a bit more cautious because of the ongoing implications of "constructive engagement." The Germans were well behind the rest of us, probably partly because of their substantial economic stake. There were also important personal differences of outlook among their embassy staff, whereas we Canadians had the advantage of having a very like-minded team. I think the unique feature of Canadian involvement was the hands-on involvement of the minister, which for instance ensured that embassy staff were hand-picked for their commitment and thus always on the run."

cater socially for representatives of the non-white population. When parliament was not in session in Cape Town their social circle was mainly limited to Pretoria, because they did not maintain consulates in the other three major cities (Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban) as the US, Britain and Germany did at all times. However, since the late 1970s, the stiff atmosphere of racial segregation has relaxed and it became fashionable for all diplomats to have hosted the leading local black bourgeoisie, including politically controversial figures.⁵ Such was the new-found importance of diplomatic dinners for hosts and guests alike that at one stage the UDF leadership made a decision to boycott all social contact with British representatives to protest against Thatcher's policies on South Africa. With a later more relaxed etiquette, it was not unusual to find PAC activists demonstrably clad in well-worn sweaters chatting confidently with white establishment figures in black tie outfits, and an ambassador fuelling the conversation with provocative questions. A Canadian official confided that more recently he deliberately invited members of the Conservative Party who could hardly follow through with party policy not to have any contact with their black opponents once they were closetted around a dinner table at the embassy. "In any case, they both discovered their common South Africanness after a few drinks" (Personal Interview, 13/5/91).

I. THE DIALOGUE FUND

One of the most imaginative and effective Canadian projects in South Africa is the Dialogue Fund. It could be called the flagship and pride of Canadian activity in the field. It was only launched in August 1988, following the CFM meeting which tried to implement the October 1987 Okanagan statement by the Commonwealth Heads of Government to "take advantage of any opportunity to promote real internal dialogue." The fund started with \$640,000 in 1988/89 and was increased to \$1.8m in 1990/91 with \$2.3m earmarked for 1991/92. Currently, it is ably

5 Earlier, then Prime Minister Vorster had posed for the first time in the company of two female Malawian diplomatic dinner guests. When asked whether he had enjoyed his unusual but attractive company, he replied "no," but he "had to do it in the interest of the country."

administered by Alena Schram, whose husband John Schram is "Minister Councillor," the second ranking person in charge of the 10 person Canadian diplomatic staff in South Africa.

In an External Affairs press release, the fund is described as "designed by and for South Africans." It offers "assistance to the alternative press; funding for events bringing together South Africans of different races to learn about each other and discuss a common future; support for human rights and professional organisations trying to break down the barriers of Apartheid; and promotion of the idea of a non-racial future through the arts and popular culture." Requests for up to \$10,000 support are approved locally. Higher amounts are referred to Ottawa where approval of an embassy recommended project is, generally, a formality. A report and accounting are expected after completion of the project.

More than 210 projects had been supported by the Dialogue Fund by 1991, mostly in South Africa. These mainly included assistance for conferences by a wide spectrum of political and church organizations, schools, students and professional groups. University research centres and institutes for political education are also heavily represented among the programmes, both for equipment, staff salaries and travel costs. The fund supported the legal defence of the editor of an alternative paper, *Vrye Weekblad*, against whom charges of defamation had been laid by a Lieutenant General of the South African Police. Filmmakers received funding for political videos; so did a fledgling Afrikaans intellectual magazine for the dissemination of 500 complimentary copies to selected opinion-makers for one year; the South African left in-house journal *Work in Progress* also benefitted from Canadian assistance, as did a progressive theatre and even a heavy metal rock group. "Progressive Afrikaner rock music is one of the most effective ways of getting through to Afrikaner youth about the need for change in their society," reads the official justification, which sounds like a confirmation of Brechnev's form of paranoia about the subversive influence of Hollywood on insufficiently indoctrinated minds.

These slight question marks behind some projects notwithstanding, the majority of the grants made a substantial contribution towards strength-

ening civil society in South Africa. Canadian funds empowered fledgling independent public institutions and initiatives that are the foundations of democracy. They were selected with sensitivity for the politically feasible and relevant endeavours of the day and administered with a minimum of red tape. Having made a close scrutiny of the Fund and some randomly selected projects within it, we can fully endorse the views expressed by former Canadian ambassador Ron McLean:

The Dialogue Fund proved to be the most effective tool we had. It was flexible, quick-acting, adequately funded, and enthusiastically and intelligently implemented—especially by Alena Schram. I think it made a greater impact than any other program, Canadian or Foreign, in South Africa. I believe we called the shots about right—projects were highly activist but just enough back from the provocation line to ensure we weren't permanently closed down by the P.W. Botha regime. I think it, or something similar, will be needed for some years, perhaps even after the election of a free government, at which point human rights concerns will not magically disappear. I still think the policy we applied in South Africa was the right one. Perhaps we should have moved even sooner to get a sensitive and flexible program like the Dialogue Fund in place.

In 1990/91, \$498,000 of the \$1.8m budget was spent in Canada and other countries with the bulk of \$395,000 going to the Ottawa-based Southern Africa Education Trust Fund to "support legal and constitutional training programmes" and visits to Canada by South Africans "for the purpose of research, seminars and consultations with similar Canadian groups and individuals." The "Nelson Mandela Fund of Canada" received another \$30,000 in 1990 "to support establishment of a structure to inform Canadians about the situation in South Africa." The Centre of Criminology at the University of Toronto was allocated \$50,000 to free one of its faculty, Clifford Shearing, for much needed advice on the professionalization of the S.A. police. In evaluating all these sensible projects and the motives of those who approved and implemented them, an objective and a subjective aspect need to be distinguished.

In objective terms, the Mulroney government's activist policy in South Africa amounted to a sophisticated cooptation of its critics, as will be discussed later. It preempted much of the usual opposition by exceed-

Reflections by a Canadian Embassy Official

South Africa was above all a moral issue and it gave all of us at the embassy great satisfaction to know that if we got ourselves exposed when standing up for what was right we would be backed up by the minister and (despite its normal bureaucratic cautiousness) the department. Our frustrations were that despite our best efforts we weren't always able to achieve as much as was needed to stop the abuses and to right the wrongs. Children were still imprisoned and the downtrodden tortured. It was all extremely stressful and depress-

ing. In the darkest days of 86 and 87 and 88 we could only hope that we were making some impression, but frankly there wasn't much evidence of that. None of us dreamed that the reform breakthrough that started with F.W. de Klerk's emergence was so near at hand. Compared to the South Africans themselves we foreigners were always marginal players despite our occasional pretensions, but even so it was enormously satisfying to know that we had at least done what we could in the circumstances to further the struggle!

ing the expectations of critics in rhetoric, worthy projects and money allocated to combatting Apartheid. In the subjective experience of those who implemented the policy, its obvious progressive effects overrode anything else. The embassy staff on the frontline and their bureaucratic back-up in Ottawa felt involved in a common moral commitment. They shared a rare sense of satisfaction and achievement in fighting a universally endorsed worthy cause. Former and current members at the embassy in Pretoria convey this spirit most vividly and realistically when questioned about successes, failures and frustrations.

Surprisingly, the imaginative Dialogue Fund has hardly been publicized in South Africa or in Canada, although almost every project is a fascinating story from many angles. The unjustified low profile of Canada in South Africa is partly due to the embassy not publicly advertising the existence of the fund for security reasons, but also not holding competitions with clear assessment procedures. Instead, the fund administrator responds to requests for assistance by people who take the initiative to seek out the embassy or who have been informally encouraged to do so. This may have the unfortunate side effects of reducing some applicants to a somewhat demeaning beggar status and favouring

those with contacts and grantsmanship skills. It also leaves considerable discretion to the embassy staff as to who and what is being funded among competing claims.

If there is any criticism of the many worthwhile projects supported, it is not political bias. Although the major share of the fund went to ANC associated persons or institutions, rival movements such as the PAC and AZAPO or affiliated groups also received assistance a few times, though not Inkatha. To what extent a foreign agency interested in fostering dialogue should go out of its way to also engage groups outside the negotiation process, is a complex issue, particularly if the projects are structured entirely by the South African recipients. The embassy does not influence how the money is spent, once a request has been granted.

Perhaps inevitably, an overwhelming amount of assistance has been spent on city-based organizations and there has been a tendency to neglect the rural areas where 50 percent of South Africa's population lives in much starker poverty. With a few laudable exceptions⁶ the focus on more accessible and literate urban structures has merely repeated what has been the dominant trend of most development aid elsewhere in the Third World. While a good case can be made that change in South Africa has to originate in the First World urban sector, there has been a noticeable relative failure to include the traditional sector and their embittered opposing youth in dialogue programmes. Relatively little has been done to address the political violence and extreme social disintegration which has befallen many rural and semi-urban districts. The

6 Among the Dialogue Fund projects a few rural-based initiatives can be found. For example, the ANC-aligned "Congress of Traditional Leaders of SA" (CONTRALESA) received assistance in 1990 as did some joint urban-rural programmes, particularly in Natal. Canadian support was helpful for advocacy groups that tried to prevent the forced removal of squatter communities, such as the Association for Rural Advancement (AFRA, Natal), Grahamstown Rural Committee, Southern Cape Against Removals, the Transvaal Rural Action Committee (TRAC) and the Surplus Peoples Project in the Western Cape. Assisted by liberal whites with access to the media, these initiatives mainly relied on publicity and legal action to protect squatters. A particularly promising attempt by American NGOs was launched by "Sister Community Projects" to twin threatened communities in South Africa with communal sponsors in the United States and, to a lesser extent, in Canada.

greatest need for improved intergroup relations lies in the remote hinterland. Here, "witches" are sometimes still burnt, initiation rites are re-sented, and corrupt tribal authorities hold sway together with authoritarian teachers and bewildered parents.

Canadian activity is not only concentrated in the cities but more specifically in the more privileged and bureaucratically developed First World urban institutions. Each South African metropolitan area consists of extremes of misery in huge squatter camps, hostels and townships on the one side and affluent sophistication, at par with any counterpart in Toronto or Vancouver, on the other. Too many Canadian supported efforts are confined to the latter; too few projects ever touch the inhabitants of Khayelitsha, Inanda or Crossroads, despite the claims of most project applicants to benefit all the peoples of the land. This does not necessarily result from deficiencies in the selection process but reflects the 'natural' communicative affinity of applicants and donors compared with the social isolation, illiteracy and underdevelopment of the real have-nots. Inasmuch as squatters or hostel dwellers are unlikely to find themselves at diplomatic receptions where the famous and powerful of all colours dominate, they can hardly be expected, in the ordinary course of events, to be among the recipients of foreign largesse. Yet the vast squatter communities and dispersed rural settlements too have interlocutors, albeit without proper dress, speech, typewriters or telephones. These disadvantages should not lead to exclusion. While there are limits to the organizational capacities of a small diplomatic staff that ordinarily has to rely on established organizations, insistence on some inclusion of the marginalized underclass could perhaps be considered in negotiations of future contracts. For instance, conference organizers could be expected not to hold all workshops in hotels or office buildings in the city, but also to reach out into dilapidated schools and church halls and leaking structures in the townships, or at least provide transportation for the silent majority.

Too often the Canadian-sponsored conferences are a nearly all male affair. Insistence by the donor that women's participation must be given priority could go a long way toward ensuring that deeply entrenched patriarchy, in the ANC no less than in Afrikaner society, is undermined.

All contracts could stipulate that conferences and workshops are expected to provide child care services as a matter of routine, which not even the large gatherings ever do.

In its assistance to church groups, Canada has exclusively dealt with the established mainstream churches. Some have taken an explicit position on political issues: the South African Council of Churches broadly aligned itself with the ANC opposition and the Afrikaner Calvinist churches, at least until recently, with the ruling establishment. It was useful to encourage dialogue between the two camps, and the agonizing soul searching among Calvinists has clearly borne some fruits. However, the majority of religious South Africans do not belong to either of the above camps but to the independent African and evangelical churches. Their clergy do not attend diplomatic gatherings but they do make their observances and perform dances in colourful robes in backyards and empty lots on Sunday afternoons. These are the churches of the servants and the uneducated and unemployed, the spiritual and material self-help organizations of the downtrodden. Since these "Zionist" fundamentalists represent the majority of the black population, and are in greater need of assistance than the educated bourgeoisie, Canadian outreach ought not to ignore them. If their voices are unheard in the corridors of power, that may mean the corridors are too high above the ground.

In summary, foreign assistance generally focuses far too heavily on elites. It needs to be oriented towards mass benefits. For example, for the price of one university scholarship or sponsored visit to Canada, a mass literacy campaign can reach far more people with greater benefits. Only when these constituencies are empowered as well, can elite accommodation really work. Long-term stability is endangered by merely expanding elites. New masters are created rather than the state being transformed. It would be a cruel irony if the foreign efforts toward democratization were to fail in this way.

Together with a reorientation of foreign assistance away from elites, the question needs also to be asked whether even the colour-blind Dialogue Fund should not incorporate an affirmative action component in the form of a deliberate tilt towards black-led organizations. For

Criticism of the Dialogue Fund by a South African Recipient

A more serious criticism is that it would appear that those who make the decisions as to who gets what and how much are guided by submissions made by organizations. This obviously is one way of allocating resources, but I would have thought that a government of the size of Canada and with its declared interests in South Africa, would be more proactive. By that I mean I think there ought to be someone or some small group who would do their own research on the ground, assess the needs, the efficiency and accountability, of potential grantees.

It would also make more sense if the Canadian decision-makers could focus more narrowly and more deeply on specific areas so

that their funding is not so widely dispersed. For example, if constant assessment and reassessment is made in consultation with key people in South Africa and critical observers in Canada, it ought to be possible to focus on two or three key areas. Quite a lot of money is given to one-off conferences, workshops, seminars. Important work can be done in this way, but there should also be more consideration for long-term projects which will go more to the heart of the needs in South Africa right now. There seems to be any amount of money for conferences, workshops, books, etc. on constitution-making. So that is not an area that I would recommend for further assistance. Where there does seem to be a need, and few people are giving enough attention to it, is the building of a democratic culture on the basis of strengthening civil society.

example, of a sample of 26 projects that the embassy had recently supported under the Dialogue Fund, the Canadian Education Fund and the Canada Fund, submitted randomly at our request by the administrator of the Dialogue Fund, (Correspondence, Alena Schram, 13 August 1991), 18 listed whites as the director or co-ordinator of the organizations receiving the funds and only 8 had blacks (Africans, Indians and Coloureds) at their head. Most of the recipients, particularly on the white side, were well established academic or legal institutions rather than what could be called grass-root organizations. This may well reflect the better grantsmanship, accountability and bureaucratic access of liberal "establishment" institutions than any bias on the part of the embassy. Nonetheless, the bulk of the Canadian money distributed ends up bene-

fitting both white and black elites who can add to their computers and secretarial staff, can buy additional furniture and equipment or have their air tickets paid for yet another conference. It seems increasingly doubtful whether this constitutes the optimal way to distribute funding in South Africa in the future although the Dialogue Fund with a different focus should be maintained. Some assistance in grantsmanship could be made available to legitimate, deserving groups in need of funding, but lacking the skills to frame appropriate proposals. Provision of guidance and support in grant applications would also serve to extend the range of recipients. Furthermore, one additional minor modification is called for.

It is in the nature of the projects supported that a detailed accounting cannot be given and the funds are mainly allocated on the basis of trust. Optimal use depends to a large extent on the discretion of the recipients. The embassy does not have the resources to control how each dollar is spent. Nonetheless, it would seem wise to issue some guidelines and set clear limits on what is considered appropriate expenditure. For example, Canadian-supported conferences were sometimes held in expensive country resorts (Mt. Grace; Valley Lodge—"Your Great Country Get-away") when a university lecture hall would have been a much cheaper and accessible venue, though clearly less comfortable. Guidelines could stipulate maximum daily fees for "transcultural communication trainers," lawyers and consultants. Many South African lawyers in political trials have for years personally benefitted from their exorbitant fees paid by overseas supporters, without paying anything back to the communities whose cause they valiantly defended. When a South African organization receives substantial donations from abroad, even if they are for specific projects, it should perhaps not be entirely left to its executive how high a salary staff members are paid. For example, the former national director of a Canada-supported political institute earned R150,000 a year (*SouthScan*, 47, December 13, 1991, p. 386) which is ten times the average salary of a secretary or twice as much as a senior academic would earn. Finally, more systematic coordination between the numerous donor countries, foundations and corporations could prevent overlap in supporting similar projects. The Canadian proposal for a donor conference would seem an excellent idea.

II. CANADIAN EDUCATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES

Besides the Dialogue Fund, Canada has maintained an expanding programme of development assistance, aimed at providing educational and training opportunities. The assistance is provided both multilaterally and through NGOs. Canadian official development aid through CIDA amounted to \$5.8m in 1987 and \$7.8m in 1988 at the height of the P.W. Botha regime, and has increased ever since. Compared with similar South African programmes in most other Western countries—particularly the US—Canadian educational assistance is comparatively well funded and professionally implemented, though not necessarily in a politically non-partisan fashion.

The Canadian government is providing about \$15m in aid to South Africa in the fiscal year 1991/92. A large part of this assistance goes to professional and political education, because, as Lucie Edwards⁷ explained, "people need to be trained now to assume key positions of responsibility in a non-racial government. Work needs to be done today in planning South Africa's long-term relations with its neighbours. South Africans are looking to Canada for help in all these areas."

In 1985, a Canadian Education Program for South Africa (CEPSA) was instituted, consisting of four components. (1) An Internal Scholarship Program for black students, channelled through the Educational Opportunities Council (EOC), aimed at assisting undergraduate bridging programmes. They were designed to bring the academic standards of disadvantaged students up to university requirements. Another component of the same programme was initially administered by the World University Service of Canada (WUSC) and provided 39 scholarships for undergraduate study over a three year period. (2) The Canadian Education Fund, administered by the Embassy, supports smaller initiatives in teacher training, literacy campaigns, alternative schooling and adult education. (3) A Labour Education Fund was allocated to the Canadian Labor Congress (CLC), the Confederation des Syndicates Nationaux

7 Presentation to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, November 27, 1991.

(CSN) and the Canadian Teachers Federation (CTF) for the training of their South African counterparts in COSATU and NACTU. (4) An in-Canada scholarship programme went to the newly (1988) formed Ottawa-based South African Education Trust Fund (SAETF) under the chairmanship of Archbishop Scott.⁸ SAETF selects and places the scholarship recipients at 180 cooperating Canadian institutions, including governments and the private sector. SAETF accommodates both long-term and short-term training. In its short existence, SAETF has developed a good reputation for innovative responses to neglected area expertise in South Africa. For example, in Fall 1991 it started a month-long interactive workshop of AIDS educators, including not only health care workers but traditional healers from Alberta and South Africa. Between 1988-91 SAETF had sponsored close to 150 South African trainees in a wide variety of fields, not including post-graduate scholarships and "political" visitors to Canada. Since South African educational institutions have traditionally neglected maths and science teaching, SAETF appropriately states that it "will therefore give preference to candidates studying in technical, scientific, engineering, administration, commerce and health fields." However, the areas of 144 trainees so far, listed in Table 10, still reflect an education and social science bias. It is also worth asking whether short-term training in many areas could not be carried out much more cost-effectively in South Africa itself.

The selection criteria of SAETF have been questioned in South Africa, as will be discussed later. At present SAETF states that "candidates are required to have the support of a South African non-governmental organization," which so far have included "liberation movements, women's groups, churches, trade unions, black professional groups and progressive educational and community organizations," according to the Annual 1990/91 Report. However, non-affiliated, politically non-active students who are, therefore, not assisted by the sponsorship of an organization, are short-changed in this selection process. While the task of

8 SAETF had a budget of \$2.2m for 1990/91 and a staff of eight under executive director Paul Puritt. An anthropologist by training with lengthy field-work experience in Tanzania, Puritt worked for OXFAM and the Canadian Labour Congress before joining SAETF in September 1990, replacing Stephen Godfrey, who joined the staff of Joe Clark.

institution-building in South Africa is an important one, it could be asked whether it is appropriate to exclude individuals who choose not to participate in highly politicized public institutions and instead concentrate on their private skill development. At present, active politicization is made a *de facto* prerequisite for foreign career training, which reinforces the ideologically highly charged climate of all spheres of South African life.

Table 10
South African Trainees Sponsored by SAEI, 1988-91

Areas of Training	No. of Individuals
Agriculture	1
Arts and Humanities	4
Communications	19
Education	38
Engineering and Technology	3
Geology, Mining and Metallurgy	2
Finance and Credit	4
Health and Nutrition	2
Human Settlements and Urban Development	4
Law	14
Management and Administration	28
Social Sciences	25
Grand Total	144

4. THE BACKGROUND TO CANADA'S ACTIVIST POLICY: THEORETICAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

"It is South Africa's continued white domination which reminds the West of its colonial past; of its own present racial conflicts; of the painful, growing gap between rich and poor and the failure of attempts to bridge it. We trot on your heels like an old faithful and unwanted hound, reminding you of your past and your obligations." —F. van Zyl Slabbert, 1988 Convocation Address, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, B.C.

Shortly after the Progressive Conservative Party came into power in September 1984, the Toronto SACTU Solidarity Committee published a well-researched and documented booklet with the title, *"Trafficking in Apartheid: The Case for Sanctions Against South Africa"* (January 1985). With almost resigned exasperation, the authors listed several Tory politicians on sponsored tours to South Africa who uttered praise such as "the most refreshing experiment in black Africa today." The authors expected business as usual with Apartheid, or an active policy of material benefit from Apartheid exploitation even worse than the pious anti-Apartheid lip-service of the Trudeau government. "The South African ambassador in Canada, acknowledged as the best lobbyist on the Hill," the authors concluded, "will no doubt find fertile ground among the Tory hordes now in the House of Commons. It will be complicity as usual" (p. 5).

I. LEADERSHIP VERSUS A BUREAUCRATIC AGENCY

As has been widely acknowledged and documented previously, the prediction turned out to be wrong. The Conservative Mulroney government adopted one of the most progressive and activist policies on South Africa among all Western nations. It took the leadership in the Commonwealth on sanctions. Why?

At the risk of personalizing policies and neglecting underlying interests, most insiders who were interviewed stress the crucial role played by the Prime Minister himself. Even an outspoken critic of Ottawa such as Linda Freeman (*CUSO Journal*, July 1990) admits: "The departures in policy on Southern Africa have definitely been made by Mulroney and the PMO (Prime Minister's Office)."

Sociological analysis usually treats a successful political leader as a mere mouthpiece of his/her constituency. Leaders are considered interchangeable. The leader articulates sentiments of followers rather than instigating them. Therefore, it is argued, analysis must focus on predispositions of supporters rather than on the power of the leader. However, since a constituency frequently holds only vague attitudes on many issues, leaders do crystallize and shape opinions. There is a particular scope for leaders when the constituency is split or ambivalent about an issue. More interestingly, the strong influence that the Prime Minister personally exercised over Canadian policy on South Africa, his "emotional involvement," allows some theoretical conclusions about the role of the chief executive versus bureaucratic politics in foreign policy decisions.

Since Richard Neustadt's (1960) *Presidential Power*, and Graham Allison's (1971) *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, a bureaucratic interpretation of decision-making has become the dominant paradigm among North American analysts. This conventional wisdom views the power of a President/Prime Minister/Chief Executive Officer (CEO) as severely limited by a bureaucratic web on which he/she has to rely. Organizational necessity and bureaucratic interests determine policy in a context in which the civil service often acts more as foe than ally of the CEO. Interdepartmental competition is compared with the diplomatic struggle among contending nations. Sections of the bureaucracy negotiate, bargain and compromise with each other so that in the end a policy decision from the top is implemented only in a diluted and compromised way or sometimes sabotaged altogether. As Allison (1989:93) puts it, "a considerable gap separates what leaders choose... and what organizations implement." According to this conventional wisdom, policy formulation is easy but it does not guarantee policy

implementation. It is "determined chiefly by organizational routines, not government leader's directions," Henry Kissinger (quoted in R. Art, 1989:443) confirms: "...the outsider believes a Presidential order is consistently followed. Nonsense. I have to spend considerable time seeing that it is carried out and in the spirit the President intended." Administrative feasibility and not the substance and content of policy, therefore, it is argued, should be the focus of policy analysis. An institutional context in which the organizational, personal and political agendas of competing bureaucracies do not necessarily reflect the values of the chief executive—if empirically correct—must indeed be taken as the central determining factor.

The organizational imperative also implies that "complex organizations must settle for satisfactory rather than optimal solutions" (S. Krasner, 1971). The paradigm absolves the CEO of ultimate responsibility for failures that are essentially not under his control. The democratic process of choosing and holding leaders accountable for their policies is undermined by the deterministic attribution of outcomes to a nameless and faceless machine. Without the assumption of rational decision-making among rational state-actors—however different their values and basis of rationality—ethical judgements are replaced by technocratic imperatives.

Pursuing such political and philosophical implications of the bureaucratic conceptualization of foreign policy making is a separate task not to be undertaken here. Rather, the Canadian case study can shed empirical light on the accuracy of the bureaucratic paradigm. Canadian policy on South Africa under the direction of the Prime Minister can ideally test the conventional wisdom of bureaucratic interpretations in a real situation.

According to various "insiders" accounts (Personal Interviews, 3/10/90; 14/10/90; 13/11/90; 5/10/91), the sanctions policy initially had to be forced by the Prime Minister on a reluctant bureaucracy in 1985. External Affairs at that stage was hardly interested in South Africa and "Joe Clark could not care less." One person involved spoke of "bitter exchanges" with senior External Affairs officials about the text of a

crucial speech and characterized the department as poised "to impede, block and distort" in what amounted in this view to "an obstructive travesty" (Personal Interview, 5/10/91). Linda Freeman (*CUSO Journal*, July 1990) writes of Mulroney as having "faced down the opposition of External Affairs civil servants reared in the ideas of the past, committed to the earlier policy, which was to complain about Apartheid while continuing to take advantage of better-than-normal trade and investment opportunities."

One insider conveyed the view that many senior bureaucrats in External Affairs displayed a distinct lack of enthusiasm for the Commonwealth which they considered to be "a waste of time." Since South Africa was tied up with the Commonwealth, it was also seen as "a soft option," while the real interest of the Prime Minister should be "playing with the big boys" in the Group of Seven in their dealings with global economic issues. They could not understand why a government should become so "emotionally involved" in a far away moral issue, from which the party "had nothing to gain domestically." Indeed, the Prime Minister himself was said to have pointed to the paradox that those who supported him enthusiastically on South Africa would most likely not vote for him anyway.

Why has a conservative Mulroney embraced the anti-Apartheid cause? Were personal reasons more decisive than political calculations? Almost each of our interviewees provided a different explanation. One foreign policy analyst pointed to Mulroney's "Irish working-class background" and the "Irish sympathy for the underdog." Others mentioned the Africa policy as "one of those idiosyncrasies of an otherwise cynical and manipulative mind" while another academic referred to Diefenbaker's influence on the young Mulroney, together with the much more thought out position of the "Red Tories." There is the perception among some academic analysts that Canadian foreign policy cannot afford to oppose Washington on any *major* issue, while Apartheid provided a rare opportunity to define Canadian conservatism in opposition to Reagan. Apartheid allowed the symbolic assertion of Canadian independence where it did not really matter, according to these observers. One prominent liberal politician who was interviewed conceded Mulroney's per-

sonal anger about Apartheid, but added that, in the light of the weak Canadian links with South Africa, "there was also a certain amount of shrewd calculating" despite opposition from within the Tory caucus and the senior civil service.

Yet in all accounts of insiders, Mulroney's personal commitment overcame the initial bureaucratic inertia. Even severe critics of the Prime Minister who are not members of his party, sound like hagiographers when discussing "Brian and Mila's stunning convictions" on racialism in South Africa. Most attribute the source of his attitudes to his close friendship with Mugabe and Kaunda as well as the president of Senegal. Close associates emphasize how frequently Mulroney consults with Mugabe and Kaunda "who also picks up the phone at any time and asks for grain which he then receives instantly." It was they who counselled against a complete break of relationships which the Prime Minister was ready and, by some accounts, even keen, to initiate on several occasions. The African leaders thought it wiser if Canada kept a monitoring presence and supportive role in the Apartheid state, much to the relief of Canadian diplomats who were increasingly motivated to justify their controversial presence in Pretoria with progressive involvement. Mulroney's personal detestation of Margaret Thatcher, (whether preceding or resulting from her intransigent anti-sanctions stance seems irrelevant), is said to have spurred his resolve further to assume the moral leadership of the Commonwealth and shed his "underdog role."

Critics like Linda Freeman (*CUSO Journal*, 1990) have said that "Brian Mulroney *does* look good" but only in comparison with Thatcher, Reagan, Bush or Kohl. The African heads of state who praise Canada, she charges, have their reference group wrong. Instead Canada should be compared with the Scandinavian countries or even the US Congress, behind which Canada has lagged on sanctions and in timing. Freeman points out that "the US Congress has been the leader in the West on the sanctions crusade since the 1984-86 uprisings in South Africa." However, it was precisely the intense American debate that also spurred the Canadian bureaucracy into action. Several Canadian politicians felt that it was not compatible with their progressive self-image that they should be out-radicalized by the US on Apartheid. As one participant at an

External Affairs roundtable remarked in 1985: "We cannot afford to crawl in the shadow of the Americans on such an important issue of human rights."

How then are such strong convictions by the Chief Executive translated into policy implementation without the cooperation of a sceptical bureaucracy? It may be shown that Freeman's (1990) statement that "External Affairs has been a brake on Clark, who is, in turn, a brake on Mulroney" is a somewhat static assessment of the evolution of a policy that soon brought both External Affairs and the Prime Minister's Office in line with each other. There is considerable evidence that External Affairs staff, particularly those with lengthy exposure to the South African reality at the embassy in Pretoria, were in the end, even more committed to activist intervention than its original proponents. Yet respected academics like Cranford Pratt insist that Canadian "policy must be set in the context of a department that was seriously disinterested" before 1985. That departmental opposition to a strong policy on Southern Africa, in the assessment of the Pratts, continued and "by 1986-87, succeeded in placing a brake on the PM's initiatives" (Personal Interview and Correspondence, 21/11/91). Success of such opposition would imply that it was openly or tacitly supported by Clark and senior officials. What evidence exists that Clark or John Schioler, the then head of the Southern African Task Force, or others were brakes on Mulroney?

According to most Ottawa observers, the image of a stalling External Affairs and a pushing Prime Minister amounts to an incorrect projection into this issue of the earlier rivalry between Joe Clark and Brian Mulroney over the party leadership. If there was any issue on which broad agreement prevailed from the beginning, it was Apartheid. Close associates speak of the "partnership" or "one of the few bonds" that made both see eye to eye on South Africa (Interviews, Ottawa, 31/10/91, 1/11/91). Both Mulroney and Clark spent an extraordinary amount of time on South Africa at the expense of other foreign policy concerns. This caused some consternation among the desk officers of those departments that did not receive proportional attention to their perceived importance.

The perception of an opposing External Affairs may also have been created by the department's attempt to liaise on sanctions with the affected businesses, reflecting Clark's desire "not to burn his bridges with the business community" and to act as a "balance wheel against the more impetuous statements" of the PM, as one insider of the time remembered it. For example, the head of the Southern African Task Force was dispatched to explain to Canadian executives the need for the new South Africa policy. Moreover, some External Affairs officials resented the direct access of outsiders to the PM, particularly Stephen Lewis, whose "extravagant prose" and refusal "to brook any amendments" they deplored as the professionals in charge (Personal interview, 14/2/91).

All External Affairs officials interviewed, in contrast to most Canadian academics and Stephen Lewis, stress the equal involvement of the minister and his staff. A senior insider who is a member of the opposition Liberal Party, praised the "consummate skills" of Joe Clark, "who ran the policy, rewrote speeches and often ignored the warnings of his officials" (Personal Interview, 4/11/91). This informant emphasized that the South Africa policy was not put together by bureaucrats, but had the persistent endorsement of both Mulroney and Clark. Admittedly, Joe Clark "had to look over his shoulder in order to keep up to the mark or the issue would have been taken out of his hand." When some slippage occurred at External Affairs, this informant attributed it not to political opposition on the part of officials, but to bureaucratic bungling, the fact that the department was understaffed, and that many people were involved who, moreover, frequently changed their administrative responsibilities. Others pointed out that Joe Clark had the unenviable task "of coping with the PM's franker statements," obviously referring to Mulroney's 1985 UN speech. This was described as a "high-wire-act." One official felt "haunted" by the speech for a long time, because the department was constantly criticized for not following through with the promised total break of relations. The key exception to the prevailing accord then was obviously the Prime Minister's 1985 UN speech in which he unilaterally threatened the potential total break with South Africa and with which most External Affairs officials did not agree. However, associates attribute even such major policy divergences to differences of

style rather than substance between Mulroney and Clark. It is said that the former comes to the same conclusions "by heart," and is more obsessed with the personalities involved, while the latter is more inclined to draw "on the analytical facilities of his bright head" (Interview, 1/11/91).

On the basis of all the evidence available, including private correspondence with Joe Clark and participation in several roundtable sessions at External Affairs between 1985 and 1989, there did not appear to be any serious rift between competing bureaucracies at this point. Joe Clark, in particular, was at all times keen to entertain new ideas on how Canadians could practically assist in the demise of Apartheid. The very calling of the roundtable sessions over the years, and the considerable resources allocated to the task force, bear out this interest.

The emphasis on interdepartmental rivalry by critics stems partly from surprise that "the government stole the flag of the NGOs on Apartheid," as one analyst admitted, but also from the need to explain why Ottawa then did not go all the way to meet the expectations of its impatient anti-Apartheid constituency. The assertion that External Affairs stalled falsely treats a huge institution as a monolithic entity when differentiation within the bureaucracy and within its hierarchy is realistically predictable. It is unrealistic to expect complete unanimity on such an emotional issue. The degree of unanimity however—despite strategic controversies within this broad consensus—nonetheless stands out as the overriding characteristic of the senior bureaucracy and public and party opinion in Canada. In few other Western countries, with the possible exception of the Scandinavian states, has an activist anti-Apartheid policy developed into such a mainstream creed with so few detractors. It is futile to speculate whether government pronouncements inspired Canadian public opinion (or instigated it, as South African officials assert), or whether government policy merely caught up with an outraged public.

Krasner (1989:424) has rightly pointed out that bureaucratic analysis axiomatically assumes "that politics is a game with the preferences of players given and independent." This static picture is misleading for two

main reasons: (1) a chief executive can also select staff of his or her own conviction, rely on experts from outside the organization and thereby partially circumvent a hostile bureaucracy; (2) an intransigent civil service can itself undergo a learning process, given the right incentives, and change from an adversary to a supporter of the leader's policy. Both processes have occurred between 1985 and 1990 during the evolution of an ever more activist Canadian policy on South Africa.

The Prime Minister's activist policy was greatly assisted by newly selected appointees who did not all come from the professional ranks of the bureaucracy, but articulated the new shift with the same credibility as the chief executive himself. Stephen Lewis's surprise appointment as the Canadian Ambassador to the UN was initially celebrated as a brilliant coup in having one of the most articulate and morally committed politicians project Canada's progressive image to the world. In addition, the new policy was ably backed by respected luminaries such as Roy McMurtry, the former High Commissioner of Canada to London where he chaired the Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa, or the Conservative Party stalwarts Walter McLean and Flora MacDonald, who had each developed a long-standing interest and expertise in Southern African affairs. Ted Lee, the Canadian ambassador to South Africa until 1986 had gone out of his way to support the efforts of the Eminent Persons Group. The new Canadian Ambassador, Ron McLean, embodied behind a gracious old-world demeanour and conservative appearance, an astute sense for responding imaginatively to the new realities in South Africa. He quietly cultivated contacts and unobtrusively broke new ground that no Canadian ambassador before had dared to tread.

Nor did these initiatives pass unnoticed. The Prime Minister used the then head of the North-South Institute, Bernard Wood, as his personal emissary to the heads of government of the frontline states to convey his anti-Apartheid policy and was reinforced by Wood's advice and progressive vision. Finally the extensive involvement of Archbishop Ted Scott, the Canadian member of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group and former primate of the Anglican Church in Canada, ensured that the policy had the highest blessings of the Canadian Churches and brought in their wide network and effective activism. For the first time NGOs

were included in the consultation, and some allocated considerable resources.

In addition to these pressures, the voices of organized labour and the independent Left in various anti-Apartheid organizations deserve special mention. The Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) has played an active role in the movement as a member of multilateral organizations (Commonwealth Trade Union Council, CTUC; International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, ICFTU), as a lobbyist of political bodies and through direct assistance to Southern African trade unions.

In 1984 at the ILO conference in Geneva, Shirley Carr refuted the traditional arguments against isolating South Africa in the hope of effecting peaceful change. The "Committee on Apartheid," which Carr chaired, concluded that, "the role of trade and foreign capital and of investments and loans to the South African Government [is] an important element in maintaining and strengthening the Apartheid regime" (*Canadian Labour*, 29(7):8).

On April 18, 1985, CLC president Dennis McDermott, John Harker and Paul Puritt met with Joe Clark to urge Canada to put "some muscle behind the [foreign] policy review now underway" (*Canadian Labour*, 30(5):8). At that time they noted that the CLC was prepared to endorse the ICFTU's call for selective disinvestment and specific boycotts and to support the CTUC in countering South African propaganda in the Commonwealth. They also called for the Code of Conduct reporting to be made mandatory.

In 1986 at a South African Women's Day rally in Toronto, Carr said that the CLC supports sanctions on the understanding that black workers in RSA are, "prepared to live with or die from, if necessary, the consequences" (*Canadian Labour*, 31(7):8). She noted that Canadian job loss would be minimal and that the CLC counterparts in COSATU and CUSA, "want us to see that they [sanctions] are imposed—comprehensive and mandatory" (*ibid.*). The CLC's position also involved supplying aid to frontline states. Such aid was to comprise food and other forms of

material goods and attempts to see investment to South Africa redirected to the frontline states in order to lessen their dependence on South Africa.

In her February 27, 1987 address to a special UN committee, Carr called for a "total economic and diplomatic boycott" (*Canadian Labour*, 32(3):9), of South Africa. She noted that Mulroney had recently said he may be prepared to invoke such measures and she indicated that the CLC would push him in this direction. At that same time Carr said that she was, "rather proud of the role played by Canada within the Commonwealth and the United Nations against Apartheid" (*ibid.*).

With reference to direct CLC involvement in the area it may be noted that the CLC has maintained close links with trade unions in South Africa for some time. In 1983 the CLC received a CIDA grant to provide seminars and fellowships to members of black trade unions in South Africa dedicated to "high-level union staff development" (*Canadian Labour*, 28(10):6). This programme was run in partnership with FOSATU and CUSA. In 1985 a CLC organizer went to assist Bata employees who had recently joined the National Union of Textile Workers in their bid to persuade management to recognize the union (*Canadian Labour*, 30(7):12).

Highly vocal and committed anti-Apartheid pressure groups of academics, students and South African exiles served as constant reminders of the deficiencies of Canadian policy. Among these independent initiatives on the political left, the Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa (TCLSAC) stands out. Since the 1970s it had inveighed against "the duplicity which characterizes Canada's official policy towards the brutal white-minority regimes" (TCLSAC, 1979:29), particularly Canada's support for the colonial policies of its NATO ally Portugal until 1974. From an implicit socialist vision, TCLSAC and other anti-Apartheid activists went further than church groups by not only deploring Canada's "sub-imperial role" but challenging the linkage between corporate interests and the liberal philosophy that purported to legitimize this role. "Clearly the moralistic and legalistic rhetoric of conventional liberalism serves Canada's powers-that-be primarily as a source of slogans readily adaptable to the needs of the moment" (TCLSAC,

1979:44). A bi-monthly journal of TCLSAC, *Southern Africa Report*, regularly published since 1985 under the guidance of York University political scientist John Saul, served as a strident voice for consciousness-raising outrage and calls for action. The Toronto mobilization was complemented by similar groups with a lower profile in many other cities, such as CIDMAA in Montreal or the strife-torn "Southern African Action Coalition" in Vancouver.

In External Affairs, a special Task Force on Southern Africa had been informally assembled by Fall 1985 and formally established by Spring 1986 to support Canada's involvement in the Eminent Persons Group. It was first headed briefly by Eric Bergbusch, succeeded from the summer of 1986 by John Schioler, a former Canadian ambassador to Egypt and Zaire, who left the foreign service in November 1989 when Lucie Edwards took over the administration of Southern African policy. It was the low-key, modest Schioler who prudently headed the Task Force during the height of the P.W. Botha repression and the evolution of the activist policy. Edwards, who enjoyed the advantage of South African field experience during three years at the embassy in Pretoria, dealt more with the subsequent period of Apartheid's formal abolition and its persistent legacy. The Task Force had 16 members at its peak in 1987, 14 when Edwards took over in mid-November 1989 but had declined to 7, including one secretary by November 1991. In February 1992 the Task Force was phased out or officially "reorganized" in a new division of responsibilities for different areas of Anglophone Africa. Edwards left to join the Middle East section.

Many of the younger civil servants both in Ottawa and in South Africa had been educated in a different tradition and exposed to activist influences that gradually turned an entrenched bureaucracy towards a new direction. The South African contingent was "handpicked." Under the prodding of the Prime Minister's Office, and the leadership of Joe Clark, External Affairs officials engaged in a learning process. In order to keep their status as foreign policy experts, senior civil servants had to develop new expertise. Had they refused, they would have looked incompetent and unprepared, as happened when they could not rebut Thatcher's figures about Canadian hypocrisy at the 1987 Commonwealth Confer-

ence in Vancouver. Increasingly frequent and heated exchanges in the Commons required that conservative MPs have well-prepared arguments about South Africa to answer an ever more morally outraged opposition. External Affairs scheduled several half-day roundtables on South Africa for its upper hierarchy which were chaired by the Minister himself. A motley, small group comprised of ambassadors to the region, senior civil servants from different departments, CIDA brass, NGO leaders, journalists and academic experts were invited for the free-for-all, think-tank sessions. For the first time, Joe Clark himself was exposed to reasoned alternatives which he found increasingly attractive as well. Starting as a total newcomer to South African issues, who in 1985 did not know what "influx control" meant, he gradually became one of the better informed and personally interested as well as morally committed anti-Apartheid campaigners. The transformation of a reluctant bureaucracy was reinforced by daily news from South Africa about increased repression at home during Botha's state of emergency and destabilization abroad.

It is noteworthy that the opposing lobbies from South Africa acted with vastly differing efficiency during this crucial period. The South African Embassy in Ottawa and individual Canadian bureaucrats kept each other well abreast of minute manoeuvrings. For example, the Embassy was informed about all the arguments of each participant of the roundtable sessions the next morning, although the meetings were supposed to be confidential. Not so the ANC representative and most other activists who kept aloof from these discussions or even looked askance at them with bemused disdain.

The ANC permanent representatives in Western States, including those in Ottawa, often lacked the diplomatic skill required to utilize a sympathetic civil service and public opinion in their host states. Ed Broadbent pointed out (Personal Interview, 3/10/91) that in his experience, the Pretoria diplomats proved far more successful in putting their case across, despite the widespread scepticism towards their official line. The explanation for the failure of the ANC to fully exploit a just cause abroad lay not only in the poor training or personalities of the South African exiles. The entire ideology of the ANC, and particularly the

SACP, predisposed them to view Western governments as secret allies of Pretoria. Rhetorical condemnation of Apartheid notwithstanding, Western officials could hardly be trusted. A general scepticism towards the "centres of imperialism" prevailed, often reinforced by local activists who condemned the Ottawa and Washington administrations for their own reasons. In this atmosphere, ANC representatives generally adopted a defensive stance. They waited until officials came to them rather than going out to put their cause to "imperialist segments" which were far more receptive than they realized. This self-imposed withdrawal only changed in the late 1980s when Ottawa and Washington officially hosted ANC president Oliver Tambo and publicly recognized the ANC as crucial to the South African solution. In particular, the affable Thabo Mbeki with his articulate, unorthodox charm gradually became the darling of the North American media and some influential forward-looking US foundations. Even Chris Hani's first visit to the US in 1991, sponsored by the discredited American Communist Party—as was an earlier visit by Joe Slovo—could not taint the media's image of a successful liberation movement, after North America had triumphantly embraced an unbanned Nelson Mandela a year earlier.

In some ways, the strong support for the ANC also represents an unconscious correction of past mistakes. Western governments are guilty, although that may not always be a conscious realization, of not supporting the liberation movements when they needed it most after their banning in 1960. The newly-exiled knocked in vain on many Western doors, including Canada's. They turned to Eastern Europe only as a last resort for organizational survival. Their close alliance with orthodox communist governments in a Cold War atmosphere subsequently provided a further rationale for ignoring the ANC during the 1970s and early '80s. It was only when the resistance inside South Africa mounted and the long-term stability of South Africa as a Western outpost became impaired, that Western governments began to take the alternative seriously.

Since 1987, several government critics complained that the "steam had gone out" of Canada's South African policy and that Ottawa was displaying "sanctions-fatigue." Former UN Ambassador Stephen Lewis

charged: "It is clear that Canada washed its hands of the leadership on South Africa" (*Globe & Mail*, May 12, 1989). Linda Freeman (*CUSO Journal*, July 1990) maintains that since the Vancouver Commonwealth Conference in October 1987, "Canada started stalling on sanctions." CUSO executive director, Chris Bryant, diagnosed that the Mulroney government "had lost its earlier enthusiasm for the struggle against Apartheid" (*Globe & Mail*, May 11, 1989). The accusations stemmed more from disappointment that Ottawa had not met certain NGO expectations than from an accurate perception of the policy.

The critique that Canada "has repudiated and betrayed the solemn commitments" (Stephen Lewis) made previously is based on three perceived omissions: (1) Canada did not impose comprehensive, mandatory sanctions, but it had never intended to do so in the first place. (2) It did not give support to the ANC directly and exclusively, but at this stage merely recognized the ANC as an important factor among other legitimate anti-Apartheid groups. (3) Above all, Ottawa did not sever diplomatic ties with Pretoria, as the Prime Minister had threatened at a previous UN speech. The Liberal Party in particular, although not the NDP, had made the breaking of all relationships the litmus test of Canadian sincerity and leadership on South Africa.

The NDP repeatedly pointed out that they "felt sorry for Joe Clark" because "he had to go to all these meetings explaining why Canada did not live up to the expectations" raised by the Prime Minister's promise to break all ties. The former NDP foreign affairs critic, Bill Blakie, suggested in retrospect that South African developments saved Mulroney from the test of how far he would have been prepared to go (Personal Interview, 23/10/90). The rejection of comprehensive and mandatory sanctions by Ottawa was taken by the NDP as an indicator that in the end Mulroney's outrage about Apartheid constituted more rhetoric than substance.

Not only did the front line states counsel against severing all ties, but internal South African activists did so as well. The wise policy to continue to monitor and influence South African developments through

the presence of the embassy sheds a particularly interesting light on the manifold factors that shaped Ottawa's stance.

According to most insider's accounts, Canada came very close indeed to cutting diplomatic ties. It had already dispatched a senior diplomat who perceived his task of "winding up the shop" (Personal Interview, 13/8/91). When at the height of resistance and repression in 1987, the clamour for withdrawal reached a peak among the Canadian public and opposition parties, the government's aspirant leadership role in the international anti-Apartheid drive seemed increasingly compromised. According to one official, the South African Task Force, therefore, was ready to recommend a diplomatic showdown when the fate of the so-called Sharpeville Six on death row in Pretoria hung in the balance in 1987. An all-night vigil in Ottawa waited nervously for the outcome of numerous pleas for clemency to the South African State President P.W. Botha. Had the six been hanged, Canada would most likely have carried through its threat of reconsidering ties, this insider speculated.

As it turned out, the continuing Canadian presence in South Africa was increasingly justified by the progressive activities of the embassy personnel in the country. While the external ANC had called on all countries to cut diplomatic relationships, internal activists remained ambivalent. Canadian diplomats routinely attended major funerals as protection against police brutality. Many sat through political trials as observers. Some Canadian diplomats regularly went to Sunday church service in the townships or invited activists to receptions. With such a close identification on the ground, together with hostile warnings by Pretoria to keep their noses out of domestic affairs, the tenuous Canadian link to the outside world was important to many South African activists. Thus, whenever Canadian lobby groups in Ottawa pressed for a diplomatic shutdown, External Affairs officials could retort that the activist priests or union leaders inside South Africa should have the final say on the issue. Since the South Africans could not agree on a common position and most found the diplomatic support, let alone the financial assistance, useful to fall back on, the presence of the Canadian embassy in South Africa was not challenged from within, despite Lusaka's unequivocal stance against continued diplomatic ties. One Canadian offi-

cial even thought that the threat to his continued presence in South Africa did not come as much from the left at home as from Pretoria. An insider at the embassy relayed the mood vividly

I believe that the Minister, Ottawa officials and the embassy staff were all of the view that closing the embassy would seriously undercut Canada's ability to *do* something as opposed to *saying* something about one of the important moral issues of our time. No doubt we in the embassy felt most passionately about closure, but then we had the advantage of being furthest from the domestic Canadian flack! In short, it was a collaborative effort. As you know, we were all pretty close to the danger line on several occasions—even as late as February (or March?) 1988 when the seventeen Anti-Apartheid groups were banned in South Africa.

With this commitment, the Canadian diplomats would have preferred to be thrown out rather than leave on their own, as the Danes had done. In the end, neither happened to the benefit of all concerned.

II. CANADIAN GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS RELATIONS: MATERIAL VERSUS IDEAL INTERESTS

The case of the activist Canadian policy on South Africa disproves the orthodox Marxist conceptualization of the state. This view underestimates the autonomy of the state in "late capitalism." Politicians and bureaucracies, though not quite "the long arm of the bourgeoisie" that Marx conceptualized, are understood to be held captive by their business constituencies which put them in power in the first place. They cannot afford to act against the fundamental interests of capital. Personal values of leading state actors are shaped and constrained by the underlying interests of their class. They are not free agents even if they attempt to be. The famous dictum of bureaucratic analysis—"you stand where you sit"—is applied as deterministically in a reductionist class analysis that ignores the independent dynamics of ideology.

From long-time advocacy of human rights causes, the first director of the "Task Force on Churches and Corporate Responsibility" (TCCR) sums up a similar sentiment that in any crisis situation "corporate Canada becomes the undeclared practioner of real Canadian foreign

policy," because in any conflict between business interests "and a forthright human rights policy, the government tends to favour the former" (Renate Pratt, 1990:104). While such a view provides a safe working hypothesis on theoretical grounds, as well as on the basis of Trudeau's explicitly stated foreign policy, it becomes problematic when it generalizes a past experience to all times and fails to take new constellations into account.

The Canadian case shows that state executives sometimes redefine the long-term interests of their class in direct opposition to the short-term views of their immediate constituency. Although Canadian trade with South Africa has always been small and direct investment even less significant, some powerful Canadian companies were negatively affected by the activist policy. They did not derail it, nor did they even attempt to do so, and the government agenda prevailed. In Marxist terms, a more enlightened faction of capital won against parochial interests that did not care about the survival of the system as a whole. Considerations of global stability and international relations took precedence over immediate profits. Nevertheless, those who had their South African economic interests curtailed were as dumbfounded as traditional left critics by what they termed "that rather surprising fellow-traveller of anti-Apartheid activity of recent years, the Canadian government" (SAR, July 1991).

Surprisingly, Canadian business submitted to the state agenda only partly, as has been charged, "because they didn't lose anything and continued trading." Others may even have gained from the sanctions. Nonetheless, most of our twelve leading interviewees in the Canadian business sector directly involved in trade with South Africa complained bitterly about the policy. They deeply resented the activism and, if challenged on moral grounds, most repeated the argument that sanctions hurt blacks most. Most respondents blamed Joe Clark and Brian Mulroney equally for an "ill-advised policy." They saw little difference between their stances on South Africa. Some even felt that the policy was pushed by Joe Clark, both by his own inclination and with support from the bureaucracy. The "Red Tory" Clark was described as "a little left of centre" and his bureaucracy was accused of "wanting a perfect world."

Others specifically blamed the Prime Minister who carried on "despite opposition from the business community." However, as one leading lobbyist complained, business felt it best not to challenge or test the government policy because of a "concern that Mulroney might prove vindictive if crossed on this matter." This respondent mentioned that business often seeks grants and other forms of assistance from government and it was his impression that "these might cease to be forthcoming were sanctions challenged." Others pointed to the stubbornness of the Prime Minister, who was an able crusader once a decision had been taken. One interviewee compared his attitude on South Africa with his known "fidelity to Israel." Despite the collaboration between Israel and South Africa as pariah states, Israel is exempt from criticism by Mulroney and "can do no wrong." This respondent mentioned the contradiction in Canadian policy between siding strongly with South African blacks but ignoring the plight of Palestinians in Israeli occupied territory since 1967.

The South African charge that Canadian sanctions benefitted certain sectors of the Canadian domestic economy has been supported by several analysts, although it would be difficult to isolate such an advantage as a major motive for sanctions. Rhoda Howard (1988:278) noted that "the ban on steel satisfied the Canadian steel manufacturer's lobby, while the government continued to permit import of metal ores." Chris Brown (1990:219) makes a similar point with regard to the Krugerrand. Its ban in North America and elsewhere boosted the sale of Maple Leaf gold coins worldwide to the extent that it was rumoured that Canada could not produce enough gold on its own to satisfy demand. How far the ban on agricultural products, particularly South African wine, assisted Canadian growers would be difficult to measure since many alternative sources of supply were available. As many countries banned South African coal, Canada's production and export increased and picked up new markets. Undoubtedly, the powerful Canadian resource industry was not averse to the elimination of South African competition, or even welcomed it, while less influential lobbies (the sugar, shipping and electronics industries for example) opposed the selective curtailment of trade. All in all, it would be safe to conclude that while there were costs to certain sectors, these were comparatively small on a

national scale and were offset by both the material benefits to others and the symbolic enhancement of the Canadian image worldwide.

The very similarities between the Canadian and South African economy facilitated the shrinking of trade and investment for economic reasons. Unlike Britain which was dependent on mineral resources and would have lost 70,000 jobs through a total cutoff (Boles, 1988), the more self-sufficient Canadian economy hardly needed to promote trade and investment with a competitor. Payne (1990:189) rightly notes: "In light of Canada's need for investment capital, the government has been far more interested in attracting foreign investment to the country than in encouraging Canadian firms to export to South Africa."

Two cases of business-government dealings on South Africa were particularly instructive and warrant closer scrutiny. The one concerns Bata, which sold its South African shoe factory with 3,500 employees under "intolerable pressure" (Bata) within Canada in 1986. The head office in Don Mills, Ontario had begun to receive pressure since 1983 from public advocacy groups opposed to Canadian firms operating in South Africa. Protests and boycotts of Bata products engendered negative media attention. A company executive suggested that "the conservative *Globe & Mail* contributed to the pressure through a story suggesting that Bata had something to hide" (Personal Interview, 4/5/91). The hassle appeared to the management to have become so strong by 1985 that it became advantageous to consider alternatives.

Although the government never formally requested Bata to sell and had no power to enforce such a request anyway, according to this source, it became clear to management that "the government would be very relieved if Bata were to leave South Africa." The firm had received additional negative publicity from opposition party claims that they were failing to abide by the guidelines of the Canadian Employment Code. In reply, the company pointed out that while it was true that 7 percent of their workforce was not receiving wages in the amount stipulated in the code, 93 percent were receiving wages above code specifications.

In July 1986, Bata appeared before the Common's "Standing Committee on Human Rights in South Africa" to present a submission on the projected effects of Canadian sanctions. Bata had initially declined the request to attend the forum but was subsequently to receive what was interpreted to be essentially a "subpoena" to attend. In the view of the Bata executive, the commission was totally biased in favour of sanctions when it took the opportunity to question Bata's defence for staying in South Africa. In 1986, the organization decided to sell, given the low percent of 3 percent of their worldwide operations represented in South Africa. The action was taken against their better judgement.

Thomas Bata, who was declared the "Canadian Entrepreneur of the Year" in 1991, states in his autobiography¹ that Canadian public opinion and not government pressure persuaded him to withdraw. He considers this "not one of our proudest moments," and concludes, in the end "it came down to a choice between keeping our headquarters in Canada or staying in South Africa. So we decided to sell, and the Canadian government heaved an almost audible sigh of relief." The bad press reports about strikes and low wages of Canadian manufacturers as relayed to the Canadian public contradicted the progressive image that Ottawa had begun to cultivate on South Africa. Even without direct government pressure on Canadian investors in South Africa, "an attitude of hostility in Ottawa," as another businessman complained, made him reconsider his South African links. Like some of their US counterparts, Canadian business people thought it not worth the effort to endure "the hassle factor" and negative publicity.

Bata is also typical in his justification for the desire to stay in South Africa. Multinationals, he argues, operate in many countries "whose regimes aren't necessarily to our liking," and putting people out of work because of this dislike amounts to "an immoral act." In fact, like most foreign investors, Bata, too, had convinced himself that "international business were doing their best to put an end to Apartheid" in addition to "training Africans for leadership roles."

1 Thomas Bata, *Bata—Shoemaker of the World*, Stoddard Publ., 1990.

The Bata story of business-government relations is confirmed by an executive of a large Canadian exporting firm who recalls, to his chagrin, "that he was called twice to Ottawa by Joe Clark" (Personal Interview, 16/1/90) and requested at least not to sell more to South Africa than the previous year. He reluctantly agreed "because you don't oppose government when you work for several large multinationals. Otherwise you risk getting fired." Asked why he did not try to bring pressure on the government in turn, he suggested that "business usually stays away from government." In a vivid simile he described his surprise that the civil service together with the media, particularly the CBC, had become "as pink as a cooked lobster." He could not "fathom where Mulroney is coming from," except that he may be "pandering to the NDP vote" in his one-sided support for the ANC and their aligned "atheist communist party" in South Africa. In his view, Canada should have taken "a middle position of peace-maker like in Cyprus," since the South African issue concerns foremost "minority rights, including African tribes."

Other lobbies complied for different reasons. Unlike the Canadian Exporters Association which encouraged its members to continue with their South African business, the Canadian Importers Association surprisingly took "a neutral position." According to a senior official of the latter Association (Personal Interview, 10/10/91) who himself had "a hard time to understand the value of trade sanctions," at no time did this lobby formally try to influence or pressure Ottawa on the issue, although individual companies were said to be "affected severely." When pressed as to why this unusual neutrality was adopted, this informant explained that "the issue was so fraught with danger." He did not mean to suggest that the association was afraid of being accused of supporting racism had it come out in favour of continued trade relations. Danger lurked in the spectre of disagreement among its members. The Association's primary goal was to preserve as wide a membership base as possible and avoid taking positions on controversial issues that could trigger conflicts and potential loss of members. Obviously, South Africa ranked low among concerns of most members who did not have business relations with South Africa. A controversial stance in favour of a minority group with South African interests would have carried risks within the larger group that the leadership wanted to avoid.

The case suggests a typical example of organizational maintenance overriding sectional interests through the consensus mechanism. Above all, even the affected minority importers from South Africa had little to complain about since they had managed to continue some of their trade without publicity or government promotion. While there were some Canadian business losers from the trade restrictions, particularly among small and medium-sized firms that had specialized in importing certain South African products, it is difficult to quantify the overall costs of trade sanctions for Canada. The import restrictions would not only have to be weighed against the new markets that opened up for Canadian products but also against the availability of equally prized import substitutes from other countries. These were generally available for South African products. For example, if South African fruits or wines of similar quality and price could be imported from Chile, Israel or Australia, the trade restrictions do not amount to a loss for Canadian business, but merely a rearrangement, not to speak of the tiny overall volume of Canadian-South African trade. In contrast, Roy McMurtry and Bernard Wood (*Toronto Star*, 25/4/89) have argued that the measures enacted by Canada imply "substantial economic loss and adjustment for Canadians, lest anyone think that Canadian principle was either cost-free or hypocritical." The assertion of "substantial economic loss" for the private sector and adjustments for Canadians as a whole seems exaggerated. The costs of assisting the change in South Africa were mostly borne by the government through development assistance. Some adjustment, to be sure, had to be made by those companies who sold their South African holdings, due to public pressure. While often made against their better judgements, these disinvestments on the whole were not loss operations. Most of the foreign investments merely changed hands and did not leave South Africa. Many firms which left nonetheless covered themselves by contracting loopholes to benefit through license agreements or buy-back clauses.

The relative insignificance of the South African stake for Canadians combined with the low costs of withdrawal, also accounts for the relative passivity of organized business regarding the policy. Had the activist policy imposed heavy losses on the private sector, a much stronger lobby would certainly have opposed it. Instead, the Canadian state made the

activist policy creditable. The Canadian state did not act on behalf of business in this respect. The policy was initiated by the Mulroney government for political reasons. However, by carrying most of the costs of a creditable anti-Apartheid policy, the Canadian government guarded the long-term interests of the white industrialized North in a potentially resentful South and thereby also benefitted Canadian business in the long run. As Joe Clark frankly stated, in his keynote foreign policy address on Southern Africa to the New York Council on Foreign Relations, on September 28, 1989: "The bottom-line here is as follows: a southern Africa plagued by Apartheid is a southern Africa which is economically crippled. A southern Africa freed of Apartheid would be a southern African open to business."

Apart from the modest costs involved for the private sector, the examples point to the underestimated influence of values in Canadian foreign relations. Government responded to the ideal interests of its staff and the public in conflict with the primarily material interests of business. Which force wins out is not pre-decided. The examples further highlight the considerable autonomy of the modern state in overriding sectional interests. Rather than being "the lackey of business" as the left has it, business sometimes becomes the compliant agent of a determined government. The Marxist interpretation of business-government relations, as well as the bureaucratic analysis of the dependency of chief state executives, underestimates the personal values and resolve of CEOs, as the Canadian policy on South Africa has proven.

The promotion of an activist policy reflected an increased consensus among Western public opinion, mobilized by extensive media coverage of repressive measures since the renewed resistance against the tricameral constitution in 1984. Americans relived on the TV screens their own civil rights struggles, Germans had their fascist history held up in a mirror, and Canadians were uncomfortably reminded of their own unresolved colonial conquest. Dormant values of collective identity and national ethos were suddenly brought up by the imagery of vicious subjugation in the name of the same principles that most Canadians hold dear. Pol Pot's Cambodia, Idi Amin's Uganda or Mengistu's Ethiopia escaped sustained international censure not only because their atrocities

were less accessible to the Western media, but because they represented a different category of rulers outside the Western value system that the South Africans claimed for themselves. Only Apartheid crimes, therefore, directly demanded a Canadian response. The widespread expression of outrage did not depend on whether the Canadian response was effective in reaching its goal or what effect it had in Canada, as long as it clearly distanced Canadians from any complicity with and responsibility for continued Apartheid. Ed Broadbent reflected a widespread sentiment in the House of Commons when he stated: "We might constitute 1 percent of trade with South Africa, but we are not talking about a statistical reality, we are talking about a political reality, a symbolic reality and a moral reality. Whether it is 1 percent, 10 percent or 40 percent, in the final analysis it does not matter that much" (Commons Debates, March 2, 1988, 13316).

The overwhelming support for sanctions therefore does not result from expectations of their effectiveness but expressed, much more, the sheer abhorrence of Apartheid. Doing business with an evil system was increasingly considered an immoral act, regardless of the effect of sanctions. Supporting sanctions affirmed a superior morality. An American scholar (Payne, 1990:173) detects a "missionary zeal common to many Canadians on human rights issues." Whatever the accuracy of such stereotyped national features, there emerged an increasing Canadian consensus that Ottawa should be seen doing something about Apartheid. "Canada owed it to its self-definition," as one interviewee put it.

The Canadian ethos was frequently invoked in the debates on South Africa in the House of Commons. Typical for many similar speeches would be the sentiment of liberal MP Marcel Prud'homme (Saint-Denis) that "Canada is perceived so much as a leader in the whole world" that "people recognize themselves in us" and, therefore, Canada must live up to its image (Commons Debates, June 13, 1986). Prud'homme called for everyone in the country "to suffer a little bit...in order to help our brothers and sisters in South Africa to show them that we, white people, care for them even if they have black skins."

There is widespread confusion or uncertainty about the role of moral values in conflicts with economic interests. One author, Payne (1990:172, XVIII), makes two contradictory statements with regard to the significance of morality in Canadian politics in the same book. He asserts both "the predominance of moral values over economic considerations on the South African issue" and that "moral considerations, however, do not supersede *realpolitik* assessments of national interests, even in countries such as Canada." It is safe and conventional for critical analysts to side with the latter assumption. However, the Mulroney policy throws some doubt on the reductionist, utilitarian explanation. Trudeau's foreign policy—aptly labelled by Clarence Redekop (1985) as "Commerce over Conscience"—shows that the same country can pursue opposite policies within a relatively short time frame. However, Bernard Wood (1990) makes the perceptive point that "it is still quite possible that under the circumstances of 1984 and subsequent years, a Trudeau government or any other Canadian government would have come to adopt similar approaches by dint of the pressures and expectations inherent in Canada's middle-power roles." In short, a unique constellation of circumstances came together to account for the activist policy—from the Prime Minister's personal commitment to an increased consensus in Canadian public opinion, from markedly stepped-up repression in South Africa to pressures on the Canadian government to respond creditably to it in the international fora of the UN, the Commonwealth, la Francophonie and even in the Group of Seven where Canada was expected to carry the torch of the unrepresented Third World.

Canada had discovered in Apartheid a foil to define its own identity in opposition to a racial colonial relic which Canadians could proudly feel they had overcome with an official policy of tolerant, multicultural diversity. In 1988, F. van Zyl Slabbert had questioned this complacent self-righteousness in a convocation speech at Simon Fraser University on Burnaby Mountain. Had Canadians been faced with the same predicaments of a settler minority in a far-away land would they not have behaved in a similarly unjust fashion towards an indigenous majority on whose labour and goodwill they depended? These were uncomfortable questions for the audience. It was better to be reassured by public figures

of high standing that Canadians possessed an intrinsic sense of justness, as so clearly evidenced in their unequivocal actions against South Africa.

In conclusion, in the drive to save South Africa from itself and retain it as a Western-oriented outpost instead of a strife-ridden, impoverished, international problem, Canada played its part. From a one-time mere observer and passive critic, it changed to an active participant in the internal and external affairs of the Apartheid state. Compared with similarly placed and ideologically oriented middle-powers, Canada's involvement in South Africa stands out, according to most indicators, both in terms of the amount of financial assistance, as well as in the quality of imaginative and useful contributions to the empowerment of the excluded and to the advent of negotiations.

This was accomplished both by the officials of External Affairs in Ottawa, the Canadian embassy in Pretoria and by the activities of various NGOs. The NGOs and other anti-Apartheid lobbies had almost replaced the traditional business lobby on South Africa. Instead of the usual bureaucratic warfare between the officials and non-governmental agencies. They co-operated remarkably well on South Africa. NGO representatives were not only consulted by External Affairs but often sought out for policy input and feasible ideas. One knowledgeable academic analyst described the relationship with the succinct remark: "The NGOs never had it so good. They ran into open doors" (Personal Interview, Ottawa, 16/5/91). Others, more cynically, argued that the radical critics were bought off and given sufficient funds for all kinds of pet projects to keep them busy. Partly through their influence, partly through the personal moral convictions of some influential government officials, and partly through the international position of Canada in the Commonwealth, Canadian policy toward South Africa has undergone a radical shift under Joe Clark since 1985. The place of Canada among South Africa's foremost critics was reinforced by the leading role of the NGOs, while some NGOs benefited from unprecedented access to political decision-making and government funds. With such formidable credentials arrayed against them, interests which would have preferred a Thatcher-type Canadian policy towards South Africa never pushed hard for fear of being labelled racist or pro-South African. An External Affairs

insider commented privately that academics always assume that business pulls the string of government. "I honestly wish they did sometimes. We haven't heard from them for a long time as far as South Africa is concerned" (Personal Interview, Ottawa, 15/5/91).

III. THE FUNCTIONS OF CANADIAN INTERNATIONAL ACTIVISM: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES

How far foreign pressure influenced Pretoria is difficult to gauge and impossible to measure. The direct economic impact of sanctions is generally overestimated, compared with the other advantages that the undefeated minority perceived as resulting from the dismantling of Apartheid. Hence, the Canadian assertion that sanctions essentially made all the difference is exaggerated.² The policy changes in South Africa since February 1990 are used to justify and glorify a controversial policy with "successful results" that may not stand up to empirical scrutiny.

A much sounder rationale for the defence of the activist policy lies in its benefits for Canada: (1) The activist policy preserved the Commonwealth as a forum for Canadian influence worldwide. It bridged the racial North-South divide by demonstrating that universal principles can take precedence over other interests. Both kith-and-kin relations as well as profit motives were proven to be of lesser importance than moral values.

(2) The ethos created by the Mulroney government on racial discrimination abroad also spilled over beneficially into domestic affairs. A foreign policy condemning racial exclusion can ill co-exist with tolerance for bigotry at home. The activist policy sensitized Canadians to the more just treatment of ethnic groups in general. It supported an emerging

² See, for example, External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall's statement during her visit to South Africa that "Canada had pioneered the sanctions campaign and helped get democracy talks under way." (*Globe & Mail*, April 8, 1992).

Canadian consensus on sensitive racial issues that even a Reform Party leadership cannot ignore.

(3) The Canadian policy on South Africa by a conservative government which was directly opposed to the policies of ideologically related administrations in Washington and London highlighted a certain degree of Canadian independence from its powerful allies. In particular, the policy allowed Canada to assume the moral leadership from Britain within the Commonwealth and demonstrated that Ottawa can be more than an extension of the United States. It could be hypothesized that the more Canada became integrated into the American empire through the free trade agreement and even more pervasive cultural colonization, the more the need was felt to assert a vanishing sovereignty symbolically. With its stress on moral leadership and peace efforts, Canada distinguished itself from its southern neighbour all the more as its economic dependency increased. The moral crusade at the same time shaped the self-perception of Canadian leaders and their public alike. It cannot be labelled cynical manipulation because its articulators themselves believed in it. The moral self-definition soon developed its own dynamic by generating policies and programmes that indeed lived up to the self-image, at least to some extent.

Unlike the Reagan policy of "constructive engagement" and friendly dialogue with Pretoria, Canada's "constructive *disengagement*" always took the wider impact of the North on the South into account. Ottawa rightly perceived Apartheid as a test case by which the North would be judged in the Third World. While the United States did not have to worry much about its image in the South, due to its self-sufficient might, a middle power like Canada was always inclined to think more internationally. "If we betray the future of a multi-racial South Africa," said Joe Clark in a speech to the New York Council on Foreign Relations on September 28, 1989, "our ability to sustain reasoned dialogue with the developing world will suffer. Our morals will be judged hollow, mere cant disguising greed and self-interest."

Bernard Wood (1990) has pointed out that as a medium-sized neighbour to a superpower, "Canada is both impelled to international activism

and somewhat constrained in that activism." Wood argues that multilateralism—the need to diversify links and pursue strategies of collective action with like-minded partners—has constituted the logical course for a medium-power in the international arena since the time of Lester Pearson. While the US can rely on power, the smaller states have to stress rules as the basis of their influence. Mediation, a preference for compromise and peace-keeping functions, secures most effectively the stake of nations without the means for unilateral self-protection. Hence the traditional much greater Canadian emphasis on the role of the United Nations or the Commonwealth as a forum to be heard. Where Canada is included among the superpowers—such as in the G7 meetings—it sometimes attempted to act as a voice of the excluded Third World, in this instance as the delegate of the frontline States, pleading for sanctions. Kaunda meant to bestow the highest honour on these efforts by calling Canada "another frontline state."

Rhoda Howard (1988:282) notes: "Given Canada's military and economic dependence on the United States, probably no Canadian government would risk American displeasure by actively criticizing US policy towards South Africa." This applies the "satellite thesis" in an undifferentiated way. The image of Canada as a "vassal state" overlooks the fact that colony status also produces quests for greater independence as well as public outrage about the policies of the empire. Kim Nossal (1985:13) has pointed to the questionable assumption of the satellite thesis, "that Canada's capacity for independent or autonomous action in international politics has been all but eliminated by its successive membership in the British and American empires." Clearly, the degree of Canadian autonomy and independent foreign policy capability differs vastly according to the issue and the means of power to be exercised. As with Canadian relations with Cuba, Canadian policy toward South Africa constituted an issue where Ottawa could differ from Washington. While ingratiating itself with Washington has always been the hallmark of the Mulroney government, the close alliance did not rule out open disagreement on South Africa, partly because the American administration was itself split on the issue. By taking the side of the US Congress, Canada showed no disloyalty but, on the contrary, demonstrated far-sighted independence from more short-sighted Reagan ideologues. Howard generalizes the

Canadian dependence to all issues while South Africa precisely allowed a symbolic demonstration of the opposite. If Canada could alienate the British prime minister, it could also entertain a progressive policy, relative to Washington, on such a minor issue as South Africa.³

However, critics of Ottawa also point out that it was precisely the rebuff of Canada's advocacy of sanctions by its mightier allies in the Group of Seven that made the Prime Minister cool his own commitment. Canada, already the economically weakest and demographically smallest partner of the alliance, could not risk its status further by pleading without clout. The Prime Minister, it was pointed out, also had to ensure that he was not considered a "lightweight," that he was taken seriously by his hardnosed, fellow neo-conservatives who were without moral pretensions towards the Third World. Nossal (1988:15) has stressed these limits of Canadian influence in international fora. While Canada was effective within the Commonwealth or la Francophonie, too insistent lobbying for Southern Africa at the Economic Summit of the Group of Seven raised eyebrows which put "the maintenance of Mulroney's influence in summit circles in some jeopardy." As one of the junior partners in the group, Ottawa risks its image of soundness and dependability by falling out of step with the major powers, for whom South Africa is a minor business irritant rather than a moral issue.

The Canadian anti-Apartheid advocacy not only carved out a distinct foreign policy role for Canada, it also served the West by rescuing its non-racial, liberal ethos from itself. Not only did the embrace of the black cause by a progressive international community blunt a potential

3 Scholars like Howard who magnify dependence into a generalized Canadian anxiety, tend to overestimate other motives when arguing that "Canada has a further fear: divestment could open the door to interference in Canadian affairs. If Canada were to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction by legislating withdrawal of Canadian-owned or -registered firms from South Africa, it might become more vulnerable to US extraterritorial jurisdiction over US-owned corporations in Canada." Our probes of motives for Canadian actions or non-actions on South Africa, did not reveal any of these anxieties among any of the interviewees, nor any fear of risking US displeasure. In any case, the US itself legislated behaviour of US firms in the 1986 Anti-Apartheid Act. If the US government would want to interfere more in Canadian affairs it would hardly have to utilize the pretence of Canadian interference in South Africa.

Africanist counter-racism in the Apartheid state itself, it proved to the entire "South" that there can be worthy alliances across the widening gulf.

It seems futile to speculate whether such Western internationalist policy depended on the communist threat as the alternative to be pre-empted. The Cold War competition in Southern Africa clearly spurred those more far-sighted policymakers who saw looming in the identification with one side a disastrous backlash against the entire Western presence in the South. With the end of the Cold War, such considerations may no longer be urgent for a triumphant global capitalism. The absence of this challenge may lull the West again into the complacent amorality that it was forced to confront so dramatically in the Apartheid issue. However, "the mutual vulnerability of South and North," that Ivan Head (1991) outlined so persuasively in his new book, continues and deepens. With its forthright South African policy, Canada has laid the ground for much closer cooperation in other pressing areas, particularly environmental protection.

Beyond these global long-term fallouts, there clearly existed domestic considerations that Mulroney's activist policy had to take into account. The resistance within his own caucus, the business lobby, and the taunting by political opponents on the liberal-left all need to be included when appraising high-profile policy positions. This domestic Canadian background is best illustrated in contrast to the US domestic scene.

Canada, despite being in NATO and a close ally of the US, was never as shackled by the ideologies of the Cold War. There was little talk of Canada's "strategic interests," a concept that dominated US policy. For example, the US would assess a liberation movement first according to its position in the Cold War divide and only secondarily, or not at all, the legitimacy of its cause. Therefore, Canada's interest in sub-Saharan Africa was sustained while the US involvement receded after the Soviet Union began pulling back from Africa in the late-1980s. Washington saw the region primarily as "a geopolitical testing ground," in which it had to secure "strategic parity." For Canada, Africa always was primarily a test case for its own relationship to the Third World and through its

considerable assistance also a test case of Canada's own self-image and identity.

In a major new book on US policy towards Africa, Michael Clough (1991:3) of the New York Council on Foreign Relations concludes: "Neither the President nor any of his senior foreign policy advisers has displayed any real interest in the continent. Instead, they have delegated responsibility for policy toward Africa to mid-level officials with limited visions and no domestic political base." The US response of benign neglect contrasts sharply with the Canadian response. The frequent travel of the Prime Minister and the Minister of External Affairs to Africa is not matched by their American counterparts. Sending Vice-President Quayle to West Africa only added insult to injury for those African leaders interested in US involvement in the continent.

Leading US analysts who have published extensively on US policy formulation towards South Africa consider Canadian policy to be "very positive," more "outspoken" and more "unequivocal" (Personal Interviews, 24/9/90; 9/10/91; 11/10/91). Joe Clark, one observer notes, may have been abrasive at times but everyone clearly knows where Canada stands on Apartheid. In contrast, US policy on South Africa was always "tortured," divided and ambiguous.

The main reasons for the difference between the policies of two conservative parties lie in the domestic politics of the two countries. An ideologically polarized spectrum of lobby groups constrains Washington, even if the administration would want to pursue a more activist policy. Powerful senators aligned with the ultra-conservative Heritage Foundation and various like-minded think-tanks ensure that the administration is not too unfriendly to Pretoria, that Inkatha receives a fair share of financial support, and that even Renamo is treated as a legitimate movement. On the other side, the black caucus and "Transafrika" provide the counterpoint in vocal and unconditional support for the adversaries of neo-conservative interests—primarily for the ANC.⁴

4 There was a short-lived attempt during the Carter administration by UN Ambassador Andrew Young in particular to build up the PAC through scholarships for South African students in the

In contrast to the ideological polarization on Southern Africa in Washington, Ottawa seldom had to face competing lobbies on South Africa. The three federal political parties always saw eye to eye on this issue. Indeed, they attempted to out-perform each other in the condemnation of Apartheid. This widespread political consensus allowed the government to formulate policy on South Africa according to an imagined national interest rather than the diverging view of feuding lobbies. In fact, Ottawa could use Apartheid to express and foster a national ethic of outrage without any dissenting voice daring to contradict it publicly. Thereby the Conservatives pre-empted criticism from the Liberals and NDP that they were in latent sympathy with racists.

Because the Canadian government has taken a clear anti-Apartheid line in the South African ideological contest, constituency conservatives have far less influence than their American counterparts. When a Jeane Kirkpatrick champions the cause of Buthelezi, he can be sure to receive publicity and a hearing from the president. When Conrad Black hosts the same visitor in Canada, even he cannot entice the Prime Minister to receive the Zulu chief.

South Africa became one of the few issues which allowed the Conservative Party to be genuinely "radical" and live up to its progressive label. With this image it could hope to offset conservative politics elsewhere and attract voters from the centre where it competed with its two rivals. Since alienated voters on the right would have to vote Conservative anyway in the absence of "right" alternatives, the activist stance on South Africa was taken without risking defections. Not only was it safe, but the Party could only benefit by attracting new voters with its progressive stance. As with the embracing of multiculturalism against the ingrained sentiment of many old-time supporters, taking a progressive outspoken stance on South Africa paid off in an enhanced domestic

US and similar support. The worldwide diplomatic success of the ANC in the 1980s however, soon overshadowed the predominant AZAPO and PAC sympathies of black South African students in North America and tempted many to realign themselves or face political isolation.

image, given the widespread popular Canadian revulsion of Apartheid and empathy with its victims.

External Affairs officials working on African issues are in regular contact with their counterparts in allied governments, particularly the US, Britain and France. They frequently exchange information on what they consider their area of strength in Africa. A senior Canadian official felt that External Affairs had a distinct and recognized advantage through their in-depth knowledge of Southern Africa, due to Canadian fieldwork on the ground as well as Commonwealth membership (Personal Interview, Ottawa, 15/5/91). Canadian analysis would be informally swapped and compared, for example, with US officials, in exchange for information on Ethiopia or Angola where Canadian knowledge was thought to be weak. In one of those exchanges, the Canadian asked the French counter-part whether they had direct contact with their local anti-Apartheid movement. The response was "no," since "all French anti-Apartheid leaders were communists or socialists and as a socialist government we know them well anyway." The French official was apparently surprised to hear that the Canadian anti-Apartheid movement was led by conservative churchmen and strong anti-Apartheid policies were advocated by a right-of-centre conservative party.

Identical anti-Apartheid policies of Western states often resulted from different domestic constellations and political cultures. For example, a Scandinavian diplomat confided that the equally strong anti-South African policies of his government were based on an informal division of responsibilities that left foreign affairs with moral appeal to the eager socialists in return for their non-interference in domestic affairs, which were the domain of the conservatives. The conservative diplomat rather liked this arrangement because his embassy in South Africa benefited from the ready funds, while at the same time the more important domestic issues were protected by this distraction. In Canada, the domestic constellation accounts for a different and more unified approach on South Africa.

Bernard Wood (1990:287) points to Ottawa's calculation, "that Canada's economic stakes in South Africa, in terms of trade and investment,

were just large enough to represent some leverage on Pretoria and would also imply enough potential sacrifice that Canadian moves would have some credibility with those who had larger stakes." If there was indeed such an assumption, it was mistaken. It overestimated Canada's clout. Analysts among Canada's allies in the US and Britain unanimously expressed the opinion that the very absence of Canadian sacrifice enabled a more activist policy. These respondents stressed that the UK, Germany, and to a lesser degree the US, had to tread more carefully because of higher stakes in their economic relations with South Africa. Canada, they emphasize, could afford the grand gesture more comfortably, because it had little to lose domestically and much more to gain in international credibility. This perception particularly prevailed in South Africa. Canada's sanctions were flatly dismissed as symbolic, even opportunistic since the restriction of South African goods from competing markets would only benefit Canadian producers. Given that Canada's trade and investment figures in South Africa represented well under 1 percent of total Canadian trade and investment abroad, it would be difficult to argue against the charge of symbolism. Canada certainly did not possess much economic leverage with Pretoria, Canadian expectations to the contrary notwithstanding.

However, the activist Canadian stance achieved a considerable psychological impact. It confirmed anew the pariah status of South Africa. When "a white Commonwealth country with a conservative government from Diefenbaker to Mulroney could consistently take such a hostile position towards a war-time ally," one leading South African National Party interviewee admitted (Personal Interview, 14/8/89), "it confirms our isolation. We may have to re-examine how we make ourselves acceptable." The Canadian and Australian hostility deepened the sense of universal ostracism in the Apartheid state. More than the American or Third World pressure, which could be dismissed as inspired by black solidarity and racial antagonism, it was the rejection by the Dutch, the mild criticism by the Germans, and the isolation by the Australians and Canadians, probably in that order, which penetrated deepest into the Afrikaner collective psyche. Joe Clark (Address, September 18, 1989) once stated, that if words won't work, "there is no better target than the pocket book." It was an illusion that Canada could reach effectively into

the pocket book of the Apartheid state. However, Canada was most influential in forging the alliance of ostracism of South Africa whose psychological impact, in the end, may have proved more effective than economic cost-benefit calculations.

Economic sanctions diminish the capacity of a state to conduct war or to sustain minority rule by the costly expedient of offering material inducements for cooptation. The rationale for sanctions is based on weakening a regime to the extent that it acts in its own interest by altering its policy. Such sanctions are effective when the target is weak and the goal remains limited to inducing a policy change rather than a reversal of government. This is clearly expressed in the Canadian axiom that Canada's policy aims at "bringing South Africa to its senses, not to its knees."

However, the target of sanctions may easily redefine the motives of its adversary. The target group may perceive sanctions as a threat to its very survival. If a government under sanctions succeeds in defining a conflict in terms of maintaining an identity or conducting a holy war for ideological reasons, material punishment is often ranked less important than symbolic and idealistic goals. In such a situation the outside threat may strengthen internal cohesion and resolve to resist it at all costs. Groups under siege are also known to have preferred collective suicide to surrender.

The Western imposition of sanctions against South Africa rests on the economic rationale outweighing ideological considerations. It assumes rational cost-benefit calculations on the part of the adversary. This expected material rationality may well turn out to be a Western cultural predisposition which does not necessarily apply to nationalist conflicts or religiously perceived struggles. If people are ready to die in order to retain and defend an identity, even severe material punishment will not deter them. The implicit economic reductionism in the assertion that sanctions will always work needs to be reconsidered. People have ideal as well as material interests, as Max Weber reminded us. Contrary to capitalist and Marxist assumptions, ideal interests remain a powerful force on their own. Not everything is for sale. There are stubborn

ideologues who do not have a price. The intransigence of Israel's right-wing government in spite of foreign pressure, though not through sanctions, constitutes a sober reminder that particular regional interests can withstand powerful global pressures.

South Africa succumbed to its internal and external challenges and irreversibly changed course. This was possible, because the South African internal domestic conflict was not about incompatible values but about the unequal distribution of power and privilege. Unlike Israel, the Apartheid state had no ethno-religious ideology to defend, only a universally discredited racial system to transform. This transformation is negotiable between peoples of similar outlooks and values. Unlike the antagonists in Israel, the white and black South Africans bargain as mutually recognized citizens of the same country. They are bound together by a common economy, and therefore rule out nationalist secession or partition. Canada, together with many other progressive states in the international community, has assisted in forging an atmosphere of negotiations.

5. FROM CONFRONTATION TO NEGOTIATION: DILEMMAS OF TRANSITION

"What right has the West, what right have the whites anywhere to teach us about democracy when they executed those who asked for democracy during the time of the colonial era?" — Nelson Mandela in Nairobi, 14 July 1990.

One of the more striking aspects of South African society is that the abolition of formal Apartheid passed almost as a non-event. In contrast to what has been universally described as the "dramatic" turnaround on February 1990, the new reality of legally unregulated race relations was born nearly unnoticed in South Africa.

I. PROSPECTS FOR A HISTORIC COMPROMISE

There are several reasons for this remarkable transition from formal Apartheid to informal stratification. Many Apartheid laws had already been largely ignored and remained unenforced. The reality of integration in some city housing, in English-language universities and private schools, but above all at the workplace, rendered the laws obsolete, long before they were formally abolished. No influx control measures, for example, could stem the flow of rural migrants into the cities in search of jobs and better living conditions. Repealing contrary laws simply verified social trends that had outpaced ossified regulations. Therefore, little or nothing changed under non-Apartheid conditions.

In the absence of formal political power of the disenfranchised, the dominant minority remained unthreatened. Many whites now wondered why they had not supported the policy change earlier, since the immediate benefits outweighed the potential dangers. On the basis of non-Apartheid, South Africans were admitted to places hitherto closed to them: from participation in the Olympic movement to freer travel and

landing rights for South African Airways, whites were rehabilitated out of a deeply resented outcast status. Now they could hold their heads high again. The desired normality had returned without the sky falling in. The secret to the growing white approval rate of de Klerk lies in the realization that the dominant minority could continue to dominate without costs attached. Normalcy for whites returned despite the lasting abnormality from the legacies of Apartheid. Few ruling groups in history have ever wriggled themselves out of a deadly predicament more elegantly. On top of it, the world praised and rewarded the change for what should have been normal policies and intergroup relations in the first place.¹

A surprising 68.7 percent of South Africa's 15 percent whites in a 85 percent turnout supported a negotiated abolition of their minority rule in a referendum on March 17, 1992. Such rational foresight in a seemingly irrational racial conflict has been universally hailed as unprecedented in the annals of politics. The same cabinet ministers and Afrikaner National Party that presided over the implementation of Apartheid in defiance of the world a few years ago, now act as democratic reformers with a two-thirds support of their constituency.

Faced with the choice of a beleaguered siege economy, the ruling group opted for a sharing of political power with its main opposition, the ANC. In the process it redefined its boundaries from an exclusive racial group to an inclusive ideological party that in future may even count on substantial support of like-minded black conservatives. Thereby the dwindling white minority did not set itself up as a resented target (as whites did with guaranteed racial group representation in Zimbabwe) but as a potentially even more powerful and legitimate force in a broad coalition government of national unity. Whites, therefore, did not vote "to transfer power" to blacks, as the media reported, but only to democratize a system in which they will remain major stakeholders.

1 For an account of how the conservative de Klerk himself underwent the metamorphosis to an anti-Apartheid policy, see the biography by his brother, Willem de Klerk, *F.W. de Klerk. The Man in his Time*, Cape Town: Jonathan Ball, 1991.

With the ANC strong only in symbolic support—but weak in its bureaucratic resources, military capacity and economic control—substantial real power will still remain in the hands of the present establishment, Mandela as president notwithstanding. For a long time, the South African civil service and the army, let alone the economy, will have to rely on white skills, capital and goodwill, regardless of the government in power. Unlike Gorbachev, de Klerk will not be swept aside by the liberalization that he unleashed. He would have been, had he not pre-empted revolution from above under rising pressure from below. De Klerk differs from Gorbachev in that he (1) presides over a reasonably functioning, albeit depressed, but potentially buoyant industrial economy, (2) is not confronted by powerful secessionist forces, except a weakened right-wing and (3) has a democratic mandate from his constituency for the reform policy.

The apparent political miracle of a privileged minority voluntarily agreeing to give up exclusive political representation started much earlier than the March 1992 referendum or even the rise to power of de Klerk and the release of Mandela two years earlier. Apartheid the gigantic Verwoerdian dream of social engineering—had increasingly proven a dismal failure despite all the zealous efforts of its advocates in power. Its rising internal and external costs, both real and symbolic, led to halting, ambivalent moves to reform since the late 1970s under the hardline Prime Minister Vorster. His successor P.W. Botha essentially continued the reluctant liberalization without being able to break with the racial paradigm and blind anti-communism. It was the end of the Cold War that made negotiations and compromise between implacable ideological foes possible and imperative for both sides. Unlike the Middle East or Northern Ireland, no religious values impede bargaining over power and privilege in South Africa by pragmatic elites who are no longer constrained by dogma to adjust to new realities.

Nationalists made it repeatedly clear that negotiations would not be about surrender but power-sharing. F.W. de Klerk (*Cape Times*, 13/4/90) insisted that “those who arrogantly equate the concept of a new SA to a takeover of power, the message needs to be transmitted loudly and clearly that the new SA will not fall prey to a section of the population

at the expense of the rest." He emphasized that "we will not accept a dispensation in which the quality of existing liberties and rights are dismantled." His constituency, de Klerk asserted, was "not prepared to bow out apologetically from the stage of history" and predicted that whites would still play a "key role."

What made the message more widely acceptable now compared to its rejection earlier was not only widespread relief about the departure of the scowling autocratic P.W. Botha in favour of the smiling worldly de Klerk. The apparent absence of outside pressure was also important. When the Eminent Person's Group tried to initiate negotiation four years earlier, its efforts amounted to a virtual stillbirth from the outset. Being seen as giving in to outside pressure was the last thing a wavering government could afford, faced with an unprepared electorate.

However, even in 1986 Pretoria came close to embracing alternatives. Sections of the National Party and the cabinet, particularly the Department of Foreign Affairs under Pik Botha, had seriously considered the option of negotiations at the time of the mission of the Commonwealth Eminent Person's Group in Spring 1986. Letters had gone out via Foreign Affairs to Washington and European capitals that Mandela could be released, provided the Western powers were to back South Africa in any ensuing internal strife. The secret Broederband, under its new head Pieter de Lange since 1983, had circulated a document about minimal conditions for future Afrikaner survival, culminating in the sentiment that "the greatest risk is not to take any risks." However, as the scuttling of the EPG mission by the South African bombing of frontline capitals on May 19, 1986 proved, the hardliners in the security establishment won out over the "softliners" in Pik Botha's Foreign Affairs and Chris Heunis' Department of Constitutional Development in the internal power struggle. The time for liberalization was not ripe given Cold War mentalities. Until the securocrats were deprived of their ideological weapon of a communist/ANC threat and were themselves party to the transition, P.W. Botha's administration was not ready to travel the final road, particularly under foreign prodding rather than under its own steam.

Moreover, during the 1980s, South Africa's rival intelligence services vied for dominance in the National Security Management System and State Security Council (SSC) on which P.W. Botha relied as his base. The old Bureau of State Security (BOSS) under the omnipotent General Hendrik van den Bergh had become discredited in 1978 in the wake of the notorious information scandal and was reorganized as the National Intelligence Service (NIS) under the 31-year old political science professor Niel Barnard in 1979. NIS differed from the smaller but Botha-favoured Department of Military Intelligence (DMI) by defining the main threat as internal to the country while DMI saw it outside its borders as a communist-led onslaught. DMI engaged in destabilizing the Front Line States in order to deprive the ANC of forward bases, while NIS favoured a more diplomatic approach, as evidenced in the 1984 Nkomati non-aggression accord with Mocambique. It was the special forces in DMI with its hit squads and assassinations that lost out in the emerging politics of negotiations.

Already in 1986, the Minister of Justice had dinner in his home with the imprisoned Nelson Mandela. Leading members of the Broederbond, including the older brother of de Klerk, had met since late 1986 secretly with ANC officials in London, particularly Thabo Mbeki, Aziz Pahad and the then ANC head of intelligence, Jacob Zuma. The much publicized historic Dakar meeting of a large group of internal South Africans with external ANC leaders, organized by F. van Zyl Slabbert's and Alex Boraine's IDASA, set the trend for the next three years, culminating in the unbanning of the ANC in February 1990, after even P.W. Botha and F.W. de Klerk held several meetings with the imprisoned Mandela.

Part of the official denunciations of dialogue with the ANC prior to 1989, the intrigue and rivalry surrounding it, stemmed from the intense bureaucratic competition over who would control the future inevitable negotiations. Access to Mandela, for example, became a highly prized asset. Kobie Coetsee as minister of prisons refused permission to his senior Colleague Chris Heunis to see Mandela, so that he and his protégés and not Heunis' department could be in charge. Barnard's NIS withdrew the security clearance of two senior officials, Kobus Jordaan and Fanie Cloete in Heunis' department. They were considered too

liberal for having engaged in independent efforts of dialogue with the ANC, as did a host of other organizations, following the successful Dakar example.

In February 1990, the mandate for negotiations received just four months earlier, the government could now move boldly without jeopardizing seats. In any case, since another election under the tricameral constitution was quietly being ruled out, the government could stake its long-term chances on the success of negotiations.

Without considering here the complex, multi-faceted causes for the shift in strategy, the self-explanation is interesting. The National Party mouthpiece, *Die Burger* (February 5, 1990), invoked historical character traits—"the Afrikaner's desire for freedom"—as lying "at the root" of this switch: "The knowledge that their own desire for freedom may not involve the permanent subservience of others compels the continent's first freedom fighters now—only 80 years after Union—to take the lead in the quest for the joint freedom of all in the country." There was no perception of defeat, or coercion by outside pressure, or admission that the new policy had to be adopted in order to regain entry into the world economy. On the contrary, supreme self-confidence reigned among Afrikaner policy planners who congratulated themselves for grasping a unique opportunity to exploit the end of the Cold War. Sanctions were hardly mentioned as the decisive trigger for the change. This view points to the increased self-confidence after the scare in mid-1989 when the country's reserves apparently were down to 3 days of obligations. "What was crucial in the Cabinet's calculation was not the threat of sanctions but the government's belief that the economy would beat them and would survive risky political experiments which the unbanning of the ANC undoubtedly is."²

The dramatic change, presented at the same time as a moral shift and verified by the long stalled Namibian independence, caught the opposition and the international anti-Apartheid forces by surprise. Normally

2 H. Gilliomae, *Weekend Argus*, 24/2/1990.

well-informed analysts totally misjudged the dynamics of white politics and the determination of de Klerk to introduce a universal franchise, which increasingly gained the support of the white electorate. George M. Fredrickson³ stands for many with this false prediction in Fall 1990: "In the unlikely event that de Klerk agrees to move directly to one-person-one-vote, it is almost certain that he will lose the support of most whites and that the right-wing Conservative party will come to power and attempt to reestablish full-fledged Apartheid, thus making a racial civil war virtually inevitable. This might happen even if he concedes less than that." The majority of whites did not desert de Klerk, nor is the right-wing likely to obtain power, despite de Klerk's direct move to a one-person-one-vote system.

In an intriguing comparative analysis Donald Horowitz⁴ detects in South Africa a unique feature: not only a conflict between divided segments as in other plural societies, but "a conflict over the nature of the conflict"—what he calls a "metaconflict." Horowitz overemphasizes the cleavages in South African society. In reality there are only three irreconcilable positions on the present conflict. First, the extreme right-wing position of secession in a racial white homeland. While the disruptive power of armed ideologues must not be underestimated, the secessionist project has little chance of gaining establishment support, because it runs counter to business interests in an integrated economy. Since South African business, including Afrikaner capital, needs, on the one hand, to be part of the global economy and, on the other, is dependent on the willing co-operation of black labour, it would also be hostile to a military takeover. This distinguishes South Africa from Latin American regimes. Second, the Africanist/socialist position of no negotiation until the regime is defeated and ready to transfer power. This would be a threat only if negotiations were to fail. Third, the emerging National Party-ANC alliance, which is more solid than Horowitz realizes. The ANC leader-

3 George M. Fredrickson, "The Making of Mandela," *New York Review of Books*, September 27, 1990, 20-28.

4 Donald Horowitz, *A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.

ship, including its South African Communist Party members, have moved close to a social-democratic economic compromise.

The simultaneous opening of state-controlled television to a more objective and freer reporting benefitted the New Nats in several ways. It demonstrated to their constituency the power of organized black opposition by having whites exposed to normal politics. Showing blacks not only in the traditional service roles or as destructive rioters but acting as citizens with reasonable leaders acclimatized a sceptical master race to the necessity of negotiations as equals. Furthermore, the publicity given to black demands as well as to extremist right-wing rejection of these demands allowed the government to position itself in the centre as the reasonable middle ground, holding the country together. Conservative Party leader Treurnicht's ranting against the white sellout not only confirmed the new-found impartiality and objectivity of the broadcast service but also helped convince the huge black audience that the negotiation project was not a new neo-Apartheid trick to perpetuate white rule in disguise.

Stephen Cohen (1991) has theorized the process of any conflict resolution as a cumulative ladder of four stages: (1) the begrudging acceptance of the adversary as an unavoidable fact, (2) mutual recognition of each other in a legal context, (3) interaction with the other as fully equal in status, and (4) partnership in a common post-conflict environment in which defined roles are shared. In 1992, South Africa has moved into the third phase with a likely "semi-permanent, interim" coalition constituting the fourth phase. Both antagonists see themselves no longer as victims, but in Cohen's phrase, as "creators of new realities." A cluster of fearful attitudes has shifted to a syndrome of hope among those participating in negotiations. If those clinging to the *status quo* can have their fear/hate cluster reduced as well by the process, they may wish to join at a later stage, rather than being marginalized, as the wavering Conservative and PAC/AZAPO elements indicate.

The historic compromise increasingly takes on more concrete features. Economically the ANC is likely to settle for black board representation, progressive taxation, equalization payments, equity ownership

and joint ventures rather than nationalization. It is only worth capturing the "commanding heights of the economy" if the heights have not been flattened by further economic decline. Anything more than a social democratic compromise towards drastic redistribution would flounder on the current power of the establishment to withhold the economic benefits from socialist political victors. All evidence points to the gradual embourgeoisement of the black middle-strata. The ANC leadership acts as their reluctant, posturing but ultimately complying representative, because the spoils of entry into hitherto closed realms are real. The strong left within the South African opposition will try to block such neo-colonial accommodation, but fail to prevent it. It will split from the old Congress alliance and form the new opposition.

Theorizing this new alignment has to come to grips with the now self-evident fact that some of the former victims of racial discrimination increasingly join the realms of power in perpetuating class domination. In this sense, South Africa has become normalized like other Western societies where exploitation is colour-blind. Instead of waiting for racial capitalism to change into non-racial socialism, a new multiracial nomenclature will likely share relative privilege at the expense of an increasingly marginalized underclass. This has been referred to as the 50 percent solution in South Africa, since the other half of the population is short-changed in political representation and influence. The National Party constitutional proposal, for example, envisages a double vote for people owning or renting property. In the ANC executive and voting constituency, migrant workers and unemployed are equally underrepresented.

In short, South Africa is heading towards a corporatist state where business, state bureaucrats and unionized labour in the form of the ANC/SACP/Cosatu alliance agree among themselves about the basics of an unwritten contract at the expense of the unorganized and weaker sections of the population. Electorally that may well be expressed in the substitution for elections of a series of appropriately worded and pre-tested referenda. This legitimizes the stake of the major players without risking unpredictable outcomes that could lead to a declaration of civil war by the losing side.

The ANC has been far more open to compromise than its detractors had ever expected. Mandela bluntly invokes the special historical circumstances to woo his opponents: "We have to address the fears of whites and we should go beyond the mere rhetorical assurance in order to address structural guarantees which would ensure that this principle will not lead to the domination of whites by blacks" (*Sunday Tribune*, May 19, 1991). While reaffirming that the political party with the most votes should form the government, Mandela assured his Stellenbosch audience, in Afrikaans, that all principles, democratic or otherwise, can be bent. "Having regard to our background it may not be enough to work purely on one-person, one-vote because every national group would like to see that the people of their flesh and blood are in the government."

This principle dovetails with the National Party notion of mandatory, constitutionally entrenched participation of minority parties at all levels of political decision-making, including a statutory, collective presidency. This does not amount to majority rule in the traditional sense, but represents a notion of democracy that rests on a wider, compulsory participation by major interest groups. Whether it will paralyze decision-making and thereby preserve the *status quo*, remains to be seen. Undoubtedly, a power-sharing arrangement, and not the rule by the majority party alone, will be the only achievable outcome at present, short of civil war. It is this context that the theorists of the ANC as an exclusive "government-in-waiting" overlook. The ANC could only become the sole government if it were able to defeat the opponent. Pretoria is under little pressure to surrender. Neither has the ANC the intention any longer to declare war, and, by its own admission, the capacity to inflict defeat.

As Guillermo O'Donnell (1988) has pointed out, corporatism is not a static concept but changes from country to country. The semi-fascist corporatism in Latin America differs vastly from a "corporatist" social-democratic accord in many Western European states. The role of the state in particular depends on the country's historical experience. The eurocentric bias by many Western scholars often overlooks these particularities outside the Western horizon. South Africa's main interest groups may well negotiate such a unique "democratic corporatism" in both the economic and political realms. Indeed, as Denis Beckett (*Front-*

line, May, 1991) has editorialized: The country has no successful models to follow, "only failures to avoid." South Africa needs to pioneer a course of its own. Most indicators show that South Africa's historic compromise is proceeding remarkably well in both the economic and political arenas. Fond of quaint British analogies, a South African free market advocate⁵ concluded that "the space between Mr. Ramaphosa's views and those of Finance Minister Barend du Plessis, it seemed to me, was less than the space between Neil Kinnock and Margaret Thatcher." In August 1990, the Minister of Constitutional Development, Gerrit Viljoen, even declared the government as part of the traditional opposition: "But the government is no longer an Apartheid regime, it is part of the anti-Apartheid movement" (*Monitor*, August, 1990: 31).

Indeed, the new flexibility of Pretoria deprived the ANC of its reliance on the intransigence of the opponent to mobilize against. As Simon Barber (*Cape Times*, 3/4/90) mused: "An opponent who asks so little in return for relinquishing his monopoly of power is almost too easy. How, if you are the ANC or its 'formations', can you mobilize against an enemy that suddenly turns out to be so reasonable that he is willing to treat all your demands as negotiable?" More politically romantic and sensitive ANC members like poet Breyten Breytenbach expressed amused bewilderment: "Most people in the ANC don't seem to have any enemies any more. The other day a friend from the national executive committee of the ANC proudly introduced me to a National Party MP, as though he was some kind of friend. I was absolutely horrified" (*Weekend Mail*, Sept. 14, 1990).

One of the crucial watersheds towards a corporate state was established by COSATU's 1990 decision to join the National Manpower Commission. This participation, although later temporarily suspended, resulted from the successful negotiations of unions with employers and manpower officials over the controversial Labour Relations Act. The accord reached, and subsequently enshrined in law, provided a model of a social democratic compromise. Since the state and employers need

5 Ken Owen, *Sunday Times*, No. 3, 1991.

unions for ensuring stability, the union threat of withdrawal from the National Manpower Commission acts as a powerful bargaining tool against unilateral dictates by state bureaucrats in drafting labour laws. To be sure, there are great obstacles to be overcome and lessons to be learned on both sides.

For example, the ANC-COSATU opposition has challenged with increasing success the government's right to decide economic policy unilaterally. The two-day national strike over the introduction of a new value-added tax in November 1991 was not called because the unions disagreed with the tax in principle but because they had no say in introducing it. The mass actions were aimed at further undermining the legitimacy of the government by proving that it can no longer rule alone, based on a white vote only. Since Pretoria itself admitted that its Apartheid constitution is wrong and needs to be renegotiated, it has also contributed to its own caretaker status. South African business is learning the corporate contract mentality the hard way. Nonetheless, it is reluctantly embracing necessity. The more sophisticated companies also discover new allies. The ANC-SACP is willing to contribute its share to the compromise.

How much the ANC-SACP alliance wishes to achieve an accord and marginalize opposing groups outside its own disciplining structure was demonstrated in what the *South African Labor Bulletin* (November, 1990) labelled "the most high-profile dispute of the year." In a bitter strike of workers against their union's policy of centralized bargaining at the Mercedes plant in Port Elizabeth in 1990, the ANC, SACP and NUMSA lined up with management in opposition to the strikers' demand for factory-based bargaining. The Mercedes labour aristocracy was rejected as "industrial tribalism," with a grateful company rewarding the assistance of the "socialist" mediators. Mercedes is now engaged in abolishing "racial Fordism" in order to involve its workers in more autonomous decision-making on the factory floor as well as in the boardroom.

Towards the end of 1990, Pretoria started to involve the ANC in decision-making on major financial and economic issues. A committee set up to oversee the introduction of value-added tax comprised an ANC

official and two sympathizers, nominated by Nafcoc. The press reported that because of the sensitivities on both sides, the ANC was not formally invited to nominate representatives, because it would have to decline to do so. The Peace Accord signed in September 1991 with great publicity constitutes another attempt at joint policing and joint administrative responsibility in the more sensitive security arena. A constitutional accord is easy to achieve in comparison.

In early 1991 Thabo Mbeki indicated virtual consensus on the future constitution between the two adversaries: "Now that we have arrived at more or less common positions on the basic constitutional issues, there is no reason why the process should take a long time."⁶ On the devolution of power, the ANC and the government agree but differ only on whether the local/regional units should have authority in their own right or whether the federal rights be delegated by the central government. There is consensus on a justiciable Bill of Rights, a two chamber parliament and a constitutional court and, most importantly, on the voting system.

ANC constitutional experts have increasingly embraced proportional representation. Thus, Kader Asmal,⁷ like Mandela, argues that "there must be recognition that the cultural, social and economic diversity of South Africa requires the adoption of an electoral system at all levels which will enable sectoral groups and political tendencies to be adequately represented in decision-making." Asmal, a member of the Constitutional Committee of the ANC, praises the "virtues of proportional representation" with the additional advantage that "gerry mandering" will be prevented by voting according to party lists. "The winner-takes-all majoritarian electoral system may have served its purpose in ensuring stability among the whites, but it is a form of stability which a democratic South Africa must reconsider."⁸

6 Thabo Mbeki, Interview, "The Watershed Years", Leadership Publication 1991, p. 62.

7 Kader Asmal, "Constitutional Issues for a Free South Africa," *Transformation*, 13/1991.

8 One independent African commentator remarked wryly about the ANC Constitutional draft: "I have no problems with it whatsoever. It looks like it has been faxed straight from London. It lacks any peculiar South African idiosyncrasies, such as the quaint tricameral parliament displayed" (Personal Interview, 27/7/91).

The newly-found preference of the ANC leadership for proportional voting, however, stems not only from concern for minority representation, but for leadership control over the process. Unlike the constituency-based Westminster system where candidates are selected by and accountable to the local electorate, proportional representation minimizes grassroots control over candidates in favour of the party leadership that largely decides who is placed on the nation-wide list and in which ranking. It was this enhanced central control that made proportional representation attractive for the constitutional planners of the ANC/SACP.

However, South African political culture is so wedded to the Westminster system of voting that proportional representation still appears to many as an undemocratic concession to racial group rights. Thus, Yvonne Muthien (*Indicator*, Autumn 1991) in an interview of Harry Gwala, asks the somewhat misleading question: "Would the ANC consider compromising on their demand for 'one person one vote' by accepting proportional representation?" Gwala in turn responds predictably: "Whose proportions? That suggests group rights, vested interests. Racism serves vested interests..." Both fail to grasp that proportional representation of political parties constitutes a far more democratic and comprehensive way of ensuring participation in decision-making than a system where all minority parties and candidates are relegated to irrelevance.

In reviewing the origins of Apartheid legislation, Hermann Giliomee has astutely isolated two inextricably interlinked motivations: "Without a privileged position the Afrikaners could not survive as a separate people; without safeguarding the racial separateness of the people, a privileged position could not be maintained."⁹ The ANC opposition needs neither separateness nor privilege. Free of the insecurities of a small disadvantaged people, the majority does not have to mobilize on exclusivist nationalist grounds but can trust democratic equality to have its interests secured.

9 Hermann Giliomee, "The Leader and the Citizenry," MS, 1991.

The striking feature of South African negotiation is the absence by consensus of the adversaries of outside intervention, facilitation, mediation or arbitration. Compared with the decolonization of Namibia or Zimbabwe, South Africa poses the problem of being a sovereign state. Neither Namibia (before 1990) nor Rhodesia were ever sovereign, internationally recognized states, but were legally colonies under the authority of Britain in the case of Rhodesia, and the U.N. and South Africa in the case of pre-independence Namibia. Once internal agreement had been reached under the tutelage of the metropolitan power, the foreign legal authority ceased its role by recognizing the newly sovereign state.

In the South African case, on the other hand, the only legal body that can enact a new constitution is the present parliament. If there is to be legal continuity rather than interference by a non-legal Third Party, the present regime would have to legalize its own transformation. This is clearly recognized by the government agenda which sees precisely such a process unfolding.

The opposition, however, argues quite understandably, that the government cannot be player and referee simultaneously. It therefore proposes a mutually agreed interim government and an elected constituent assembly that could transform itself into the first parliament once a constitution has been agreed upon. Pretoria, on the other hand, rejects elections before negotiations. From this perspective correctly, general elections before a new constitution has been agreed upon would amount to surrender, an abdication of power rather than negotiation about a new order. Pretoria also insists that lawful government and administration of the country must not be jeopardized during the period of constitution-making.

In adopting these legalistic positions, the government constantly confuses sovereignty with legitimacy. Sovereignty Pretoria possesses, legitimacy it widely lacks. It also falsely equates liberalization with democratization. Since de Klerk's rise to power, the South African state has clearly liberalized itself but at the beginning of 1992 still has to institutionalize meaningful democratic participation for all citizens. Liberalization extends rights and opens up new political space. It reduces

the costs and risks of individual expression. Democratization aims at equality of citizens and an improvement of life-chances for everyone. It is the latter aspects that will prove the sticky parts—not the transitional arrangement and constitutional accords themselves.

There are two dangers that an interim government of national unity has to avoid. (1) It can easily trigger more violence from the right-wing and plunge the country into a real civil war if the interim government is perceived as a surrender in these circles. Therefore, constitutional continuity and the legitimacy of any transitional arrangement among the majority of whites would seem an important consideration. The danger also points to the need for a constitutional accord to precede an interim government rather than emerge from it in dragged-out negotiations.

(2) For the ANC, the danger of an interim government lies in assuming responsibility without having power. While there would be a measure of control over the security forces in particular, it is doubtful that this newly acquired limited power would be sufficient to stop all the atrocities that would now be committed in the name of the ANC as well. The ANC would carry the burden of a declining economy, but would also be constrained to implement radical restructuring. Disappointed expectations and disillusionment with the ANC are likely to flow from a situation of responsibility without power.

Some more astute ANC leaders view with alarm the perception of being co-opted and wisely maintain a distance between themselves and Pretoria. "We are adversaries—the government and the ANC. The government sometimes acts as if we are part of that government, and yet we are not part of that government."¹⁰ Hani expresses the usefulness of being a symbol of radicalism and militancy. Rather than being concerned with the content of a radical policy, he admits to its manipulative function: "I don't want the ANC to lose that image because once it loses that image, it will lose the support of young people." How the inevitable ANC participation in government is to be reconciled with its aura of

¹⁰ Chris Hani, Interview, *Monitor*, December 1990.

militancy remains to be seen. Nevertheless, when the ANC sets deadlines and declares, "our patience with this regime is running out," everyone knows that the tough talk merely camouflages the even deeper involvement of the two antagonists with each other.

For example, in April 1991 the ANC issued an ill-considered ultimatum to the government to meet certain demands (sacking of two ministers), or it would withdraw from negotiations. Since Pretoria could not afford to be seen to heed ultimatums, and the ANC could not afford to pull out, the ultimatum necessarily backfired on the ANC which was locally and internationally criticized for a serious error of judgement. Veteran journalist John MacLennan (*Sunday Times*, April 14, 1991) commented: "It is difficult to believe that the ANC was willing to use such powerful and irreplaceable ammunition, threatening to end the talks, when it really didn't need to." If the ANC were to use the threat

A South African Constitutional Forum Along a Canadian Model*

**This commentary by Heribert Adam was initially published in the Cape Times, February 17, 1991 and received mostly sceptical responses as to the ability of the South African public to engage in a sophisticated Canadian process of populist constitutional consultation.*

The South African current constitutional impasse does not result from unwillingness to compromise at the leadership level. Nor are acceptable compromise formulae in short supply. The leaders, particularly in the ANC, face difficulties selling solutions, negotiated in secret, to a suspicious constituency that wants to have a say in all decisions. Grass-root activists insist on democratic mandates and thereby their own participation. Autocratic behaviour was the major criticism of the ANC leadership at its December 1990 consultative conference.

If every issue of constitutional negotiations were to be referred back to an often disorganised, amorphous and ill-informed constituency, little progress would be possible. Mandela rightly insisted on continuing confidential discussions with the government. However, if a politicised constituency ultimately disagrees with negotiated compromises, or worse, rejects its previously acclaimed leaders as undemocratic, the negotiated solutions are not worth the paper they are written on. It would seem that a modified Canadian political innovation would

be worth considering for South Africa.

South Africans are rightly suspicious of foreign solutions to their unique problems. There is widespread consensus among all parties that the new constitution should be homemade without foreign mediation or interference. This sentiment, however, should not prevent constitution makers looking at how other nations tackle similar constitutional impasses of deeply divided societies. Canada currently wavers at the brink of dissolution after the failure of a compromise formula that would have declared Quebec a "distinct society." Support for Quebec separatism in this province has reached unprecedented heights (67%), while Anglo-Canada could not care less and the federal government's support is at an all-time low. In this predicament the Mulroney government has appointed a 12-person constitutional Commission, "The Citizen's Forum on the Future of Canada," to hold public hearings across the country. The Forum has been received with widespread scepticism as a clever public relations exercise. However, the Forum wants to solicit the views of ordinary people, not only professional experts, and the dynamics of these debates are open-ended. Small discussion groups will ultimately involve one million citizens. With lots of

media attention, the arguments of a national debate are multiplied. Through a toll-free telephone number everyone can invite himself or herself and request a kit of relevant information material. After a few months of country-wide consultations, the Commission will issue a public report about its findings. Obviously, the Commission does not make decisions but functions as a clearing-house for divergent opinions.

Suppose South Africa were to start a similar exercise which would not pre-empt a constituent conference or assembly, but prepare for it? What would be the obstacles and advantages?

Who should serve on such a Constitutional Forum could be contentious from the outset. All major parties could be invited to delegate two trusted representatives. Alternatively, people with high national standing and credibility across party lines, such as F. van Zyl Slabbert, Oscar Dhlomo, Albie Sachs, Wynand Malan, Enos Mabusa could be persuaded to serve as paid commissioners for a month. They could be supplemented by union and business representatives, church leaders, legal academics, judges, writers and journalists and other persons with special expertise but not high-profile party leaders themselves.

Everyday the Commission would hold well-publicised open hearings in all major townships and rural areas, in churches and schools, in stadiums and hotels. Each evening, the SABC would broadcast the day's highlights, and the newspapers would have permanent correspondents accredited to the Commission. The country would become temporarily involved in a massive joint exercise in political education about voting systems and federalism, nationalisation and privatisation, minority rights and individual freedoms. Speakers should be able to address the Commission in the language of their choice, including African languages, as simultaneous translations services would be available. The commissioners' primary task is to listen, not to lecture, and to ensure that all opinions receive a fair hearing. Participants should receive the constitutional blueprints of all parties beforehand, including the constitution of Namibia. The commissioners, like a bench of judges, should pose additional questions and correct information or hate propaganda, but refrain from expressing their own view.

While obviously no consensus would emerge at the end, all par-

ticipants would be better informed about opposing perspectives. Would the constitutional roadshow amount to mere democratic window dressing in as far as its results will be ignored by the real powers to be? Political elites across the political spectrum could hardly afford to cast the articulated sentiments aside. Above all, they would benefit from the input of ordinary citizens on whose votes they will have to depend. Leaders could adjust their programmes to the emerging new reality and build the necessary compromise on greater trust and a higher level of mass information. The essence of democracy—participation in shaping the political institutions rather than merely ratifying decision by others—would be realised as far as possible. Regardless of the final forms of negotiations, all its participants will have an easier task if they can rely on a constituency that has been widely consulted and comprehensively informed rather than left with distrust and the feeling of being manipulated behind closed doors. A South African constitutional commission that initiates and guides a national debate beyond the slogans of polarised organisations could be an important step towards reconciliation.

again when it really became necessary, it would have lost its credibility. The ANC public relations exercise together with a serious concern for

the escalating violence revealed the advantage of the government in having a relatively homogeneous constituency since it shed its right-wing, while the ANC constantly has to reconcile conflicting demands from its heterogeneous support base. At this stage, the negotiating leadership must retain the radical wing in its ranks and does this mainly through strident posturing.

White South Africa has so far failed to recognize the need for symbolic victories on the part of the ANC. The more the ANC is drawn into constitutional politics, the more it loses its moral status as the movement of liberation. Vulnerable as a fallible political actor among a more powerful establishment, it must show its supporters either that it can deliver on their inflated expectations or that nothing has changed in the intransigence of the adversary, and, therefore, it cannot be blamed. Both choices, however, are detrimental to the need for compromise in negotiation politics. The less leverage the ANC can exercise within the narrow constraints of constitutional negotiations, the more the emphasis shifts to socio-economic issues. Against the establishment's attempt to restructure the economy through preemptive privatization and constitutional guarantees, stands the ANC's need to guard against disappointing the economic expectations of its constituency.

Therefore, the rise or fall of the future South African democracy depends on an upturn in the economy. Only an expanding economy allows both antagonists to satisfy their supporters, and thereby eases the necessary compromises. The less economic leverage exists, the more the ANC will fall back on street mobilizations to guard its flanks and the more the establishment will view the necessary long-term redistribution as a zero-sum loss strategy. It would want to sabotage such attempts with all its leverage, including refusals to reinvest in South Africa. The ANC in turn loses its incentives for entering negotiations if they produce neither economic gains nor symbolic political victories. Yet the ultimate paradox remains that an economic recovery depends on a creditable political settlement. Therefore, negotiations cannot wait for an economic turnaround when conditions are more conducive for a democratic compromise.

It is sometimes uncritically assumed that if "negotiations stall or break off, then South Africa could find itself back on the path to insurrection..." (Price, 1990:296). Yet with the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the major outside sponsor of the previous insurrectionist strategy would have to be replaced. While Libya, China or smaller Stalinist relics like Cuba or North Korea could presumably step in, renewed exile or repression for South African activists is not an inviting prospect. The current ANC leadership at least would rather bend over to reach a compromise than repeat a failed historical experience. For the Afrikaner Nationalists, too, there is no option of going back to the repressive era, because they are too weak and divided. A renewed consensus on racial repression is simply inconceivable. It would also be suicidal for the minority.

II. DILEMMAS AND CONTRADICTIONS WITHIN THE ANC

"We initiated negotiations and we are serious about negotiations...I think we need to have a lot of what I call revolutionary patience." — Chris Hani, December 1990.

In the process of preparing itself for normal politics, the ANC was confronted with its own shortcomings. It was forced to become more self-critical. ANC spokesperson Gill Marcus admitted: "The emotional support for the movement is massive, but translating that support into a knowledge and understanding of the ANC's policies, strategies, programmes and tactics is proving to be an unenviable task." (*Natal Mercury*, February 4, 1991). The rival organizations that maintained the liberation posture and stood aloof from the politics of compromise could much more easily maintain a purist stance on internal problems.

The initial organizational chaos within the ANC reflected badly on its potential for government. It deterred sympathizers and adversaries alike in considering the organization as an effective alternative. "When the movement cannot even clean up the hopeless muddle in its own head office," editorialises the National Party organ, *Die Burger* (July 4, 1991), "how does he (Mandela) actually expect that people should trust him to govern a taxing country like South Africa." Other observers focussed on the spreading political violence which had clearly weakened the organization. Blaming the victim was combined with naive disappointment that the ANC could not guarantee instant stability.

A South African commentator (Harold Pakendorf, *Sunday Times*, 26/8/90) asks in all seriousness: "Does the ANC actually exist—as an organization—beyond the rhetoric and the headlines?" He concludes: "What is apparent is that the ANC does not initiate the violence in the country, does not direct it, does not control it and cannot end it."

The international press, too, voiced criticism and disappointment. Thus the *Guardian Weekly* (April 14, 1991) concluded that the ANC "has not had a good year." The writer, Roger Omond, summarized sympathetically the various obstacles encountered by the ANC, but could not hide disillusionment: "Whatever else the ANC may have in its armoury—international goodwill, the backing of probably the majority of South Africans, and moral force, a magic wand is missing." Other more cynical observers (Simon Barber, *Sunday Times*, 2/9/90) have wondered about the temptations of exile: "The truth perhaps is that the ANC is only truly at home abroad. Abroad, it is treated as the government-in-waiting. Foreigners, especially in the West fawn obediently, allow it to dictate their policies and grant it the illusion that it has won a famous victory. At home, there is no such obedience but rather a grinding confrontation with unpleasant facts."

The most important criticism of Mandela's first period in freedom from the white liberals deplores his failure to reconcile the ANC with Inkatha. By placing himself solidly in the ANC fold upon his release, he also inherited the organizational feuds and constraints. An alternative strategy would have been to assume the mantle of a reconciling statesman above the petty quarrels. Mandela's huge prestige and the widespread longing for peace and stability would have perhaps allowed him to play such a non-partisan role for a while. However, he would not have had an organizational power base and would have had to rely solely on his prestige. By subjecting himself to the collective ANC discipline, Mandela eschewed the presidential role in favour of a more democratic mandate and organizational clout rather than a fragile charisma. That prudent decision is now bearing fruit in Mandela's extraordinarily high prestige and influence in the organization.

The moral stature of the leader notwithstanding, it is in the organizational arena that the self-declared "premier organization of the oppressed and democratic majority"¹¹ faced major gaps. By taking for granted its mass support, the ANC hierarchy gradually woke up to the harsh reality

11 Editorial, *Sechaba*, October 1990, p. 1

of a fragmented, confused and sceptical constituency. So disappointing was the first ANC recruitment drive that the organization initially refused to reveal membership figures. Total membership in June 1991 was given as 521,181, well below the April target figure of 776,000. In contrast, the government minister in charge of constitutional negotiations boasted in all seriousness that the newly inclusive National Party could beat the ANC in a straight election contest. Gerrit Viljoen may have been engaged in wishful thinking or perhaps he placed his trust in the manipulative power of the government-oriented television monopoly whose immense influence on attitudes is still vastly underrated by the opposition. Whatever the eventual crystallization of ambiguous sentiments, the ANC did not fare as well as expected. South African politics remains far from a market place where groups may compete on equal terms.

However, many of the ANC's dilemmas cannot be reduced to poor institutional support for people who mainly qualified themselves only through suffering and commitment in the past. Some problems result from ideological contradictions and doubtful policy decisions of the ANC's own making.

The ANC argues that it has to remain a liberation movement and not a political party, "because Apartheid is not yet gone" (Cyril Ramaphosa, *City Press*, July 21, 1991). However, there are obviously other advantages to staying a liberation movement, regardless of Apartheid. Several foreign donors do not fund political parties. A liberation movement can continue to define itself as a broad alliance while an ANC political party would obviously necessitate a separation from the South African Communist Party. At the same time liberation movement status prevents the organization from developing specific policies which would split the ideologically heterogeneous movement. It has to rely more on symbols and myths of which "Africanization" and "defeated enemy" are prime examples.¹²

12 For the same reason the vague 1955 Freedom Charter is elevated to sacred status because no other more specific platform could fulfill the function of uniting divergent views and interests. The Charter is the minimalist common denominator.

The symbolic Africanization of the ANC opposition hampered support among other ethnic groups who either stayed on the political sidelines or looked to the government for protection from feared black majority domination. At the 1991 Durban National Congress, Mandela acknowledged that the ANC could ill-afford to be content with the low level of success in attracting whites, Coloureds and Indians to the ANC. "We must ask ourselves frankly why this is so...confront the real issue that these national minorities might have fears about the future," Mandela warned. The ANC had to remain a movement representative of all the people of South Africa, both in name and in reality.

The colour-blind non-racialism of the ANC is contradicted by Mandela's commonsense emphasis on "minority representation." For example, while Boesak or Maharaj publicly announce that they are unwilling to represent Coloureds or Indians in the ANC, Mandela's sense of political realities leads him to stress the opposite. In Mandela's old fashioned recognition of ethnicity, "the ordinary man, no matter to what population group he belongs, must look at our structures and see that 'I, as a coloured man, am represented. I have got Allan Boesak there whom I trust.' And an Indian must also be able to say: 'There is Kathrada—I am represented.' And the whites must say: 'There is Gerrit Viljoen—I have got representation' " (*The Star*, July 18, 1991). The racial representation that Mandela advocates constitutes a dramatic departure from the colour-blind non-racialism hitherto propagated. Were Mandela's views followed literally, the ANC would embrace previous National Party policy of group representation, paradoxically at the very moment when the old racist party has foresworn any reference to race or ethnicity in its constitutional blueprints.

Yet the pragmatic balancing of ethnicity in the parties and executives of a plural society is demanded by a political reality that is still largely perceived in ethnic terms, perhaps as much by the ruled as by the rulers. Mandela realistically senses this culture of ethnic perceptions but prescribes an unsuccessful remedy. In his noble attempt to avoid racial polarization and build a broad cross-cutting movement, he overlooks the reality that the non-African ANC members are not considered community representatives, precisely because they have long disassociated

themselves from their assigned ethnicity by embracing ANC-style non-racialism.

Indeed, among the 50 elected NEC members are seven whites, seven Asians and seven "Coloureds." That makes the latter two groups, particularly Indians, over-represented in the ANC leadership. However, they do not represent "the Indian community" in the ANC and are not active in the ANC "as Indians," but as marginalized dissidents in the Indian community. They rejected the primacy of their "Indianness" long ago in favour of non-racial individualism. NEC and SACP member Mac Maharaj stated explicitly that he does not wish to be referred to as an Indian since he considers himself a third generation South African, does not know any Indian language and finds his only link to his Indian origin in a preference for curried food. Although most Indian South Africans share this political acculturation to a new environment, they would nevertheless remain suspicious of Maharaj's rejection of his cultural background. In short, the "Indian" representatives among the ANC officeholders are the wrong Indians as far as attracting support from the "Indian" sector is concerned. Similar perceptions towards Coloured and white NEC members hold among these respective communities.

The whites on the NEC are all self-confessed members of the SACP and long-time political activists who have fought bitterly against the predominant attitudes among their ethnic peers. While the sophisticated tolerance of an Albie Sachs attracts admiration among liberal whites, the underground games played and unconventional behaviour exhibited by Ronny Kasrils serve to deter other whites from the ANC. In fact, the SABC TV seems to deliberately put characters like Kasrils on its programmes in order to discredit the ANC.

The amazing aspect of the 1991 NEC is the total absence of liberal whites who have fought the anti-apartheid struggle inside the country in sympathy with the ANC. The ANC made no effort to woo into its ranks some of its potential high-profile supporters with great appeal among anti-apartheid whites, such as F. van Zyl Slabbert, Alex Boraine or Wynand Malan. The SACP faction, who in the past exercised a veto over which whites were allowed to join the ANC, would not wish to share its

monopoly with strategists of a different ideological outlook. As with any political organization, long-time activism for the party as a foot-soldier is ranked higher than expertise or voters' attraction. Candidates have to earn their mandate through long service, as Alan Boesak was reminded when he wisely withdrew his nomination for the NEC. However, as long as the ANC has no prominent liberal minority members among its officeholders, it is unlikely to make any inroads into sceptical (rather than hostile) minorities. Ironically, the previously racist National Party, particularly if it bills itself as a "Christian Democratic, law-and-order, free-market-alliance" may turn out to be the most non-racial grouping by attracting widespread support from security-conscious conservatives across the racial spectrum.

The Antics of Winnie Mandela

Dozens of lectures on South Africa to different Canadian audiences in various locations obviously solicit a wide spectrum of questions and concerns, with one predictable exception: Canadians are most fascinated by the person who has been compared with Evita Peron, Eleanore Ceausescu and Leona Helmsley (Richard Gwyn, *Toronto Star*, May 22, 1991). An infatuated husband being destroyed by a megalomaniac wife reinforces ago-old stereotypes, not matched by the daily soap operas.

Nonetheless, what is the political significance of the story and what lessons can be drawn from the Winnie Mandela trial about the state of the ANC? The antics of Winnie Mandela, her soccer team and her trial have been extensively reported but little understood in a wider context.

Scepticism toward the suffering yet glamorous idol had built up among political activists for some years. Her association with dubious friends raised eyebrows. In the midst of Soweto's poverty Ms. Mandela built a huge house. She wrote a glowing preface to a book that advocated unfettered free market policies as South Africa's solution. Her emotive utterances about how to achieve liberation often contradicted African National Congress strategies. Significant advisors to the party raise questions as to why Winnie Mandela has not received "careful assistance" in preparing her speeches for international events. The terror

tactics of her bodyguards merely confirmed that she had become more of a liability than an asset to the anti-apartheid movement. By saying that "most of the real leaders" of the anti-apartheid struggle were behind bars, Winnie Mandela denigrated UDF leaders who had come out in opposition to her. Lately, Winnie Mandela poses in battle fatigues with her friend Chris Hani, saluting parading MK soldiers after the ANC has suspended the armed struggle.

Initially the ANC in Lusaka was reluctant to endorse the ouster of the "mother of the nation" from the movement. Asked to comment on the day of the decision to expel her, Thabo Mbeki a senior ANC official who was at a conference at Duke University, pointed to the persecution and suffering that Mrs. Mandela had endured during 26 years of separation from her husband. He refused to go further and pass judgement on her action (Personal Interview).

When the national executive committee of the ANC finally issued a statement on February 18, 1989, it reiterated her merits under difficult circumstances: "Bearing the name of Mandela, and in her own right, she increasingly became one of the symbols of resistance to racist tyranny both at home and abroad." But this tribute was preceded by a strong condemnation, albeit issued "with a terrible sadness that we consider it necessary to express our reservations about Winnie Mandela's judgement." This stance resulted from outrage inside South Africa. The ANC statement speaks about "our organization, *complementing* the initiatives of leading personalities of the Mass Democratic Movement."

In meetings of a crisis committee set up to deal with the death of Stampie Seipei and the murder of community doctor Abu-Baker Asvat, several resolutions were passed and also ratified by the leading unions' shop stewards' council: none of the progressive organizations should grant Winnie Mandela a platform, her football club should disband, she should no longer claim to speak on behalf of the community, no progressive lawyer should act for her.

In response, Ms. Mandela, South African newspapers reported, demanded a full list of those who attended, and accused the crisis commit-

tee of consiiving with the community, and communicating with her long-time ANC supporter Oliver Tambo and her husband behind her back. She also accused the South African Council of Churches and the Christian Institute of being "sheep in wolves' skins." She reportedly threatened that she would call a press conference where she would announce her "resignation" from the ANC.

Only when it became apparent that Ms. Mandela's antics would harm the image of her husband and when internal pressure for condemnation grew did the ANC intervene, culminating in its press release: "Unfortunately our counsel was not heeded by Comrade Winnie Mandela. The situation has been further complicated by the fact that she did not belong to any structures and therefore did not benefit from the discipline, counselling, and collectivity of the Mass Democratic Movement."

The ANC was clearly worried about the potential for disunity that Winnie Mandela's popularity could trigger. She is known to have repeatedly spoken about "attacking soft targets," which endeared her to an impatient military faction in the ANC, as did her statement on liberating South Africa with boxes of matches and tires at a time when the ANC leadership attempted to stop "necklacing."

The ANC called for unity and counselled "a balanced approach to the problems." It is best served by blaming "the enemy." In this vein the ANC attributes what it calls the "unbecoming activities [of the Mandela Football Club] which have angered the community" to the suspicion "that the club was infiltrated by the enemy, and that most of its activities were guided by the hand of the enemy." Obviously the government greatly benefitted from the affair. But rather than engineering it, as the conspiracy theory of the ANC suggests, Pretoria seems to have exploited Ms. Mandela's misjudgements by giving her relatively free rein to discredit the Mandela name herself.

The high publicity of the affair reflected a media spectacle that had created the prominence of Winnie Mandela in the first place. By initially elevating the wife of the ANC leader into a goddess—rather than treating her as a person in her own right—the media could celebrate her downfall

with even greater glee. The very role thrust on Winnie Mandela contributed to her hubris. Why would a person so lionized need to seek a mandate when speaking on behalf of the people she presumably represented?

The same journalists who wallowed in the tragedy also failed to recognize the strength of a movement that takes such a principled stance. In a continent where authoritarianism and corruption are the rule rather than the exception, the South African opposition distinguished itself by putting democratic principles before expedience and hero-worship.

The Winnie Mandela trial in Spring 1991 raised doubts again about the moral state of the ANC, after she had been rehabilitated as the wife of the released leader. The trial represented the first test case of the ANC attitude towards justice and legality. In the view of many traditional liberals, the ANC failed the test on several counts. It placed the fate of a person above the law. Despite initially welcoming the trial as an opportunity to clear her name, the ANC later reversed its stance and denounced the prosecution as a hostile act. All ANC officials were expected to show support by attending the trial in what should have been a private affair. The trial basically involved two feuding youth gangs and two rival minor warlords (Richardson and Stampie Seipei), the "mother of the nation" had taken sides with her own team in the brutalization of the other side.

Necessary criticism was muted by the widespread personality cult. Long-time political prisoners and returning exiles remained immune from public scrutiny for some time, even after they had joined the fray of normal politics. Those who had acted courageously on principle were sidelined by the Mandela court.¹³ The ANC leadership, particularly its

13 In addition to their strained relationship with Winnie, some leading activists questioned the status of her imprisoned husband which did not endear them to the emerging Mandela dynasty. Thus, in a much noted interview, then NUM general secretary Cyril Ramaphosa (*Leadership*, November 1989) argued: "Mandela is a member of the ANC, and his status is no different from the status of any other member of the ANC...He is one of those people who may have to be considered for a leadership position in the ANC." Mandela privately characterized Ramaphosa as "the Rottweiler in my lap" and the two most powerful ANC leaders continued to publicly contradict each other, for instance on whether an ANC government would honour foreign loans. As the ANC's general secretary and most skilled negotiator, Ramaphosa is the likely successor to Mandela.

general secretary Alfred Nzo, initially failed to distance itself from a tragic figure who had mainly acted out her own ambitions. Instead the ANC, in a crucial misjudgement, declared the criminal trial a political persecution and demanded public support. It is not to the credit of most NEC members that they heeded the expectations by showing up in court. The one activist with prison credentials who refused to even enter the Mandela home, unless ordered to do so by the NEC, was in retrospect celebrated as a lone courageous voice.

With the leadership on a high horse riding roughshod over popular sentiments, the ANC's influential internal constituency however, gradually made its presence felt more decisively. The defeat of Winnie Mandela for the presidency of the ANC's Women's League by a 400 to 200 vote in April 1991 should have warned the leadership, particularly since it came from "within undoubtedly the most organizationally conservative of the ANC's structure" (*Southscan*, May 17, 1991). The temporary demise of the idol was preceded by unusually harsh inside criticism which led the normally sympathetic *Weekly Mail* (February 15-21) to ponder about a "grave cause for concern about the ANC's attitude to justice." The paper elaborated: "The problem was symbolized by the arrogant ANC marshals who took control of the streets, strutting around in makeshift military fatigues and abusing journalists and others. Is this what the ANC promise in a future system: the rule of the Toyi-Toyi Macoute?" The defence lawyer even courted a bit of censorship by asking the judge to direct the media not to speculate on matters before the court during the trial.¹⁴

In public advertisements, lesbian and gay activists accused the defence of Mandela of reinforcing homophobia. It used alleged homosexuality as justification for the removal of young men from a church home. ANC supporters picketed the court with anti-homosexual placards. Gay activists found the defence's linkage of homosexuality with sexual abuse "as ludicrous as equating heterosexuality to rape." Since the defendant, Ms. Mandela, was the head of the ANC's Department of Welfare and

14 The Anti-Censorship Action Group included this item in their newsletter *Update*, February 1991.

Political Correctness on Winnie Mandela

Rosemary Brown, the former NDP MLA in British Columbia, is generally considered the epitome of political correctness. It is probably for that reason that *The Vancouver SUN* provides her with a weekly column to balance the many other right-wing opinion-makers in the paper. Brown (*Vancouver SUN*, April 22, 1992) continues "to love and stand in awe" of Winnie Mandela. She admits "lack of information" but nevertheless defends the indefensible, because "as a woman" she would like to assist a pilloried friend.

In the disassociation of the ANC from Winnie, Brown suspects "conjured up images of all the wicked women of a legend"; she speculates about dark "forces that would seek to drive them apart." Ultimately, Brown opines, it is male punishment of a strong woman for "having a mind of her own." Moreover, male ungratefulness for female sacrifice is clear: "After working to secure her husband's release, she now finds herself being put aside by him."

This extraordinary misjudgement by Brown reflects a confused political correctness at any

price. It undermines the feminist cause when blind solidarity is expressed, regardless of the behaviour of a woman. Brown's "loyalty" is of the uncritical kind that in the past made many astute intellectuals go on political pilgrimages to Moscow and Havana and return in praise of Stalinist dictatorships.

The facts are more important than the well-intended sentiment. It was not the husband who "put aside" his wife. Nobody should pass judgement on Winnie for her widely alleged romantic affairs under the tragic circumstances. Yet all sober analysts must question Winnie's political judgement and moral behaviour. Instigating the murder of a child and community doctor in order to remove the witness to her own callousness, if proven, amounts to an extraordinary crime by "the mother of the nation." Even the suspicion of the murder makes a public figure a liability. Tolerating and encouraging homophobia, plotting against senior ANC colleagues out of sheer vengeance, discrediting respected UDF community leaders because, according to Winnie, "the real leaders are in jail," testifies to poor judgement gone astray. Winnie's political fault lies in facilitating the state's assault on the opposition. She made herself into a liability.

since her defence seemed contrary to the spirit of stated ANC policy that discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation should be considered unlawful, the protesting lesbian and gay activists understandably demanded support from the NEC and all progressive organizations.

In response, Kader Asmal, a member of the constitutional committee, emphasized the legal difference between the ANC and Ms. Mandela's defence (*Weekly Mail*, April 5, 1991). However, the *Weekly Mail* pointed out that the ANC itself had identified the two. Against Asmal's advocacy of "limits of comment" during an ongoing trial, the paper asserted that judges and the courts should not be above public scrutiny or comment. Fatima Meer (*Weekly Mail*, 5/4/91), on the other hand, defended "Dr. Winnie Mandela" against accusations of having used foul language. From her knowledge of her long-time friend, she said, that would be totally out of character. In any case, she argued, the paper had been guilty of reporting allegations as facts.

The saga has not come to an end, not only because of the pending appeal to her conviction (which for political reasons can hardly be upheld). Moreover, the state has further damaging criminal evidence to discredit the accused and the ANC, should it become convenient. Nonetheless, during the July 1991 election for the ANC National Executive, Winnie Mandela received 53.9 percent of the vote, mostly from the younger delegates.

Insurrectionism and the Myth of Victory

Until legalized, the ANC refused to accept that incrementalism could lead to the dismantling of Apartheid. ANC intellectuals would accept that there were reforms, but considered the liberal advocates of reforms to be dangerous detractors. Thus Rob Davies, at an ANC-Soviet Social Scientists' Seminar in Moscow 1989 warned: "The danger is that often those who speak of reforms seek to convey the image of a process which, by small incremental changes, will finally lead to the cumulative result of Apartheid being dismantled." However, this was precisely the result of the reform process. Even when the *de facto* stalemate was admitted, this ANC strategist could only think of other options as "means of

exploiting the transfer of power in a situation of unfavourable balance of forces." Potential negotiations with an undefeated enemy were ruled out as a sellout.

The subsequent ideological confusion and scepticism of black activists towards the new negotiation politics results from such past indoctrination. A regime that was supposed to make no concession unless forced to do so now almost outradicalizes the opposition in adaptive political manoeuvring.

As a result, many activists have manufactured a new myth to explain the contradiction: Pretoria is in the process of capitulating at home since it has been defeated militarily in Angola, and economically through international sanctions. At the ANC July 1991 Durban conference, outgoing President Oliver Tambo received the loudest applause during his lengthy report when he said the South African Defence Force "met their match" at the battle of Cuito Cuanavale. This wallowing in an imagined victory was all the more remarkable as the delegates were appropriating foreign heroism, since no ANC units were involved in the stalemated siege. "A sobering military defeat at the hands of Angolan, Cuban and SWAPO forces at the Cuito Cuanavale" is likewise asserted by an analyst (Andrew Clark, 1991:46) of the Ottawa North-South Institute. Similar assumptions are widely cited in European literature on the left as the main reasons for Namibian independence and the concessions by Pretoria.

Military defeat of Pretoria is given as the reason for negotiation by ANC stalwart Elias Matsoaledi, a former Umkhonto we Sizwe commander in Johannesburg: "The government mounted talks with the ANC because it had been 'shaken militarily' " (*Cape Times*, 12/4/90). Such explanations are sometimes combined with exhortations for military education: "To shoot down the enemy's aircraft you need mathematical knowledge, so get into the classrooms and learn military science." Other adherents to the insurrection myth see the "armed struggle" as interchangeable with negotiations, another site of the same process: "Whether we enter Pretoria with tanks, mortars and bazookas, or

whether it is done via a negotiated settlement, the option is left to the enemy to decide."¹⁵

Ironically, in the view of the state, too, military victory by the Apartheid forces led to the policy changes and negotiations with a defeated adversary. "The military successes of the SADF in the late 80s in Southern Angola paved the way for the political dispensation in South Africa," declared Magnus Malan on the day of his demotion and reassignment (*Argus*, July 30, 1991). The former commander of special forces tells soldiers a typical Dolchstoß Legende (being stabbed in the back): "You did not lose in Angola. You did not lose in Namibia. You were betrayed by politicians acting under foreign pressure" (quoted in *The Economist*, March 21, 1992, p. 46). Obviously, for both adversaries the myth of victory seemed a crucial precondition for realignment. But both cannot be right and the question remains, who has the more credible claim? James Barber has appropriately commented: "Although South Africa did not lose the war in a strict military sense, after the stalemated battle of Cuito Cuanavale the cost of continuing the war was considered too high by all sides, including Pretoria."¹⁶

The South Africans calculated that they could not afford to lose 300 white soldiers which a full-scale assault on the newly-reinforced Cuito Cuanavale could cost. Although South Africa had lost air superiority in Angola, due to the arms boycott, it is doubtful that "military realities in Southern Angola had been the single most important factor forcing the South African government to the negotiating table."¹⁷ Other developments such as the increasing costs of the war in a declining economy, together with the end of the Cold War and the new relationship between the Soviet Union and the US on regional conflicts, would seem far more important causes to explain the shift. The war in Angola had long been unpopular with the far right as an American inspired adventure. With a

15 Sechaba, February 1989, p. 27.

16 James Barber, "Smuts House Notes," *International Affairs Bulletin*, 14, 1/1990.

17 Thomas Ohlson, "The Cuito Cuanavale Syndrome: Revealing SADF Vulnerabilities," *South African Review* 5, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1989, p. 182.

weakened ANC—cut off ideologically and financially by its disintegrating East European sponsors—the National Party saw a unique opportunity to gain global legitimacy after the demise of the unpopular P.W. Botha.

While Cuito Cuanavale is celebrated as the decisive battle which turned the Angolan war around and forced South Africa to give up Namibia, in the perception of the South African officials, particularly those involved in the protracted negotiations, quite different calculations tipped the scale. The South African government concluded that the only way to renewed world acceptance lay in improved relations with African states. Namibia was seen as the major stumbling bloc to South Africa's open entry into Africa. With respect to Namibia, South Africa was a colonial power, defying international law. A South African official remarked: "African leaders considered Namibia even more important than Apartheid" (Personal Interview, 5/5/89). Kaunda called it the South African "testing ground." Getting rid of this liability became a priority of Foreign Affairs officials in their perennial competition with the militarists who would have liked to keep Namibia, despite the costs. By including the head of the military and intelligence services into the American-sponsored negotiations at all times, the diplomats co-opted their suspicious adversaries into the gradual agreement and also secured the reluctant support of P.W. Botha for the Namibia solution.

In addition, the South Africans became very impressed with the changed attitude of the Russian observer at the negotiations. Contrary to their image of the masterminds behind a total onslaught, the Soviet Union counselled compromise and flexibility with their Cuban and Angolan allies. In the estimation of most participants in the negotiations, without the Russian tutelage of its clients and the new Soviet relationship with traditional adversaries, a Namibia agreement would not have been reached.¹⁸

18 The April 1, 1989 SWAPO incursion seemed to strengthen the South African militarists who had argued all along that you cannot rely on negotiations and agreements. Again it was the pressure by SWAPO's sponsor which put the Namibia agreement back on track.

There exists an understandable psychological bloc to recognizing that the South African anti-apartheid transformation is presently taking place with the willing cooperation of the former Apartheid supporters. If they "made it happen," this would taint the undeniable sacrifices borne by activists. The decade-long mass mobilization and suffering would be meaningless, in addition to being considered ineffective, if its decisive impact were to be ignored in the history of transformation. As Farid Essack¹⁹ observes: "Many of our activists are understandably resentful of the way those sacrifices are now rubbished or dismissed as insignificant in the dismantling of Apartheid."

If all these changes were a result of mobilization from below together with hard fought for external pressure, then there is no reason why a reluctant ruling class should be rewarded for bowing to the inevitable. The easing of sanctions "to encourage the movement underway" would in this view be counter-productive. Instead of speeding up the final abolition of Apartheid, it will slow it down, since it lessens outside pressure that is viewed as the very cause of change. When ANC grass-root activists, therefore, stubbornly insist on maintaining sanctions and mass mobilization, it is not only a device to reserve veto power for the organization over the costs to the opponent, but a strategy that rests on a particular view of the causes of the historical change.

In order to present the compromising leadership as a militant vanguard, the public resolutions adopted use the strident language of the past and deny that any relevant changes have taken place. Thus a full ten months after being legalized and operating freely in the country, the ANC December 1990 National Consultative Conference resolved: "We unanimously and unequivocally rededicate ourselves to the four pillars of our revolutionary strategy, believing that there have been no fundamental changes in the political situation which would require a departure from our strategy." At most, the conference conceded, "the regime has its own agenda, that of retaining white domination in a new form." As if the organization were in a position to resume the suspended ("but

¹⁹ *Cape Times*, January 4, 1991.

not terminated") armed struggle after the return of exiles, the conference threatened "our patience with this regime is running out" for "the transfer of power." The weaker the opposition, the more the organization has to present the changes as the result of "the struggle of our people" that "succeeded in forcing the Apartheid regime" to make concessions.

It may be important to psychological equality in negotiations to speak of Umkhonto as "victorious." But the illusions of victory also hamper predispositions to compromise. It denies the reality of stalemate. By emphasizing the forced "transfer of power," albeit to all South Africans in a democracy and not to the ANC alone, the opposition, nonetheless, does not prepare its constituency for power-sharing. Since power-sharing will be the inevitable outcome of negotiations—which otherwise would be superfluous—the resulting compromise solution must necessarily be considered a sellout, especially when compared with victorious transfer. Thus the negotiating leadership also unwittingly undermines its own long-term negotiation strategy by acceding to the illusionary rhetoric. The short-term tactic of appearing militant backfires on the long-term legitimacy of a negotiated compromise.

In the light of the widespread popularity of armed struggle among the youth, the negotiating ANC leadership now has to deny that it ever aimed at military victory. While the leadership never had illusions about its guerrilla war, it nevertheless had to uphold the myth which it now is demolishing. Thus Terror Lekota (*Cape Times*, 3/5/90), "on behalf of the ANC," reinterprets the goals of the "armed struggle" against its own mobilizing slogans of "Victory or Death." "When the armed wing was set up it was not because the ANC was in search of a military victory. No, Umkhonto was merely to pressure the government to respond to the demands of the people." Against the ANC Youth League which argued that the ANC did not start the "armed struggle" in order to negotiate, Lekota advocates the priority of political solutions: "Those organizations which demand a military victory of the ANC have misunderstood

the approach of the ANC in the first place."²⁰ Even the popular Chris Hani as chief of MK now openly admits that his troops were not in a position to destroy Apartheid. In a December 1990 interview in *Monitor*, Hani was asked whether MK could have won the war? He admitted that "MK alone without the Mass Democratic Movement would not have caused problems." He stressed the ANC capacity, "ultimately, to destroy the will of the government to continue with Apartheid," but also added realistically, "but it would have taken a very, very long time."

In light of these realities one can only be amazed by the exhortations of Canadian academics, "that the popular movement in South Africa complements its already broad and impressive range of political tactics with a growing military capacity."²¹ When John Saul fantasizes that "the regime itself has nightmares....," it reveals a view of South African politics that seems to underlie, albeit in less dogmatic forms, many Canadian activists' accounts of why the Apartheid regime has finally started to reform itself.

South African commentators often warn that the accelerating slide into endemic violence seems to be following the pattern in Angola. "Once the objective of ousting the Portuguese had been achieved in Angola, the liberation movements began to fight among themselves for a new objective: political power in 'liberated' Angola."²² However, the analogy is misleading for three reasons: (1) In South Africa the whites have not been ousted. They are unlikely to depart. They constitute a

20 With the strong sentiment against abandoning the armed struggle, the leadership also had to reinterpret "suspension" to mean a preparatory pause for renewed action. Thus, SA Communist Party leader Raymond Mhlaba clarified in February 1991: "The suspension of military activities does not mean that MK as such is disbanded. It is there intact, and there are MK members in military camps. Some have gone for refresher courses so that by the time we tell them to go into action, they are mentally and physically equipped and well versed in the use of modern weapons at their disposal." However, at the same time the ANC in a new accord with Pretoria committed itself to cease military training and the setting up of underground structures. Therefore, the sooner MK combatants are integrated into existing SADF units or Bantustan armies the better for peace on this front.

21 John Saul, *SAR*, May 1989, p. 7.

22 Gerald L'Ange, "Sliding Towards the Vortex," *Star*, 25/9/90.

permanent force that even as a numerical minority has the economic and military power to ensure its accommodation and a minimum of coercive stability in the country. South Africa is not a colonial situation. (2) The Angola post-independence conflict cannot be divorced from the larger Cold War context. In 1974, when revolutionary Portugal and the Soviet bloc adopted the MPLA as the only legitimate force in contravention of the Algarve agreement that promised elections, the US and South Africa responded by supporting UNITA as a counter to Soviet influence in the region. With the Cold War over, local South African antagonists will be hard put to find international sponsors for continued warfare. (3) With the outside pressure on for a political settlement rather than a proxy war, the South African factions do not have access to the heavy arms that sustained the Angolan fighting. Unlike the Angolan liberation movements that fought the Portuguese from the inside, the armed struggle of the ANC was hardly ever more than a propaganda weapon brandished from the outside.

In the absence of East bloc sponsorship of the ANC, the South African government still maintains a monopoly of the instruments of coercion. The official suspension of the armed struggle by the ANC merely acknowledged the relative military powerlessness of the opposition. This was different in Angola and Mozambique. Winnie Mandela may appear in battle fatigues and threaten "to return to the bush," if negotiations fail, but unlike Savimbi or Frelimo, Winnie Mandela and most South African activists have never experienced bush warfare in the first place, and there is no "bush" in South Africa to fight from. This different context makes facile comparisons with liberation struggles elsewhere in Africa very dubious. Therefore South Africa remains a unique case, not only because of its level of economic development and mutual interdependence, but because it is qualitatively different from the peasant economies of Angola and Mozambique. In the words of the late Tertius Myburgh, the diversity of South Africa makes victory impossible for any party and, therefore, makes compromise inescapable for all parties.

The concept of a self-limiting revolution was developed by Polish Solidarity intellectuals because of the threat of Soviet intervention. Solidarity could have seized power but risked almost certain occupation.

In South Africa, on the other hand, the option of a seizure of power simply does not exist in reality, only in the rhetoric or fantasy of ill-informed activists. That makes a power-sharing coalition of national unity a question of necessity in South Africa but of choice in Poland. In the Polish case, the historic compromise resulted from the strength of the opposition; in South Africa it has emerged from the mutual weakness of the antagonists, although both Solidarity and the ANC shared widespread legitimacy.

John Carlin of *The Independent* has judged that "the ANC's arrogance, as much as its naivete, blinded it to the fact that the scales were tipped heavily against it." Indeed, the myth of believing that a cunning adversary had finally been bludgeoned by sanctions, armed struggle and mass action to negotiate a deal for the transfer of power lies at the heart of the false triumphalism. The ANC has failed to realize that the release of political prisoners, the return of exiles, the normalization of politics and even the end of formal Apartheid were not the real issues at stake. Apartheid had to go anyway, with or without the ANC. For the dominant enlightened Afrikaner establishment, political incorporation of disenfranchised subordinates had long become the only way of retaining power and regaining international legitimacy. Contrary to the ANC belief that "we initiated negotiations" (Chris Hani) the Afrikaner liberals and corporate planners had long before prepared themselves for this historical inevitability. By not recognizing the real causes of the change, and by attributing it to the opposition's own efforts, assisted by "de Klerk's integrity," the ANC deceived itself into overrating its own power. An orientation that is built on such crucial flaws also fails to recognize that the skewed economic Apartheid order will essentially remain intact, long after Apartheid is gone. In this respect the militant's slogan "Victory is Certain!" characterizes the other side more accurately. But "*la lotta continua*" does not offer a suitable guide either, unless the ANC "in power" wants to turn the struggle upon itself while being simultaneously constrained by the duties and responsibilities of office.

This dream of a Maoist permanent revolution ignores the truth that officeholders necessarily turn into bureaucratic functionaries despite their pasts. At present, the ANC is undergoing the painful process of

resocializing exiles to South African realities, changing the socio-political environment as well as itself at the same time, the strident rhetoric of past legacies notwithstanding. Liberal democrats can only hold their breath, hoping that the ANC does not become internally ungovernable during the volatile transition.

III. THE SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNIST PARTY: WAVERING BETWEEN MARXISM AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

Short excerpts from this chapter have previously been published as "Transition to Democracy: South Africa and Eastern Europe," in Telos, 85, Fall 1990 and Theoria, 76, October 1990.

Questioning the ANC-SACP Alliance

A strange discrepancy exists between the reaction of liberal and non-socialist anti-Apartheid activists in South Africa and their counterparts in Canada and elsewhere in the international anti-Apartheid movement. Canadian supporters of the ANC hardly ever mention the ANC alliance with the SACP, while the South African liberal democrats are greatly concerned about the influence of the SACP in a future ANC government. The Canadians ignore or dismiss these anxieties as red-baiting or relics of the Cold War. Yet Oxford political scientist R.W. Johnson²³ has, not without evidence, described the success of the SACP in setting the agenda for the anti-apartheid forces worldwide: "Bolstered by Eastern bloc financial and political support, the SACP became the paymasters and organisers of the ANC in exile, effortlessly colonising anti-apartheid 'support organisations' in many countries, and dictating terms to non-Communist sympathisers such as the World Council of Churches, trade unions, student organisations, UN agencies and so forth." Johnson, who is considered to be on the British Left, would certainly be criticized for this view by those who do not feel duped and who supported the anti-Apartheid cause without consulting mentors. However, he correctly stresses the influence of the growing and committed group of now 25,000 card-carrying communists, who celebrated the 70th Anniversary Congress of the Party in December 1991.

Inside South Africa, the ANC-SACP alliance²⁴ constitutes probably the single most important reason why only a few from the white,

23 R. W. Johnson, "The Past and Future of the South African Communist Party," *London Review of Books*, 24 October 1991.

24 For a well-informed although personalized account of the ANC-SACP alliance by the editor of *Africa-Confidential*, see Stephen Ellis and Tsepo Sechaba, *Comrades Against Apartheid: The*

coloured and Indian groups have so far formally joined the ANC, although their ideological sympathies and hopes for the future lie with the Congress opposition. Peter Brown, a victim of state persecution, a sterling liberal of long standing, and a close associate of Alan Paton, has perhaps most clearly articulated these concerns in his journal *Reality* (July 1991). Since the SACP is a separate party with separate policies within the ANC, Brown questions whether the "high proportion of what seem to be members of the SACP on the new ANC national executive committee" also means that the ANC is influenced in the SACP direction. "It has not been SACP policy in the past for its members to leave their convictions and their practices outside the door when they join another organisation" (*Reality*, July 1991). Indeed, the more the ANC changes into a normal political party, the more the standard answer that communists are only loyal members of a liberation movement from which they take orders, sounds hollow. When the same crucial personnel serve in both parties, they either have merged in their policies or the one is using the other for its separate goals. These issues not only concern economic visions of self-defined Marxist-Leninists but also commitments to multi-party democracy and tolerance of political dissent.

IDASA executive director Alex Boraine has pointed out that voters have a right to know whom they voted for and the specifics of a policy they support. However, this would not be possible if the ANC and the SACP continue to fuse their images. "It is in the interest of both the ANC and perhaps the SACP to have a very clear distinction between them because the current alliance will inevitably come back to haunt them" (Boraine, *Cape Times*, 10/7/91).

The government, too, perceives problems with the SACP. As long as the ANC-SACP alliance exists, a genuine NP-ANC coalition government of national unity will be resisted by sections of the NP, because of potential right-wing delegitimation. Simply put, the government makes itself too vulnerable to the accusation of having allowed communists

ANC and the South African Communist Party in Exile, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992.

into the hall of power. This would give the right-wing a major boost and could trigger more terrorist acts from this quarter, quite apart from delegitimising the historic compromise among whites. Therefore, Pretoria too would want to see the ANC-SACP marriage end as soon as possible after the first election. On the other hand, in the first democratic election campaign, a National Party-led nonracial coalition would also greatly benefit from the ANC-SACP alliance, because it would deter conservative voters from the ANC and allow the National Party to parade itself as the guardian of free enterprise.

SACP strategists, who piggyback their socialist vision on the populist ANC, do not see the propagandistic benefits that this alliance grants the adversary. Instead, they elevate it to the great threat of which the government is supposedly afraid. "What the regime most fears, and with good reason, is the combination of a working class political party with a relatively large following (the SACP), and a massive national liberation movement."²⁵ The West European model of a capital-oriented conservative party ("Christian Democracy") and a labour-oriented, social-democratic ANC occupying the broad political centre in a roughly equal balance, would marginalize the communists giving them the same status as fringe parties of the right. Therefore Cronin quite logically insists on "a broad national democratic front, and not a charade of a west European democracy." This is justified by the task of overcoming three centuries of underdevelopment through democratization with "the socialist project." The SACP vision of historically discredited socialism, as opposed to the feasible social democratic vision of reformed capitalism, denies emphatically that it impedes both economic development as well as democratic competition in the post-Marxist reality of South Africa in the 1990s.

In its own eyes, the ANC leadership made its peace with business long ago. However, it failed to communicate its social democratic programme convincingly. It allowed the bogey of Marxism and expropriation in a command economy to impede the much needed economic growth. Even

25 Jeremy Cronin, *Work in Progress*, 76, July/August 1991, 49.

sober liberal analysts abroad take the ambiguity and alliance with the SACP as a serious threat. For example, *The Independent* (4 Sept. 1991) editorialized under the heading "South Africa not for the Squeamish": "The biggest single question continues to be the attitude of the African National Congress to private ownership. Marxism may be a dying creed in Eastern Europe, but it is alive and well in the ANC, which remains formally committed to nationalisation of leading companies." Thus, the ANC was faced with the predicament that if it declared openly its accommodation with capitalism, it would lose major sections of its radicalized constituency; however, if it played the card of rhetorical socialism much longer, it would not attract the essential growth to enable itself to deliver on a minimum of the high expectations. Instead, the cultivated ambiguity and contradictory signals contributed to a further deterioration of an already declining economy. It foreclosed the option that the negotiations could be legitimized with material gains, while the lack of political education in black South Africa prevented forthright alleviation of the anxieties of much needed investors with risk capital.

Mandela has repeatedly confirmed this close co-operation with a long-standing SACP ally, at least until the new constitution is accepted. "We don't think that we have been persuaded to feel that there is something wrong in the alliance. I don't think that we could ever be persuaded to put an end to that alliance."²⁶ If the ANC were to push for a separation now, this would not only deprive the ANC of many leading activists, but would split the movement on ideological lines. The ANC reluctance to turn itself from a broad liberation movement into a political party with precise economic policies is mainly motivated by this dilemma.

Who then is the SACP? How serious a political and intellectual force is the group at the end of the Cold War? Is the Party a band of unreformed Stalinists or reluctant social democrats? What does it mean to be a communist after the collapse of the communist metropole?

26 Mandela interview with Stanley Uys, *The Star*, July 18, 1991.

Few political groups are as misunderstood and misrepresented as the SACP. While the South African government in the past regularly painted communists as militant, KGB-led terrorists, the American press has characterized them as "not of the Gorbachev stripe but more along the lines of fire-breathing Trotsky of yester-year."²⁷ If anything, the SACP has been an adherent of Trotsky's main opponent Stalin. Until 1989, it regularly endorsed Soviet policy and criticized its detractors as "childish Trotskyist ultra-leftists" or "ghetto-nationalists."

The well-known alliance between the ANC and SACP makes the strategic logic of South African communists particularly important for the future of democracy. Joe Slovo, the former SACP General Secretary, is Mandela's right-hand man at negotiations. Most leading members of the ANC National Executive Committee (NEC) are self-declared communists. Only in the Apartheid state does the hammer and sickle emblem proudly fly at mass rallies. Fukuyama may naively proclaim the end of history, because the "principles of liberal capitalism have won" and "cannot be improved upon,"²⁸ but as long as the gross inequality and historical exclusion of the majority persists, all hopes that Eastern Europe's embrace of capitalism will also prove infectious in South Africa remain wishful thinking. Anglo-American director, O'Dowd, may invoke the mass migration out of existing socialism or "the stifling of initiative and progress implicit in Slovo's hatred of profits,"²⁹ but the dream of greater equality and non-exploitation will be fueled rather than stifled by Anglo-American monopolies. This reality gives SACP pronouncements a special importance, its quaint orthodoxy and discredited Stalinist past notwithstanding. The end of state socialism, many argue, heralds the future of democratic socialism in South Africa.

South African socialists, like their comrades elsewhere on the continent, face the dilemma that only failures rather than successes of social-

27 *The Wall Street Journal*, February 5, 1990.

28 Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History," *The National Interest*, No. 3, Summer, 1989.

29 Michael O'Dowd, "Yes, Mr. Slovo, Modern Socialism has indeed Failed," *Business Day*, February 14, 1990.

ist decolonization are available to emulate. In Zimbabwe the socialist forces were subjugated to the national struggle and eventually unions became as emasculated as under the Smith regime, despite the Marxist rhetoric of the state. In Angola and Mozambique, after national liberation, socialism became entrenched as an official Marxist state agenda, but proved as disastrous an economic failure as it was for their East European sponsors. Neither Zimbabwe nor Angola nor Mozambique, let alone the "market Stalinism" of China or the one-party dictatorship of Castro, can, therefore, serve as a model of socialist transformation for South Africa, quite apart from their different economic base.

Slovo has made the first attempt to shed the ideological ballast of a Stalinist past,³⁰ and to come to grips with the Party's role in supporting Stalinism. But Slovo describes only partial features of Stalinism and does not explain it. He does not go nearly far enough in criticizing a tyrannical system whose terror is akin to fascism as well as to Apartheid. By blaming human error rather than fundamental Leninist tenets, he fails to recognise the intrinsic causes of Stalinist tyranny. The Leninist notion of a "vanguard party" with "moral superiority" remains incompatible with liberal equality. Even if the vanguard role is to be earned rather than imposed, as Slovo now realises, commitment *per se* is no criterion of truth or higher morality.

The exclusivity of Party membership is rationalized on the ground that only tested and committed activists are wanted, not opportunists or dead wood on whom the leadership cannot rely. In practise, this amounts to a self-styled elite within the opposition movement. SACP members are ascribed a higher consciousness and a deeper insight into political reality. In Maharaj's definition of the vanguard: "Its selectivism is to ensure that those who say they want to join the Party come to a higher level of consciousness at the level of activism and at the level of understanding the political realities."³¹ However, it is the Party hierarchy and not adherence to any particular theory that determines what consti-

30 Joe Slovo, "Has Socialism Failed?" *The African Communist*, No. 121, 1990.

31 Mac Maharaj, *New Nation*, July 6-12, 1990.

tutes "correct consciousness." Maharaj despises the "ultra-Left" as "arm-chair theorists." He urges his left critics to "move to a constructive mode of thinking and acting" if they do not wish to disappear as chaff "into the dustbins of history." In Maharaj's Leninist vision, the "ultra-leftists" will have to abandon their "puritanical forms of principles in the furnace of struggle" and emerge, like the communists, as "steel." Not even the hand-picked members of the Broederbond are expected to display such "steeled" loyalty to the cause of the *Volk*. It is only after a six-month probation of supervised study and activism that a potential comrade can be admitted.

Yet an elite group may be needed to discipline and educate a vast pool of undereducated and brutalised youth. For sheer self-protection, the Party may have to be selective about potential members who might otherwise threaten the leadership, upset the cohesion, and discredit the Party by their questionable actions carried out in the name of communism. That is already the negative side of the open membership of the ANC to which the organization has found no answer other than the futile exhortation for better political education. Since the ANC has not yet developed an effective political strategy for pragmatic politicization, it is the SACP that, almost by default, provides political guidance and organizational clout. The necessary reliance on conspiratorial methods in the past severely hampered not only organizational networking and political education but internal democratic culture as well.

The organizational ANC vacuum was obscured by the emphasis on underground structures during the period of illegality. The government's exaggeration of the clandestine ANC-SACP threat and the activists' wishful thinking made both antagonists believe in their own illusions. One of the most surprising aspects of the normalization of South African politics since February 2, 1990 has been how little the opposition was prepared to assume its self-proclaimed role. Mandela's deification after his release, together with his undisputed leadership role, must also be explained in the context of an organizational and ideological vacuum, hidden behind the myth of a Mass Democratic Movement. As many critics have pointed out, neither its mass nor its democratic character should be assumed at face value.

Stalinism Reconsidered

In an interview, Slovo admitted that the SACP was part of a personality worshipping cult: "I was defending the Stalinist trials of the thirties." To his credit, he does not plead ignorance as so many other converts from tyrannical regimes usually do. "It's not that we did not know what was going on, but we just rejected whatever evidence was produced and rationalised our way out of it... It resulted in a defence in principle of everything Russia did both domestically and internationally."³² Indeed, the party that in 1929 was told by the Kremlin to campaign for a black republic in South Africa subsequently supported the Soviet invasions in Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Afghanistan. Long after Arthur Koestler's seminal account of the show trials in *Darkness at Noon* (1945), long after the gradual disillusionment with the Soviet Union by most Left European intellectuals, long after Euro-communism and Solzhenitsyn, the SACP's solidarity with the Soviet Union remained unshaken.

Only a few months before the collapse of the East European client states in 1989, the SACP adopted a program that stated: "Socialist countries today represent a powerful international force. Some of them possess highly developed economies, a considerable scientific base, and a reliable military defence potential... A new way of life is taking shape in which there are neither oppressors nor the oppressed, neither exploiters nor the exploited, in which power belongs to the people."³³

Why do people with such an acute sense of injustice in their homeland become blinded to oppression elsewhere?³⁴ The admirable early com-

32 A summary of this interview with Hermann Giliomee at an IDASA conference in Leverkusen, Germany, October, 1988, was published in *Die Suid-Afrikaan*, February 19, 1989.

33 *The African Communist*, 3rd Quarter, 1989, p. 118.

34 In a fascinating study, Johnstone has pointed to the phenomenon of "racial bracketing," of "putting the racial problem into a special category of irrational evil. This permits a double standard; the old double standard of the Leninist Left (fascism as dictatorship is bad, communism as dictatorship is O.K.). Domination could be condemned by domination: racial domination (fascism) by rational domination (Leninism), irrational evil by a rationalist Marxism sitting in judgement on the privileged throne of Enlightenment reason and truth." See Frederick Johnstone, *Apartheid and the Gulag*, ms., 1989.

mitment of South African communists to the cause of liberation feeds on this self-definition of being the guardians of a universal rationality, of which the Soviet Union was considered the first realisation.

While the SACP was never an offshoot of the CPSU, its intention to root itself as an African communist party only acquired momentum with the collapse of the mother in Moscow. Even that separation of state and party, after the military coup against Gorbachev, occurred in true authoritarian fashion by an edict of the leadership rather than by a democratic vote of members. The reaction of the South African communists to the demise of the CPSU bordered on the frivolous; it refused to draw historical lessons. In the opinion of the SACP's Essop Pahad: "If you lose your mother you cry and bury her, but you don't jump into the grave with her."³⁵ When Pahad now argues that the events in the Soviet Union confirmed what the SACP has believed all along, "that you can't build socialism in an undemocratic society," his critics pointed out that the SACP kept this belief very quiet.

Even the *Weekly Mail* (August 30-Sept. 6, 1991) editorialised simultaneously: "It is deeply shaming to reflect that the South African liberation movement—not just the SACP but the ANC too—could uncritically support a system so dehumanising and so lacking in the qualities that the movement espouses in South Africa." For fear of joining the government anti-communist hysteria, the independent alternative press and the democratic South African Left in general has to share the blame for not reprimanding the movement about its dubious ideological baggage. Essop Pahad now maintains: "It is true that we were often in common agreement with the party in Moscow, but we didn't take our line from it." If the past SACP policy was indeed based on independent judgement rather than necessity, it makes the fault worse.

Slovo now claims that he has had his personal doubts since the middle 1950s. However, he remained silent on the subject and the Party continued to endorse subsequent Stalinist practices. When pressed as to why,

³⁵ *Financial Mail*, August 30, 1991, p. 42.

the answer amounts to expedience: "It became almost risky and counter-productive to battle this issue out in our Party. It would have caused an enormous split, and it had less and less bearing on our own work."³⁶ Such opportunism on a vital issue disproves Slovo's current claim that there has always been internal democracy in the Party. If the Party could not take a principled position on Stalinist crimes for fear of a split (or, more likely, for fear of being denied Soviet assistance), then its internal debates on peripheral issues were meaningless distractions.

Choosing between the political goal of effectively opposing Apartheid and the ethical necessity of denouncing Stalinism, obviously placed the SACP in a predicament. The Soviet Union construed any criticism as disloyalty. Under these circumstances, a public stance against its sole sponsor would have jeopardized the very purpose of the Party, *i.e.*, the liberation of South Africa. Cut off from financial and military assistance in the absence of alternative sources of support, the SACP would have condemned itself to organizational ineffectiveness and political paralysis. Faced with such a choice, it is understandable why the Party opted for organizational clout rather than morality, although the separation of expediency from ethics must be difficult to rationalize for a Party of self-claimed "moral superiority."

The issue, however, is not whether South African communists made the wrong choice in favour of politics and against morality. The real question is, whether the SACP went beyond political necessity and enthusiastically endorsed Stalinist practices. There is considerable evidence that this was indeed the case, and a majority of Party members identified with Soviet strategy as politically desirable and ethically justifiable. They glorified and romanticized the Soviet Union against all criticism and thereby also discredited the anti-Apartheid cause. For this politically foolish, but most of all morally reprehensible position, the Party ought to be held responsible in as much as former Apartheid supporters should not now be let off the hook with the lame excuse that the grand experiment has failed.

³⁶ Summary in *Die Suid-Afrikaan*, February 19, 1989.

To be sure, there has also been some internal dissent. Some Party members left with a troubled conscience, others were purged by the Stalinists themselves. Slovo as an individual must not be equated with the organization. Yet the record shows that, in all its public and official pronouncements, the Party spoke with one Stalinist voice. Party publications did not reflect any debate or even slight qualms about what had developed at the very least into a great taboo.

There is now a new myth emerging that has whites joining the Communist Party for the noble cause of fighting Apartheid rather than advancing socialism. As Fredrickson put it: "Many of the whites who joined the Communist Party seem to have done so more because they hoped to prevent race war and to achieve a racially integrated and egalitarian South Africa than out of support for the Soviet Union or even for a proletarian revolution."³⁷ Besides the fact that only a small percentage of Party members is white, the statement overlooks the dual motive of committed communists who saw in the ascendancy of the Soviet Union and socialism the most effective way to defeat South African racism. There is ample evidence that whatever the initial motive for joining the Party had been, it frequently became overshadowed by the advocacy of Soviet policy, sometimes at the expense of the goal of an egalitarian South Africa. The Soviet doctrine of "socialism in one country" subjected all local concern to the overriding interests of Moscow. The SACP submission to all Soviet foreign policy decisions is clearly documented in the Party publications. Not only was this submission to a sponsor accepted invariably and uncritically by the Party—even on such controversial issues as the Hitler-Stalin pact—but Party publications and resolutions consistently endorsed and defended Soviet imperialism while inveighing militantly against its Western counterpart.

The initial rejection of South Africa's entry in WWII is a good example. The denunciation of South Africa as exhibiting the worst kind of fascism which should be fought at home rather than in Europe on the side of the Western imperialists, let one editorialist in the Party organ

³⁷ George M. Fredrickson, *The New York Review of Books*, September 27, 1990.

declare in June 1940 that "he would rather be a Jew in Hitler Berlin than a Native in Johannesburg."³⁸ It was only after Hitler attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941 that the Party changed its anti-war stance. "Accordingly," a Party historian writes, "the Party launched a series of dynamic campaigns to transform South Africa's contribution to the Allied war effort in accordance with the potentialities..."³⁹

The question remains: can the communists' dedication to the anti-Apartheid cause, the suffering they endured like no other group and the bravery they showed, obliterate their simultaneous political foolishness and moral culpability in supporting Stalinism? The tendency is now to forget, forgive and excuse in light of other achievements. Thus in a review of Baruch Hirson's bitter Trotskyite critique of his Stalinist fellow comrades, Kridler concludes: "Whatever their involvement in expulsions of Party members and despite their subservience to the Moscow line, what they strove and bravely fought for threatened a racist and authoritarian state. And in the last analysis, this—not the shoddy, Moscow-induced politics in which they sometimes engaged—is their legacy."⁴⁰ However, if human rights are universal, the anti-Apartheid struggle, no matter how noble and dedicated, cannot be divorced from human rights violations elsewhere. Expedient silence here affects credibility there. Support for one of the worst tyrannical systems invalidates democratic claims elsewhere as long as the Party has not come to terms intellectually with its errors. The Stalinist past haunts the democratic future.

The more striking feature about the renewed socialism-versus-capitalism debate in light of Eastern European developments is the emphasis on performance that both protagonists stress. Slovo goes beyond a sterile comparison of output but still cannot resist the usual praise of the Soviet Union and Cuba in terms of material achievements: "There are more

38 No author, *South African Communists Speak 1915-1980*, London: Inkululeko Publications, 1981, p. 151.

39 A. Lerumo, *Fifty Fighting Years*, London: Inkululeko Publications, 1971, p. 79.

40 Jeremy Kridler, *Weekly Mail*, June 22, 1990.

graduate engineers than in the US, more graduate research scientists than in Japan and more medical doctors per head than in Western Europe. It also produces more steel, fuel, and energy than any other country. How many capitalist countries can match the achievements of most of the socialist world in the provision of social security, child care, the ending of cultural backwardness and so on? There is certainly no country in the world which can beat Cuba's record in the sphere of health care."⁴¹

Even if these statistics were taken at face value, one would have to ask what they mean in broader terms. The former Soviet Union represents the only modern society where life expectancy is declining. The country has to import food and lacks basic consumer goods despite its large number of graduates or its level of steel production. Cuba may have the best health system, but it also quarantines all AIDS carriers. Finally, what does "ending of cultural backwardness" really mean, when after 70 years of socialism the country is wracked by ethnic riots, religious intolerance, and anti-semitism. When Western Europe denationalizes, the socialist East re-nationalizes with the worst kind of 19th-century chauvinism. How is "cultural backwardness" measured?

Instead of celebrating with the oppressed Eastern European population and the rest of the world the downfall of the corrupt regimes, the editor of *The African Communist* regrets the new search for democratic socialism that the liberalization in Eastern Europe made possible: "The disappearance of the communist governments of Eastern Europe has been an undeniable setback to the liberation movement..."⁴² In Cold War fashion, he equates "the threat to the Soviet Union, Cuba and other communist governments" with "the domination of imperialism."

For the SACP the 1990 collapse of the communist movement represents merely a process of "cleansing." A Party journal's editorial reiterates SACP goals "to establish a socialist republic in South Africa based

41 Slovo, *op. cit.*

42 Bunting, *New Nation*, June 22, 1990.

on the principles of Marxism-Leninism, to promote the ideas of proletarian internationalism and the unity of the workers of South Africa."⁴³ The Party closes its eyes to Eastern Europe when it defiantly asserts: "Nothing that has happened in Eastern Europe or elsewhere makes us believe that this perspective (Marxism-Leninism) needs to be altered."⁴⁴ Cocooned in a dream world, the Party's 7th Congress in 1989 declared that "the advances of the socialist countries inspire the working people throughout the world..." Such dogmatism refuses to notice that the Eastern Europe example has discredited the socialist idea elsewhere.

Slovo defines Stalinism as "socialism without democracy." He repeatedly refers to "distortions" from the top. It is pilot error rather than the plane's structure that is responsible for its crash. Even pilot faults are referred to euphemistically. Ruthless purges, including, before the German invasion, the systematic killing of substantial sections of the Russian officer corps by a paranoid clique, are described in functionalist terms as "damage wrought to the whole Soviet social fabric (including its army) by the authoritarian bureaucracy." There is no comprehension of Stalinism as "internal colonialism" akin to Apartheid.

Slovo's "judicial distortions" is tantamount to a rationalization of the show trials. "Distortions" leaves the principle intact by merely deploring its excesses. Had Stalin killed a few million less or even only one committed comrade, it would still be a crime. Yet nowhere in Slovo's account does one find an adequate explanation, let alone some moral outrage, about the Stalinist Holocaust. The paper attempts to distance the SACP chairman from an embarrassing past and to hide his failure to examine the causes of the Stalinist tyranny behind one of its unfortunate consequences: the discrediting of socialism. Proper naming, rather than metaphor and euphemism, remain crucial for overcoming and under-

43 *The African Communist*, No. 121, 1990.

44 *Ibid.*

standing a criminal past. Stalinism's fault was not primarily the discrediting of socialism.⁴⁵

Almost alone on the Left, Johnstone insists that the Gulag is about Apartheid, that Auschwitz is about Cambodia. "It is certainly no accident that even now, by the end of the twentieth century, the horrendous fact that the human toll of Stalinism exceeded Nazi crimes against humanity remains greatly unreflected upon in its deeper implications. Or that many on the Left would dismiss any attempt to think about the Leninist state in terms of the Apartheid state."⁴⁶ Slovo's laudatory attempt to reflect critically on Stalinism ultimately fails, because he does not draw the obvious connections.

The victims of Auschwitz, the Gulags and Apartheid are not concerned in whose name they were killed and maimed. The Apartheid labour system compares almost favourably with the Leninist system that prohibits independent trade unions. Both combat idleness. But forced labour under the exhortations of discipline for the people's cause is worse, because of its pretenses. In the original Marxian vision, alienated labour was to be abolished. Leninists glorified higher productivity as the patriotic duty of selfless brigades. The Apartheid labourer at least knows of his exploitation and grudgingly complies because there are no alternatives. The Leninists and the Stalinists betrayed their victims in addition to exploiting them. This explains the magnitude of the fury for revenge when set free. Blacks in South Africa always knew that racial rule was for the benefit of the ruling race. They do not feel cheated as the hardworking Party member did when the luxurious corruption of the people's representatives was finally revealed. Hence, most blacks merely desire their proper share rather than wanting to turn the tables.

45 Aryeh Neier has perceptively pointed to a reverse personality cult in the personalized blame of Stalin. "According to current official pronouncements, virtually all the evils of the past can be attributed to a single villain in much the same way that Stalin was once credited with every achievement in the Soviet Union. The effect is to promote a cult of personality in reverse." See his "What Should be Done about the Guilty?" *New York Review of Books*, February 1, 1990, p. 32.

46 Johnstone, *op. cit.*

Scientific Socialism

Slovo reiterates the scientific nature of Marxism. He refers to it as a "revolutionary science" or a "social science whose fundamental postulates and basic insights into the historical processes remain a powerful (because accurate) theoretical weapon." The insistence on the scientific nature of historical processes, which can only be established by positivistic methods, has long been abandoned by leading historians and critical theorists. Instead, they stress the hermeneutic, interpretive task of analysts. Social *science* is a misnomer, in as much as it assumes that human behaviour is predetermined by laws similar to those in the natural sciences that can be verified or falsified by the proper Marxist method. In this postulate, human agency and the essential open-endedness of history is denied. It usually results in a crude reductionism or economic approach that neglects that people not only have material interests but ideal interests as well. The infinitely varied subjectivity through which people perceive, interpret and mediate their world cannot be reduced to an epiphenomenon; the powerful attraction of materialist rationality notwithstanding. Individuals are more than agents of interests.

Slovo restates the central tenets of "Marxist revolutionary science," *i.e.*, that the class struggle is the motor of human history, that "all morality is class-related" and that "working class internationalism" is the most liberating concept. However, who are "the people," the "working class?" Who is the "society as a whole" that, according to Slovo, should assume control? In the South African debate against Leninists, Frost has rightly reiterated a point made at the turn of the century by Robert Michels, and later documented by Max Weber: "In modern states control by society as a whole means in practice bureaucratic rule... Those who say organisation inevitably say oligarchy," asserts Michels. Oligarchic tendencies can only be counter-acted by a democratic culture below, not by Leninist "democratization from above."⁴⁷

47 Mervyn Frost, "Opposing Apartheid: Democrats against the Leninists," *Theoria*, No. 71, May 1988, pp. 15-22.

Like Marx, Slovo hypostatizes an abstract working class. But *the* working class is comprised of blacks and whites, men and women, religious adherents and agnostics, homosexuals and heterosexuals, skilled and unskilled workers who live in urban or rural settings. Above all, there are employed and unemployed. By ignoring all these faultlines under an abstract category, the concept misses the crucial social texture. Yet whether a group *is* or can become the leading force in a conflict depends as much on those differential social conditions as on common material interests.

To expect solidarity because of common exploitation is a long-standing illusion. Yet it is precisely on such a self-deception that the ANC and the SACP base their strategy. Working class unity and solidarity have failed worldwide. Ever since the German social democrats voted for the Kaiser's war budget in 1914, the dream of internationalism has suffered repeated set-backs. The idea has nevertheless retained its elusive attractiveness. In a crunch, organized labour wants to prove its patriotism against conservative accusations of disloyalty. Thus workers participate in nationalist euphorias in different political cultures as readily as their class antagonists—from the World Wars, to the Falkland conflict, to the Armenian-Azerbaijani clashes in the Soviet Union. External enemies defuse internal class conflicts, but only until the enemy is defeated. Ethnic divisions also undermine solidarity. A split labour market—with more expensive indigenous labour pitted against more exploitable immigrant labour in most Western states—proves an ideal situation to counteract union solidarity, let alone militancy. Working class racism and chauvinism remain among the great taboos within the Left.

Given this record, it is all the more surprising that the dream of working class unity lives on in a society where its white and black segments are politically and legally furthest apart. Because an economic recession also affected the privileged white working class, the ANC and the SACP argue, the prospect of a common struggle with black workers has opened up. "It is becoming clearer to sections of white workers, faced with growing impoverishment, that they have to stand up in the face of economic policies aimed at appeasing big business and strength-

ening the Apartheid regime."⁴⁸ Despite the long tradition of similar failed strategies, the Left Apartheid opposition hopes that involvement of big business by white workers could translate into cooperation with black unions. "This has opened up some possibilities for these workers to be drawn into struggle, and in action, to realise more clearly that their true interests lie with their fellow black workers and the democratic trade union movement."

However, in the perennial conflict between common interests and nationalist-racist surrogates, it is futile to bank on the superior rationality of interests winning out. The symbolic satisfaction of belonging to an imagined community of superior qualities easily defeats the potential real benefits of solidarity. The appeal to emotional rewards wins over the calculations of material interests. Rather than joining COSATU or the ANC, the few remaining white workers flock to the neo-fascist AWB. Deep resentment over loss of status and immediate economic insecurity drives its victims into the camp of those who long for the restoration of a lost past. That was one of the lessons of Nazi Germany.

By building its strategy on white-black, working-class alliances, the SACP not only starts from false assumptions but neglects to address an increasingly significant split in the labour movement: the competition between employed and unemployed. Neither the ANC nor COSATU has devised a strategy to cope with one third of the national workforce who are unemployed. Unions increasingly represent only the employed. Mere employment in South Africa almost qualifies for membership in a "labour aristocracy": having a job is already a mark of privilege. A whole range of life-chances—from access to housing, medical care, education and pensions—depends on employment. Those millions outside the formal economy—in the backyards of townships, in the shacks around the cities and in desolate huts in the barren countryside—form a permanent underclass. The liberation movements have yet to organize these permanently marginalized outsiders; unions have yet to address the relation between employed and unemployed workers. With the ranks of

48 The January 8, 1989 ANC National Executive Committee Annual Policy Statement.

the unemployed swelling, the state finds ready recruits for its various police forces; local war-lords organize vigilante groups from a vast pool of resentment; puritan, fundamentalist church cults vie with drug peddlers and petty criminals for the souls and pockets of the downtrodden. Orthodox Marxism has traditionally written off this *Lumpenproletariat* that forms a substantial section of the South African population.

Wavering Social Democrats

The 1989 SACP program "The Path to Power," claims to be "guided by the theory of Marxism-Leninism" as well as its own and others' experiences of revolutionary struggles. It repeatedly postulates "seizure of power" as its goal and asserts: "We are not engaged in a struggle whose objective is merely to generate sufficient pressure to bring the other side to the negotiating table." Yet barely a year later the SACP officially negotiates with "the enemy." The SACP chairman assures capital that only a mixed economy guarantees growth. He declares "the narrow issue of nationalization is a bit of a red herring."⁴⁹ In Slovo's pragmatic assessment, the South African economy cannot be transformed "by edict without risking economic collapse." Instead of bureaucratic *state* control along Eastern European lines, Slovo now advocates *public* control through effective democratic participation by "producers at all levels."⁵⁰ This amounts to a classic social-democratic programme of co-determination where large firms are held publicly accountable and union representatives sit on boards. Since such widely legitimate visions are also considered negotiable, not much of economic orthodoxy is left among former Leninists. The collapse of Eastern European state socialism has finally made its impact on some of its last fervent adherents.

As a test of reality, classical Leninism misled the SACP in its understanding of a totally changed constellation. The SACP's orthodox worldview could not comprehend three crucial developments that did not fit the predetermined constellation of interests. First, the ANC-SACP lead-

49 Slovo, *Argus*, February 28, 1990.

50 Slovo, *The African Communist*, 1990, p. 123.

ership was surprised by the active support that sanctions calls received in Western capitals, Margaret Thatcher notwithstanding. In the SACP theory, Pretoria as the outpost of imperialism, has been and would always be propped up by its international sponsors. Isolation and pressure on the Apartheid regime would have to emanate primarily from progressive socialist and non-aligned countries. In fact, the opposite occurred: South African trade with African and some other Third World countries increased; diplomatic contacts between, *e.g.*, Pretoria and the Soviet Union or Hungary improved while South Africa's relationship with the US, Canada and the EEC deteriorated.

Second, these trends increased pressure for Pretoria to seek a negotiated solution, particularly in the light of the cut-off from foreign investment capital which threatened to by-pass South Africa in favour of Eastern Europe. Faced with benign neglect by its traditional allies while it lacked a political settlement, South Africa had to change course if it aspired to remain part of the global economy and avoid becoming a future Albania. By its own admission, the SACP was caught off-guard when it was legalized on February 2, 1990. After preparing thirty years for liberation, the ANC also found itself unprepared. Believing in its own propaganda of a fascist, racist enemy, most exiles never took seriously the warnings about their opponents' adapting, deracializing abilities and modernizing potentials.⁵¹ Without an adequate theory of the antagonist, the opposition wasted precious years with ineffective strategies. Finally, the slavish support for the Soviet Union made the SACP one of the last foreign parties to understand Eastern Europe. A worker's party that backed the Polish government against Solidarity proved unable to sense the people's anger that finally swept East European rulers out of power. Deprived of Honecker's solidarity, the SACP exiles suddenly found themselves searching for new international allies almost against their will.

51 See Heribert Adam, *Modernizing Racial Domination*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971.

Despite its newly professed anti-Stalinism, the SACP held its 7th Congress in 1989 in one of the last Stalinist redoubts: Havana. Observers have interpreted this choice as "perhaps indicative of the schism between the SACP and CPSU"⁵² that *perestroika* and the flagging Soviet interest in regional confrontations with US allies have brought about. Yet the test for the future South African democracy may not lie in past alliances of the most committed component of the Apartheid opposition, but in the current practice of a democratic culture in the new internal constellation. The recognition of union independence by the SACP, together with the conditional endorsement of a multi-party system and traditional liberal freedoms, bodes well for South African democracy, despite the Leninist relics and a repressed Stalinist past.

Because SACP members are the major force in the theoretical debates within the broad Apartheid opposition, its own practice of internal democracy influences the style of the entire movement. Whether the SACP declarations for democracy should be taken at face value or treated with scepticism is best tested by the behaviour of the Party itself. At present, the organization remains a self-styled elitist group with semi-secret membership, apart from the leadership. While security reasons can be legitimately invoked for this undemocratic tradition in an authoritarian environment, the time will arrive when a more democratic climate allows and requires less clandestine behaviour. Will the SACP, nevertheless, continue with placing its members into strategic political and union positions in the same way as the secret Afrikaner Broederbond infiltrates influential Afrikaner and government institutions? As long as the Party has to "authorize" its chairman to circulate a discussion paper, it resembles more an authoritarian Jesuit order for the organic intelligentsia than an open, broad-based vehicle for the self-critical exploration of feasible socialism. Pallo Jordan, one of the few unorthodox intellectuals in the ANC top hierarchy and himself a one-time victim of SACP paranoia in the movement, has harshly pointed out that "the political culture nurtured by the SACP's leadership over the years has produced a spirit of intolerance, petty intellectual thuggery and political dissem-

52 *Africa Confidential*, January 12, 1990.

The ANC Mourning of False Socialism

This commentary by Heribert Adam was first published in Die Suid-Afrikaan, May 1991, and reprinted in Race Relations News, December 1991.

In the December 1990 German elections the reformed successor of the East German communists, the so-called "Party of Democratic Socialism" received 11.1 percent of the popular vote in the territory of the former GDR. Apart from this small band of functionaries and beneficiaries of a 40 year experiment, few mourn the disappearance of Prussian socialism. Rejected by its own population in massive street demonstrations, the most productive "socialist miracle" among the Soviet satellites turned out to be the faltering card house of corruption at the top with an outdated production system in an ecological nightmare across the land below.

Secret police activity with an army of informers had kept the population in check. The infamous Stasi harassed the people and spied on them only a bit more thoroughly and efficiently than the various police and intelligence agencies in South Africa. The GDR's most sought after export article, from Mozambique to Cuba, was the technique of surveillance and security organization. It monopolized this modernizing developing aid to socialist states.

Those who wanted to escape

from the depressing prison state were shot along the Iron Curtain; those who wanted to leave legally were fired from their jobs and detained if they persisted. The children of politically suspect parents could forget about higher education. More prominent dissidents were expelled to the West and denationalized, just as the Apartheid state was happy to see some of its fierce opponents in exile. A slight difference may be indicative: while the anti-Apartheid activists worked for the revolutionary overthrow of a seemingly irreformable order, many political victims of state socialism were genuine Marxists who agreed with the principle of the first "Workers and Peasant State" on German soil but criticized its undemocratic implementation. Nevertheless, in the bureaucratic despotism of a self-serving clique, any critical voice was immediately stifled as an "enemy of the people."

Long after this embarrassing "socialist" model mercifully passed into history and long after its domestic oppression had been exposed in all its lurid details, the official ANC journal *Sechaba* in its December 1990 issue celebrates with a front-page picture

and an editorial the cordial ANC-GDR relations. The ANC writer bemoans "the loss the liberation movement has suffered with the disappearance of the German Democratic Republic as we knew it, and the emergence of a new Germany." The ANC author in all earnestness asserts that "Sechaba was printed voluntarily by GDR workers" in what was the state-owned and Stasi-controlled "Erich Weinert" printing press. Without noticing the contradiction that for the first time when the workers could really make a voluntary decision after the disappearance of their regime, Sechaba explains, that "the new conditions under which our supporters have to operate do not allow direct assistance...such as we have been receiving all along, to be given." The ANC blames "capitalist competition" because now the plant "must give all its available time to this competition." Any student press in a basement could have typeset and printed the thin "official organ of the ANC" during a few overtime hours, if they were really committed. But far more serious moral issues arise from this false lament.

The SACP and the ANC have yet to question the morality of accepting support from dictatorships, be they the GDR, Libya or Cuba. It could be argued that American foundation money is

also tainted by slavery and imperialism, or even pious Scandinavian or Canadian government grants are ultimately derived from workers' exploitation. But at least these donors do not impose their will on their subjects who can get rid of them if they disagree strongly. In this respect donations to the ANC indeed are based on consent of the people. The East German or Libyan citizen has no choice or say in who their executives are, how their taxes are spent or how they are collected. This remains the essential difference between a democratic and a criminal autocracy. Even if no support is available from the right side, is it, therefore, justifiable to align oneself with the criminal camp? No church, charity or other worthy cause, no matter how much in dire straits, could knowingly accept money from the Mafia without discrediting its own cause. Yet the ANC has for decades known about the undemocratic privileges of an East European nomenclatura in the midst of the misery of its people. ANC representatives themselves had the luxuries of a socialist elite showered on them and willingly participated in their prescribed role. The East German ANC representative even went hunting with Honecker who cunningly subsidised *Sechaba* in return for praise by a universally acclaimed liberation movement. Yet it never occurred to the South

African exiles that by accepting "fraternal solidarity" from such a dubious source they also ignored the plight of the oppressed in East Germany, let alone harmed their own goal of establishing democracy through association and praise for dictatorships. To this day most ANC leaders would find such moral reasoning odd and mischievous and instead argue pragmatically that they had no choice in taking money, regardless of the sponsor's record, if they wanted their organization to survive. Indeed, can the hungry be blamed for accepting food from the devil?

The concern for the democratic Left must be what life is left of "Marxism" after being espoused for decades by the Honeckers, Castros or Mugabes of this world? As indeed has been argued by many democratic so-

cialists: if Marxism or any critical counterforce against an unfettered, triumphant capitalism is to be retrieved, it has everything to gain from being thus "discredited." By reappropriating the original Marxism from its Leninist and Stalinist detractors, the democratic Left faces a unique historic opportunity to develop alternatives free of the bureaucratic coercion of "really existing socialism." Instead, a pedestrian ANC-SACP mourns the breakdown of its own chains, because it lost a printing press in the process! The Eastern European transformations in 1989 constitute the most fundamental change in the world since the French revolution 200 years earlier. What does it say about the state of mind of a liberation movement and an allied Communist Party that it laments the event, not to speak of comprehending it?

bling among its membership."⁵³ Such a culture of authoritarianism does not bode well for the chances of democracy in the post-Apartheid era—despite the new SACP lip service to democratic values. However, the pressure for democracy from below, particularly in the unions, may well force the SACP to abandon the relics of Stalinism.

What white South Africa has not yet fully understood is the recent development that turned rhetorical Stalinist ideologues into the ANC's more pragmatic force. With a disintegrating Soviet bloc seeking peace and investments instead of world revolution, South African communists

53 Pallo Jordan, "The Crisis of Conscience in the SACP," *Transformation*, No. 11, 1990.

have nowhere else to go but home. This makes them unexpected allies of Pretoria's negotiation project, even "without a hidden agenda," as Slovo assured during the first Groote Schuur talks. The SACP now considers reconciliation and trust a useful method to bridge differences. Against all tenets of Marxist orthodoxy, the Party journal editorializes: "Recent events have proved abundantly that long-standing prejudice can be dispelled by personal contact,"⁵⁴ as if antagonistic interests could be wiped out by pleasant small talk at cocktail parties and conferences.

The SACP's professed socialism in the second stage, after democracy has been achieved, depends in Slovo's words on the "class forces in play" at that time. In practical terms this puts socialism on ice. Once non-racial capitalism delivers the goods in a relatively colour-blind way, Marxist socialist parties shrink or turn into social-democratic parties, as has been demonstrated the world over.

Because of its past radical image, the SACP leadership can entice a sceptical youth into the negotiation process. From this perspective the government should welcome the red flags. If anyone can prevent a latent counter-racism and make a rational colour-blind attitude prevail, it is the traditional Marxists with their ideological indoctrination in internationalist universalism. That is the historical merit of South African communists, their undemocratic Stalinism notwithstanding. Slovo's self-critical account of the failure of socialism constitutes the first indication of a democratic renewal that may lay to rest van den Berghe's skeptical comment that "South Africa, which has already spawned the world's last official racists, may also see its last Stalinists."⁵⁵

Democratic or Authoritarian Post-Apartheid Rule?

The question remains: to what extent does the SACP's residual Stalinism colour the ANC? Given that many members of the ANC hierarchy are also SACP members and the close alliance is likely to continue for a

54 *The African Communist*, 123, March, 1990.

55 Pierre van den Berghe, "South Africa After Thirty Years," ms, 1989.

while, the prospects of democracy are directly affected. Most internal ANC critics so far have complained mainly about administrative chaos, uncertainty about decision-making and authoritarianism, "geared to an underground conspiratorial organization" where orders come from above and debate is limited. The editor of the *Weekly Mail*, sympathetic to the ANC, pointed to complications at various levels of leadership: "The returning ANC hierarchy, the internal ANC leadership, the UDF executive, those who were thrown up in the Mass Democratic Movement during the Emergency, the military commanders, the Robben Islanders...."⁵⁶ But stylistic differences and internal organizational competition would be welcome indicators of democratic pluralism if they did not represent a much deeper ideological dilemma.

With the Apartheid enemy gone, the amorphous ANC alliance is in danger of ideological disintegration. The only force with sufficient discipline and cohesion to come out of this internecine strife relatively intact is the SACP, based in the unions. Redefined as a Left social-democracy for redistribution alongside economic growth, it is likely to survive the discrediting of socialism elsewhere. The long lasting mass poverty of a black proletariat will see to that in South Africa. No fictional consumer nationalism and yearning for a market is likely to pacify this quest, as in Eastern Europe. Therefore, unlike movements such as the Citizen's Forum in the former East Germany and elsewhere that were overtaken by anti-communist conservative forces, the initial radical advocates of change in South Africa are likely to stay around as a formidable force. However, whether they will show a socialism with a human or an authoritarian face is unclear. Mandela's moderation is not necessarily an indicator of things to come when political competition starts in earnest. The real problem is the lack of a democratic culture in black politics.

Cyril Ramaphosa's first public act as ANC secretary general was to forbid ANC members to publicize their membership in the SACP. "We

⁵⁶ Anton Harber, "The ANC Begins to Wobble as it Nears the Home Straight," *Weekly Mail*, September 21, 1990.

felt that the press had no business to subject members of the ANC to such an inquisition" (*Vrye Weekblad*, August 9-16, 1991). Quite apart from encouraging rumours and red-baiting smears by his interdict, Ramaphosa denied legitimate inquiries into the political beliefs and loyalties of public figures.

Adherence to a multi-party system is half-hearted and contingent. A March 1990 meeting of the SACP and COSATU in Harare resolved that "in general" the multi-party system "provides one of the favourable conditions for democratic participation" but also states that "a one-party-system cannot be ruled out in principle—particular conditions may make it necessary."⁵⁷ Of course, it would be the SACP that decides when formal democracy has to give way to a more suitable "people's democracy."

During its 70th Anniversary Congress in December 1991 in South Africa, the overwhelming majority of the 413 delegates reaffirmed the Marxist-Leninist nature of the Party and rejected the proposal by the leadership to define its future goal as "democratic socialism," choosing instead to drop the word "democratic." The rationale of the 330-strong majority was that the adjective amounted to a tautology, since the SACP vision of socialism was inherently democratic, in contrast to the "distortions" of socialism in Eastern Europe. At the same time, however, the congress praised Castro's Cuba as a socialist model, and Slovo criticized Gorbachev for having abolished the Soviet Communist Party in a Stalinist manner after the failed 1991 coup. While the congress was generally interpreted as an assertion of greater organizational independence of the Party from the ANC, it also demonstrated how strong the overlapping membership between the Party, the ANC and Cosatu still is. Both the Cosatu president and vice-president were elected to the central committee of the SACP and 11 of its 30 members are also on the National Executive Committee of the ANC.

57 *The African Communist*, 122, March, 1990.

The constant invocation of "the will of the people" almost implies a totalitarian assumption, as if the people were monolithic and had only one will. Speeches by ANC leaders or articles in ANC-SACP journals hardly ever refer to competitors such as PAC, AZAPO or Inkatha by name, but denigrate them as "third forces." Despite the central message of unity of the anti-Apartheid forces at the first South African public rally of the ANC-SACP leadership at Mitchells Plain, neither the main speaker, Slovo, nor Mandela, nor Alfred Nzo nor anyone else mentioned the names of Biko or Sobukwe in their long historical reviews. To be sure, it is no longer true that the ANC makes hegemonic claims to power. It has now realised that Afrikaner nationalism has to be accommodated and a simple transfer of power is an unrealistic demand. But the ANC still claims ideological hegemony.

One of the most astonishing features of the Stalinist show trials was the humble plea by most of the convicted that they be duly punished or even executed for their crimes. The brainwashed defendants—previously all strong, self confident, highly placed and committed communists—in the end themselves believed in their "unintended crime," because the Party's collective wisdom had so decreed. An analyst of the Slansky affair put it succinctly: "The main point of the trials was the violation of reason, of logic, of common sense. They proved that lies can be impossible or outrageous, and still be taken as truth; they are protected not by logic but by state power."⁵⁸ When one reads the rationalization of Stalinism by some South African communists now, it seems as if the violation of common sense and evidence can be achieved even without psychological torture. There is a constant repetition of the theme that "the excesses committed under Stalin, while not justified," must be seen in the light "that spies and saboteurs were being infiltrated into the Soviet Union."⁵⁹ Thus, Gwala, an influential local Natal leader and member of the SACP "Interim Leadership Group," explicitly rejects "the denunciation of Stalin" by Slovo. "This sort of nihilism only clouds the issue and does not deal with the problems of socialism scientifically." In Gwala's

58 Josef Skvorecky, "The Theater of Cruelty," *The New York Review of Books*, August 16, 1990.

59 Harry Gwala, "Let us Look at History in the Round," *The African Communist*, No. 123, 1990.

view, the talk of giving socialism a "human face" is incorrect because "to us Marx's socialism has only one face, the scientific face." Against all evidence, there is an unyielding dogmatism. According to Gwala: "The saying that the term 'dictatorship of the proletariat' has been abused and therefore we must shy away from it sends shivers down our spine." The Cold War and the siege of the communist bloc by Western imperialism is said to justify or at least explain "extreme measures." While Soviet domination "protected" Eastern Europe from such machinations, in Western Europe "the American troops saw to it that the working class was stifled." Those are the views of a leading South African communist who, together with his comrades, proved powerful enough to initially veto the planned meeting between Mandela and Buthelezi.

After the military coup against Gorbachev in August 1991, the SACP presented another picture of confusion, despite Slovo's previous support for democratic socialism. While the attempted takeover had already been condemned by the world as "unconstitutional" and "disturbing," the first SACP statement was "information on developments in the Soviet Union is still sketchy. Without adequate information and a proper study of it, we are unwilling to comment on these events." The Natal Midlands Branch of the SACP even issued, what Slovo later described as an "unauthorized" statement welcoming the downfall of Gorbachev. "His government could have become destructive to the socialist objective." The ANC journal *Mayibuye* (October, 1991) prominently publishes Gwala's denunciation of Gorbachev and the defence of the military coup against him: "Those who employ bourgeois morality and imperialist norms in dismembering a socialist union and suppressing the Communist Party can expect any method to be employed in defending socialism."

Gwala and his Natal supporters are not alone arguing for a stricter adherence to Marxist-Leninist principles. Dave Kitson⁶⁰ deplores the departures and "ill-informed denigration of the doctrines" by the Party,

60 "Is the SACP really communist?" *WIP*, 73, March/April, 1991.

that in his view has descended into a social-democratic "Kautskyist-Luxemburgist" position. The insurrectionists among the Left would like "to arm the masses in the townships." Rather than democratize the SADF and integrate MK into it (as the current SACP chief and former MK commander Hani advocates) they dream of seeing the state and its security apparatus dismantled and displaced. Because of this ideological disarray in the ranks, the Party is careful not to tamper with its unifying symbols, particularly its name. The Party journal scoffed at the suggestion to adopt a social-democratic label and suggested that its ill-informed critics "should consider changing their prejudices instead."⁶¹ More significant than such posturing remains the SACP practice of active co-operation in the negotiated compromise. The calamity of Eastern Europe seemed to have finally dawned on at least some of the Party leadership because they now accept full responsibility for the "task of confronting the reality of the crimes committed in the name of the cause for which we stand."⁶²

61 *The African Communist*, 124, 1991.

62 *Ibid.*

IV. PSYCHOLOGICAL LIBERATION: BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS AND AFRICANISM

This section is a revised and expanded version of a paper presented by Kogila Moodley at the World Council of Churches sponsored conference on "The Legacy of Steve Biko," Harare, June 17-19, 1990.

Internalized Colonialism and the Psychology of Liberation

The idea of Black Consciousness heralded an era of alternative political awareness in the late 1960s. A self-empowering, vibrant, reconstructionist world view emphasized the potential role of black initiative and responsibility in articulating the power of the powerless. Between 1968-1976, the Black Consciousness Movement (B.C.M.), as it became known, was one of the most important developments in South Africa, not only as the result of the self-confident protest and rebellion that it unleashed, but also "because of the questions it posed about the nature of oppositional politics in South Africa and its relation to the nature of South African society."⁶³

It would seem worthwhile to consider the related concepts of black consciousness and Africanism at length for three reasons: (1) they are widely misrepresented but, above all, underreported in Canada where the ANC vision dominates; (2) they may well develop into the dominant black outlook again as they had been in the early 1960s and during the 1976 Soweto upheavals; and (3) although their respective organizations, PAC and AZAPO, clearly have minority support at present, their non-compromising stance forces the ANC into policy positions which it might not take without the serious challenge from a left Africanist flank.

Black South Africa in the 1960s was ripe for an ideology of liberation. The oppression of Apartheid society took place overtly and blatantly. With all opposition silenced and institutionalized racism triumphant,

63 Sam C. Nolutshungu, *Changing South Africa*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1982, p. 147-148.

blacks were portrayed as innately inferior, accustomed to dehumanized living, sexually promiscuous, intellectually limited, and prone to violence. Blackness symbolized evil, demise, chaos, corruption and uncleanliness, in contrast to whiteness which equalled order, wealth, purity, goodness, cleanliness and the epitome of beauty. Exclusionary practices over centuries led to what might be described as the "inferiorization" of blacks, inevitably internalized by the victims themselves. To be sure, due to a variety of factors, the degree of self-doubt has always been lower in South Africa than among US Blacks. Open collective discrimination allowed the cause of failure to be identified more easily than the informal discrimination hidden behind US laws of equality that lend themselves rather to the search for individual causes of misery.

But undoubtedly, Apartheid society also produced self-hate. The limited range of opportunities gave rise to rationalization of the status quo because of the doubts that many victims had about their own abilities—in short, they blamed themselves. In addition to this self-racism, the fragmentation of the three black groups through differential privileges and incorporation led to a reinforcement of an intra-black hierarchy.

Thus, Black Consciousness emanated from the differential material and political circumstances in which Blacks were situated. Its prime movers in the early phase were relatively privileged medical students, not workers, who served as educated articulators of the plight of the underprivileged and politically excluded. Yet, unlike the usual profile of medical students elsewhere, many of them came from working class backgrounds and were not insulated from the harsh conditions of Apartheid society. They were joined by other students on the newly-created segregated black campuses, where they operated under very restrictive circumstances and had come to depend upon the white dominated National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) to speak and act on their behalf, since they were formally prohibited from joining this organization.

Yet, even as some blacks at the open universities worked with NUSAS, they experienced the bifurcating effects of 'academic integration' and 'social separation' at all levels. Much of this was inherently due to the

vast gap between the life circumstances of both groups of students. A similar scenario characterized the University Christian Movement because the initial promise of a liberal alternative soon evaporated as black students once more saw themselves in the role of followers. Given the political vacuum created by the banning of the ANC and the arrests of its leaders, it was left to liberal whites to articulate the case for black rights. The role to which Blacks invariably became relegated was one of passivity. Steve Biko, the best known proponent of Black Consciousness, described on these effects as dulling black originality and imagination, "where it takes a supreme effort to act logically even in order to follow one's beliefs and convictions."⁶⁴

In the editorial introduction to the 1972 annual *Black Viewpoint*, Biko referred to the great vacuum of black writing in the media. "So many things are said so often to us, about us and for us but very seldom by us."⁶⁵ He emphasized the images of dependency created for blacks through the way in which they were depicted in the white press and expressed the need for deconstructing the implicit interpretive connotations, underlying values, attitudes and interests of both the financial supporters and the readership of those newspapers. Biko articulated a general insight into conquest that defeat for the losers has always meant more than physical subjugation. It means, as two historians of the Soviet Union have described in other circumstances, "that the conquerors write the history of the wars; the victors take possession of the past, establish their control over the collective memory."⁶⁶ In short, their definition of reality becomes the dominant explanation.

The difficulty of working bilaterally with even the most sincere Whites posed a moral dilemma for black students, who were the last to want themselves labelled "racist." Yet for Biko and others the need for exclusive black organization was very clear, something Ben Khoapa

64 Aelred Stubbs, ed., *Steve Biko: I Write What I Like*, London, Penguin, 1988, p. 32.

65 B.S. Biko, ed., *Black Viewpoint*, Durban, Sprocas, Black Community Programs, 1972, p. 7.

66 Mikhail Heller and Aleksandr Nekrich, *Utopia in Power: The History of the Soviet Union from 1917 to the Present*, New York, Summit Books, 1988, p. 9.

referred to as the need for "regroupment."⁶⁷ Blacks were considered to be an interest group, like workers in a trade union or teachers fighting their own battles. The collective segregation and oppression based on skin colour therefore provided an eminently logical basis for self-assertion and independent organization. No longer would they allow themselves to be objectified in the negative image of 'non-whites'—instead they reconstructed themselves as blacks, who were self-defining initiators. Gone were the days when they appealed to whites by persuading them that they too had civilized standards. Black consciousness was about pressuring whites through the will-power of their opponents.⁶⁸ Accusations that this was a racist act were dismissed on the grounds that "one cannot be a racist unless he (*sic*) has the power to subjugate."⁶⁹

Later, when Black Consciousness developed a socialist tinge, the co-operation with white liberals was not rejected because of their race or their objective privilege, but because they were seen as representing a bourgeois class enemy. Collaboration with representatives of racial capitalism would amount to betrayal. "Black Consciousness," writes the US historian George Frederickson,⁷⁰ "had evolved from an effort to overcome a black sense of inferiority through independent, non-violent action into an explosive combination of race and class revolutionism." Whatever the meaning of that phrase, Black Consciousness remained above all an awareness-raising movement, rather than an organization that practised revolutionary violence.

Redefinition of Blackness

The origins of disillusionment with non-racial opposition organizations go back to the adoption of the Freedom Charter in 1955 by the Congress of the People, which gave rise to a split between the Charterists

67 B.A. Khoapa, ed., *Black Review* 1972, Durban, Black Community Programmes, 1973, p. 64.

68 Heribert Adam, "The Rise of Black Consciousness in South Africa," *Race* 15, No. 2, October 1973, p. 155.

69 Stubbs, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

70 George M. Frederickson, "The Making of Mandela," *New York Review of Books*, September 27, 1990, p. 27.

(ANC) and those who formed the PAC. The latter's racial definition of 'African' later evolved into a broadly-inclusive subjective one, in that it included people of any group who considered themselves African, and who identified with Africa and its people as opposed to exploiting settlers. By contrast, Black Consciousness utilized an objective definition of Black to describe all those denied privileges by whites, as well as a subjective definition of those who consciously rejected white domination in all its forms. Even Bantustan leaders fell into the former category and were recognized as such for a while by the South African Students' Organisation (SASO).

What was distinctive about the B.C.M. was "its originality in elaborating an ideology of hope rooted in a theology of liberation which emphasized the solidarity of the oppressed regardless of race."⁷¹ Unlike the PAC which, despite its stated goal of including all "Africans," is perceived as narrowly Africanist, Black Consciousness as an ideology was genuinely inclusive. From its inception the new movement sought to incorporate Indians and 'Coloureds'. However, while it had its appeal for this 'middle group' in expressing political identification, G.J. Gerwel⁷² points out that it failed to provide the psychological identity they needed. In general, it enjoyed greater support from activist 'Coloureds' than Indians, not least because some students and clergy identified with its rejection of the label 'coloured' in favour of an inclusive 'black' category', that focused on political oppression. Many Indians on the other hand, while prominent in the early leadership of SASO, experienced a certain denial of self at the grass-roots level. Seldom accepted as being authentically 'black' enough, they felt pressured to replace their cultural heritage with African symbols, and indeed a few gave their children African names, as a way of identifying with the movement. However, these were exceptions—often alienated community mem-

71 Robert Fatton, *Black Consciousness in South Africa*, New York, State University of New York, 1986, p. 66.

72 G. J. Gerwel, "Coloured Nationalism" in T. Sundermeier, *Church and Nationalism in South Africa*, Braamfontein, Ravan Press, 1975.

bers—rather than the precursors of a groundswell of Indian sentiments toward identification as blacks.

The fragile unity of the oppressed was frequently exposed. The ease with which Indians could be threatened for not identifying sufficiently with the cause, and for considering themselves a minority, is evident in a not untypical SASO⁷³ newsletter article in 1972 entitled "Ugandan Asians and the Lesson for Us." In addition to exonerating Amin for his treatment of Asian Ugandans, the latter were portrayed stereotypically as "refusing to see themselves as part of the soil of Africa": "middlemen who continually saw themselves as a minority and by their practice of exploitation of the Africans through money lending at inflated interest rates, through the practice of bargaining...they contributed to the growth of animosity between themselves and the Africans who saw them as a hostile exploitative minority." Here the East African model was uncritically transposed on to the South African situation, thereby overlooking the crucial fact that the Indian South African community originated mostly as indentured labourers. Unlike the trading minorities and the colonial civil servants in East Africa, the majority of Indian South Africans belong to the working class. This uncritical comparison pointed to the absence of class analysis in the movement at this initial stage.

The categorization of Indians as exploiting traders also overlooked the fact that even the minority shopkeepers had to compete with white-owned monopolies in order to corner some of the increasing African consumer market. But because the owners of family stores came into direct contact with African shoppers, unlike the white owners of larger supermarkets and department stores, Indian-African perceptions of each other frequently focussed on unequal exchange relationships. The mutual ambivalence was reinforced by the widespread practice in Natal industries for African workers to be supervised more often than not by Indians who, in turn, had to justify to their white employers their preferential treatment. In this respect, the message of black solidarity

73 SASO, *Newsletters*, Vols. 1, 2, Nos. 1-5, 1971-1977, Durban, SASO, p. 7.

came up against a formidable institutionalized racial hierarchy in employment.

B.C.M. transformed a negative attitude about subordinate 'non-whites' into an inverted, positive discourse of resistance. It offered psychological support to an oppressed group by providing a model for positive identification, and sought to alter the contempt which the victims often felt for their own group. Despite the political motivation of movements such as Black Consciousness to provide an alternative to past descriptions, they have been criticized for implicitly accepting the legitimacy of colour as a marker. In doing so, it is argued, they also reinforced the accuracy of the dominant discourse of 'race' by which they have been signified and exteriorized as the 'other'.⁷⁴ On the other hand, Nolutshungu argues that "the character of the state conditions not only the terms of domination and submission but also the ideologies and political behaviour that challenge and reject it."⁷⁵ The very role that the state gives to national and racial oppression calls forth "alignments among the subject population that are focussed primarily on the terms of political domination rather than those of exploitation."⁷⁶

Ideological Influences and Biases

Notably lacking in the initial stages of the formulation of Black Consciousness was an economic perspective on the nature of exploitation. Conceptualizations of South Africa in class terms remained peripheral and there was no systematic analysis of what was later termed racial capitalism. In part, this represented the rejection of Marxism as a white ideology and its association with the South African Communist Party. However, this omission also reflected the censorship of Marxist literature at the tribal universities, as well as the exposure to existentialism, phenomenology and philosophical psychology which were popular among some of its European-oriented faculty. Hence the focus on values and

74 R. Miles, *Racism*, London, Routledge, 1989, pp. 73-76.

75 Nolutshungu, *op. cit.*

76 *Ibid.*

essences, while the rejection of capitalism was couched in terms of dehumanization and materialism, not commodity fetishism.⁷⁷

Although there was little of the 'black is beautiful' hype which characterized American black protest, the B.C. Movement in South Africa was influenced by trends in the United States. It raised consciousness about the extent to which blacks, at great costs, were trying to copy white images of beauty, and helped to restore their own sense of self-appreciation and self-acceptance. Indeed, in the early stages of the movement in Natal, there were reports that some African men had beaten African women who had straightened their hair, or lightened the colour of their skin. One indicator of the success of Black Consciousness in this area was the vastly reduced advertizing and sale of bleaching creams in South Africa.

Barney Pityana describes B.C. inspirations as originating from African religious movements and prophets, from attempts by Africans to regain their land, from the history of the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union of Africa (I.C.U.), and from Anton Lembede. He stresses the significance of both the Africanist and nationalist strands within the traditions of struggle. Philosophically, Black Consciousness was also broadly influenced by the writings of Leopold Sédar Senghor, Aimé Césaire, Albert Memmi, Frantz Fanon, Eldridge Cleaver, Stokely Carmichael and Paulo Freire. They expressed the humiliation as well as the dignity of the colonized and also the power of the powerless. Their main concerns were with the psychology of oppression and the exorcizing of colonial humiliation. However, there is little evidence in the Black Consciousness literature that, for example, Fanon's central notion of the cleansing power of anti-colonial violence found resonance among South African activists. There was a rather sceptical silence about the ANC's "armed struggle" among Black Consciousness students at the early stage.

77 Nolutshungu, *op. cit.*, pp. 155-157.

Unlike the US version, Black Consciousness in South Africa had no need to become a revivalist movement, reconstructing a distant past and golden heritage, since African linguistic and cultural traditions have continued as a way of life in the Apartheid society. In the absence of the American trauma of slavery there was no need to search for putative roots. Leaders made a clear distinction between their focus on Black Consciousness and 'Black Power' in the United States where already enfranchised blacks wished to constitute themselves as a pressure group in a white majority society. In South Africa, the B.C. movement was seen as a way of preparing people for equal participation in a transformed society that reflected the outlook of the majority.⁷⁸ Psychological liberation was sought through a return to African values of communalism, shared decision-making and more personal communication styles, in contrast to the individualism of white consumer society.

Despite the designation of the black world as 'communalistic' versus the 'individualistic' orientation of the white world, the sexual division of labour within the B.C. movement closely resembled that of white society. All five office bearers in the 1972 executive were men. Women for the most part were relegated to traditional women's domestic roles, responsible for child-care, moral education and socialization in black cultural heritage, for health, nutrition, and the making of clothing. This view permeated women's self-defined roles, as evident in the preamble to the constitution of the allied Black Women's Federation:

1. Black women are basically responsible for the survival and maintenance of their families and largely the socialisation of the youth for the transmission of the Black cultural heritage;
2. The need to present a united front and to redirect the status of motherhood towards the fulfillment of the Black people's social, cultural, economic and political aspirations.⁷⁹

78 Mokgethi Motlhabi, *Black Resistance to Apartheid*, Johannesburg, Skotaville Publishers, 1985, p. 115.

79 Asha Rambally, ed., *Black Review 1975-6*, Durban, Black Community Programmes, 1977, p. 143.

In contrast, the Institute of Black Studies, formed in 1975, was "to provide a forum where the Black *man* can express himself." It was "intended as a platform where issues facing the country can be analysed and interpreted."⁸⁰

The heavy use of the third person masculine, which prevailed in the SASO Policy Manifesto of 1971, may well have reflected and reproduced standard English usage of 'he' and 'man' in what was viewed as their 'generic' sense. However, in contrast to the black cultural ideal of an inclusive communalism, the male is constructed as the empowered speaker and women—even when included as 'sister'—presented as the included 'other', powerless and voiceless.⁸¹ The ancillary role of women in the leadership of SASO further corroborates this tendency; those taken seriously were often in the position of honorary men, and a few of them were prominent in student representative councils and in campus activities. There may also have been structural factors that kept women from participating on a more equal basis, which raises questions about the fairness of attributing their under-representation in the movement to exclusionary practices.

Forms of Protest

In its earlier phases, the movement was characterized by spontaneity and an easy evolution, without any rigidly worked out plan of aims and directions. The style was informal, free of heavy organizational trappings. An example of this was Biko's "I Write What I Like." Politics were consensually based, until the rude awakening of Temba Sono's public criticism of the B.C.M.'s directions in July 1972. After that, the membership was more carefully screened and the style of speeches became more prescribed.

80 *Ibid.*, p. 135.

81 Dorothy Driver, "Women, Black Consciousness and the Discovery of Self," unpublished paper, 1990.

Conscientization often took the form of light-hearted, satirical, humorous utterances. College campuses during the late 60s were the base for frequently staged political theatre. For a while, it amused even Nationalist-oriented staff members who seemed to rejoice at the way in which 'the natives' amused themselves, in images derived from 'their own lingo'. The style of acting and diction was a refreshing variation from the previous stilted, imitative, colonial models of the 'Speech and Drama' genre. Afrikaner faculty at the tribal colleges loved this rejection of the British yoke and there was a self-congratulatory air about how well those institutions actually allowed people to express themselves. So it was very ironic that Black Consciousness was spawned in the very protected thought-streams of the government whose aim was to ethnicize, depoliticize, fragment and render the opposition manageable. It was not surprising that theatrical performances featured among the subversive activities listed by the State in its trial of the Black Consciousness leaders.

From the late 1960s until the arrest of its most articulate proponents in 1977, Black Consciousness filled a crucial vacuum created by the silencing of the ANC and PAC leadership. The main tenets of the ideology permeated the thinking of a generation of students regardless of political persuasion. The initial analytical focus on 'culture', 'identity' and 'value systems' gradually shifted to define the struggle in terms of racism and capitalism. In 1971 the preferred focus was to conscientise the population through direct political criticism of the regime; through infiltration of ruling organizations, including collaborating institutions, so as to convert them from within; and through 'orientation politics' which would address a range of educational, cultural, religious and economic needs. Under the influence of Julius Nyerere's ideas about self-reliance, various community projects explored ways in which blacks could become more self-supporting.

The 1972 Black Review cited Black community projects in operation throughout the country, mainly in rural and semi-rural areas in the Transvaal, Natal and Eastern Cape. Literacy campaigns, health projects, and home education schemes were meant to offer appropriate assistance.⁸² Popular short-term notions of an imminent revolution were

replaced by patient, disciplined preparation. Khoapa proposed that the philosophy of liberation required a frank appraisal of white institutions and policies and "an advanced programme of economic democracy" in order to expand black interests to universal interests.⁸² This called for an extended movement and a change from sheltered student politics to a broadened mobilization of the work force. It did not take long to discover that the intellectual bias of Black Consciousness impeded a major transformation as long as it did not reach workers effectively. This goal implied not only a modification of language, but also a fundamental shift of concerns: building diminished self-images seemed peripheral, at best, to people whose lives were heavily burdened by the daily drudgery of earning a labour-intensive living. The new projects, however, were severely hampered by the constraints of student life. Distances between campuses and townships, inadequate financial resources for travel and free time, and the need to work with Bantustan authorities were inhibiting factors. So, too, was the marginal status of young students, who in the traditional scheme of things could hardly be considered leaders. All these factors served to identify the need for an 'adult' branch of the growing movement.⁸³

What was distinctive about the B.C.M. at this point was its willingness to forego the rhetoric-laden, sterile, non-compromise party lines of preceding organizations and to liaise, for pragmatic reasons, for a while even with adversaries like Gatsha Buthelezi. Indeed, Steve Biko and Buthelezi shared a platform when the movement was bringing together an alliance of diverse black groups. The same openness also manifested itself in seeking to establish a socialist dispensation, while striving for nationalist liberation.

This unconventional mix of tendencies hampered fundraising. To begin with, very few were willing to support Black Consciousness financially. Those who were willing to fund the nationalist cause would

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 66.

⁸³ Gail Gerhart, *Black Power in South Africa: The Evolution of an Ideology*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1979, pp. 291-292.

baulk at supporting a movement with what they viewed as socialist sympathies. On the other hand, those who might have supported radical political initiatives would not do the same for an organization that emphasized the significance of colour. Given the choice between compromising principles and being unfunded, or being independent, principled, locally-based but poorly supported, they characteristically settled for the latter.⁸⁴

Considering B.C.M.'s relatively modest means and low-key profile, the vehement reaction of the Pretoria regime which followed a period of tolerance and even praise for the 'Apartheid-like' student thinking, needs explanation. At a time when the state itself flaunted separatist black education, this movement which on the surface used the same symbols, nevertheless refashioned 'black identity' into a more inclusive category, through raising awareness about the structure of oppression. SASO emphasized black content in education and attempted to subvert the authority structure by divulging the relations of power and eurocentric bias in institutional life. It demystified the relationship between knowledge, control and hegemony as articulated so eloquently in Ernest Baartman's address, "Education as an Instrument for Liberation," at the SASO banquet of June 1973.⁸⁵ Tendencies such as these served only to highlight the dialectic of Apartheid education for the colonized, as was predicted earlier.⁸⁶ From the perspective of the ruling regime, what could be worse than forces that usurped its idioms and subverted its motives in order to challenge it?

The initial state tolerance rapidly changed after a series of industrial strikes throughout Durban during 1973 for which the Black Consciousness movement was blamed but neither claimed nor disclaimed responsibility. The government retaliated with the arrest of eight SASO organizers

84 M. Seleane, "The Black Consciousness Movement," *South African Foundation Review*, December, 1989.

85 E. Baartman, "Education as an Instrument for Liberation" in H.W. van der Merwe, *African Perspectives on South Africa*, Cape Town, David Phillip, 1978, pp. 273-278.

86 Kogila Adam, "Dialectic of Higher Education for the Colonized" in H. Adam, ed., *South Africa, Sociological Perspectives*, London, Oxford University Press, 1971.

although there was little connection between SASO and the strikes. The last straw was a Durban rally which SASO organized in 1974 to celebrate Mozambique's independence. Although only intended to express black solidarity and strengthen the B.C. movement, the 'Viva Frelimo' cries of the crowd at the banned meeting were like red flags to bulls. The police reacted violently, followed by a series of arrests and bannings culminating in a number of deaths in detention.

These were the underlying influences manifest in the 1976 rebellion of Soweto students, most of whom were members of the South African Students' Movement (SASM), infused with the spirit of Black Consciousness in their rejection of Afrikaans language instruction as a tool of their subjugation. What had been intended by advocates of Black Consciousness as education *for* liberation, later became confused with what some viewed as calls from abroad for liberation *before* education. In response to massive arrests of children and police intimidation, the armed struggle was seen as the only way left. Large numbers of these students escaped from the country. In the absence of any alternative, many were then absorbed into ANC camps beyond the borders, although a Black Consciousness Movement in exile was also set up as a third South African liberation group.

Given the deterioration in the conditions of black schooling as well as the unbridgeable rift between children and school authorities under the Department of Education and Training, a group of concerned parents founded the National Education Crisis Committee (NECC). They promoted the idea of People's Education as an alternative, to attempt to get the children to return to schools. However, since most of those active in the NECC were detained, this initiative gained little momentum. Individuals and institutions sympathetic to Black Consciousness continued to conduct research and develop curriculum materials and policy perspectives on crucial areas for an alternative South Africa.

In the 1970s, the B.C.M. was said to have been cocooned as an intellectual crusade with little grass-roots support, lacking a solid base in organized labour. Some critics said the movement was heavy on 'moral purity' and faced the danger of stagnating at the level of black

solidarity, without translating its ideas into the 'politically possible' for 'political action'.⁸⁷ Others expressed concern about whether the movement was forward-looking enough to prepare itself for a post-Apartheid society.⁸⁸

While Black Consciousness has always been weak among organized workers, often to the extent of being non-existent, it did spawn its own union during the 1970s. The Black and Allied Workers' Union (Bawu) criticized its stronger FOSATU rival for employing white intellectuals. This practical non-racialism of a fledgling independent union movement was contrasted with B.C.'s "anti-racism" under "black leadership." Successor organizations like the Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA) and the Azanian Confederation of Trade Unions (Azactu) later formed the National Council of Trade Unions (Nactu) that has kept its organizational and ideological distance from Cosatu to this day, although both federations increasingly co-operate on tactical issues.

In 1978, after the banning of all constituent components of the B.C.M. the previous year, the Azanian People Organisation (AZAPO) was formed. Its leaders incorporated a class analysis into their policy and directed attention toward the political involvement of the black working class. A focus on psychological liberation and 'blackness' gradually gave way to more talk of 'socialist', 'anti-capitalist' alternatives. Those speaking on behalf of AZAPO refuted charges that this was merely an intellectual movement, and insisted that they enjoyed wide support.

While initially favouring the Black Consciousness tendency, the state as well as liberal institutions later began to look more favourably at the ANC supporters' non-racial promise. In 1991, AZAPO students at Witwatersrand University, for example, complained about the university's non-recognition of the B.C.M. on the grounds that the organization was exclusively black and, therefore, violated the university's non-racial

87 Heribert Adam, *op. cit.*

88 Richard Turner, *The Eye of the Needle: Toward a Participatory Democracy in South Africa*, New York, Maryknoll, Orbis Books, 1978.

charter. The students considered it ironic that exclusively Jewish or Islamic student societies were always recognized, and that their compulsory fees were used to subsidize Charterist organizations through the local SRC. The Vice-President of AZAPO, Gomolemo Mokae (*Frontline*, May 1991) lists a series of incidents "where 'liberal' universities like Wits and Natal are guilty of complicity in Stalinistic censorship against non-Charterists." The grievance results from the AZAPO practice not to distinguish between legitimate ethnicity (cultural and religious groups) and illegitimate race. In black and white nationalist thinking, race and ethnicity are identical.

Black Consciousness continues to rely on the development of a 'fictive kinship' between all three 'non-white groups' who have experienced the shared indignity of oppression and material deprivation. At the psychological level this appealed to many in all groups. The effectiveness of Black Consciousness lies in the moral appeal it evokes. These feelings can be activated from time to time, but can they be sustained? One of the major obstacles to a consistent appeal is to be found in the differential experience of Apartheid. Material rewards coopt and 'whiten', so does feared loss of 'cultural terrain'.

Africanism in the Post-Apartheid Era

Analysts of black politics are currently puzzled by the dispute between the two main black anti-negotiation groups that seem ideologically so close together. At the beginning of the 1990s, AZAPO and the PAC appear to be further apart from each other, the more they were both marginalized by their opposition to the Charterist power-sharing project. According to Patrick Lawrence, a journalist: "Given the convergence between their ideological positions, including their insistence on black leadership and their commitment to socialism, AZAPO and PAC were strongly hostile to one another. AZAPO accused the PAC of intolerance, of forcing AZAPO members to wear their T-shirts inside out at a Sharpeville Day commemorative service instead of welcoming them as brothers-in-the-struggle, and of belatedly pressing for a constituent assem-

bly, an idea first promoted by AZAPO in 1984.⁸⁹ Behind the petty quarrels, however, lies a class difference that often is overlooked.

The PAC speaks on behalf of some of the least privileged and less educated members of the subordinate majority. With a reservoir of Africanist sentiment in selected rural areas and recent migrants, the social base of the PAC resembles that of Inkatha rather than the more professionally-led and urban-oriented ANC. On the other hand, AZAPO has always comprised a better educated elite being particularly popular among university staff, clergy, journalists and other professionals. Given its sprinkling of Indians in prominent leadership positions, AZAPO continues to be resented by some Africanists just as the PAC initially objected to the perceived inordinate influence of Indians and white communists in the ANC. Although the PAC also has a few prominent non-African members, it offers essentially a very down-to-earth articulation of diverse grass-roots sentiments. In short and with crude oversimplification, AZAPO constitutes a sophisticated intellectual elite in search of a constituency while the PAC, at least in the past, has represented a potentially powerful army with disorganized and quarrelling generals.

The repeated internecine PAC leadership conflicts and petty ideological disputes stand out especially in comparison with the united ANC. In contrast to the PAC, the ANC has had the advantage of much wider international recognition, diplomatic support and a sympathetic international press that virtually ignored the PAC. The ANC could also fall back on a wider pool of experience and expertise in resistance politics. The popular symbols of resistance, such as the *toyi toyi* dance, songs and colours are all associated with the ANC tradition, and they are also used by Inkatha. Contrary to expectations which would have an Africanist cultural revival produce the political emotions, they originated from the internationalist-oriented ANC. Its support by the Soviet bloc far outweighed the initial PAC support by China in the inter-socialist rivalry. It was only in a few frontline China-aligned states, such as Zimbabwe and

89 Patrick Lawrence, *S.A. Foundation News*, January 1991.

Tanzania, that the PAC found some external support which began to evaporate even more after Mandela's release. The PAC's ambiguous stance toward negotiations and the joining of a short-lived "patriotic front" with the ANC in 1991 must be seen in the light of a less cohesive constituency.⁹⁰

In defining who is an "African," the PAC's General Secretary, Benny Alexander⁹¹ distinguishes "two strains," the first indigenous people "who historically cannot be traced out of Africa," which excludes whites and Asians. They are considered the second strain, provided their only home and allegiance is to Africa. For the PAC this amounts to a non-racial concept and defines the nation. It accepts self-declaration of allegiance, so that those who define themselves as non-African do so by choice. "Settlers" are considered only those whites who oppress indigenous people.⁹²

Oscar Dhlomo⁹³ has rightly stressed that the PAC's position that anyone can be an African by choice, regardless of colour, "will only become meaningful the moment the movement begins to admit non-black members." At present, the absence of whites in the PAC implies that this group of South Africans is monolithic and does not identify with

90 The PAC has repeatedly criticized the ANC decision to negotiate as "appeasement." "You cannot appease de Klerk, he is a Nazi," declared PAC leader Zeph Mothopeng (*Cape Times*, February 19, 1990) and the decision to enter into negotiations under certain conditions is likely to further strain the PAC cohesion.

91 Benny Alexander, Interview, *Monitor*, June 1991.

92 More thoughtful members of the movement, such as returned exile Barney Desai, clearly realise the danger of radical counter-racism: "I wish also to caution my brothers and sisters that the slogan of 'one settler one bullet' is inconsistent with our stated aims. No mature liberation movement has ever had as its stated policy an intention to drive the white people into the sea" (*Argus*, March 13, 1990). Presumably in good South African humour, another PAC adherent explained the macabre slogan by saying: "The PAC is a poor organization and can't afford more than one bullet per settler." The disavowed slogan, which originated during the bush war in Zimbabwe, is nonetheless popular among the PAC grass-roots. White right-wingers have responded with bumper stickers which make the converse point: "One settler—one thousand bullets."

93 Oscar Dhlomo, *Sunday Times*, September 1, 1991.

Africa. Thus the PAC practice contradicts its commendable non-racial postulate.

Another PAC contradiction lies in its insistence on "armed struggle." PAC's policy is to attack security forces only and it has not renounced armed struggle as the "principal method" to bring about liberation. Activities of the Azanian People's Liberation Army (Apla), the armed wing of the PAC, have generally concentrated on the assassinations of policemen. The few self-confessed Apla guerrillas convicted in South African court cases, even after the suspension of the armed struggle by the ANC, had mostly received training in Tanzania and Libya. According to estimates by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the PAC commands around 350 trained operatives. ANC and PAC ridicule each other's claims on military confrontations with the enemy as fantasies with the PAC pointing to the "random terror" of the ANC. The PAC conveniently does not disclose, as a matter of policy, any information about incidents involving its combatants, except when it loses people.

Benny Alexander also claims that at the end of 1990 "our membership was bigger than theirs [ANC's]" and that the PAC has "the support of most of the oppressed intelligentsia." Few would not view these claims as inflated in the light of attendance figures at rallies and surveys that generally indicate 3-4 times greater support for the ANC. However, if negotiations fail or turn out to be too compromising, the PAC and AZAPO could potentially swell into the mass movements of the earlier periods when they eclipsed the ANC. The Pan Africanist Youth Wing, Azanya (Azanian National Youth Unity) welcomed the overthrow of Gorbachev. In a press statement, Gorbachev was described as a traitor who had been "flirting and conspiring with the imperialist West to disintegrate the socialist countries throughout the world."

AZAPO, too, now portrays itself as the vanguard for the struggle for socialism in 'occupied Azania'. The SACP is viewed as having 'betrayed' the struggle for socialism "by riding the ANC towards a negotiated settlement of compromise with the de Klerk regime, which has the potential to set back socialist transformation by many decades."²⁴ Both AZAPO and the PAC are vague when pressed to describe their vision of

"scientific socialism" more concretely. A 41-page official booklet published by the PAC, "Towards a Democratic Economic Order," concludes that its "political and economic mission shall be: redistributive, development, reproductive, accumulative, restorative, entrepreneurial-supportive, human needs oriented and equi-beneficial" (41). If the ANC needs its economic research capacities strengthened and updated, as the Canadian IDRC report argued, that applies even more to the other anti-Apartheid movements.

More recently, AZAPO made some tactical errors which undermined its influence and public profile by withdrawing from the Patriotic Front that it initially convened together with the ANC and PAC. The contentious issue was the participation of 14 homeland parties or participants in the tricameral parliament that together with 70 other organizations were invited to form a united front for the forthcoming constitutional negotiations. Two weeks before the conference, AZAPO general secretary Don Nkademeng unilaterally wrote to them demanding that they resign from "system-oriented structures" before they "sit with patriots." With the ANC eager to have the widest possible representation, including particularly the Democratic Party, it could hardly give in to the unrealistic AZAPO demand. AZAPO thereby missed the chance to present itself with 20 delegates as equal to the ANC and PAC at the founding conference. ANC-oriented observers commented that "it was a suicidal move by an organization which has been steadily losing influence for the past 15 years."⁹⁴ However, AZAPO can also now claim not to have fallen for false compromises in the interests of controversial negotiations.

In conclusion, in the 1990s the Black Consciousness movement and the PAC-aligned Africanists, though outmanoeuvred by the ANC, continue to conscientise through community development programmes, health awareness projects and women's organizations. These groups have left the discourse in black politics with an indelible print although they were overshadowed by the publicity, diplomatic success and organ-

94 SouthScan, October 25, 1991.

izational clout of the ANC. Compared to the latter's mass rallies, AZAPO remains primarily an intellectual force. Supported by a number of influential opinion-makers in the universities, as well as by some clerics and trade union leaders, Black Consciousness lives on more as an alternative vision than an active political movement. Its success and failure lies in the extent to which Black Consciousness ideas have shaped the attitude of directly involved political actors, some of the organizational rivalries and even physical clashes between ANC and AZAPO supporters notwithstanding. The historic high-points of the B.C.M. in the 1976 Soweto-uprising and of the PAC in 1960 were eclipsed by the subsequent rise of the Charterist hegemony, in which many of the exiled Africanists and Black Consciousness supporters were absorbed. Although the B.C.M. continued organizationally as the third exiled liberation movement, separate from the ANC and PAC, and without sponsorship by a major power abroad, many found their home in the ANC which in turn benefitted from the influx of committed students. Without this infusion of a new generation of young radicals, the subsequent rise and renewal of the Charterist tradition would have been inconceivable. In shedding the internalized colonial mentality and liberal tutelage alike, Black Consciousness laid the ground for the self-confident challenge of the Apartheid state whether through refusals of co-optation or negotiations.

A number of observers have stressed the 'transitional' character of the movement including David Hirschmann, who concludes that "Ironically the B.C.M. was ultimately a victim of its own success."⁹⁵ To be sure, many of its promoters found their home in the ANC and the current numerical support for AZAPO strategies remains small, according to all surveys. However, the situation might change if the ANC is perceived as too moderate and accommodating. The continued significance of Black Consciousness as well as Africanism lie in their potential. The fact that the negotiating ANC leadership feels obliged to use strident language and ultimatums testifies to the latent impact of the more radical alternative.

95 D. Hirschmann, "The Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 28, 1, March 1990, pp. 1-22.

V. POLITICAL VIOLENCE, "TRIBALISM" AND INKATHA

I have never once had any discussion with any National Party leader in which we talked about Zulus and Afrikaners ganging up against a black majority government." — Buthelezi, Sunday Times, 29/9/91.

Limited Explanations

Probably no other aspect of the South African conflict has elicited more divergent explanations and misinterpretations than the ongoing political violence. It is variously attributed to (1) *de Klerk's* double agenda and unreformed police; (2) a "third force" of right-wing elements in the security establishment, bent on derailing the government's negotiation agenda; (3) Inkatha-ANC rivalry, engineered by an ambitious *Buthelezi* in danger of being sidelined as an equal third party; (4) the ANC's campaign of *armed struggle*, ungovernability and revolutionary intolerance; (5) ingrained *tribalism*, unleashed by the lessening of white repression that merely resulted in "black-on-black" violence formerly held in check; (6) the legacy of *Apartheid* in general, migrancy, hostel conditions, and high unemployment among a "lost youth" generation. Helen Suzman, for example, singled out sanctions for at least "part of the blame" in her 1991 presidential address to the Institute of Race Relations, while its director, John Kane-Berman, lists all parties as having "bloody hands" (*Race Relations News*, December 1991).

Our analysis refutes single-cause explanations. It de-emphasizes a primary focus on the policies of leaders in favour of predisposing social conditions, such as the rural-urban divide, the inter-generational cleavages, and the differential living conditions, social status and heightened competition of long-time urban residents, shack-dwellers and migrants in single-men hostels. Regardless of peace-accords signed at the top, antagonistic groups at the bottom often act violently outside of leadership control. This applies, in particular, to elements of the official

security establishment, linked to right-wing agendas of destabilization of the negotiation process.

A vicarious North American public stands out as comparatively unified when asked who they "consider most responsible for the bloodshed." In a Canadian Gallup poll commissioned for this study during October 1991, almost 40 percent of all respondents blamed "the government, de Klerk or his police" (see Table 11). This figure rises to 48 percent among city dwellers and respondents in B.C., while the corresponding figures of "don't knows" is highest among French-speakers who comprise 50 percent, compared with 36 percent among English-speakers, 51 percent among housewives and people in small communities. With generally two-thirds of Canadians in all other categories expressing an opinion on the question, a relatively high degree of interest, if not accurate information prevails.

According to their political convictions, many informed analysts adopt a combination of the causes mentioned. A credible comprehensive account of the violence has yet to be produced, despite dozens of articles and books on the topic. Matthew Kentridge's (1990) book, like most other journalistic attempts, captures well the impact of the war on people's lives but remains descriptive without dissecting the forces which have caused and sustained the conflict. Most of these "verbal snapshots," as one reviewer (John Wright, *Transformation*, 13, 1990) accurately describes this genre, implicitly blame Inkatha warlords, backed by the South African state, as if their one-sided aggression were self-evident. Indeed, the most puzzling question remains: "What possesses them to go to war against fellow blacks with such ferocity?" (Phillip van Niekerk, *Globe & Mail*, 3/4/91). Yet as soon as the perceptive *Globe* correspondent asks the relevant question, he capitulates: "No one—not sociologists, psychologists or political analysts—can provide an explanation of what it is really about."

Indeed, most academic analysts either adopt a single conceptualization: clientelism or vigilantism (Charney, 1991; Haysom, 1990) or "lumpen elements" (Saul, 1991). The focus on the state's use of vigilantes, while highlighting important auxiliary forces, fails to explain the under-

lying causes of vigilante success in attacking a vastly more popular liberation movement.

Table 11
Canadian Opinion on South African Political Violence
Gallup Poll - National Omnibus - October 1991

Question: "Reports from South Africa describe widespread political violence for which many sides and causes are often to blame. However, on the whole who do you consider *most responsible* for the bloodshed?"

	(N 1053)
	%
The Government/de Klerk/The Police	37.4
The Extreme Right Wing/The 3rd Force in the Police	3.7
Inkatha/Buthelezi/Zulus	3.6
ANC/Mandela/The Communists	3.3
Old Tribalism	3.1
Social Conditions (Poverty/Unemployment/Hostels/Migrancy/Apartheid)	9.5
Others/Don't Know	39.0
Not Stated	.3
	100%

Obviously, traditional African patrimonialism, the role of petty-bourgeois power-brokers in the townships and chiefs in the countryside was challenged by youthful activists. Traditional authority structures themselves clashed with the newly autonomous, better educated segments of an urbanized working class. Analysts of political violence are aware of this larger context, but they list, label and categorize a variety of contributory factors without explaining their origin or relationship. Here is a particularly comprehensive example by Cape Town political scientist Peter Collins (1990:96): "Gangsterism, vendettas, banditry, protection rackets, individual and group psychosis, competition for turf and treasure, a spreading mood of anarchy in which everyone thinks they possess a licence to kill, the resurgence of antique hatreds, desperation born of unendurable poverty or fear—all these factors have variously contributed to outbreaks of violence." At least, one would have to weigh these causes against each other and denote the historical conditions under which they express themselves simultaneously.

Other South African academics readily point fingers at "the system" as the cause of the township conflict. In the words of Rupert Taylor (1991:1-14), "Apartheid has succeeded in engineering group divisions among the oppressed." While one can agree that the conflict "is not of some essential ethnic forces," to blame it only on the manipulations of Apartheid is an oversimplification. Ethnic antagonisms exist in societies without Apartheid. Above all, in demystifying ethnicity, the analyst needs to show why the manipulators are so successful in constructing and exploiting ethnic cleavages. Apartheid did not invent all ethnic divisions, it skillfully utilized collective memories and distinct histories. By denying this historical reality altogether, magic formulae are invoked to wish away deep-rooted perceptions that can be mobilized for progressive as well as retrogressive ends.

A much more promising and sociological approach has been adopted by Lawrence Schlemmer (1991) who distinguishes between a) general background conditions, b) predisposing factors and c) triggering events. Background conditions include the dislocation through urbanization, the high levels of unemployment and dependency, the breakdown of the traditional family structure, and the erosion of normative restraints on killings. These conditions are difficult to address by any short-term measures. On the other hand, predisposing factors and, in particular, triggering effects, Schlemmer points out, can be reduced or directly counteracted. Ranking high among these predisposing conditions are the social alienation of rural migrants in an urban youth subculture and their heightened competition for limited opportunities in a social climate of politicized mass action. Once set in motion, the violence becomes self-perpetuating. Distrust increases and is reinforced by partisan reporting. Clearly, solutions in such a situation particularly those advocated by outsiders, do not lie in apportioning blame and taking sides. Instead, bringing the feuding groups together, supporting independent monitoring committees, ensuring impartial policing, taking grievances seriously, and balancing the press reporting through a better understanding of both sides, should be the primary goal of outside intervention.

The State, Inkatha and the "Third Force"

De Klerk's supposed double agenda of posturing as a peacemaker but secretly stoking violence, is commonly believed in Canada. The *Globe & Mail* (December 14, 1991, D4) reported as a matter of fact "recent evidence that Mr. de Klerk's government and police are fomenting violence in the black community." The evidence probably refers to the widely reported police funding of Inkatha, the state support for an Inkatha-aligned trade union (UWUSA), and the training of some 200 Kwa Zulu police and military forces by Pretoria, allegedly for VIP protection.

At the height of the sanctions campaign and the civil war with the ANC, the South African government clearly saw the anti-sanctions Inkatha movement as a valuable ally. It courted the free-enterprise advocate Buthelezi as a useful counterforce against the "socialist" ANC-SACP. Initially, Pretoria was concerned that Inkatha might be eclipsed by the ANC and aimed at propping up the only credible black moderate with an assumed large following. This included offers of all kinds of massive propagandistic educational and military training assistance by front organizations of military intelligence, which a besieged Inkatha readily accepted. However, there is no evidence that the relatively small amount (\$100,000) of money transferred for an Inkatha rally, that triggered the uproar, or the more substantial contributions for a semi-defunct, in-house union, were given to foment violence. John Saul's (1991:14) dictum, that the de Klerk regime "directly sponsored the resulting mayhem to the tune of several million rand," assumes a Machiavellian conspiracy that would have run counter to Pretoria's desire to forge an alliance with the ANC and regain international legitimacy. It could be argued that a decimated ANC would neither be willing to make such an alliance, nor capable of enforcing a compromise against an enraged constituency. In its quest for international legitimacy and foreign investment, the South African state needed to project an image of stability. Black violence would frighten white voters into support of right-wing parties. The entire project of a negotiated transition and renewed legitimacy would be jeopardized by state-sponsored violence.

The instigators of violence can be found in the same circles of semi-independent military intelligence operatives who, disagreeing with the de Klerk policy change, wanted to see negotiation fail and the right-wing agenda succeed. P.W. Botha had accorded these securocrats unprecedented autonomy. De Klerk had cautiously begun to dismantle their institutions and allowed their illegal activities to be publicly exposed through the Harms Commission. Yet these were the same decorated forces that had trained Renamo and Unita and had proceeded with covert funding to ready Inkatha and the Kwa Zulu police for similar destructive ends. Once part of a state-sponsored destabilization campaign to make the surrounding region economically dependent, the murderous ideologues had acquired a life of their own, long after the state ideology had fundamentally changed. There is evidence that some of the leading *verligtes* themselves, particularly Pik Botha's Foreign Affairs Department, had to take precautionary measures against the bizarre machinations of this "third force," operating under its own rules and out to defeat the negotiation course. Dan O'Meara (1991) aptly comments: "As de Klerk sidelined the generals...he had to move with great caution. Plots against him were commonplace in the SADF Special Forces and other dirty trick units after February 1990 and support for the CP in SADF middle ranks mushroomed." Their dealings with blacks merely reflected the much more vital struggle among whites. In the conflict about opposed strategies for Afrikaner survival, even the faction in control of the state could not afford to suppress its opponents directly. While de Klerk certainly prevaricated, it is illogical that he would have been personally implicated in fomenting violence, as his critics charge.

The same issues are played out at the level of daily police behaviour towards political protest. There is no question that the South African Police does not behave in an impartial manner. This is especially true of its black members, particularly in Kwa Zulu. There can be no doubt about frequent police collusion with Inkatha demonstrators at the expense of ANC supporters. However, the obvious right-wing sympathy for Zulu warriors does not mean that their traditional leader is a mere paid stooge of the government. On the contrary, Buthelezi's defiance against participation in an ANC-government led pact has been rising, the more the government's initial, clumsy attempts to support Inkatha have

isolated and discredited the movement. In various surveys⁹⁶ Inkatha is more unpopular among the black sample than the AWB. More than 50 percent of both ANC, NP-DP and AZAPO-PAC supporters blame Inkatha for instigating the violence. In the Schlemmer survey of 905 black respondents in the Witwatersrand townships in early 1991 only 5 percent would vote for the IFP in a hypothetical free election although that percentage rose to a dramatic 71 percent among the hostel dwellers in the sample.

How have the revelations about Inkatha funding by the state in August 1991 affected the standing of the main players since these surveys were conducted? Two immediate implications favouring the ANC flowed from "Inkathagate." First of all, Buthelezi's claim to being an equal third player in the negotiations could no longer be maintained. Government grants had reduced him to a stooge against his will. What both Inkatha and the government had hoped for—a creditable conservative counterbalance against the ANC-SACP—they themselves had destroyed. Moreover, the scandal reinforced a polarized conflict perception by undermining the chances of third parties in a multi-party democracy. Secondly, the ANC's demand for a neutral interim government of national unity overseeing the transition, received a major boost. The government was exposed as not being neutral. Pretoria itself conceded the accusations of the ANC. Inkatha, too, endorsed the accusations of partiality by rejecting the money. This amounted to a reversal of its first reaction which was to justify the support by pointing to the government's payment of costs incurred by the ANC during their first negotiation sessions. Above all, Buthelezi's credibility was diminished by his plea of ignorance. While Inkatha's internal support, particularly among the 90 percent illiterate rural population in Natal and the migrant workers, remained unaffected, Inkatha's international acclaim and its support among South African

96 Amanda Goves, "Political Intolerance" and Lawrence Schlemmer "The Mind of the Townships," in *Vrye Weekblad/Sowetan*, *Quarterly State of the Nation Report*, Winter 1991. Compare these figures with the widespread impression among Canadian conservatives that "Buthelezi represents some six million Zulus, one quarter of the population" (J. Dean, 1989:25). Since less than half of Zulu-speakers are likely to vote for Inkatha, there is hope for non-tribal politics.

business suffered. In short, the exposure somewhat levelled the uneven playing field between the government and the ANC, locking both sides tighter into negotiations by discrediting third-party claims. These were the unintended side effects of the episode which although overblown abroad, produced only a muted and restrained response from the ANC.

Past government-Inkatha relations have been widely misinterpreted. For example, the noted US historian George Fredrickson (1991:38) writes: "One might also question the appropriateness of his (Buthelezi's) negotiating with the government on behalf of the African majority when he strongly opposed the economic sanctions that, more than anything else, brought the government to the bargaining table in the first place." Leaving aside the controversial issue of whether sanctions were the main reason for Pretoria's shift in 1990, Buthelezi has never negotiated with the government on behalf of the African majority. He successfully resisted "independence" for his Bantustan and the consequent denationalization of its inhabitants. He opposed the new 1984 tricameral constitution along with all other progressive forces except South African business. Above all, throughout the 1980s, Buthelezi consistently argued that the release of Mandela and free political activity remained the preconditions for his entering into negotiations about a national settlement with Pretoria. For this and other reasons P.W. Botha and Buthelezi never saw eye to eye with each other and hardly kept any contact. Indeed, the National Party always considered Buthelezi "very much his own man,"⁹⁷ and in a different league, compared with other more opportunistic Bantustan leaders and "system politicians" in the coloured and Indian community. It was precisely this higher credibility that made Buthelezi an attractive ally for government and business.

Why then did Inkatha's influence decline? Why did the possible merger or coalition between Inkatha and the ANC never take off? Premature predictions of Inkatha's "terminal decline" (*SouthScan*, 17 January 1992) rest, above all, on the autocratic behaviour of Buthelezi, who turned the organization into a tightly-controlled one-man show. It

97 P.W. Botha, Personal Interview, March 7, 1990.

was this paranoiac isolation of an affable person that allowed Apartheid apologists of his own anti-sanctions stance to sponsor him.⁹⁸ This anti-sanctions stance alone did not harm him since it was also shared by a wide variety of respectable anti-Apartheid liberals such as Helen Suzman and F. van Zyl Slabbert. Moreover, sanctions evoked considerable ambiguity within the black community, despite rhetorical majority support for tough international action against Pretoria. Buthelezi primarily articulated the fears of his less privileged constituency of migrant workers and rural traditionalists who had most to loose from higher unemployment and economic decline.

After hailing Inkatha as a non-violent, free enterprise, responsible, black counterforce, the North American mainstream press has now for the most part uncritically adopted the ANC's version of Buthelezi as the instigator of violence. Typical of this perspective is a lengthy piece by a Danish correspondent in the US magazine *Africa-Report* (Jan./Feb. 1991, 50-56) which calls Buthelezi a "radical warmonger" and assigns him personal responsibility for all the atrocities. "Nowhere else in South Africa has bloodshed taken place on such a scale as in Buthelezi's Natal, and by exporting this conflict to the Witwatersrand, he has plunged South Africa's most popular area into horrifying carnage."⁹⁹ On the other hand, the predictably opposite conservative view has it that all of Buthelezi's speeches at dozens of rallies are genuine pleas to his followers to bury the hatchet and ensure peace, often invoking the rich imagery and language of his rural audience: "When a tree falls across your path, you remove it so that you can walk. When you have a thorn in your foot, you remove it. When there is a fire you put it out. And when there is violence and when there is Black brother killing Black brother, you put an end to it."¹⁰⁰

98 Inkatha is also supported by conservative foundations around the world. For example, Inkatha has received more than DM 16 million (US \$9.6) of public funds during the 1980's from the German Konrad Adenauer Foundation alone. The ultra-conservative US Heritage Foundation claims Buthelezi as its favoured black ally and the US Agency for International Development (US-AID) granted Inkatha R 7m versus the ANC's R 12.5m in 1991.

99 Peter Tygesen, Jan/Feb. 1991, 50-56.

100 M.G. Buthelezi, Speech, Enhlalakahle, Greytown, September 29, 1991.

Hardly any ANC supporter believes such exhortations and this sentiment is also echoed by most academic analysts. Typical would be a judgement by Robert Price (1990:294): "With his mass support dwindling to insignificance, and with the domestic and international political spotlight firmly focused on Mandela, Buthelezi apparently decided to guarantee himself a central role in negotiations over South Africa's future by demonstrating that unless he is taken into account, there will be no peace." John Saul (1991:16) calls Buthelezi simply "a hired tool of the security services." To assess such strong accusations beyond their mobilizing functions requires a detailed knowledge of the predisposing conditions and actual motivations of the antagonists. An analysis of the unrecognized fault lines and collective psychology that allows "mass endorsement of violence" is called for. Before this is attempted another look at the role of the security forces, their relationship to the state reformers, and the reformers own shortcomings is useful.

As previously argued, ample evidence exists that right-wing forces within the police and military intelligence actively foment black violence and exploit cleavages. Court evidence on the activities of the now disbanded "Civil Cooperation Bureau," as well as testimony by defectors and survivors, reveals a story of atrocities and sick minds that surpasses the fantasies of thriller writers.¹⁰¹ Poorly trained policemen and security officials in various government agencies resent both the negotiation course as well as the ascendancy of blacks. On the other hand, "professionalism" can also be successfully mobilized to defend the state, regardless of personal sympathies, as the Ventersdorp event showed.¹⁰²

101 For a descriptive account of unofficial state violence by a well-known South African political journalist see Patrick Lawrence, *Death Squads. Apartheid's Secret Weapon*, Johannesburg: Penguin Forum Series, 1991. In light of these atrocities on ANC activists, it is remarkable that the ANC has absorbed some of the chief perpetrators into its ranks. It would seem to carry forgiveness to its extreme when cold-blooded murderers who now pose as legitimate ANC members are accepted for a change of mind and for exposing their masters.

102 The police-rightwing clashes in Ventersdorp during a speech by de Klerk in July 1991 resulted in the death of three AWB protesters and dozens of injured. The confrontations took place despite similar ideological leanings of the police. 1600 Afrikaner policemen—hard-drinking men with moustaches and bellies, steeled in vicious battles with the ANC—nevertheless let loose with Alsatian dogs, teargas and live ammunition against equally socialized soul brothers. Institutional

While there has been a slow shift towards a professionalization of the South African police, the de Klerk government during Malan and Vlok's command of the military and police was either unwilling or, more likely, unable to control the relics of the previous period in the form of death squads, special forces or Recee commandos. It took the Inkathagate scandal to have new security ministers installed. However, Pretoria has yet to come clean on the unreformed elements within its security machinery, despite progressive changes at the top.

The continued violence by current and former state agents was unwittingly tolerated by the failure of the de Klerk government to make a moral break with the Apartheid period. By not offering any apology, let alone compensation to the victims, the impression was reinforced that previously a just war had been fought which now, for tactical reasons, had come to an end. Pik Botha, for example, in defending the Inkatha funding, reiterated defiantly that he would repeat it under the then prevailing circumstances. In the undeclared war, the normal rules were supposed to have been set aside and the state killers were celebrated as heroes. What was then considered shrewd bravery, therefore, could not now suddenly be defined as atrocity, particularly since the perpetrators disagreed with the government's new tactical policy of reconciliation with "terrorists." Thus, the unreformed state agents acted out years of indoctrination that the government never refuted. In the new era, Apartheid is treated as a mere mistake and costly error, not a crime or a moral aberration. Had the new policy also been accompanied by expressions of guilt and repentance, it would have at least signalled official condemnation and abhorrence to political killers who are normally deferential to authority. Instead of utilizing such pressure to conform, the government

loyalty outweighed ideological affinity. Internalized discipline in an authoritarian organization—elevated to professionalism by the propagandists—proved stronger than the appeals of the ultra-right. No policeman likes to be shot at, no matter how close his beliefs are to his adversaries. Had the AWB approached the police cordon with flowers instead of baseball bats and hunting rifles, the response may have been different. Many of the Afrikaner boys were confused. Hesitation prevailed initially, but gradually broke down when attacked with the steel-rods carried by half-drunken hordes led by respected elders. The scene became a village brawl, with the police claiming to defend freedom of speech and the right-wing the democratic right to voice protest.

chose to point to rules which everyone knew had been ignored in the unofficial war.

Of course, the de Klerk cabinet could hardly be expected to pursue a moral break with Apartheid because that would have implicated them in the conception and execution of the system. Just as the former Stalinists in the new Soviet Republics now pose as democrats, so the former Apartheid rulers now behave as reformers because the old system did not work. The absence of an albeit painful moral rehabilitation of a society, raises scepticism about the depth of social transformation. With the same incumbents in office in both periods, the past literally haunts the future and reveals itself in the continuation of the same practices, regardless of the new facade.

In the delicate climate of generalized anxiety and confused transition, even small "third forces" thrive and with little effort trigger major confrontations. The new element of the 1990s is the indiscriminate attacks on train commuters as well as the professional random shooting of both ANC and Inkatha supporters. The security police has yet to identify the culprits, which suggests indifference, if not collusion. It can be safely assumed that both the state, Inkatha and the ANC have lost full control of some of the ground forces acting in their name. Peace accords signed by the leadership constitute a helpful signal but do not bind those who operate outside rules. This, of course assumes that the leadership is genuinely interested in reconciliation and not actively involved itself in fueling the flames. In short, there is little doubt that collusion between the police and Inkatha takes place, yet for the time being one has to accept R.W. Johnson's (1991) judgement: "How far up the hierarchy of either the security forces or Inkatha such collusion goes is impossible to know." The accord signed in September 1991 between the government, the ANC and Inkatha lays down useful rules for the behaviour of policemen and politicians, yet it does not regulate the death squads and hit-men on the loose for whom no rules apply. While these ought to be suppressed by all means possible, the same cannot be advocated for organizations with a genuine constituency. Nor does it help to prevent civil war to advocate negotiations with the alleged masters of "state terrorists" while ignoring their relatively autonomous offspring who

then set out to scuttle a fragile accord. Unless the principle of desirable negotiations is applied to all substantial forces, regardless of their ideological position or gruesome record, an end to the violence is unlikely.

"Tribalism" in Perspective

In truly divided societies it is almost impossible to assume any identities other than those prescribed by the communal division. In Northern Ireland, hardly anybody can escape being a Protestant or Catholic; in Israel everyone is either a Jew or an Arab. This provides, as many social scientists have suggested, "the framework within which people define and interpret social existence." The everyday social reasoning according to familiar labels and expectations has little to do with doctrinal issues of a different religion. It signifies likely power and status differentials, based on a long history of communal conflict that encompasses every member of the community.

South Africa differs from those communal conflicts in that Apartheid labels have engendered so much opposition and comprise such a variety of cross-racial common characteristics, that many whites and blacks can afford to act as if they live outside their communal category. In fact, the democratic nonracialism espoused by most major actors transcends the communal labels and thereby renders the South African conflict qualitatively distinct from entrenched, exclusivist communalism elsewhere. The state construction of official ethnicity in South Africa has no precedent in any other divided society although the post-Apartheid ethnic strife in the end may not be so different from communal divisions elsewhere. History's verdict on this question is still outstanding.

One of the great surprises of 1990, therefore, was the sudden emergence of the "tribal" factor. Hitherto, it had been taboo for the disenfranchized to talk publicly about Zulu and Xhosa forces. Only Apartheid ideologues would use such labels. Why then has simmering ideological conflict suddenly been transformed into a tribal clash in the perception of its participants? While both leaderships proudly display their non-tribal stance, their followers, nevertheless, kill each other as Zulus and Xhosas.

An explanation need not recall historical competitions and conflicts between the two Nguni-speaking people. Indeed the premier organization to combat tribalism politically, the Congress, always had a fair succession of leaders from both ethnic groups. It had managed to overcome tribal consciousness to a large extent at least as far as the political activists were concerned. The ANC's last president before its banning, the Nobel Peace Prize winner Albert Luthuli, was a respected Zulu chief and the ANC's National Executive Committee in exile always included some, albeit an underrepresented number, of Zulus. NEC members assert that the ethnic background of candidates never became an issue. They state that in some cases they were not even aware of the origin of comrades which makes sense in the context of exile and in terms of the SACP's ideology of cosmopolitan internationalism.

What gradually changed this outlook was the independent policy that Buthelezi's Inkatha movement pursued after 1979. There are many reasons for this rift and these are not unrelated to Buthelezi's personality and statutory role. The role of the ANC in initially approving Inkatha is nowadays often unmentioned. Oliver Tambo in particular encouraged Buthelezi to assume his Bantustan role. The ANC behaved as the mid-wife of Inkatha, which was envisaged as an ANC internal wing under the protective umbrella of a Bantustan, led by Buthelezi. A shrewd former member of the ANC youth-league, Buthelezi's aristocratic descent from a family of the king's advisers greatly helped his popularity.

However, the ANC offspring quickly outgrew its parent and began to pursue an independent line. Buthelezi refused to recruit for the MK camps and thereby risk direct clashes with Pretoria. Among the ANC cadres Zulus became underrepresented, although about half of all Zulu's support the ANC according to surveys. The much higher ANC support in the Xhosa heartland of the Eastern Cape, compared with its organizational vacuum in rural Natal, is, therefore, also reflected in the composition of the ANC's membership and leadership.

Tribal separateness was reinforced not so much by Buthelezi's style or cultural symbolism as by his divergent policies. After all, the Xhosa Transkei was the first Bantustan to accept tribal independence while the

alleged tribalist Buthelezi refused to steer a secessionist course. He harboured national ambitions. But his rejection of the armed struggle and support of foreign investment deepened the Inkatha-ANC cleavage and drew Inkatha closer to the South African establishment than to the anti-Apartheid exiles abroad. This happened in spite of Buthelezi's consistent anti-Apartheid stance.

The turn of events traumatized the ANC whose own ally had now become a potential partner for an internal solution that would have further marginalized the exiles. An endless war of words started. It culminated in the South African Youth Congress (Sayco) declaring Buthelezi "an enemy of the people" in 1990. For the ANC, Buthelezi had become a red flag. During the various meetings between ANC executives and South African academics that preceded the legalization of the resistance, one could talk rationally about any controversial subject, but not about Buthelezi.¹⁰³ Similarly, many foreign South African watchers have informally adopted the ANC line that Buthelezi "is a pathological case" and Inkatha consists of "a bunch of murderers" akin to the Khmer Rouge.

While Buthelezi's Bantustan regime is singled out for mobilizing vilification, other ANC-aligned Bantustans are exonerated. The habit of uncritical silence reinforces double-standards and counter-productive developments, as can clearly be seen in the case of the ANC-Transkei relationship. Instead of attacking all Bantustan structures, the anti-Apartheid movement has exempted the Transkei and others because its leaders have aligned themselves squarely with the ANC. This strategy allows Buthelezi to dismiss the ANC demand for the dismantling of Kwa Zulu as a Xhosa-led plot against Zulus. Ethnic suspicions of beleaguered Zulus are thereby legitimated. The collaboration between the ANC and the Transkei military ruler General Bantu Holomisa—despite his de-

103 In contrast to most activists, particularly in the Transvaal, Mandela always kept in polite contact with Buthelezi both on the phone and by mail. "Obviously, my fervent hope," he wrote to Buthelezi from prison, "is to see, in due course, the restoration of the cordial relations which existed between you and OR (Oliver Reginald Tambo, president of the ANC) and between the two organizations in the Seventies" (*Sunday Tribune*, April 16, 1989).

fense of the integrity of the Transkei, its detention without trial and repressive security legislation—runs counter to the very core of the democratic movement. Securing civil service positions for returning exiles in the Bantustan administrations now functions as a justification for their continued existence, albeit integrated into the new South Africa.

As a consequence of the ANC-engineered enhanced legitimacy of Transkei, other Bantustan-based pocket dictators now seek to strengthen their fragile base with new emerging powers and alliances with Pretoria. Instead of the desired unity of the disenfranchized, the differential flirtation of the ANC with Bantustan leaders¹⁰⁴ that was supposed to bring about the patriotic front of all blacks, has created new animosities and potential fragmentation. The two strongest Bantustans, Kwa Zulu and Bophutatswana, now resist being drawn into an ANC led alliance of a centralized state, instead insisting on federal solutions or even potential secession.

The violent struggle for territorial control of townships, squatter camps and hostels soon entered the even more vulnerable factory floor. Mainly through the explicit political stance which COSATU took, the formerly integrated union movement became fragmented and labour relations heavily politicized. Conflicts on the shop floor emerged as the consequence of Inkatha's founding of the new union UWUSA. It was applauded and backed by short-sighted employers, responding to COSATU's backing of sanctions. Elijah Barayi, the president of COSATU, promised at a mass rally in Durban in November 1985 "to bury" Buthelezi. In retrospect, even COSATU activists consider this declaration of war a serious political error. Jeremy Baskin (1991), one time national coordinator of COSATU, now deplores Barayi's speech: "It gave the impression that COSATU's major aim was to oppose

104 The ANC was engaged in a mutual courtship not only with the military rulers of the Transkei where Mandela, Hani, Mbeki and many other top leaders originate but also with sympathetic smaller Bantustans like Kwa Ndebele and Venda. Venda's military chief addressed an MK conference in August 1991 at the local university to wild cheers from former guerrillas now in search of jobs and recognition. Transkei's Holomisa is frequently flaunted as the possible future Defence Minister.

Buthelezi and the homeland system. His speech ignored the lesson learnt by Natal unionists over the years: winning workers in the region to progressive positions was achieved by hard organizational work and not by attacks on Buthelezi."

The Inkatha perception of being under siege was heightened by the ANC-COSATU decision to elevate the Natal regional violence into a national issue in July 1990. National marches and stayaways were supposed to demonstrate that Inkatha was not a national force, that it could be sidelined in the forthcoming negotiations and Buthelezi could be "buried politically." This strategy, in the perception of Inkatha, put the onus on it to demonstrate its clout on the Rand as well. The migrants in the hostels became the obvious force to be mobilized. If the ANC was going to demonstrate the irrelevance of a rival, Inkatha was going to show its relevance through ferocious impis. Isolated hostel dwellers who were looked down upon by the ANC youths in the townships were ready to teach them a lesson, although both segments of the urban proletariat had coexisted side by side for decades. With the exception of clashes between residents and migrants during the Soweto upheaval in 1976—which were largely instigated by the police—tribal cleavages had hardly played a role in the multi-ethnic townships before.

In fact, Zulu origins characterize many township residents, including the majority in Soweto. Migrants of both Zulu and Xhosa origin lived in shabby hostels and backyards. Attacking Zulu impis would be unable to distinguish township residents according to ethnicity. But with the hostels labelled "Zulu" and the townships "Xhosa and ANC," an ideological conflict and socioeconomic cleavage became transformed into a tribal war. The transformation was triggered by the ill-advised ANC strategy to isolate Inkatha rather than include it in the broad anti-Apartheid alliance. Former Inkatha general secretary Oscar Dhlomo (*Sunday Tribune*, August 26, 1990) rightly concluded from his independent insider perspective: "Buthelezi has skillfully utilized ANC blunders to his advantage. He is now able to claim, thanks to the ANC, that anyone who demands the dismantling of the Kwa Zulu government is challenging not only the Zulu nation but also the Zulu King."

In contrast to the Tembus and other Xhosa clans where the royal house and paramount chiefs play a more titular role, the Zulu King is a more high-profile, albeit politically symbolic figure for his people. The King is supposed to stand above politics and act as a unifying symbol to whom all Zulus, regardless of ideology, owe allegiance. Zulu-speakers have only one King. In reality the current King, Goodwill Zwelithini, a nephew of Buthelezi, is strongly aligned with the Inkatha position. This bestows on Inkatha tribal legitimacy beyond that of a mere political party, but it also undermines the authority of the King and contributes to Zulu disunity. Although the Natal violence is clearly between Zulus, any violence anywhere acquires a tribal connotation as soon as the chiefs, indunas, sangomas and shacklords present it as a legitimate defence of a traditional order. Their large clientele has little option other than to fall in line.

Once the mutual hostility is labelled in tribal terms, the leaders reinforce this perception because it broadens their constituency. "I want to make it quite clear that ANC attacks are not only attacks against Inkatha," said Buthelezi (*Guardian Weekly*, 12/5/91) at a rally in Bakkersdal. "They are attacks against Zulu people just because they are Zulu."

Inter-generational and Urban-rural Cleavages

Traditional Zulus with a reconstructed memory of a pre-colonial independent kingdom find the rejection and denial of this identity by the young comrades deeply offensive. In the perceptions of traditional Zulu leaders, an established cultural hierarchy is threatened. Thus King Goodwill Zwelithini complained: "Everything Zulu is being ridiculed. Our cultures are now being torn apart...the Hlobane violence was triggered off by Cosatu members who stated that when Dr. Nelson Mandela was released, my uncle the Chief Minister (Buthelezi) and I would be his cook and waiter respectively" (*Front File*, September 1990). The aristocratic leader perceives his traditional constituency withering away and invokes resistance in the name of history: the King told Zulu chiefs at a meeting in Ulundi that their ancestors would turn in their graves if they saw the extent to which the strapping Amakhosi (elite corps) and their warriors were fleeing before ANC children. "The Amakhosi of Kwa

Zulu must now stand firm because any retreat is the first step towards a rout" (*Front File*, September 1990).

The call for cultural revival is heeded because the most deprived among the Zulu people search for responses to their humiliation. An escape into a mythical past of pride and success in battle provides the dignity and identity that most of the hostel dwellers and unemployed migrants have lacked. In this predicament, tribal identification carries with it a badge of honour. Only those with a more secure identity of a different kind consider the tribal collective a badge of shame.

In this sense, the political violence can only be superficially explained as an ANC-Inkatha power struggle. To be sure, the threat of isolation by the emerging NP-ANC Alliance triggered Inkatha to play the tribal card. But similar frustrations exist among the other side and the conflicts between youthful ANC supporters and traditionalists among Xhosa squatters follow a similar pattern.

In Cape Town, a vicious war between two rival black taxi organizations reflected the conflict between two patronage groups, both claiming allegiance to the ANC. The heightened competition for scarce ranks and an outdated permit system that favoured newcomers over old-timers represented a local variation of clientelism among a deprived Xhosa group, as had been played out among Zulu-speakers in Natal many times before. Members of the older taxi association, Lagunya, who were confined to intra-township routes, wanted their share of the more lucrative city traffic which the newer Webta association had pirated and monopolized. The long-simmering conflict has cost several dozen lives, including that of the widely respected civic leader Michael Mapongwana who was assassinated, as well as R 2m damage, and reflected the resentment of old-time residents and their civic organizations towards more recently arrived "outsiders," linked to the competing patronage system of town councillors in the expanding Khayelitsha shack settlements. Police partiality toward Webta drivers in their violent battle against the established civics further inflamed the conflict resulting in a level of mutual distrust that even Cape Town city council-sponsored mediation and peace efforts could not break. In the final analysis, as

Tony Karon (DSA, 36) has rightly stressed: "The legacy of Apartheid has created an urban context in which hundreds of thousands of desperately poor people compete for the allocation of scarce resources." It is this source, not tribal animosity or political ideology, that causes deep rifts and violence among the deprived. Another example in a somewhat different area illustrates a similar outcome.

In April 1991 residents of Katlehong squatter camps clashed when people from Holomisa Park attacked inhabitants of Mandela Park, both strongholds of the ANC. At the centre of the dispute were stolen portable toilets which the Mandela Park squatters tried to reclaim from the other side. Long established Mandela Park, with running water and roads, houses an ethnically mixed community which was accused by the homogeneous Pondo settlement of harbouring hostile Zulus. While all squatters had lived in peace before, heightened competition over these facilities quickly turned into tribal suspicions. The ANC's Chris Hani barely succeeded in calming the residents by reminding the crowd that the ANC was a home for all ethnic groups. Rival political strategies though heighten the intra-communal frustrations.

At the Mandelaville squatter camp near Bekkersdal, youth belonging to the ANC-aligned Bekkersdal youth congress wanted to stop pupils in the area from writing end-of-year examinations in December 1990. Pupils under the leadership of the Azapo-aligned Azanian Student's Movement and the Azanian Youth Organisation resisted the move and the fighting that ensued left a trail of death and destruction (*Star*, 20/12/90). Strikes and mass protests that are often enforced through intimidation by overzealous youth constitute a regular trigger of counter-violence. Not only has the leadership on all sides lost control over some local segments that act in their name, gangster-elements exploit the insecurity and political confusion. The killing of 37 mourners at the wake of a murdered ANC leader in Sebokeng in January 1991 had its origins in a dispute between the ANC and a local gang over its rape, theft and murder spree. When the local ANC chairman, Christoffel Nangalembe attempted to stop the gang terror and reported the AK-47 rifles of the gang to the police, he was kidnapped and strangled to death by the local gangsters. Despite requests by the organizers of the wake for police

protection of the mourners, the police failed to provide it. Accusations of police connivance with the gang in the massacre of the ANC activists are widely believed in the township.

The predominant urban black identity emerged out of a mixture of traditional elements of rural customs, the street wisdom of survival in the townships and in the modern workplace, and consumerist aspirations that are not different from any secularized Western society. This neo-traditional identity defines itself in sharp contrast to the rural inhabitants and migrants who are considered illiterate, unsophisticated country bumpkins. In the status-hierarchy of the townships, the people with rural ties are often looked down upon as ignorant ancestor-worshippers who don't speak English and practise a social life of tribalism and witchcraft, compared with the politicized individualism of the cities. The denial of ethnicity among urban blacks reflects not only previous government attempts to manipulate ethnic differences but also rejection of most cultural traditions. The township identity was reinforced in its attitudes by an arrogant predilection to associate rural customs with false consciousness.

The ANC ethos embodies the urban views of those who have left tribalism behind. They dress in suits and ties on all occasions, and at the most display tribal traditions as ceremonial events with amused smugness in much the same way as Westerners enjoy folk dances. The ANC's internationalism and cosmopolitan universalism limits its appeal to the traditional African rural population. For many of them, the ANC appears as an elitist urban group whose leadership speaks English and looks down upon the ethnic customs of the peasants.

Many people in the rural communities and the migrant hostels deeply resent the political activism of the urban-based youth. It challenges a traditional order in which children obeyed and politics was left to the elders. On the other hand, the youth accuses the parents of having compromised themselves with the system. The older generation views the youthful activism as ungratefulness and wasteful of educational opportunities for which the parents sacrificed so much. This generational conflict has torn apart many families and pitted communities against

each other, particularly in the semi-urban settlements surrounding Pietermaritzburg where the squeezed rural lifestyle and the urban values directly clash under conditions of great impoverishment.

Here youthful activism also has greater space because the area, like the Durban townships of Lamontville and Chesterville, have traditionally been freehold settlements not under the jurisdiction of the Kwa Zulu Bantustan authorities. Their potential incorporation into Kwa Zulu was particularly resented in the 1980s. In contrast to black life in Johannesburg or Cape Town, Kwa Zulu reaches right into the suburbs of Durban. Rural and urban life interface with one another in Natal. Since Kwa Zulu never applied influx control measures, unplanned squatting on the outskirts of the city was common, while the rural newcomers found a much more regulated and also planned environment in Cape Town or Johannesburg. Furthermore, in Natal the failure of employers to hire Africans as supervisors and middle-managers impeded African upward mobility.

The late conquest of Natal compared with other parts of South Africa meant that the traditional economy remains more intact than elsewhere. Although the majority of homesteaders in rural Zululand are dependent on remittances from migrants in Johannesburg, fewer families have moved out permanently and the majority of migrants consider the rural area their home to which they periodically return and plan to retire. Together with the reconstructed and mobilized memory of more successfully organized resistance against colonial conquest under powerful kings, a more traditional way of life has survived among segments of Zulu-speakers. Both their self-definition as proud warriors as well as their objective differentiation in attitudes and geographical movements form the background to the clashes in the cities.

Isolated Migrants in Single-Men Hostels

The single-men migrant hostels on the Rand, with the majority of their inhabitants Zulus, provided the ideal reservoir of resentment. It could be easily disturbed by the insensitive strategies of the antagonists in a changed political constellation.

The violence in Alexandra provides a good example of defensive aggression in which close to a hundred people lost their lives. The riots started after a first ground-breaking accord was signed between the Transvaal Provincial Administration and the ANC controlled Alexandra Civic Organisation. The agreement amounted to a local model of what had yet to be negotiated at the national level: phasing out of the black council that was widely considered to consist of corrupt collaborators, and the placing of township land on the Far East Rand under the control of ANC-aligned civic organizations in collaboration with the surrounding white areas. To all intents and purposes, the accord represented an ANC victory over the traditionalists who under Alex "Mayor" Prince Mokoena controlled Alexandria before. His office had been occupied for several weeks by community activists who put up posters declaring "Away with Mokoena—out of our hostels." Many councillors had been killed or driven from office during the ANC campaign to render the townships ungovernable. Many remaining councillors, therefore, aligned themselves with Inkatha for protection.

Like the councillors, the hostel dwellers too could justifiably expect to be driven out of Alexandria, although the Civics denied such intentions. However, since the accord provided for the "upgrading and possible conversion" of the hostels, the perception easily spread that the hostels were to be demolished. The political power struggle became ethnicized when the besieged Mokoena mobilized the hostel dwellers with the slogan that the other residents "are undermining the Zulus."

The migrants, at the bottom of the social hierarchy, not surprisingly find solace from their material and symbolic deprivation in their identification with a mythical Zulu pride and fighting spirit. Humiliated by the better off township residents, and involved in frequent sexual rivalries, the single men felt their very homes and existence threatened. Although the Civics claim that they always consulted the hostels in all negotiations, such consultation clearly did not forge any bond or political loyalty.¹⁰⁵ On the contrary, the promise of better housing for families was

105 Steven Friedman (*WM*, May 10-16, 1991) had astutely pointed that the well-intentioned "phasing out" of the hostels may well trigger greater violence, as long as the hostel dwellers are

perceived as abolishing the last foothold of the illiterate migrants in the city, many of whom do not want their rural wives and children to stay with them under current conditions. Yet they had attached meaning to their own deprivation. The *Weekly Mail* (March 22-27, 1991) observes: "The stench-ridden 'single-mens' hostel, built decades ago for migrants labouring in the factories and homes of Johannesburg but with no legal right to bring their families to the city, resembles a prison. Yet it is home to these men and their loyalty to such a place is surprising."

Into this volatile mixture, the "third force" added fuel. Leaflets with the ANC logo and written in Zulu appeared, demanding that Zulu people be evicted from Johannesburg. The leaflets were clearly the work of a third force intent on inflaming animosities.¹⁰⁶ Tragically, instead of issuing counterstatements or sending Zulu emissaries into the hostels to explain the ANC position, the ANC simply ignored the leaflets. It was one more missed attempt to communicate with a segment that felt further marginalized when their fragile foothold in a hostile environment became threatened.

The sense of social isolation by the migrants was reinforced by trends in union politics. Eddie Webster (*Business Day*, 2/8/91) in his inaugural lecture as Professor of Sociology at the University of the Witwatersrand has pointed to the trend in which union leaders are increasingly drawn from the better educated and more skilled urban-based stratum. Simultaneously, union leaders have also involved themselves more in national

not part of the agreement. In the authoritarian fashion typical of previous regimes, the government—ANC-Civics accord on the upgrading of the hostels was concluded without anyone asking the inmates "whether they wanted the hostels to be phased out," according to Friedman.

106 The ploy of forged leaflets has been extensively used by secret agencies at different times and locations to fan intercommunal antagonism or to discredit activist groups. For example, in early 1990 pamphlets distributed widely in Natal maintained that Indian women carried an antidote to AIDS. Mandela repeatedly denounced this pernicious call for racial rape. Port Elizabeth seems to have been the centre of fomenting anti-ANC sentiment during the 1980s when forged UDF and COSATU leaflets functioned as "agents provocateurs," for example by demanding financial contributions to the struggle from each household. Usually, the products could be easily identified by the false "struggle-language" they attempted to imitate. Over time, however, the products of the hatemongers became ever more sophisticated and successful.

politics. The sectional interests of rank and file members have been sacrificed to the overall demands of a national agenda. Among the obvious victims of this professionalization were the shop-floor representatives of the migrant underclass. Webster concludes: "Indeed, the failure of unions to address hostel-dwellers' grievances has contributed to the feeling of alienation among many and made them an ethnic constituency more easily mobilized by Inkatha's labour wing, Uwusa."

At about the same time, the Inkatha leadership also felt strongly besieged by a prospective ANC-National Party deal. In response to the ANC labelling of Inkatha as a "minor party," and both the government and the ANC referring to themselves as "senior players," the Inkatha leader bluntly warned de Klerk at the opening of the Kwa Zulu Legislative Assembly that Inkatha would "tear down piece by piece and trample on" any future that the NP and the ANC were to design in a private arrangement. In this respect the political violence in the Transvaal benefitted Inkatha by demonstrating the national scope of the party. The defensive aggression need not have been orchestrated from above, as the ANC asserts, given the enmity on the ground. However, it weakened the ANC and gave Inkatha the profile the party could not expect from elections.

The fury and irrationality with which gangs of hostel dwellers lash out indiscriminately against train passengers and other symbols of their anxiety can only be understood in this context of isolation. The magic rituals among the combatants in Natal, the fact that many could not even identify the cause or the name of the leader for whom they were fighting, points to symbolic compensations for depths of powerlessness that can readily be exploited by the strongmen on each side.

During the battles in Natal both sides "press-ganged" youth into the fighting. In some areas, each household was required to pay 10 Rand for "equipment," a euphemism for weapons and muti. "People's courts" implement the "call-ups" and war taxes with 100 lashes for offenders. On both sides elements of traditional superstition motivate the combatants.

Before we go into the fighting, some people at the houses near the battlefield stand outside with buckets of water and *muti*. They dip a broom into the mixture and sprinkle it over us as we run past. If you want extra protection, you can also go to an *inyanga*, but that costs more. Comrades believe the *muti* will stop the bullets from hitting them and will give them courage. (Carmel Rickard, "When you see the enemy's shacks blaze, you can't help feeling good," *Weekly Mail*, February 23, 1990, p. 3)

The same "comrade" describes one of the enemies who was shot and tried to run away but fell and was stabbed. Then someone cut off his genitals and took them away.

Mutilations are reported in many communal conflicts. People are not just killed in Yugoslavia or Azerbaijan but in addition are often grossly disfigured. This unexplained practice points perhaps to deep-seated feelings of emasculation. It has yet to be satisfactorily explained by psychological insights which are usually neglected in favour of the focus on national competition. Through the mutilations the enemy is robbed not only of his life but of valued qualities which the victor symbolically appropriates: potency, eyesight, and brains. By possessing vital organs of the enemy, the victor invokes the magic of invincibility and immortality. The more powerless people are, the more they become obsessed with the symbols of power. The rituals of protest and the preoccupation with an imagined armed struggle reveals other dimensions of the same phenomena.

Chris Hani, the former Chief of Staff of MK, observes that the suspension of armed activities "has not been really appreciated by most of our people," despite its having gained the ANC more international support and the moral highground. Hani concludes: "Today we can't cope with the interest that young people are showing in Umkhonto we Sizwe." Such attitudes are superficially explained as signs of political militancy. As with the foot-stamping *toyi-toyi* and strident war songs ("Kill the Boers"), ritually performed at each rally and only interrupted with repetitious shouts of "Amandla!" (power), both the militant attitudes and the militaristic gestures express something deeper than mere militancy. Imagined power must substitute for real clout.

Deep humiliation results in fantasies of power. The more the ill-fated armed struggle fades into the background after its official suspension, the more the township youth wants to resurrect it. A unique expression of the fantasies of the powerless can be found in the numerous imitations of homemade guns, sported at rallies. Imaginatively designed and carefully assembled like objects of folk art, the MK47s and bazookas are often grotesquely oversized. Their grim-looking bearers, shouting martial slogans, resemble the children of other societies who pose on the tanks of war memorials or play with war toys in order to borrow strength and conquer their own anxiety.

Clientelism as Secessionism

Leader-follower relationships among the majority of Zulu supporters of Inkatha are hardly based on ideological identifications but on reciprocal instrumental advantages and ethnic symbolic gratifications. Inkatha's poor and illiterate constituency depends on patronage, handed out by strong leaders and local power-brokers in return for loyalty, regardless of the leaders' ideological outlook or ethical behaviour. Past political powerlessness reinforced the importance of African auxiliaries to whom the impoverished could turn for protection and favours. When the South African state decentralized control by letting trusted African clients police themselves and administer their own poverty, their status and actual importance were further strengthened. Thus emerged a classical system of clientelism and patrimony. Clientelism flourishes in conditions of inequality, where marginalized groups depend on patronage networks for survival, or at least for small improvements. It is the exclusive control of scarce goods (permits, houses, civil service positions, etc.) that give patrons their power. This clientelism thrives with rightlessness.

Once equal citizenship, however, gives formal access to basic goods to all, and all are entitled to equal treatment, the monopoly of patrons has been undermined. Hence, democratic equality that allows claims to be made through formal channels preempts the dependence on informal patronage. If the police, for example, act impartially, there is no need to be protected by a warlord. If people acquire confidence in the law, they

need not rely on vigilantes. If justice is done through impartial courts, it need not be sought through private vendettas.

However, as long as comrades attack the police as agents of a hostile system, the police will hardly act impartially. In as much as town councillors are forcefully driven from office, they will seek protection from wherever they can find it. As long as "collaborators" are stigmatized and their houses are destroyed in the name of the people's anger, it is highly unlikely that a coalition for reconstruction will emerge. Continued violent confrontation will be the outcome. Instead of denouncing the local notables as enemies to be replaced with their own, the civic organization would be much wiser to engage and coopt them, if they are interested in accommodation. This applies both at the local and national level.

There are two common objections to such a policy of reconciliation with regard to Inkatha: (1) that the support of Inkatha is so low that the movement can be ignored, pre-empted or even eliminated, (2) that the price demanded for incorporation by Buthelezi is too high and, therefore, continued exclusion is preferable.

Against the first argument Lawrence Schlemmer (1991:7-10) has pointed out that conflict resolution has to take not only size and scope but also *intensity* of interests into account. "The intensity of the IFP's [Inkatha Freedom Party's] interaction in the political process has clearly signalled the potential costs of excluding it, or reducing its leverage in negotiations." From a moral point, this position can be interpreted as yielding to violence. From a pragmatic perspective, however, there is little choice if greater damage is to be avoided. Weighing the costs of continued confrontation against the potential benefit of peaceful competition through compromise amounts to a political calculation that separates ideologues from pragmatists.

It remains to be seen whether equality before the law and new life-chances for the formerly disenfranchized will pre-empt clientelism and the quest for ethnic separateness. It may be easier to achieve with regard to Inkatha's constituency than with regard to the separatism of the

white right-wing. Observers remain sceptical, even with Inkatha. *Sunday Times* (8/9/91) editor Ken Owen notes that a relatively autonomous Natal in a federal structure might be a cooperative partner in a greater South Africa, "while a Kwazulu forcibly incorporated in a structure controlled by its bitterest enemies, might become as indigestible as the IRA in Britain, or the Turks in Cypress, or the Basques." Buthelezi too has threatened that the civil wars in Angola and Mozambique could pale in comparison with the future destructive upheavals in South Africa. The ANC, on the other hand, is not inclined to heed such predictions and would rather risk a repetition of Biafra than compromise on the relative centralization of political power or bend towards recognition of Zulu claims. This sets the New South Africa on a collision course not only with Inkatha but the Boerestaat advocates as well.

In order to avoid such possible civil war scenarios, it may be worthwhile to consider a valuable suggestion by the American moral philosopher Allen Buchanan (1991) who has argued the moral right to secede by any group in any state. Such a right to secede could be constitutionally recognized and specified (referendum, qualified majority support, treatment of minorities). A constitutionally entrenched right to secede under regulated conditions and international arbitration would spare any country the civil disorder in the wake of a political divorce or the forceful retention of an unwilling partner. Buchanan (1991:161), who considers even the discussion of the constitutional right to secede too divisive in the present South African climate, nonetheless concludes: "If non-Zulus are unwilling to adopt constitutional measures that would add further power to the numerical superiority that Zulus already enjoy, the only possibility for a peaceful solution may be Zulu secession." However, Buchanan overlooks the fact that there would be strong opposition from a large section of the Zulu-speakers themselves. This is one of the differences between the repressed independence movements in Eastern Europe and the Apartheid-encouraged Bantustan sovereignties.

Although it has hardly been discussed in South Africa, it may be timely to consider a secession clause in the new South African constitution in the light of recent experiences in Eastern Europe. A serious discussion of the right to secede would also constitute the necessary

incentive to bring the potential secessionist parties into the constitutional negotiations.

VI. THE WHITE RIGHT-WING: THE OPTION OF SECESSION, CIVIL WAR AND SOCIAL DISINTEGRATION

Ideologically, the black and white ethnic fundamentalists mirror each other in their intransigence to compromise, their advocacy of confrontation and their single-mindedness. The difference lies in the relative strength and military capacity of each camp. While only a small portion of blacks currently support fundamentalist views, a third of the white electorate would vote for parties on the right of the ruling Nationalists. Moreover, the white right-wing is overrepresented in the police and security establishment. This segment is well trained and armed. It is able to cause serious violence and disruptions of the ongoing accommodation as numerous bombings and shootings have proven. Individuals on the white right-wing have also tended towards "representative violence," the random targeting of outgroup members which has been rare among black political activists.

The white ultra-right, however, is unlikely to provoke a military takeover under present conditions. Even if such a seizure of power were to take place during a civil war situation, the right-wing alone could not govern the country. This distinguishes South Africa from Latin American states where military juntas could count on domestic financial endorsement and influential international support; in the South African case they could count on determined opposition. The hope of the ultra-right, despite its martial rhetoric, lies not in a take-over but in secession from an increasingly integrated, nonracial state.

A minority of conservatives are drawn to the vision of an independent Boerestaat for reasons of ideological commitment to Afrikaner self-determination while the majority of whites who have joined the right-wing did so out of anxiety about an uncertain future. The economic recession has swelled this segment. The tangible rewards of a booming nonracial state, if only it could be allowed to boom, would substantially reduce this fear. It is generally recognized that the white right-wing represents the downwardly mobile sections of the group: white mine workers, farmers deprived of previous state subsidies, and the lower echelons of the Afrikaner civil service, who are very concerned about Africanization.

Although political attitudes and identities cannot in general be crudely reduced to material considerations, a strong correlation between socio-economic conditions and political outlook remains most striking in South Africa.

The white segment is internally more stratified than is commonly realized. Although the white working class has consistently shrunk, due to state patronage, about 20 percent of urban adult whites still have a net worth of under R10,000 (\$4,000). Over half the white population owns net assets of under R100,000 (\$40,000), 6 percent over R500,000 (\$200,000) and 1.7 percent are considered rand millionaires.¹⁰⁷

There are different versions of a white homeland on which their respective supporters cannot agree. It is this disagreement which not only has split the right-wing but paralysed the concept politically.

In the late seventies the son of Hendrik Verwoerd set up the "Orange Werkers Unie" in search of a growth point for a white homeland. His choice of Morgenzon, a nondescript hamlet in the Eastern Transvaal, proved unattractive to all but 20 families who moved and bought land in the town. These odd inhabitants, surrounded by 6,000 blacks, insist that they will not employ black labour and become dependent on "outsiders."

The *Boerestaat Party* of Robert van Tonder strives to revive the traditional Boer republics in the Transvaal and Orange Free State, but rejects the notion of a white homeland as racist. Just as Zionists asked for the ancient Jewish state to be reinstated without excluding all Arab inhabitants, according to van Tonder, so the *Boerestaat* will coexist with a black majority in its midst. But by dividing these blacks into different

107 The figures seem to support the argument that even if this private wealth of 13 percent of the population were to be equally shared among the total population, it would still be insufficient to make any great material difference in the living standards of the impoverished 30 millions. On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that South Africa has one of the most skewed income distributions in the world (Gini coefficient 0.68). Stellenbosch economist Servaas van den Bergh (EPSC Occasional Paper No. 3) has pointed out that if recorded income were distributed as it is in the United States "the income of the poorest 15 million people in South Africa (40 percent of the population) would be about 70 percent higher than it is."

nations, the Afrikaners will still be in the majority. In this definition of the ruling group, even Cape Afrikaners who did not go on the Great Trek are excluded, as are of course English-speaking whites. According to Piet 'Skiet' Rudolph, the Free State, Transvaal and Northern Natal are still part and parcel of the Boerevolk. He equates the Boere claim for land with the dispossessed black community's demands for land restitution. The Boere homelands then would form a loose federation for economic cooperation with the rest of South Africa.¹⁰⁸

Carel Boshoff, the head of the *Afrikanervolkswag*, presents the more sophisticated and pragmatic version of the nationalist territorial dream. He considers it unrealistic to move or dominate millions of people against their will. Instead, he looks for an area with low population density as well as great development potential, "where a new settlement can be developed, and where new high technology can be placed, and where a country, a republic, a state can develop in time." Boshoff's most recent map identifies an area along the Orange river in the North Eastern Cape and Southern Namibia as the future Boerestaat.

The Conservative Party itself has also begun drawing up boundaries for a white state. It has informally dropped its former position that the whole of Apartheid-South Africa should be restored to white rule. For the Conservative Party, a minimal homeland would include the Western Transvaal, including Pretoria, the Orange Free State Province and the Northern Cape Province. Since this conservative heartland is interspersed with "black spots," influential white conservatives seek an alliance with the black conservative Mangope of the Bophutatswana Bantustan who is equally opposed to the ANC hegemony. This secessionist coalition in the name of national self-determination may well include Buthelezi's Kwa Zulu territory.

The Conservative Party is deeply split on whether such a plan should be negotiated with other parties and whether the conservatives should,

108 Due to his weapon thefts, subsequent underground activities and imprisonment, the militant Rudolph assumed almost a Mandela-like mythical role among sectors of the far right for a while.

therefore, participate in the ongoing all-party talks. The party is in danger of being marginalized by its boycott politics. Its hope to gain power through another white-only election is increasingly exposed as a fiction despite a string of victories in by-elections. In the meantime, the militarization on its fringes continues.

The decisive defeat of the conservatives in the March 17, 1992 referendum and the preceding wavering of whether to boycott or participate in the referendum, has further exacerbated cleavages between conservative moderates and hardliners. On the one hand the referendum alliance of the respectable "party conservatives" with the neo-fascists, has discredited all conservative politics in the eyes of the majority of Afrikaners. Even on the right, political-legal strategies to achieve Boere self-determination are more popular than the violent antics of the AWB affiliated associations. The street theatre of these groups has been vastly overrated in the media reporting.¹⁰⁹ On the other hand, the marginalized, violence-prone ideologues could cause even more disruption through economic and industrial action than through direct violence. Even a powerful ANC-NP government would be powerless against the sabotage of the gold mines where the majority of the white miners show AWB sympathies. It is already established that "white miners are playing a significant role in supplying explosive to the far right" (*Africa Confidential*, March 20, 1992) which was used in the bombing of a few newly-integrated white schools. A new government is likely to be saddled with the difficult task of controlling high-publicity terrorism of the Basque type, unless these elements can be pacified with some kind of Afrikaner state.

The militants of neo-fascist groups, like the AWB, accuse the Conservative Party of "giving our country away" for a parliamentary salary. The CP members of parliament rejected calls to resign and thereby force

109. This went to the extent that almost all pundits predicted an uncertain outcome of the referendum, with the *New York Times* (March 16, 1992) for example forecasting a result "too close to call." Even the *Johannesburg Weekly Mail* participated in painting the doomsday scenarios of both the English and Afrikaans press. Its beneficial effect was the voters' mobilization to the extent that an unprecedented 85 percent turned in their ballot.

country-wide by-elections that would have demonstrated the decline of white support for the government. In Terre'Blanche's view this would be "the last chance" before "Tambo's communists start the black revolution." Others in this group now openly declare: "The time for voting politics is over—it is now time for bullet politics" (*Cape Times*, 1/3/90).

The Conservative Party deplores the violence associated with the AWB and likes to project an image of respectability. However it also emphasizes its ideological affinity. CP leader Treurnicht declared: "What we have in common with the AWB is that we belong to the same people, speak the same language, have the same opponents and enemies and the same ideals to have our own fatherland governed by our own people" (*Cape Times*, R1/8/91). Despite the contempt that the leaders of each faction express for the other's style, the AWB can be considered the armed wing of the CP. What the one party tries to achieve through legal and institutional means, the other complements through extra-parliamentary threats and military mobilization for the coming "volks war."

Martial rhetoric by the ultra-right usually receives the loudest applause and foot-stamping at rallies where many wear Khaki uniforms with the red, black and white swastika-like insignia. Referring to the Conservative Party's bid to gather one million signatures in support of its campaign against reforms, Terre'Blanche says: "The AWB does not want one million signatures, it wants one million guns." Other speakers emphasize that cherished symbols—such as Pretoria, the city of Boer republic leader Paul Kruger—would be taken only "over our dead bodies" while defending itself against its "third siege."

Ironically, the right-wing now demands the abolition of the very security legislation that it once advocated, particularly Section 29 of the Internal Security Act. This Act, argues Eugene Terre'Blanche, had been introduced by former Prime Minister Vorster for the purpose of destroying communism. "However, since the government has now made friends with the communists...the Act is now being used in the most cruel fashion to lock up, without any access to law, Boer freedom fighters" (*BBC Monitoring Report*, 18/12/90).

A future ANC-NP government clearly faces the prospects of either a) accommodating the right-wing separatists, at least symbolically in some more or less autonomous territory, or b) repressing a substantial section of a hostile population group and thereby becoming itself undemocratic, or c) being destabilized by an uncooperative civil service and suffering sabotage in the strategically still crucial productive sectors in agriculture and mining. It would, therefore, seem wise to make all and any possible efforts to draw at least some sectors of conservatives into the ongoing negotiations, although the ANC will have great difficulty in ever accepting the legitimacy of secessionist claims.

In conclusion, the uniform demonization of all political activity on the right of the National Party in the SA English-language press and foreign media needs to be corrected with a much more nuanced view of conservative motivations and behaviour. Not all right-wingers are the swastika-waving fascists who form what is really a vociferous minority among many more honourable ideologues and plainly fearful voters in feudal rural settings or declining mining towns. Liberal editor Denis Becket¹¹⁰ has dramatically illuminated the conservative spectrum: "Yet for every rightist who breaks up a black picnic, ten anguish over their role in Africa. For every barfly telling Kaffir-jokes, there's a pious householder praying for guidance. For every Terre Blanche rattling sabers there's a Boshoff seeking good neighbours through good fences. For every CP farmer who donders his labourers, twenty deliver their babies." Neither South African liberals nor the ANC, let alone Western policymakers, have yet engaged these anxiety-ridden ideologues, as unpalatable as this may be for anti-racist tastes.

As the moderate middle ground—the ANC and the National Party—explore their common interests and draw closer together—the extremes on the white right and black left step up their rhetoric or even their physical attacks. In his intriguing analysis Donald Horowitz (1991) views this dynamic of pressure from the flanks as the best guarantee for the fragile centre to hold. Yet the possibility of a low level civil war

110 Denis Becket, "Leading the Right to Reason," *Die Suid-Afrikaan*, October/November 1991.

cannot be ruled out. The right-wing may not win a war, but they could certainly start one. In a less frightening but still alarming scenario, even if the ultra-conservatives are unsuccessful in preventing a settlement between the ANC and the NP, they can prolong the uncertainty and mutual recrimination. Already the government is using the symbolic existence of MK as an excuse that it cannot ban private armies and disarm the right-wing. By pointing to 'the threat from the right', the government strengthens its negotiating position. Even if it did not instigate the "third force" violence among blacks, as many critics charge, Pretoria has benefitted from the weakening of the ANC forces. Thus the right-wing can also succeed by causing friction at the centre and undermining successful negotiations, just as settlements have been prevented in Northern Ireland or presently in Israel.

In practical terms, the white right-wing can only be controlled by the white centre, and ultra-conservative Afrikaners by more reformist Afrikaners. If this is to be a relatively nonviolent process, the centre's legitimacy is crucial for carrying the right-wing along. As long as the transition is managed with white majority electoral support and constitutional legality is maintained, the right-wing insurrectionists place themselves outside the "law and order" that they themselves fetishize. Therefore, the ANC has to allow the NP forces its posture of legal respectability, rather than push the party into a perception of surrender. Indeed, as many commentators have pointed out, if an NP-ANC solution were to be foisted on a defiant white majority, the ground would have been laid for a costly long-term IRA-type destabilization. The paradox of the South African power equation is that both sides can prevent the other from exercising power. Therefore, neither side can rule alone peacefully without taking the vital interests of the antagonists seriously. The alternative is violence without victory which only the most rigid ideologues prefer over accommodation.

Assessing the pessimistic scenario: Lebanon or Peru?

Against the optimistic scenario of a social-democratic compact with renewed high economic growth stand many well-documented pessimistic predictions of likely social disintegration. Authors in this school do

not doubt the goodwill of the leadership on all sides to reach an accord quickly, but question their ability to enforce it against overwhelming objective odds. In addition, some distrust the democratic motives of the major parties who are said to be interested in a non-racial oligarchy at best. Editors like Ken Owen dwell on the theme of Africa reverting to the bush in the "heart of darkness," while Barber (*Cape Times*, 24/4/90) warns of the white establishment "sliding into functional cahoots with the ANC and its totalitarian project." The National Party is inclined to adopt this route, it is argued, because it strives for external recognition, and that can only be won with ANC connivance. Both the National Party and ANC want order above the law. A future division of control with the National Party holding the right-wing in check, and the ANC disciplining the townships under an authoritarian leadership is thought to be looming. Negotiations would mainly be about zones of influence and hegemony. The National Party must only ensure that the relinquished share of power does not threaten its own privileges. In Barber's nightmare: "A one-party state condoned by a specially protected white nomenclature." If right-wing anxiety about "a sellout to blacks" represents one side of white consciousness, the vision of an authoritarian unholy alliance constitutes the liberal other side of the same coin. Both sides deplore the moral decay of the ruling group. In Barber's phrase: "The establishment lacks either the guts or the basic humanity." The scenarios waver between de Klerk as the South African Gorbachev who loses control over the process he initiated, or de Klerk and Mandela as joint dictators.

In this vein, academics Pierre du Toit and Willie Esterhuyse¹¹¹ argue that both the National Party and the ANC employ hegemonic models of bargaining. In this view, democratic, inclusive rhetoric only masks the desire for total control. Negotiations aim at co-optation or defeat of the adversary by other means, as well as exclusion of those on the right or left who reject the new alignment. It is a despairing assessment.

¹¹¹ Pierre du Toit and Willie Esterhuyse, eds., *The Mythmakers: The Elusive Bargain for South Africa's Future*, Johannesburg: Southern Books, 1990.

There is little evidence at present that both antagonists would abandon a negotiated democratic contest, although they both lack a democratic tradition and have illiberal hardliners in their midst. Even on the assumption that the pessimists are correct and the "regime models" of both camps—"technocratic liberation" *versus* "people's power"—allow at best a non-racial oligarchy, the question remains whether the objective constellation of power would not constrain the anti-democratic interests. South African social forces are so diverse and multifaceted that political legitimacy and economic stability simply cannot be reached by a new coercive alignment, even if it comprises a numerical majority. The resulting unrest and instability would defeat the main purpose of the new pact. Sooner or later a more inclusive and pluralist order would have to establish wider legitimacy of a polity in which all disruptive forces are accommodated.

Much more serious economic trends, however, may jeopardize the democratic recovery of South Africa and lead to social disintegration beyond the control of politicians. It has become a well-worn cliché to stress that South Africa sits on a time-bomb of economic frustrations. Only 125 of the estimated 1,000 people who come on to the job market daily can be accommodated in the formal economy. The capacity of the South African economy to absorb new job seekers declined from 73.6 percent of the new entrants in 1970 to 12.5 percent in 1989. The time-bomb analogy, however, falsely suggests an impending explosion. The real consequences of the rejected underclass lie in the more invisible slow societal disintegration, as indicated in rising crime rates, political violence, family dissolution and a breakdown of the social fabric and value system under the weight of general misery. An ANC government is likely to suffer the consequences of its advocacy of sanctions and ungovernability even more than the sheltered white sector which has many more options.

A comparison with Lebanon during its 15 year long civil war (1975-1990), masterfully analyzed in an 800-page comprehensive survey by

Theo Hanf¹¹² illustrates the unique South African dilemmas. For South Africans, an understanding of the Lebanese example is both encouraging and frightening. Lebanon was primarily destroyed by outside forces: the Palestinians, the Israelis, the Syrians, the Iraqis and even the Americans, all tried to impose their solution at one time or another on a weak central state. Unlike Lebanon, South Africa is relatively free from direct outside interference and sponsorship of competing factions. What has kept Lebanon together, on the other hand, is the persistence, throughout the war, of a surprising popular consensus on the unity of the nation, despite the progressive disintegration of the institutions of the state. "It is not fanatical masses that prevent a new consensus," Theo Hanf concludes, "but short-sighted and power-hungry elites." In South Africa, the opposite holds true. Compromising leaders on all sides are constrained by militant and alienated constituencies.

Hanf demonstrates perceptively that Lebanese society disintegrated at the top while life below continued with remarkable normality. Children continued to go to school, water and electricity supplies were not cut off, the courts and the police, hospitals and fire brigades, banks and garbage trucks, all as far as possible provided their usual services under the most unusual conditions. Within their groups even the political gangsters were relatively safe from attacks by opponents. The militia on the payroll of feuding warlords behaved like private armies everywhere: ruthless against enemies from other communities, keen to enrich themselves through extortion, theft and drug-smuggling but also protective of the communities they came from. The civilian population on all sides of the barricades suffered from intermittent shellings and devastating car bombs, but they were not massively debilitated. People across the communal divisions hated and feared the disruptions of routine—as they demonstrated in several mass protests—but kept up a remarkable pretence of normality. Despair expressed itself mainly through emigration.

112 Theo Hanf, *Koexistenz im Krieg: Staatszerfall und Entstehung einer Nation im Libanon*, München: Nomos Verlag, 1990.

Everyday life on the ground in South Africa's black townships is qualitatively different. Although far more and more substantial weapons are available in Beirut than in Soweto or Khayelitsha, lives are much more at risk in South Africa than in Lebanon. Not only do crime and simmering political feuds make physical danger more pervasive, but the psychological impoverishment, the hopelessness and alienation seem almost worse. If the well-worn sociological concept of anomie can be applied anywhere, it is in Sebokeng or Edendale. With people dreading to sleep in their own homes for fear of unprovoked attacks, with 39 mourners blown apart at a funeral by a revenge-seeking gang, with passengers in commuter trains scrambling out of the windows at the cry "the Zulus are coming," with groups of girls abducted from a Salvation Army home and raped, and with the annual murder rate in Cape Town climbing to 65 per 100,000, as compared to four in Toronto, South Africa would seem to represent the epitome of normlessness. Random violence is almost less bearable than more brutal but predictable atrocities.

South African criminologists note the worrying change that previously non-violent house-breaking and theft have become increasingly violent. Statistics for rapes and serious assaults climb every year. The violence, beyond the enforced redistribution by impoverished people, indicates new levels of aggression and frustration, that are heightened by unfulfilled fantasies. The general lack of regard for human life reflects a reaction to disappointed expectations; the long-awaited breakdown of Apartheid has not changed material living conditions. Indeed, with the political insecurity and factional violence among competing black parties increasing, the immediate life of many township- and squatter-dwellers has changed for the worse. Symbolic gratification, provided for a while by the legalization of political parties and the release of Mandela, turned into real bitterness and blame of the leaders who promised but could not deliver.

With the freeing of political shackles, common criminal activity also found more space. Weapons from sources in Renamo and Umkhonto entered South Africa more freely. Weapons traffic was facilitated by the influx of refugees from Mozambique and other strife-torn areas who thus began to destabilize the initial destabilizers. For the increasing

number of school dropouts and unemployed youth, there opened a new field of making a living by trafficking in mandrax tablets, just as the underclass of North American cities survives on the sale of drugs. Car hijacking emerged as a lucrative endeavour. When the banks hardened their security, armed robbers shifted to softer targets such as retail outlets or private homes. Breeders of bull terriers and Rottweilers cannot cope with the demand. The booming private security industry fails to deter the spread of crime just as the over-politicized policing proves ineffective in prevention. Not only is the "community" inaccessible for a policeforce that is distrusted as the enemy, but the alienated community makes self-administered community policing itself a source of strife.

The 1990 annual Institute of Race Relations Survey points out that the common murder rate is four times higher per capita in South Africa than it is in the US, that 8,000 people were killed in political violence between September 1984 and 1990 and about 850 of those were "necklaced." Despite the ANC disavowal of necklacing after first condoning it under the rubric of "people's resistance," this barbaric method of dealing with political opponents continues to be practiced, though at a lower rate. In the meantime, the incidence of political violence attributable to extremist right-wing organizations has also increased, complementing the legalized police brutality referred to in township jargon as "system terror." The Minister of Law and Order has called his country "a nation of gangsters." He does not mention that it was chiefly his Party's Apartheid policies which brutalized the impoverished young. The illegitimacy of Apartheid institutions made all other social institutions illegitimate.

In the matter of social decay and the life-chances of the majority, South Africa resembles the Soviet Union more than the Lebanon. The powerful Afrikaner institutions of the centre still hold the society together, but conceal the rot at the bottom. As in the repressive era of the Soviet Union, the South African state thinks that it can best combat crime through more police deterrence without seriously addressing the underlying causes of alienation. The most telling indicators of decay are the schools. Black schools hold classes but often no teaching goes on there. Either pupils or teachers are engaged with other priorities. In the rigid and outdated centrally-administered matriculation tests in 1991, only 39

percent of black candidates passed, as opposed to approximately 95 percent in the other communities. The low pass rate does not primarily result from differential expenditures, facilities or teacher qualifications. Several equally poor black homeland and mission schools achieved or exceeded the rate of the more privileged minorities. As the ANC-aligned National Education Crisis Committee self-critically stated, "schools have been allowed to become battlefields and students were compelled to find them selves in the forefront of this political violence."

While the pass rates of matriculants of non-African population groups scored unprecedentedly high grades, the rate for black pupils dropped to an all-time low. The *Sunday Times* (January 6, 1991) commented: "The implications of a massive black failure rate are unrelievedly grim. It will aggravate youthful rage, incite racial envy, clog educational facilities and, ultimately, worsen South Africa's real Achilles heel: our desperate shortage of skills." Stemming from this educational cementing of the *status quo* are claims to entitlement which run contrary to the meritocratic route to equality. In as much as Afrikaner state patronage has secured privileged group advances in the past, so African collective claims understandably advocate restitution and redistribution in the future. In such an ethnic division of spoils, with differential access to scarce occupational opportunities, two unequal contenders are inextricably locked into different justifications of claims. The insistence on individual ability and achievement on the basis of existing privilege is countered by the hope that the new political system will deliver the valued goods and services. This dissensus on the legitimacy of claims bodes ill for accommodation.

Already a praxis of free entitlement to state-services has spread widely, and normal administration has broken down. Rents are boycotted, electricity is cut, taxes remain uncollected, emergency calls go unheeded. Because Apartheid laws and regulations were primarily designed to suppress and control, they have lost all legitimacy even where they potentially benefit the people. In a state of anomie, paralyzed by the daily struggle to survive, the majority of the population waits to be saved. A new black law and order party, not connected to Apartheid institutions, could make substantial inroads in the townships at the

expense of the ANC. It is only a matter of time for a black *Terre Blanche* to emerge.

Even the acclaimed ANC leadership is increasingly viewed with suspicion and scepticism. The more it presses on with negotiations and confidential understandings, the louder the whispers about sell-outs and the shouts about opportunistic behaviour. At best, many activists see negotiations as war by other means, designed to culminate in a "transfer of power." The ANC leadership and returning exiles make heroic efforts to coax the grass-roots into line, but even the credibility of the SACP is strained by its advocacy of "guarantees for the bourgeoisie."

The three-decade-long (1960-1990) ban on liberation movements reduced the complexities of "the struggle" to ill-understood slogans. Opposition to collaboration was interpreted as "making the country ungovernable." Resistance to the government's "Bantu Education" was intended as "education for liberation," but became the counter-productive "liberation before education," and ended in the slogan "pass one, pass all." Schools were proclaimed as "sites of struggles," although efforts are now underway to restore proper schooling. Where the resistance created counter-institutions to the discredited Apartheid authorities, it often merely compounded the anomie. The unelected "people's courts" and street committees of the "young lions" often exceeded the terror of the Apartheid courts. Detention in Pretoria is preferable to being necklaced in Soweto.

Petty criminals continue to terrorize, traditionalist warlords attempt to extend their turf, and brutalized comrades retaliate. The political leadership preaches discipline and unity but few heed the calls for reconciliation. South Africa needs to build legitimacy at the top by means of a constitutional accord, but is in danger of reaching a settlement by elites on a hollow base. Unlike Lebanon, South Africa needs a "recovery movement," a collective therapy and moral revival that cannot be decreed from above. In Lebanon, an accord by the feuding elites on foreign military presence was sufficient to end the strife. In South Africa, an agreement of this kind is crucial, but it won't remedy the underlying social decay. And even if more houses are built and jobs created in an

expanding post-Apartheid economy, that won't be enough without some sort of moral renewal.

In the absence of strong religious communities and traditional families disrupted by Apartheid, this renewal can best be built around the notion of a non-racial democracy. Rather than stressing the need for unity or allowing the "will of the people"—as if the people had only one will—the opposition movements should speak up more loudly for the idea of respect for political opponents. Intimidation of antagonists—and worse—has a long history on a continent where the practice of "loyal opposition" hardly exists. Were the ANC to fragment into warring factions, there would be little hope for such fledgling notions as individual autonomy, freedom of choice and pluralistic empowerment.

A functioning democracy requires autonomous citizens, civic organizations and a host of disciplining grass-roots institutions, from apolitical sports clubs to dedicated parents and committed teachers. The democratic state cannot create the foundations of its survival: it can only facilitate their emergence. The greater the variety of the civil society, the better the chances for democracy. Dozens of earnest Afrikaner and ANC think-tanks must watch that they do not build their sophisticated accords on shifting sands. Neither side has sufficiently prepared its constituency for the remarkable speed of the accommodations which its leadership has been prepared to make. The militant rhetoric is meant to camouflage all this moderation, but raises expectations which may prove counter-productive when it comes to selling the inevitably disappointing compromise.

With a further decline of the South African economy, an impoverished township society could conceivably produce a Peruvian scenario. Here *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path, or known simply by the faithful as the Communist Party), under a shadowy leader Abimael Guzman, directs a violent campaign not only against the country's establishment but against foreign-aid workers, the clergy, and even the urban poor who engage in self-help relief efforts and co-operative industrial activity. The Maoist movement with about 5,000 guerrilla followers views any improvement in the lot of the poor as counter-productive to the revolution. Organized

relief is not to be tolerated since it pacifies the masses. The brainwashing of Shining Path followers guarantees blind loyalty in an escalating war to overthrow capitalism and turn Peru into a peasant-worker state.

Shining Path tactics are opposed by the rival Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) of Cuban-style Marxists who prefer to use violence without civilian casualties to bring about a redistribution of resources. They condemn the massacres of *Sendero Luminoso*, very much as the SACP kept the lid on indiscriminate violence in South Africa. In both Peru and South Africa, an alienated and unemployed youth accounts for the appeal of radical movements. The difference in South Africa is that this frustration was successfully channelled into a national resistance organization that could legitimately claim to have the support of the entire world. By actively championing the cause of the excluded, foreign governments have preempted the rise of ultra-radical, irrational protest. With Canadian NGOs among the sponsors of the ANC, even if that meant turning a blind eye to the ideological antics of the SACP, foreign intervention has so far prevented the isolated irrational protest that characterizes Peru.

Given the interpenetration of reformist and revolutionary political cultures in contemporary South Africa, it seems unlikely at present that the Peruvian scenario would repeat itself. However, with little improvement in the life-chances of half of the South African population under 20, even an ANC government could not rest for good on its past record, particularly if the radical SACP ally were to lose its appeal.

When has a post-Apartheid order been achieved? The move away from racial domination does not necessarily ensure the achievement of democracy. How the process of dismantling domination is conducted strongly influences its outcome: it can create a culture of violence or it can lay the moral foundation for the lasting consensus about legitimate rules. F. van Zyl Slabbert has frequently stressed that "there is not an event that can be seized upon by the outside world to symbolize how and when South Africa moves from an Apartheid to a post-Apartheid era." Even a constitutional settlement must not be confused with the end of the conflict.

6. IMAGES OF CANADA AMONG SOUTH AFRICANS: THE IMPACT OF ISOLATION

*"Apartheid is just a fancy name for Naziism." —
Brian Mulroney in Gabon, 13 October 1991.*

*"Canadians and Australians are the worst coloniz-
ers when you look at how they treat their aboriginal
people." —A South African MP, Interview,
18 August 1991.*

Opinions about the impact of foreign pressure and isolation on South Africa differ widely. Some attribute the reformist moves of Pretoria since February 1990 mainly to sanctions and economic boycotts. Others dismiss these measures as relatively insignificant, compared with South African domestic developments inside Afrikanerdom, the stepped-up resistance among the disenfranchised and the end of the Cold War. While the economic effect of foreign intervention remains arguable and controversial, the psychological impact of isolation on South African whites is indisputable. Apartheid South Africa could evade trade sanctions to a large degree but it could not escape polecat status in the world.

I. PERCEPTIONS OF WHITES

How do ordinary whites react to their universal ostracism? How do they perceive and rationalize their worldwide stigmatization in a pariah state? Has the psychological pressure emanating from the country's isolation led to an introspective rethinking of traditional attitudes or has it hardened intransigence?

No empirical study has yet been undertaken that probes these vital questions. We do not even know how well aware South Africans are of

the outside policies. Yet any assessment of the impact of outside intervention on the South African powerholders calls for a detailed exploration of the white consciousness on this issue. Of particular importance are the mechanisms with which foreign criticism is absorbed or deflected. In short, how are the legitimization needs of any modern political system, even the most repressive one, affected by stern criticism by foes and potential allies alike?

This assessment is based on a questionnaire survey of 163 business executives who took specialized short-term management courses at the Graduate School of Business at the University of Cape Town during July and August, 1991. The respondents came from all over South Africa and most held senior positions in a variety of companies, including parastatals, with the exception of 68 MBA students in the sample. These were younger professionals in their late twenties or early thirties while the age of the larger group ranged between 35 and 50.

Most in the sample had completed their university education; several in the MBA class held doctorates in other disciplines. While none in the sample could be said to be among the, say, top 100 business managers in the country, several could be expected to move into this category later in their careers. In short, they represented the broad spectrum of South African private and public upper business management with various degrees of experience but a uniformly high level of formal education, income and future career prospects.

As is the case in South Africa more than in any other Western industrialized country, the overwhelming majority in this group is male (94 percent in our sample) and white (93 percent in our sample). The black respondents, identified by childhood language spoken in the otherwise colour- and ethnicity-blind questionnaire, were later excluded in the evaluation, as were about 6 percent foreigners who were enrolled in the courses without being permanent residents in the country.

The anonymous questionnaires on political attitudes were administered to the captive audience by one of the visiting instructors in the course before any lecture had been delivered. The topics of the later

lectures in each of four groups were business ethics and the analysis of government-business relations in the politics of South Africa. As part of these lectures the respondents were provided a summary of their answers and a systematic discussion on most questions was conducted within the class. Impressions from these four "focus sessions" on Canadian policy also entered the evaluation presented here, although the examples to be quoted all originate from the written answers. This evaluation is further informed by 87 in-depth expert interviews with recipients of Canadian assistance, academics, journalists and politicians that were conducted on Canadian policy in South Africa during 1990-91. The same questionnaire was also administered to 200 black social science students at the University of the Western Cape and the University of Durban-Westville for comparative purposes.

It can be safely assumed that the reactions described are fairly representative of the attitudes of the political and economic power elite in South Africa. Although many government officials would not state their opinion on Canada as bluntly as our respondents in the anonymous forum of a provocative questionnaire, official rationalizing and reasoning on the issue may be even more hostile and evasive since Afrikaans-speakers are under-represented (28 percent) in our survey. Our sample is clearly biased towards the more liberal English-speaking sector of white society.

In fact, the MBA class comprised several political activists, some of whom had been jailed or restricted previously. It should also be remembered that the University of Cape Town—which alongside the University of the Witwatersrand is considered the premier liberal institution of higher learning in South Africa—attracts and fosters more open-minded cosmopolitan attitudes in the traditionally more relaxed and easy-going racial environment in the Cape. A similar survey at the University of Pretoria or Potchefstroom should yield decisively more intransigent attitudes. Hence, a result that shows that foreign criticism is deflected in surprising ways among our more enlightened sample can be expected to prevail even more clearly at the Afrikaner institutions in the Transvaal.

To convey the authenticity of the rationalisations necessitates extensive direct quotes. These are grouped into different categories with rough percentages of frequency indicated, although the evaluation is primarily a qualitative one. Only the hermeneutic method of *verstehen*, of putting oneself into the mindset of the other, and viewing the world from the perspective of the participant studied, allows the analyst a judgement of how the group had been affected.

Most of the thirteen questions on controversial political issues were open-ended, so as to gauge spontaneous reactions and not to prejudge answers. The informants were asked to state their opinions on the major political parties, leaders and problems in South Africa, as well as to list political leaders in the world today or in recent history, that they admired most and least. Question 6 read: "If you had an appropriate job offer/opportunity to live overseas, would you emigrate permanently from South Africa?" This item preceded the crucial question 7 reported here: "*From what you read and know about Canadian policy towards South Africa, how would you describe it?*"

Unlike the black sample at UWC and UWD where a large segment of politicized students had never heard of and were totally uninformed about a specific Canadian policy, 92 percent of the white sample stated an opinion and described in more or less detail, contemptible or appealing features of Canadian policy as well as presumed reasons for it and implications flowing from it. This knowledge about Canada seems to have largely been derived from press reports and to a lesser extent from relatives or emigrants who had travelled to or settled in Canada.

The South African mainstream dailies hardly ever mention Canada but are obsessed with American and British events, fed by a variety of correspondents and direct news stories from these countries. This applies even more so for the state-controlled television. Only the occasional story about the complaints of Canadian First Nations people (called Red Indians in South Africa) or the rise of Quebec nationalism is reported on television. Otherwise, knowledge of Canada, foreign countries and international news generally, is mainly confined to the reporting of crimes, sports and disasters in the typical tabloid style, in the English, Afrikaans

and black press. Canadians are infinitely better informed about South Africa than vice versa. In short, perceptions of Canada among South African whites vary widely from the frequent blank of a vast frozen land "adjoining America" to a nuanced knowledge of better economic opportunities and a desirable haven of emigration. Indeed, a successful play about such fantasies at the Johannesburg Market Theatre ran under the title, "Dreaming of Toronto."

The overwhelming majority (88 percent) of our white sample clearly identifies Canadian policy as "hostile" to Apartheid. Most use adjectives like "unfriendly," "pro-sanctions," "cold," "anti-South African," "hard-line," "pro-ANC," "inflexible," "antagonistic—not in keeping with British/ French overall policy," "biased," "negative," "condemnatory," "partisan," "counter-productive," "cool," "distant," "remote," "arms-length," "uncompromising," "destructive." Some single out "Foreign Minister Clark as very anti-South Africa" (256, 315). Others describe the policy as "not the moonshine and roses that people used to think in the past" (323). Some seemed surprised that "as a white nation Canada is pro-ANC" (320). They rationalize that the anti-South Africa stance of the government "does not seem to accurately reflect the thinking of the people" (315).

A small group (12 percent) describes Canada's policy as indifferent, hands-off, neutral, mixed, mostly not radically anti-Aartheid, cautious. "They could not care less" (271). One respondent, in this group, writes that

"I believe they have bigger fish to fry and do not have historically close ties. They are therefore quite critical of South Africa ... However, they do not appear too hostile or vociferous" (255).

While the bigger group criticizes Canada for its pro-sanction stance, these 12 percent consider the policy to be more rhetorical than action-oriented. Similar to many blacks these respondents remain unconvinced that the policy constitutes more than

"getting in with the feelings of the time and making politically expedient statements with little commitment to action" (297).

"verbally critical but underlying support" (307).

However, not all who identify Canadian policy as hostile to South Africa also condemn it as one would expect. A substantial section (20 percent) uses laudatory adjectives for "a principled stand," that is "strongly pro-democracy" (236), "forthright and clear," "persistent and consistent" (214). Among this fifth, one finds typically a remarkably succinct and generally accurate description of Canadian policy.

"Canadian policy has in my opinion been a constructive policy that has sought through adherence to sanctions (along with the Commonwealth and Western allies) to bring pressure on the South African government while maintaining dialogue. At the same time it has been actively involved in giving support to development projects in the black community and education (bursary) programmes" (205).

"Sympathetic to the calls from the oppressed organizations, yet diplomatic" (225).

"Refusal to encourage business or further contact, e.g. sports until Apartheid has gone and black government is in place. They do support anti-Apartheid groups. Even given the current reforms to date, there has been no significant change in Canadian policy to South Africa" (227).

A few respondents point out that Canada is

"only willing to consider merits of change, once change has been successfully completed" (251).

Among those who identify Canadian policy as hostile to South Africa and disagree with the stance (the overwhelming majority), the most frequently mentioned criticism refers to double-standards, hypocrisy, self-opinionated, insincere, non-pragmatic, aggressive, self-righteous, sanctimonious and protectionist, selfish and guilt-ridden, prescriptive. One Afrikaans-speaker condemns the policy as "humanistic"! (325). A

typical comment by the many who label the policy opportunistic would read:

"...takes the safe line of advising and supporting black aspirations to the detriment of whites—often unjustifiably to cover up its own deep divisions" (324).

In total disregard and ignorance of the Canadian efforts to assist negotiations and accommodation, the impression is widespread that Canada is only

"actively supporting anti-Apartheid groups and condemning South African policies. Playing no role in bringing about reconciliation between the various parties involved in negotiations" (289).

Several respondents, particularly many Afrikaans-speakers and de Klerk supporters feel, Canadian policy

"would be more realistic in supporting transition economically and not only one-sided ANC support, but all parties. Transition will work only if economic order is sound" (202).

They emphasize that Canada is too "cautious in recognizing the reforms of de Klerk" (249). They complain that "Canada is not in touch with what is going on here. Lots of posturing rather than effective action (of a policy) biased towards ANC" (248).

In explaining the hostile Canadian policy about 20 percent of the sample refer to Canadians being followers of others, that they "are playing to the gallery" (232), following the bandwagon, that Canada "is in the pocket of the US" and therefore cannot initiate its own independent policy, that Canada merely "follows world trends" (239). Several respondents charge that the policy aims at "currying favour with Africa and the developing world" (343).

"Will sit on the sanctions fence until the group moves. Not prepared to initiate any positive moves to assist in any way with the solving of the problem. Readily prepared to castigate" (339).

"...following US policy. No real understanding of the complexities" (278). "low key. Following what America does" (277).

"wishy-washy. Determined by others. Trying to please more radical countries. Part of WASP guilt" (230).

"...dictated by what Black Africa/Third World countries expect Canada to do and also by a vocal leftwing" (219).

A respondent who describes Canadian multilateralism as "deliberately insular in order to preserve their position relative to the rest of the world" charges

"Now that world opinion seems to be softening towards South Africa, they will follow suit. Canada is a follower not a leader in world politics" (292).

A frequent explanation given for Canada's pro-sanctions stance mentions selfish, opportunistic benefits. In this view, Canada embraced the policy because it opened for itself "a larger share of the world minerals markets" (244).

"They are in it for themselves. They have benefited through the anti-Apartheid movement and sanctions, e.g. gold coins, wheat. They may have problems competing against South Africa when South Africa rejoins the international community" (213).

"Overdone for their own gains. They are strongly competing with South Africa and would like to keep South Africa out of the international market" (326).

Several respondents thus console themselves that Canada is simply "scared of South African export expansion" (303).

Another equally strong strand of dismissal of outside criticism justifies it with the labels "ill-informed," "shallow," "simplistic." This line of rationalization accuses Canadian policy in the same breath of having no right to criticize but also of being "standoffish" and indifferent to the

host of complex problems. One typical respondent who refers to Canadian policy as "judgemental" writes:

"They think of themselves as paragons of virtue and adopted punitive measures against South Africa without trying to offer their services to be of help" (204).

"Canadians support the press description of populist action against South Africa without having any knowledge of the situation. Canadian policy is to have nothing to do with South Africa" (206).

"Only concerned with moral values. No real concern. No effort in investment" (288).

Many respondents resent being lectured with the often repeated insistence that they alone are affected, while Canadians

"are comfortably on the moral high ground because they do not themselves have to face the issues involved" (313).

The unresolved claims of First Nations people in Canada have penetrated popular white consciousness as the vehicle to dismiss Canadian criticism as hypocritical. A vague caricature of the real situation allows white respondents to feel superior, because

"(the natives) don't easily get jobs in Canada, not even as laborers. In fact Indians in Canada are treated worse than blacks in South Africa. The same goes for aborigines in Australia" (203).

Several respondents charge that Canadians "make South Africa their scapegoat" (333) that Canada "appears very quick to criticize but has its own problems re language etc. and resents interference" (335). If it is not "the Red Indians" that should foremost concern Canadians it is the Quebec problem that in the view of some respondents should counsel caution:

"Canada with its English-French problem should be more tolerant than others" (295).

Contrary to the empirical evidence that Quebecers favour a slightly less activist policy than people in the rest of Canada is the view that:

"It strikes me that this (pro-sanctions) policy is motivated more from the French-speaking Canadians than from the English-speakers. They have always been one of the strongest anti-South Africa countries in the world—with Holland and the Scandinavians" (245).

While many view Canada's own problems as the main motivation to deflect criticism on South Africa, some conclude the opposite:

"Anti-Apartheid, but not one of the most vociferous in their condemnation, perhaps because of their own internal Indian problem" (226).

"Not involved. They have problems with their own people" (263).

This peculiar but frequently mentioned explanation for Canada's perceived reluctance and indifference was clarified from a different perspective by a black Zimbabwean of the group, who also talked about the French Canadians and Indians:

"I feel that they may be resisting involvement in South Africa in order to avoid being in the spotlight and their own problems being highlighted, e.g. red Indian rights, etc. Canadians are lucky that the red Indians are a minority" (209).

The perception is widespread that Canada is "misled by the media and (the) trend is to do-good, irrespective of the ultimate consequences for all concerned" (299). Some respondents spell out the specific "complexities" that worry them and that Canada is perceived to ignore. Canada, it is said,

"supports the simplistic view of one man one vote without actually understanding the complexities of the country, particularly the propensity for violence and intimidation to enforce political objectives. Believes correctly that the current system is wrong, but does not want to get involved in finding a realistic, workable solution" (296).

The theme that Canada "has not made any effort to learn about our issues" (322) recurs, together with the perception of posturing and "political point scoring only" (321). White South Africans feel deeply offended that their reform moves are not instantly rewarded. Because of the moral high ground that Canadians occupy, most respondents remain sceptical that Canadian policy will change in tandem with political developments in South Africa.

"I would imagine that of all the Western countries, Canada would be the last to recognize changes in South Africa" (221).

Several responses however register approvingly a gradual change of Canadian policy "backed by the reform policy of de Klerk and due to Mandela and the ANC" (216). One respondent notes with a sigh of relief that "changes are taking place and we can at least trade with them" (304).

"It has been hostile but appears to be warming in line with other countries in response to reform" (257).

"Very anti in Apartheid's heyday. Still no consul etc. But relations are improving as a result of change here. Still far "colder" than US" (250).

Many respondents compare Canada with Australia rather than the European countries or the US. More than the previous South African Commonwealth membership, this association seems to reflect perceptions of two similar middle-powers and settler societies with indigenous populations. Since South African whites traditionally cultivated more sporting contacts (rugby, cricket) with Australia than Canada, they were particularly stung by the isolation from this "white colony," so similar to themselves. In the comparison with Canada, our respondents reserve their scorn for Australia, while Canada is generally portrayed "as not as outspoken" (244), but in the same "self-serving" category.

"The Canadians are acting out of self-interest, not as obvious as the Australians but more on a subtle level. I regard this as not out of the ordinary" (247).

"I rate the Canadian's policy towards South Africa as 2nd worst. Australia the worst" (310).

For many white (as well as black) South Africans the universal concern with Apartheid has reinforced the perception that the world revolves around South Africa as the centre of worldwide interest. In this "navel-gazing" perspective, the term "isolationist" is generally used for policies that attempt to isolate South Africa. The South African use of the term "isolationist" for Canadian policy ignores its opposite meaning of not forging multilateral linkages in Canada.

"Canada's policy is one of restricted contact with South Africa, regarding not frowning on trade and tourist contact. Somewhat isolationist but not to the same extent as Australia for example" (234).

"It is a condescending, ignorant attitude. Very similar to the Australian" (254).

Many respondents go beyond these descriptive, condemnatory or applauding labels for a policy and also comment on other aspects of Canadian society. As if the mere mention of the name triggers associations of hope and more secure lives, Canada stands for a vaguely perceived alternative. A small minority (6 percent) expresses a grudging admiration for Canada, irrespective of its South African policies. Canada is praised as

"an open free market country with enviable social policies and record, including health system. I obviously don't agree with all the Canadian policies, especially sanctions, but I think it is an admirable country" (201).

In the light of Canada's official attitude, many whites express surprise that "emigration to Canada is possible—and seems to be the choice of many people" (238). Some comment in detail on Canadian immigration procedures or that "jobs are very hard to come by." One respondent notes that Canada is

"willing to accept people emigrating from RSA and thus friendly yet does not agree to past Apartheid policy in South Africa" (282).

Others cannot reconcile the seeming contradiction between

"one of the stalwart campaigners against Apartheid. However, question motives! Why does Canada accept a large proportion of South African professionals? Hypocritical" (259).

It is noteworthy that none of our respondents complained about Canadian visa restrictions or the difficult entry requirements under the rubric of "people's sanctions." Either none of them had been personally affected, or they had calmly coped with the impediments as an unavoidable hassle. Therefore, the intent of the measures, namely to remind whites as a group of their Apartheid-induced exclusion in the world, seems to have largely been missed.

Surprisingly, few of our respondents reject the outside criticism as illegitimate interference into the domestic affairs of a sovereign country. Most take it as a natural factor to be expected in global politics. Several even deplore that the outside interest is not more intense in the sense of better informed and constructive assistance. South African whites in their majority, however, remain convinced that if the critical world only knew the intricate problems of a complex society from the first-hand experience of having to live with it, they would be far more understanding and sympathetic to the predicaments of the minorities.

The term "complexity" as the overriding label for the South African situation has become the codeword for going soft on the criticism of Pretoria. The reference to the "complex situation" in South Africa instantly sets its author up as a nuanced expert who understands the intricacies compared with the simplistic outrage of an adversary. Decoded, the term "complex" means going slow and not upsetting a delicate balance, lest one rushes into unforeseen consequences. "Complex" invariably is found in the vocabulary of the National Party while the discourse of the ANC seldom refers to the term.

The overriding conclusion from the expressed images of Canada and its policy towards South Africa remains one of distortion of the explicit intent of the critic. The respondents assert the very opposite of the

motivation of the Canadian policymaker. When the critics see themselves as leaders, the recipients label them followers. When Canadians claim moral reasons for sanctions, the South Africans dismiss them as materially motivated. When the Canadians genuinely lament the Apartheid injustices, the criticized charge: look at your own.

The distortion of motivation makes the criticism both comprehensible and tolerable. Distortion provides the mechanism with which to avoid introspection. Together with the denial of the critics' competency, distortion of motives and "blame placing" allows successful rationalizations to take place.

The predominant reactions against sanctions and isolation by South African whites display the classical defence mechanisms, well known in political psychology. In its psychoanalytic tradition, many of the responses can be interpreted as a denial of reality. By employing this self-deception, the threatened relieve themselves of anxiety. It guards a vulnerable self-identity by deceiving itself about the accuracy of the critique.

Other responses illustrate an equally primitive defense, namely *projective identification*; this is the attribution to others of what one unconsciously repudiates in oneself. For many years, acidic observations on racism in other countries have virtually been the signature tune of white South African political discourse. Sometimes the results are ludicrous, e.g., "In fact Indians in Canada are treated worse than blacks in South Africa" (203).

In the more recent cognitive tradition of social psychology, the rationalizations described raise questions about the information processes at work. A "cognitive bias" seems to characterize most responses to the Canadian trigger. This confirms doubts about our common assumption that normally all information is processed rationally. The rationality assumption is not supported by our data. This implies that better information and education would only achieve a limited impact. In what Tom Pettigrew has called "the ultimate attribution error," people normally perceive their own group as right and attribute error or malicious intent

to the outgroup. In an initial "attentional stage" criticism is registered but in a subsequent "integration stage" it is distorted and rejected. In other words, South African whites are well aware that they are isolated and criticized. That does not mean that they also understand and comprehend why South Africa became a pariah state.

Apart from these psychodynamics well known in political psychology two other conclusions also stand out. First, most respondents are simply ill-informed about the origin and purpose of Canadian anti-Apartheid policy. This points to a lack of effective communication by Canadian representatives as well as a possible distortion by the South African media on the few occasions when Canadian and Commonwealth policies are reported at all. A much more aggressive effort by the Canadian embassy, perhaps through a special media liaison person, could go some way toward correcting the distorted image and set the record straight.

Second, surprisingly, few of our respondents complain about the economic costs of the sanctions policy. It does not seem to have affected this sample in any appreciable way directly. None of our respondents lost their jobs or had their careers thwarted by economic isolation. In the focus sessions, it was generally understood that if a workforce had to be cut, blacks would be fired first and whites last. With this rule, the economic powerholders shifted the burden of sanctions to the weaker parts of the system. Many of our respondents rather than having materially suffered individually may actually have benefited from sanctions. Some would not have reached their positions had their competitors not emigrated, because of economic decline and isolation.

II. PERCEPTIONS OF BLACKS

In September 1991, the same question—"From what you read and know about Canadian policy towards South Africa, how would you describe it?"—was asked of two groups of social-science students at the University of the Western Cape (UWC) and a class of economics students at the University of Durban-Westville (UDW). While the senior students predominate in both samples, one-third of them were first year students from age 18 upwards. This makes for a substantially younger

and less experienced sample of respondent than their business counterparts at UCT. However, the black students could be expected to be far more politically interested and informed, particularly at UWC. This institution, formerly established for the "Coloureds" only, had since 1986 under its new rector Jakes Gerwal developed into a self-described "centre for the left" attracting a substantial section of disenchanted African students from the so-called tribal universities.¹ Both institutions emphasize their nonracialism by not keeping racial statistics although whites are hardly represented in the student body, and vastly over-represented in the faculty. Various members of the UWC faculty—fewer at UDW—had been the recipients of Canadian financial assistance. The Canadian embassy had sponsored numerous conferences held at UWC so that one could expect a high level of awareness of Canada's and other foreign countries' anti-Apartheid stances.

The expectation of basic knowledge about Canadian policy on South Africa did not hold true for 45 percent of our sample of 192 who could not or would not comment in any way on the topic. Since the other questions elicited detailed opinions, the reluctance to do so *vis à vis* Canada clearly points to ignorance. In short, despite its involvement, Canada does not have a profile among a substantial section of the future black elite.

However, the majority of black students who do comment on Canadian policy (55 percent) hold opposite views to their white counterparts at UCT. Where the majority of white respondents criticize Canada for being hostile and pro-sanctions, most of our black informants praise Canada or criticize it for not going far enough. Again a detailed exposition of the unedited opinions reveals interesting aspects of black students' political consciousness and world views.

1 At UDW a similar process started much later in 1990 when the old Broederbond administration finally relinquished control and Jairam Reddy, a former Dean of Dentistry at UWC, became rector. However, the Indian predominance at UDW, backed by a more conservative Indian bourgeoisie, constrains the outward institutional ideology. UDW became the focus of world attention when the ANC held its first internal congress there in July 1991.

A slight majority of black students who have an opinion on Canadian policy express it in terms of full and unqualified praise. A student who admires Nkrumah, Mugabe and Lenin most, articulates this perception most clearly:

"Canadian policy has helped the Black South Africans in their struggle for liberation and has played a great role on the issue of sanctions to the advantage of the liberation movements, particularly the African National Congress" (181).

Most in this group emphasize that Canada is sympathetic to the cause and that is all that counts.

"All I know is that they want de Klerk to do practical reforms. To them, de Klerk has done nothing so far" (190).

"It is behind the eradication of Apartheid" (4).

"Canadian policy was fair to South Africa, because of the Apartheid system that was here" (83).

"...supportive to the oppressed" (160).

"Very constructive in that it wants the people of South Africa to solve their problems" (146).

"True policy, non-compromising" (98).

"A good relationship is being established" (102).

"It is a good policy advice on democracy, what South Africa should follow in order to be a good democratic state" (115).

"I think it is very much constructive" (140).

"It is one of the countries which is interested in dismantling of Apartheid and not just in self interest" (147).

"Assisting and supporting of the struggle for total liberation of the oppressed masses in South Africa" (149).

"The Canadian government has reassured its links with South Africa in order to help to create a democratic state by offering programmes which will help to enrich and uplift the standard of life of all South Africans" (158).

"...provides opportunities for the underprivileged" (176).

"Helped South African youth to further studies and provided opportunities for job training" (185).

Unfamiliarity with Canadian policy, however, is sometimes substituted with allusions to Canadian tolerance:

"Unfortunately I do not know anything about Canadian policy. What I do know is that they have this fairly open policy of allowing South Africans to settle there" (56).

While acknowledging its good intent, some students criticize Canadian policy with charges of inconsistency and indecisiveness. In their impression Canada wavers and does not carry through with its promise.

"Canadian policy to South Africa is supportive to the struggle against Apartheid and good but it has got no backbone. It is not steadfast" (95).

"Self-contradictory..." (113).

"Very much unreliable and unpredictable" (121).

"They are not really sure what to do" (63).

"Not very good, because recently we have heard that Canada is suspending sanctions and that is a deadly blow to the strength of liberation movements. Apartheid is still intact. It is gone statuarily" (152).

"I think it has been positive until recently when it began reviewing its position on sanctions" (155).

"Progressive people in anti-Apartheid organizations in Canada need to be praised. Also the government, but I am not sure of its consistency" (156).

The identical reasons that are cited by some white students for a condemnation of Canada, are mentioned by some black students for praise.

"(Canada) is pursuing a foreign policy that is against South Africa. It is anti-Apartheid. It has embarked on economic sanctions against it" (119).

"It is very positive towards democracy, because it is... the oppression of the people" (122).

"It is a good policy of non-cooperation with Apartheid government" (126).

A sizeable group does not trust Canadian policy but can only articulate its scepticism in terms of the vague, natural self-interest of a foreign country.

"In my opinion, it displays more self-interest rather than to the benefit of most (majority) citizens in South Africa" (118).

Others accuse Canada of manipulative deceit:

"Canada has closed our eyes with mud as if it is working for removal of Apartheid although it never did that" (175).

A more conservative "coloured" student who favors de Klerk as president criticizes Canada as:

"Very unrealistic towards changes in South Africa" (19).

An ANC supporter who admires Mandela, Castro and Sisulu most, detects negative self-interest behind Canadian policy:

"It is not geared towards the country as a whole but compromises the internal situation with its own interests..." (99).

The same theme is repeated with different refrains by others:

"Only concerned with their interests and what they can get out of us—parasites" (86).

"I am sceptical towards *all* policies towards South Africa. Firstly another country would not invest anything in South Africa without personal gain which is usually at the expense and exploitation of innocent people. The Canadian policy is no different" (87).

Because Canada and South Africa are both capitalist countries, some students conclude that they must resemble each other in crucial respects:

"Canada is almost the same thing with South Africa; it advocates capitalism which benefits the few" (101).

"In favor of a bourgeois democratic South Africa with equal political opportunities but no fundamental economic transformation" (103).

"Bed-fellows in the preservation of capitalism. Nevertheless, Canada did open its mouth a few times against Apartheid" (130).

A student who admires both Lenin, Trotsky and Che Guevara most dismisses Canadian assistance as imperialist charity:

"Imperialist aid/relief for the underprivileged means treating the symptoms but not addressing the causes" (111).

One student denounces Canada in similar terms of Marxist orthodoxy with a tinge of conspiracy:

"Canada is one of the most imperialist countries which is extracting large sums of money from South Africa by investing and developing on behalf of South Africa" (184).

Just as white respondents were biased in processing information to preserve a positive self-image, so many black informants rely on expectancy. Inferences from expectancies also bias the information processed. A prior knowledge-structure about capitalism is deeply encoded in this

dogmatic mindset. No deviation is even being considered because objective interests are perceived as determining similar behavior.

A 25-year-old admirer of Lenin, Castro and Mandela acknowledges Canadian support but, nevertheless, despises the country for continuing to trade with the Apartheid regime.

"They are a very dishonest people. They play a leading role about/against Apartheid. On the other hand they were trading with them... But I do agree that they supported us materially and we must not forget them" (148).

Others charge that Canada has allowed itself to be deceived by a smiling de Klerk. One student who identifies himself as an "African in occupied land by foreigners" and who considers de Klerk "brutal but silent-tactical," giving the false impression that "he is a real liberal"—charges that:

"Canada's policy to South Africa has changed. This clearly shows that the Canadian government is convinced about de Klerk's shifts that he is busy making" (153).

The few students who look at the future and talk at all about economic ties with Canada make these clearly contingent on political change.

"If South Africa would change from its illegitimacy—the relationship, especially the economic relationship would be appreciated" (159).

In our sample of black students at UWC and UDW we encountered only two who explicitly favour the lifting of sanctions. The overwhelming majority insists on maintaining sanctions.

"...the Canadian policy is correct, especially in maintaining sanctions against South Africa, and it is my wish for them to still maintain that position until Apartheid is totally dismantled. It should resist the influence of Bush and Major" (154).

This widespread sentiment suggests that the ANC would lose at least some of its academic constituency if it were now to agree to a lifting of sanctions. On the other hand, it is not clear what influence a strong ANC leadership stance on the softening of sanctions would exert on attitudes. Judging by the various heated debates within the ANC on the contingent linkage of sanctions to gradual progress on the ground, it would surely be a difficult position to sell.

Some students feel that the Canadians should choose their South African friends with care, lest they overlook their unequal representation in parliament.

"They should be aware who they develop their relationship with in our country—considering that the majority of people are not represented in parliament" (171).

A few students on the left appear to have bought the South African propaganda about a parallel history of oppression removing the Canadian right to criticize. They justify their condemnation by the common history of conquest. A typical comment by a PAC supporting student, who would like to see Diksang Moseneke as president and who admires Ghaddafi, Castro and Nyerere most, writes:

"Canada is just like South Africa in all respects because they keep Red Indians in reserves under very squalid conditions. The Red Indians are the legitimate owners of that country. They did not come from Europe, but when Europeans arrived there, the Red Indians were there. So South Africans and Canadians are the same" (117).

Some black respondents openly admit that their information about Canadian policy is limited but nevertheless assume that Canada is be a silent Apartheid supporter.

"I don't know much about their policy relative to South Africa but it seems that they have not tirelessly and very vocally opposed the heresies of Apartheid" (133).

"It also enforces the Apartheid laws" (143).

Others assume that a country in the shadow of the United States must be slavishly following the lead of the mighty neighbor. These students display the dogmatism combined with ignorant certainty that characterizes so much of the South African debate. A Muslim student who admires Ghaddafi, the Ayatollah and Arafat most, expresses this syndrome clearly:

"I'm not very familiar with it. But as far as I am concerned, Canada is an imperialist country that cannot think for itself. It listens to Bush and the US most times; so it can therefore not have an independent policy towards South Africa" (139).

The lack of basic political information would indicate a need to pursue a much more vigorous and imaginative political education among the deprived black intelligentsia. Compared with America, whose way of life has been presented by the United States Information Service (USIS) and, of course, by Hollywood, Canada remains *terra incognita* in black South Africa. This dismal state is hardly altered by elite contact or by assistance to political organizations at the leadership level. A few sponsored visits by South Africans to Canada do not contribute much to mass political education either. Since the mainstream press is much distrusted and the alternative press is limited in its impact, better informed journalists reach only a small audience. What may be worthwhile and cost-effective would be the free distribution of a basic textbook on Canada and its foreign policy to all black high-school teachers, school libraries and tertiary institutions. Yet another initiative might be the establishment of a Canadian Resource Centre, along the lines of the USIS in Soweto and Kayelitsha. Such a centre could make available a range of reading material for all levels of the reading public. This facility could be located in accessible lower income areas, and also offer a range of audio-visual teaching aids. Canada as a multicultural society provides many parallel concerns and approaches. With the cultural boycott of South Africa repealed, the National Film Board could offer its material to South African television and educational institutions. Moreover, if Canadian studies departments and visiting Canadian scholars are subsidized at US, European and Japanese universities, why should a South African university not be endowed with an equivalent chair in Canadian studies?

Simultaneously a serious South African Studies Centre along the lines of the Southern Africa Research Programme at Yale could be established at a Canadian university with suitable library holdings and faculty interest. The SARP programme at Yale under the guidance of Leonard Thompson, funded by the Ford Foundation and the National Endowment for Humanities, has since 1977 had singular success in attracting the best scholars on South Africa for a year of intensive research and academic dialogue that frequently spilled over into the Washington foreign policy discussion. Canadian foreign policy formulation never had such a resource to draw on and instead relied on individual academics or, more frequently, on in-house expertise and NGO activists. However, they are usually more occupied with short-term, day-to-day problems rather than the conceptual exploration of long-term trends, social shifts, and appropriate policy responses, for which independent academic research teams may be better equipped. The proposed Inter-University Consortium on Southern African Studies could be another useful institutional device to co-ordinate Canadian academic expertise.

III. PERCEPTION OF EXPERTS AND THE IMPACT OF SANCTIONS

Canadian policy, by which Canadians pride themselves for having successfully led the sanctions drive against the Apartheid-state, also needs to be viewed from the perspective of those most directly affected by it. A full dozen surveys have been conducted with the political aim of either proving or disproving black support for sanctions.² Few systematic enquiries, however, have explored how sanctions have affected the powerholder's political will to reform or defy the world. An assessment of overall Canadian policy by South African experts across the political spectrum allowed us to place the impact of various anti-Apartheid measures by foreigners in a comparative perspective.

2 The seemingly contradictory survey results seem to converge, if the questions are formulated without political bias, i.e., "Do you support sanctions if sanctions abolish Apartheid?" (Majority, yes). "Do you support sanctions, if it means losing your job?" (Majority, no). For the best arguments of the pro-sanctions advocates see Mark Orkin, ed., *Sanctions Against Apartheid*, Cape Town: David Philip, 1989. For a more sceptical evaluation of the impact of sanctions see Merle Lipton, 1990.

This analysis is, therefore, based on in-depth interviews, either through correspondence or personal discussions or both, with 87 South African experts, professionally knowledgeable about Canadian policy, or recipients of Canadian financial assistance, or previous visitors to Canada. Many spanned all three labels. Professionally, they comprised mainly academics, journalists, clergy, parliamentarians and diplomats. Politically, they belonged to or sympathised with parties across the spectrum. Independent, oppositional but non-aligned, "liberal" observers probably made up the majority in our sample. The aim of the study was not to establish a representative sample of any kind but to interview a broad variety of people who would be in a position to know and judge Canadian policy. Our main criterion of selection was a simple one of access.

Open-ended questions focused on general impressions of Canadian policy, the performance of and experience with Canadian diplomats, and a comparison of Canadian efforts with those of other Western countries. The loosely structured personal interviews solicited a critique of Canadian programmes, recommendations for future policy, and, finally, an evaluation of the impact of sanctions. These results are presented together with our own assessment of the literature and the public discourse on sanctions to which many of our respondents had previously contributed.

Surprisingly, many of our interviewees were slightly embarrassed when pressed about Canadian policy which had, to their minds, "poor visibility." They could talk at length about American, British or Swedish policies toward South Africa but frequently confessed ignorance about Canadian attitudes. Several refused to be drawn out further on a country that, in so many of their responses, "did not matter." Two comments are typical, the first by a well-known liberal member of parliament:

"I do not know what Canadian policy towards South Africa *is* and I know the same applies to other people. This in itself says something: either that a deliberate low profile policy has been successful or that policy wasn't formulated to the point where it could be politically 'marketed'. The contrasts with the US, U.K. and the Nordic countries are obvious. Someone once used a word about Canada's representation here which has stuck in my mind: it was '*underwhelming*'."

One prominent academic, who had published several books on the anti-Apartheid struggle, declined to comment because he thought his knowledge of Canadian policy "far too inadequate for me to respond intelligently to your question." He speculated that the reason for the lack of Canadian exposure in the South African media is due to the fact "that Canada has really had minimal interest in the region and has only become involved when required to do so by UN or Commonwealth initiatives." Many respondents expressed surprise that we even raised the question of Canadian influence, culminating in one answer: "In most spheres of South African life Canada is peripheral, and even amongst my ANC colleagues, there is an attitude towards Canada: 'useful to be exploited'." Therefore, most discussions quickly turned to outside sanctions in general, rather than to specific Canadian measures. Another person, at home in the diplomatic circuit, a frequent presenter at international conferences, and recipient of Canadian assistance recommends:

"Canadian ambassadors have tended to adopt a low profile in South Africa. One would wish to see them play a greater leading diplomatic role in the process of political transition. It is important that countries like Canada, which are not perceived by blacks as 'bosom friends of Apartheid South Africa,' should play a more visible and fairly high profile role during the period of socio-political transformation in this country."

It is interesting to note that Canadian diplomats alone perceive themselves to be playing a high profile role. In part this results from the praiseworthy practise of allowing South Africans exclusively to design and administer the projects which, for example, the Dialogue Fund supports. While other embassies and foundations are named in advertisements of sponsorship or even provide speakers, or jointly appear on conference platforms, Canadian financing is discrete and often only known to a few organisers. Unconfirmed rumour has it that on one occasion a speaker thanked the US embassy for what was in fact a Canadian-sponsored event.

Only on rare occasions does the Canadian embassy go public, for example, through a reprint of the Canadian Charter of Rights in the South African press in November 1991. This well-intended contribution

to the South African constitutional debate could have been even more useful had it been published with a well-written commentary about Canada's own controversies. Instead it was a low-key advertizement little more than a small-scale reprint of the charter itself. A much higher Canadian profile could be achieved, for example, by recognising annually the best South African film producers or by sponsoring an annual well-endowed book prize for the most incisive study published by a South African. The embassy could encourage and advertize essay-writing competitions on suitable topics by high-school students, very much as Canadian schools compete for prizes within the Commonwealth. Rather than continuing with the outdated monitoring of the six Canadian controlled companies left in South Africa (with altogether 24 black employees in 1991), the embassy could provide suitable public recognition and incentives for any firms in South Africa with the best social responsibility programme, with the highest percentage of blacks and women in senior management, with the best occupational health and safety programmes, or with exemplary labour relations, AIDS education, or environmental conservation records. The embassy could advertize Canadian standards as a desirable model to be recognized when emulated in these neglected socio-economic areas.

There is also consensus among both supporters and critics of Canadian policy that, as a South African diplomat formulated, "Canada unquestionably has a great deal to offer South African society, particularly with respect to health care, housing, education and law enforcement." With these pressing needs in mind, a majority of our respondents across the political spectrum express concern that not enough is being done to improve the economic situation. Two typical answers suffice:

"For the future, South Africa's biggest problems are the unemployment, lack of access to jobs and poverty of black people. On the level of research and 'development work,' the international mind must begin to focus on job creation, and the structural restraints on access to jobs black people experience, as a priority."

One of South Africa's most prominent economists challenges Canadian complacency, while showing understanding of the Canadian stance on sanctions.

"As far as the future is concerned, we will have an enormous need for foreign investment in a new South Africa. While one can understand the Canadian policy on investment at this stage, one asks oneself the question what the Canadian government can do—and will do—to promote the flow of foreign investment to South Africa when Mr. Mandela—or someone like him—tells the world that constitutional development has reached a point where sanctions and disinvestment can be terminated. Perhaps it is not too early to contemplate the Canadian policy in such circumstances very seriously."

As could be expected, the overall assessment of Canadian policy among South Africans who are aware of it or who are recipients of Canadian assistance for professional purposes, is sharply divided along political party lines rather than race. ANC-oriented respondents praise the policy as creative, generous, and enlightened. Government supporters, particularly South African diplomats, equally strongly deplore the Canadian stance as misguided, a view which is also shared, not surprisingly, by black conservatives in Inkatha. The liberals or non-aligned analysts in between rarely present a third view, but adopt either praise or condemnation with some measured nuances. Rather than give a superficial overview of the many repetitive points among the whole spectrum of interviewees, the most typical positive and negative response in each category have been selected. This allows a better assessment of the arguments and the intensity of feelings.

Typical for the philo-Canadian response is the thoughtful praise of an ANC member, a previous official visitor to Canada, and recipient of Canadian assistance who declares himself "something of a fan of Canada," of whom "we could not have asked for more," a country "that hopefully will be both respected and befriended by post-Apartheid South Africa."

"Canada has been relatively fortunate in not having been faced with the dilemma of having historically accumulated large Canadian financial

interests in a country whose policies have become more and more obnoxious over time. Hence moral issues could more readily impact on policy, and plainly they have.

Canadian Foreign Policy, to my assessment, has been based on a very sophisticated reading of South Africa, its politics and its social thrusts. Canadian embassy personnel I have met have understood remarkably clearly the nature of South African society, its tyranny and its beauty. Canadian public opinion seems to have been equally well informed.

The result of all of that appears to be a balanced assessment of the prospects of the NP to reform, and an understanding of the tensions within that organization; a good understanding of the Total Onslaught philosophy and the NP policies that followed from that, and the covert and deadly activities that ensued therefrom; and an understanding and sympathy for the aspirations of black populism. Policy appears to have followed from all of these things; viz, harsh criticism of NP human rights abuse; an understanding of Inkatha in the context of it as a state-sponsored bulwark against the total onslaught; and support for the organizations of black populism, and their support structures. Both positive actions (support for anti-Apartheid NGOs in South Africa) and negative (trade and other sanctions) as applied by Canada have been well thought-out and correctly and courageously applied.

Canada has been, along with the Scandinavian countries, one of the most valuable foreign influences on South African politics. Given the limited fiscus and the remoteness (geographically and in terms of historic ties), Canadian policy has been generous, enlightened and enormously creative. There is hardly a little or big human rights and anti-Apartheid NGO in South Africa that has not been touched and helped from some Canadian source, mostly coordinated by Embassy personnel. Canada can proudly claim its place amongst the nations that did the most to end Apartheid."

Another well-known, high-profile recipient of Canadian assistance who is not aligned to any political faction oozes similar praise, although he seems to romanticize Canada's adherence to international obligations.

"I think that Canadian policy towards South Africa is just correct. It is neither too hostile nor too friendly. My impression of Canadian diplomats is that they are keen to assist the disadvantaged sections of the South African population. Their aid programme through the Dialogue Fund has assisted many anti-Apartheid organizations. The main reason for the

policy could be that Canada, as a member of the Commonwealth and the United Nations, feels bound by resolutions of these organizations to assist the process of dismantling Apartheid by empowering its victims in a variety of ways."

This respondent, in line with the majority of other interviewees "would rank Canadian policy and performance as 70 percent on a scale of 100 percent, compared to other foreign countries.

Most respondents know too few details about other countries' policies to make confident comparisons. However, some prominent anti-Apartheid campaigners venture bold judgements:

"My view is that Canada's policies on South Africa have been better than those of the United Kingdom, but they have not been as good as those of the Australian government or, of course, as those of other Commonwealth governments. Specifically, the sanctions imposed on Apartheid by the Canadian government could have been more rigorous."

In a similar vein, this respondent differentiates between his "relatively good relationship with Minister Joe Clark" and his relationship with the Prime Minister who he "does not regard...in the same light." Several leaders in the domestic protest campaign praised the Canadian diplomats and singled out Ambassador McLean in particular.

"He was one of the diplomats who offered considerable assistance in monitoring policy activity and putting pressure on the South African government during crucial moments in the Defiance Campaign in 1989."

A Cape Town academic observer with similar political sympathies offers much the same response but with a touch of cynical irony.

"I know the Canadian representatives very well and my perception of them is very positive. The previous ambassador (Ron McLean) did a very good job. I have had only one discussion with his successor (Chris Westdal). He made a good impression. The other representatives give me the impression that they are in a discreet way, an active part of the 'struggle'. If I compare the performance of the Canadian representatives with those of the US, UK, and Germany, then there is merit to say that while they are

part of the 'struggle', the representatives of the 'big three' have become—since February 1990—very much part of the system—or should I say the 'Extended System'."

Another comparison frequently mentioned refers to the actual financial contributions of each country involved in South Africa. Few of our respondents were familiar with these details but those who had contacts with the diplomatic scene seemed to concur with the statement of one prominent political educator:

"The contributions made by Canada to a number of organizations over a fairly long period have been relatively generous in relation to direct grants given by embassies in South Africa. However, in relation to moneys granted by US AID, the British Government, the Swiss Government, to mention only some of the bigger nations, the amount is very small."

The opinion was frequently expressed "that Canada if it really wants to match its rhetoric with deeds, needs to extend its budget considerably." It was also emphasized that the policy "ought to be more proactive in the selection of projects that it is going to support" and that more consultation with a broader range of people from civil society beyond the leadership of liberation organizations would be useful. A few respondents particularly doubted that South Africa needed Canadian advice on constitution-making. One compared this unwanted Canadian assistance to the hypothetical situation of South African constitutional lawyers offering advice to Canada on how the Quebec problem should be solved. "They would be laughed out of court in Ottawa." Yet, it was pointed out, an army of foreign experts descends on South Africa, some in the country for the first time, and condescendingly offer advice on how socio-economic problems should be solved without the contextual knowledge necessary to make such expertise meaningful. In this respect the IDRC mission in the country was criticized for being unfamiliar with the political conflict and therefore adopting too narrow a political focus (to be discussed later in Chapter Seven, II). One academic recipient of IDRC funding stated:

"It is also my impression that Canadian policy favours the African National Congress—a political organization rather than democratic proc-

esses per se. In my own experience with IDRC funding, much emphasis is placed on enhancing the research capacities of blacks and the policy-making machinery of the ANC—both laudable goals in their own right—but tying funding to one organization might not be such a good idea.”

South Africans do not normally distinguish between Canadian government policy and the position of independent researchers such as the IDRC evaluators or even NGO representatives. In this sense, all Canadians in South Africa, from development workers to academics, are also partly diplomatic representatives and virtually the only source of information about the unknown land “bordering Alaska.” When, therefore, Canadians in South Africa uncritically praise the ANC or mainly support ANC associated projects, they invite the ire of even liberal antagonists:

“As it is, Canada gave by and large blanket approval to the ANC. And what did it achieve by that? Canada in effect has underwritten the ANC's claim to political hegemony, not democracy. The favouritism countries such as Canada and Sweden have shown to the ANC has, according to several non-ANC activists, directly contributed to the ongoing violence in black society. Quite simply, the unquestioning support countries such as Canada have given has fed the ANC's assumption that it could impose its mobilizing actions, ideology and discipline on the townships and the population at large.

The ANC may one day through force of circumstances, become a genuinely democratic party. But that would be in spite of, not because the role countries such as the Soviet Union and Canada played. In this respect the Canadian governments of the 1980s rank little higher than the pre-Gorbachev regimes in Moscow.”

The critique of Canadian policy and government supported assistance comes both from the political left, concerned liberals and, naturally, government representatives. They complain for vastly different reasons. The critics on the left, mainly South African academics, distrust all Western aid as a sophisticated form of cooption and social control. South African socialists charge that Canadian assistance plays into the agenda of elite accommodation for the members of a black bourgeoisie who will join in a new corporatist South Africa. Showered with opportunities for travel, dialogue and professional training, the programmes socialize a

new elite with whom the old elite will have few problems communicating and wheeling and dealing as part of their inner circle. Above all, it is the new black bourgeoisie, once they have been incorporated as equals and are sharing the spoils, that will be far better equipped to demobilize and disempower the masses in the name of democracy. In this respect an ANC-influenced government promises far greater stability for capital than the old Apartheid state. It is only the blind ideologues in the global conservative camp who cannot see this advantage. These critics on the left readily grant that Canada, unlike Thatcher's Britain, is not among them.

Several South Africans ridicule the sterling Canadian solidarity with the oppressed. Aggrey Klaaste, the editor of the *Sowetan* (24/6/91), after a visit to Canada writes about his hosts adapting "with great pain and reluctance" to the changes in South Africa. "If South Africans have been caught flat-footed by the scrapping of Apartheid laws, Canadians seem even more desperately compromised by the changes," Klaaste observes that "glorifying and fighting for the oppressed has almost become part of their lifestyle. It seems as impossible for a tiger to change its spots as to get foreigners to change their views about South Africa." Klaaste, far from being taken in by solidarity and capitalist splendour to be emulated at home, writes: "In fact after seeing families walking aimlessly through the streets of Canadian cities, I have become a reluctant Communist." In light of such suspicion and contempt for America and, by extension, Canada, it was also pointed out several times by both blacks and Afrikaners that if ever outside mediators or arbitrators were needed, South Africans would rather opt for Nigeria or other fellow Africans than "neutral" peacekeepers from North America. The dislike for "moral imperialism" perceived to be driven by liberal guilt, is as widespread among the Afrikaner establishment and Africanists like Klaaste as the Canadian support is "a source of wonder" for Mandela.

A different critical tone is frequently struck by liberal academics, particularly Afrikaners, who despise Canada for renouncing its affinity with a fellow frontier society. The insert by a well-known Afrikaner academic and national commentator best illustrates the disappointed brand of reasoning.

***Despising Canadian Amnesia By An Afrikaner
Liberal Academic And Newspaper Columnist***

It is difficult to decide whether Canadian foreign policy towards South Africa must be considered as cynical, frivolous or just plain misguided. A policy which deserves so little respect cannot simply be the result of an accidental error. The malaise obviously goes much deeper: it is the reflection of a country without compelling political values or a significant historical experience. Apart from collective amnesia there is no other explanation for the patent failure to deal with one of the great political dilemmas of the late twentieth century.

Consider Canada's policy in a comparative context. In the course of the 1980s, U.S.A., Britain and Germany attempted to achieve some evenhandedness in pressurising the South African government and the liberation organisations to come to a negotiated settlement. These countries also tried to display some sense of proportion in funding the liberation organisations. The ANC deservedly received most of the funding but there was also a definite effort to bolster the smaller anti-apartheid organisations. Sweden, Canada and Australia did not follow this policy. Until very recently their policy was identical in that its chief purpose was to

align as closely as possible with the ANC.

Without condoning it, an explanation can at least be found for Swedish and Australian foreign policy. By being tough on the South African government, Australia tried to wipe out the negative image of its "white Australian" policies of old, thus enhancing its respectability in the eyes of Asian countries where its future destiny lies. Sweden, on the other hand, is relatively so homogeneous that one can partly condone its innocence with respect to the complexities of a divided society like South Africa. Furthermore, the ANC at least professed to admire the Swedish economic and welfare system as second best to its preferred alternative of nationalisation. (The question of Swedish guilt about its dubious role in the Second World War can be properly left in brackets.)

What possible explanation can be offered for Canadian policy? For some unfathomable reason Canada has considered itself qualified for global leadership which it wished to demonstrate with its policies towards South Africa. If anyone followed Canada it must be only out of amused curiosity. Why would anyone follow a coun-

try which mistakes moral posturing for leadership? Surely leadership is recognised only when there is steadfast projection of strongly held values as distinct from an opportunistic alignment behind a movement or future government.

If Canada had been true to its own history it would at least have recognised how difficult it is for a settler society to come to terms with a history of conquest and colonisation. If Canada had learnt any lessons about its own history as a binational nation it would have been much more circumspect about exerting all its pres-

sure to bring about the national defeat of the Afrikaners and the larger white community. If Canada had developed any insights about the competitive advantage of markets over the command economy and about the base private property helps to provide for liberties it would have at least, like the Americans, asked questions about the ANC's association with the South African Communist Party. If Canada had the courage of her convictions—perish the thought!—it would at least have expressed its views on undemocratic practices within the ANC, outmoded economic policies and dangerous Jacobin tendencies towards nation-building.

South African diplomats, both in Ottawa and in Pretoria, express a similar sense of disappointment, albeit in more measured tones. One interviewee points to the "South African drug amongst particularly civil servants." He singles out a "dependency syndrome" of several thousand persons in Canada who "were directly or indirectly dependent on South African issues for their livelihood," funded "almost solely from government sources." One correspondent reluctantly admires how a "widespread lobby succeeds remarkably in penetrating the decision-making of government echelons and articulating the very nuts and bolts of actions." This respondent sees "a deeper cause" in "the Third World propensity of the Canadian government, in which South Africa became the touch stone for the tone of the policy towards the rest of the world."

Diplomatic sources in South Africa believe that there was far more opposition to the activist policy than was generally admitted and made known.

"Opposition to the Mulroney Government's South Africa policy continued to grow, particularly within his own Progressive Conservative Party. During one Caucus meeting, Prime Minister Mulroney apparently prohibited all further discussion within the Caucus of his Government's South Africa policy. This led to considerable bitterness, particularly amongst MP's from Western Canada, who felt that the Government's policy was out of line with the thinking of most PCP supporters.

The South African Embassy in Ottawa also received hundreds of letters from PCP supporters across Canada who vowed to disassociate themselves from the Party in future elections. Clearly, a deep rift was developing between Messrs Mulroney and Clark, on the one hand, and the mainstream of the PCP, on the other hand."

This well-placed diplomat diagnoses "a noticeable shift in Canadian policy" with the appointment of Barbara McDougall who is seen as "the driving force behind the lifting of Commonwealth sanctions." With this decision, several South African diplomats see Canada as having "taken a major step towards the normalization of South Africa/Canada bilateral relations."

Equating South Africa with white society only, regret is expressed about:

"an attitude in Canada regarding South Africa which will hang over for a long time beyond Apartheid: that South Africans are something apart and distasteful and what they produce and do is to be avoided (wines, apples, books, paintings) unless 'politically correct'."

The diplomatic isolation of South African representatives abroad also hurt. Pik Botha remembers "when I was Ambassador to the US and the United Nations in the seventies not a single one at a reception attended by 90 ambassadors would be photographed with me" (*Sunday Tribune*, October 27, 1991). South African diplomats in Ottawa complained that until the 1990 switch, they could not meet with the editorial board of a major Canadian newspaper or enter a campus for a lecture. However, such "minor discomforts" pale in comparison with the arguments about sanctions that virtually all respondents made the core of their assessment of Western policies.

The overwhelming majority of our white South African respondents are amused by the foreign insistence that sanctions made the ultimate difference in bringing Pretoria to the bargaining table. They point to internal reasons as far more significant. The more historically minded list the evolution of Afrikaner identity, its redefinition to include English-speaking whites in the Vorster era, the failed co-optation policies of his successor P.W. Botha aimed at incorporating Coloureds and Indians through the tri-cameral constitution, and, finally, the admission under de Klerk that only inclusive citizenship for all South Africans can secure a future for Afrikaners. This is attributed to the intrinsic pragmatic rationality of Afrikaners rather than the circumstances in which perceptions are formed and group boundaries are redefined. Yet, these circumstantial exigencies were largely triggered by internal opposition and foreign isolation which in turn shaped perceptions and mediated policies.

The American scholar Robert Price (1990:298) correctly points to the "boosting effect" of internationally imposed economic constraints on the domestic political dialectic. However, if our respondents are to be believed, Price (1990:291), like most other foreign analysts, overestimates the impact of foreign pressure and engages in economic reductionism when he "directly relates" the risks Pretoria is willing to take with "full black participation" to the "amount of international economic pressure it feels." Deon Geldenhuys (SAIQ, July 1991:50), one of the most respected South African political scientists and author of an acclaimed comparative analysis of *Isolated States* (South Africa, Chile, Israel and Taiwan) concludes: "I could not find any direct, positive correlation between reform in South Africa and disinvestment from abroad." Geldenhuys points out that the undoubted harming of the South African economy does not automatically translate into political reformism, but nonetheless concedes that disinvestment was one among several other factors contributing to the abolition of Apartheid.

In this ongoing controversy most of our respondents agree that some indisputable historical facts stand out although they draw different conclusions from these facts. Mass mobilization and spreading unrest in the mid 1980s, while never threatening the existence of the state, nonetheless, weakened it in unexpected ways. It motivated the Chase Manhattan

Bank to recall its loans and triggered an avalanche of similar withdrawals by other banks. This forced Pretoria to declare bankruptcy in August 1985. This capital flight was not intended to speed up political change in the minds of its originators; the instability had simply led to a higher risk perception that led to the refusal to rollover short-term loans. It was this economic decision, not the legal sanctions introduced later, that accelerated South Africa's crisis. About R30-33 billion, mostly in repayment of foreign loans, was lost to the state between 1985 and 1990. The inability to raise new loans, which the various sanctions acts soon made illegal, merely sealed the unfavourable economic assessment of South Africa as a high risk area. While South African business flirted briefly with the idea of courting the ANC in a much publicised visit to Lusaka in 1985, it abandoned the overture soon afterwards, because it caused problems at home. The prospect of liaising with "Communists" was, of course, anathema to the arch-capitalists. In fact, there is some evidence that sanctions reinforced a unity of interests between government and business which both needed each other to overcome a hostile environment. Hermann Giliomee³ (1991) who has always had an astute sense of the shifting currents within the Afrikaner establishment persuasively suggests that it was the new opportunity rather than economic necessity that triggered the liberalization.

Internal resistance and sanctions exerted constant pressure but they failed to achieve the fundamental requirement for a substantial shift in power: a crack in the regime. No significant section of the ruling bloc went outside for support. In making his decision in late 1989 to unban the liberation organisations, de Klerk did not act at the behest of business or religious elites but on the advice of his security establishment who felt that the ANC had been sufficiently weakened to be a containable force.

In his September 22, 1987 speech to the UN General Assembly, Joe Clark claimed that "the sanctions imposed upon South Africa have been effective" in that "growing numbers of individual South Africans have reached out for reform." However, none of the liberal whites we interviewed hinted that sanctions had motivated their reformism. Almost all

3 Hermann Giliomee, *The Last Trek? Afrikaners in the Transition to Democracy*, ms. 1991.

of them deplored economic sanctions as counterproductive and ill-advised. On this issue, South African liberals enthusiastically applauded London and Washington while Ottawa held to its contention that sanctions pressure was indispensable for achieving dialogue. Nonetheless, the threat of more sanctions was continuously used by the South African business lobby to stave off further Apartheid measures or to advocate liberalizing incrementalism. It allowed the liberal opposition to warn Pretoria that it would provoke more harmful foreign hostility by its intransigence. For example, the Urban Foundation's advocacy of the repeal of Group Areas Act legislation and forced removal argued: "Needless to say, even debate on the prospects of such removals at this stage would provoke a local and international political and economic backlash of disastrous proportions."⁴

It is difficult to assess how much of this discourse amounted to self-serving rhetoric in light of the close and willing co-operation of South African business to circumvent sanctions. It would be even more difficult to ascertain whether or how seriously the South African cabinet heeded the business warnings about the harmful effect of foreign restrictions. Apart from the advocates of a siege economy,⁵ genuine confidence that foreign interference could be beaten alternated with laments about its counterproductive impacts and the widely expressed hope that international legitimacy be restored soon, if further economic decline was to be avoided. Hardly any public utterance by a business executive failed to point to a political settlement and a climate of optimism as a precondition for economic growth.

4 Ann Bernstein and Jeff McCarthy, "Opening the Door" in *Opening the Cities*, Indicator S.A. Issue Focus, September 1990, Johannesburg: The Urban Foundation/Indicator Project S.A.

5 Some influential Afrikaner corporate executives, such as the late Sanlam Chief Fred du Plessis, favoured defaulting on South Africa's debt and relying on growth through import substitution. The siege economists believed that South Africa could never satisfy the outside world, regardless of its normalisation policies, since sanctions would be ratcheted up. Under this assumption, debt repayment would be a fruitless drain on resources. Merle Lipton (1990:28-29) attributes the defeat of this strategy to the wise imposition of partial sanctions "by leaving open the possibility that South Africa could 'claw its way back' into the international community."

In this respect, the sanctions-induced lack of confidence for long-term investment decisions proved effective in contributing to a change of perceptions. In the early 1980s, conventional wisdom in South Africa held that economic recovery could solve the political crisis. By the end of the decade, political reconciliation was now viewed as the essential step in dealing with the economic crisis. From cabinet ministers to industrialists, it was generally acknowledged that the annual GNP growth could be three percent higher with international legitimacy and open access to the world's financial markets.⁶ Because of a low level of domestic savings relative to desired investment, the "fundamental constraint on the South African economy is the shortage of funding to finance fixed investments" (J. Garner and J. Leap, 1991:1). It was this refusal by South African domestic capital to invest because of low confidence and the inability to raise long-term loans on foreign markets that forced South African policy-makers to maintain high interest rates and restrain growth at the cost of high unemployment and declining real incomes. The policy resulted from the need to generate large current account surpluses in this predicament.

In a series of incisive papers by associates of the Commonwealth-funded "Centre for the Study of the South African Economy and International Finance" at the London School of Economics, several authors caution against an overestimate of the impact of sanctions. Merle Lipton (1990), who has published the most systematic and comprehensive investigation of this question so far, argues that South Africa's foreign debt problems are neither unique nor solely due to sanctions. She contends that the political effects of sanctions have been "mixed," leading to a shift in attitudes towards an immoral and unsustainable system in some cases but intensified resentment and intransigent insecurity in others. In contrast, Joseph Hanlon (1991:v), the coordinator of the "Commonwealth Independent Expert Study on Sanctions Against South Africa" (see Hanlon, 1989 and 1987) maintains that without sanctions,

6 For example, Minister Wim de Villiers said that South Africa could increase its economic growth rate by three to four times if sanctions were dropped. "Sanctions had reduced the growth of employment opportunities in the industrial sector to just 1 percent a year" (*Cape Times*, 6/2/90).

"Namibia would not yet be independent, and Mandela would not yet be free." Yet even Hanlon admits that sanctions were not the most important reason for either event (Hanlon, 1991:v).

In conclusion, sanctions compounded market forces already at work, especially capital flight which began in the mid 1970s, long before sanctions were instituted (Kahn, 1991). However, sanctions also provided an additional push and gave outsiders leverage to influence South African developments through psychological blows to business confidence. The Apartheid regime was finally caught in a vicious circle where over time black protest contributed to increased risk perceptions, which triggered capital flight, reinforced by sanctions, which in turn strengthened the protest movement.

Among the black opposition, it is a firmly held belief that a weak South African government is kept in power by its Western allies. Hence, withdrawal of international support and sufficient pressure would force Pretoria to relinquish its exclusive political control. "We believe that you in the US, together with your allies, have the means to get the South African government to the negotiating table," read an "Open Letter to the American People," signed by Alan Boesak, Desmond Tutu, Beyers Naudé and Frank Chikane on the occasion of their Washington visit to the newly elected President Bush (*ANC Newsbriefing*, 13, 4/6/89).

Such an assessment would seem to overestimate the vulnerability of the South African regime as well as the clout and political will of Western powers. It also contributed to a widespread myth that liberation would be delivered by outsiders. Liberation as a cargo cult reinforced domestic political paralysis in as much as it geared some of the protest towards triggering outside pressure rather than affecting the domestic power equation directly.

The effects of sanctions can be summarized in nine more or less controversial propositions:

(1) Sanctions measures fall into three distinct categories: disinvestment, trade restrictions and bans on long term credit. The latter has

affected South Africa most; trade boycotts were relatively easy to circumvent, albeit with some additional costs, while "disinvestment has not noticeably impeded the functioning of the South African economy" (Lipton, 1990:v).

(2) Many foreign firms which have withdrawn from South Africa have maintained their links with the South African market by supplying it with its products through new, independent local outlets (Kodac/Sanroc) or from neighbouring states (Coca Cola).

(3) The nominal withdrawal has allowed South African conglomerates to buy out absconding foreign firms at bargain prices. This has increased the capital concentration in the South African economy. Withdrawal has benefitted the larger corporations such as Anglo, Barlow Rand and Sanlam.

(4) The expected pressure by business on government as a result of sanctions has not occurred. In fact, sanctions have brought business and government closer together in the patriotic cause of beating foreign interference. Thus sanctions have been counterproductive to an important precondition for change: deepening the cleavages within the ruling minority. Nevertheless, sanctions have undermined business confidence and contributed to the search for alternatives.

(5) The withdrawal has negatively affected the social responsibility programmes and labour codes with which various foreign interests rationalized their South African presence. Local management has proven less amenable to fair labour practices.

(6) Sanctions have marginally increased the already high black unemployment. In the general economic recession and restructuring of firms, white rather than black workers' interests have been protected. Powerholders have deflected the impact of sanctions onto weaker sectors.

(7) Non-racial unions, although numerically stronger than ever, have been weakened by the large surplus army of unemployed. Although

COSATU officially supports all pressure on the South African government, many affiliated unions were ambiguous about further economic measures, particularly disinvestment. Union officials feared that further black unemployment will depoliticize workers rather than make them take further political risks.

(8) After 1987, although the ANC demanded comprehensive mandatory sanctions, the sanctions drive in Western public opinion had lost momentum. This perception was reinforced by the failure of existing measures to change Pretoria's policy as well as the realization of South African relative self-sufficiency and the dependency of frontline states on the South African economy.

(9) Some loss of Western markets for South African products has been substituted by the dramatic development of South African trade links with Pacific Rim countries, particularly Japan and Taiwan. South African exporters have made elaborate preparations for disguising the origins of their products by using Mauritius, Swaziland, the Seychelles and Namibia.

In short, no general conclusion can be drawn about the success or failure of sanctions against South Africa. A final judgement depends on the empirical and political evaluation of the positive and negative effects of different measures in specific historical circumstances.

7. FROM ANTI-APARTHEID TO DEVELOPMENT

"The response of the international community needs to be finely tuned to this complex and delicate process of negotiations...encouragement, pressure and assistance would need to be suitably applied as the process unfold." — UN Secretary General, 4 September 1991.

A future policy towards Southern Africa formulated by any Western nation will differ from previous decades in one fundamental respect: the policy can be arrived at without the constraints of the Cold War. The significance of this historical break cannot be over-stressed.

This analysis has been inspired by the stimulating assessment of US foreign policy in the post-Cold War period by Michael Clough (1992) who generously provided his just completed book manuscript.

I. A POST-COLD WAR FOREIGN POLICY ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

In the past, the Africa policies of all Western powers were to a greater or lesser extent influenced by the Cold War competition for hegemony and "strategic parity" in the remotest regions of the globe. For the United States in particular, less so for Canada, sub-Saharan Africa had assumed primary, strategic significance as a battleground "to contain" the advances of the Soviet Union, to check perceived Soviet proxies with Western clients, and to bar access of the Soviet Union to what were declared vital mineral resources and strategic routes for the survival of the Western economies.

These alarmist assumptions were largely incorrect because Soviet policy in Africa was frequently more reactive in exploiting opportunities

than in aggressive planning advances into Western orbits of interest. For example, the Soviet-supported Cuban intervention in Angola only occurred after the Kissinger-backed South African invasion of the country in 1975. Soviet interest in Africa has often been exaggerated. On some occasions the Soviet Union even turned its back on willing clients, as when the application of Mozambique for membership in the COMECON was rejected. While the Soviet Union had its own agenda in Africa during the Cold War competition, it was largely driven by its Western adversaries and aimed mainly at recognition of equal superpower status on the continent. The South African myth that the Kremlin was cunningly plotting to lay its hands on the treasures of the Cape nonetheless achieved wide credibility and helped to sustain the repression of democracy in the name of anti-Communism.

Many African people were thus dragged into the Cold War as pieces in a chess game. To be sure, many of the African leaders also manipulated the Cold War competition according to their own autonomous interests. They benefitted from the rhetoric of anti-imperialism, as much as the Apartheid ideologues benefitted in presenting themselves as stalwarts of anti-Communism resisting the "total onslaught" of the Soviet-sponsored ANC. All these master narratives which forged strange alliances and designated imagined enemies have now lost their guiding power. The "imagined war" has come to an end.

The Cold War paradigm of the US understanding of Africa led to a closure of many domestic discourses as well as alternative policies. Africa's regional conflicts and their resolution were subsumed under the global competition. Revolutions in foreign countries became the great threat for the US, and US African policy mostly amounted to counter-revolutionary intervention.

Fortunately, William Appelmann Williams' *Empire as a Way of Life* did not apply to Canada in the same way, although there was always an ideological spillover. Canada's small-scale economic role in the Caribbean, for example, emulated the US penetration elsewhere. However, Canada's role in Southern Africa has always been a much more contradictory mixture. Influential Canadian constituencies, including Tory

radicals, broke out of the imperial idiom within the Commonwealth framework. For a middle power, there were objective limits to the expansionist logic.

Williams' influential *Tragedy of American Diplomacy* could never have directed the same accusatory force at Canada that cultivated ties with the non-aligned world, and even with foes of the US like Cuba and Communist adversaries like China. Canada may have been a silent partner in the US empire, as well as its agent in places where the superpower could not tread, however Canada lacked the military clout and spirit to enforce the empire. Growth as the euphemism for empire acquired a different meaning. Unlike the US, Canada could decenter the Cold War from Africa. Its ideological mastercode stressed mediation and peace-keeping as a way of advancing its international influence. Where US capital rode on the back of tanks and jet fighters, Canadian business, a Marxist could quite rightly argue, used the more sophisticated tool of diplomacy. The difference is substantial and real in its consequences. Canada did not support surrogate forces engaged in destabilization.

However, lest there are illusions about Canada's virtuous role, its contradictions must not be forgotten. While Canada pursued policies towards the frontline states that aimed at rectifying the effects of destabilization, it never criticized its US ally that actively contributed to the destruction of Angola by supporting UNITA. It was in those contradictions that the constraints of the Cold War alignments showed their impact on Canada as well. Ottawa, like London, poured money into a SADCC hole without caring much about how the need for assistance was caused in the first place.

The US-Soviet collaboration in settling African regional conflicts in Angola and Namibia in 1989 and later the disappearance of the Soviet Union as an international actor freed Western policy towards Africa from the shackles of the Cold War. It now operates without ideological guidance and certainties. This allows NGOs and special interest groups a far greater influence in shaping foreign policy. What had frequently been rejected as infeasible or secondary in the light of Cold War ideological priorities, now finds a hearing on its merits.

This applies in particular to the concerns of new organizations with a global constituency. The environmental movement, as represented, for example, in Greenpeace, or human rights concerns, as articulated by Amnesty International, stand out as two such forces that will make themselves increasingly felt in foreign policy. Greenpeace or Amnesty International are truly transnational lobbies, whose clout has risen with the end of the Cold War. There are many other similar global lobbies such as "Medicine Without Frontiers," Oxfam, and various international charities that operate with different budgets but sterling commitment. As long as Canadian policy on Southern Africa remains responsive to such global constituencies, it will not only show moral leadership but pragmatic sense in making the global village a safer place for everyone.

There are critics who dismiss the recent Canadian emphasis on international human rights as another public relations exercise that aims at rehabilitating a domestically unpopular government. This overly functionalist interpretation, even if it were entirely correct, does not detract from the value of human rights advocacy, regardless of the motivating reasons for it.

Any future Africa policy that aims at soliciting the active support of the Canadian public will have to attempt to reverse the prevailing negative image of Africa. This can only be achieved by "good government" in the African countries themselves. At present, the perception dominates in the West that Africa constitutes an unmitigated failure. After the euphoria of independence in the 1950s and 1960s, most supporters of the anti-colonial struggle have become thoroughly disillusioned with its outcome. Often cited are the economic stagnation and collapse in the countryside, the wide-spread human rights abuses, detentions without trial, tortures, frequent coups in one-party states, the inter-communal massacres, civil wars, and the burgeoning graft and corruption of a government elite living in ostentatious luxury while paying lip service to humanist and socialist ideals. To this disastrous picture must be added the streams of refugees and more recently the devastating spread of HIV which few African governments have taken seriously. Perhaps with the exception of a marginal country like Botswana and, arguably, one or two other cases, there are hardly any

sub-Saharan states that can be held up as democratic and economic success stories. Therefore, the new Canadian emphasis on human rights adherence as a precondition for development assistance, constitutes a long overdue shift. Its sceptical reception and outright rejection by the majority of Canada's Commonwealth associates only confirms the correctness of Canada's insistence. After the disappearance of Apartheid as the Commonwealth's main *raison d'être* for the past decades, the spotlight will fall increasingly on its members' own domestic performance. Cold War allegiances will no longer serve to stifle criticism from embarrassed allies. Unless most Commonwealth members, particularly the African States, drastically reduce their infringement of human rights and democratic principles, the colonial club will marginalize itself further. With the emerging trilateral trading blocs, the Commonwealth will in any case lose importance as a sentimental alliance and contact arena for political elites. A strengthened United Nations increasingly substitutes for the colonial sub-systems of cultural association. The same applies to la Francophonie.

Future directions for Canadian policy towards Southern Africa can be discussed most sensibly in the context of four possible options for Western policy in general. The focus on Southern Africa in turn must be placed in the context of overall policy options towards Africa and the Third World. While it may be useful to outline what ought to happen, the analytical focus on what is likely to occur is always a better guide, even for the normative blueprints. Idealist recommendations deserve to be taken seriously only if they possess a minimal chance of being realized. Sober analysis of a depressing reality does not amount to a rejection of the utopian dream but constitutes a strategic precondition for its potential implementation.

The so-called bottom line of Western policy options towards the Third World in general and the South African region in particular can be stated in the four scenarios of (1) militarization, (2) abandonment, (3) recolonization, and (4) development.

Militarization comprises the acceptance of new security responsibilities for selected regions, such as the US-led coalition in the Gulf War

demonstrated for parts of the Middle East. The priority of this strategy lies in guaranteeing stability and access primarily through stepped-up policing, the formation of new military alliances and security guarantees which will include increased arms sales to and training of friendly local forces.

Abandonment, as is self-evident in the term, simply means the gradual withdrawal of formerly involved outside forces. Regions are left to fend for themselves while limited resources like investment capital or government assistance are increasingly directed towards more economically attractive or politically promising states, such as the emerging democracies in Eastern Europe.

Recolonization defines the process of externally dictated economic policies, for example, through the so-called Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) of the World Bank and IMF. While action of the World Bank has to be requested and the terms of SAPs are formally negotiated and never unilaterally imposed, the bankruptcy of many Third World states and their dependency on further loans for vital imports, leaves little leverage for bargaining. A stark choice of compliance or rejection is the only real option.

Development denotes the process of mutually agreed upon outside assistance with the goal of benefiting the mass of the population through broad economic empowerment. It differs from Structural Adjustment Programmes by offering substantial concessions on debt relief, investment in infrastructure and human resources (education) with long-term benefits for the entire population, rather than short term rewards only for an urban elite with access to hard currency at the expense of useless local currency wages. Development policies could also include much of the SAP shock treatment, such as measures to correct an inflated currency, increase export earnings, reduce government spending, privatize state enterprises, and cut subsidies. However, the development policies would not primarily aim at paving the way for multinational profit-making but balance short-term investor interests with the long-term payoff of social investment in education or health care.

The four policy options sketched above are obviously not mutually exclusive; they could be pursued simultaneously with different emphases. They denote ideal-types in order to highlight choices. Different Western countries will follow different policy options according to specific national interests and traditions. Canada in particular will obviously not embark on militarization on her own but can become dragged into military options, as her nominal participation in the Gulf War has shown. Canada does not act in a political vacuum but is constrained by its various alliances, particularly its relationship with the United States. Its free trade agreement, for example, excludes unilateral action in the much needed removal of trade barriers that block Third World commodities from reaching Western markets.

What must also be considered is the possibility that a strife-torn South Africa is increasingly lumped together with other black African states as an unsalvageable proposition. A familiar argument in support of this tack is that such states deserve to be left to their own fate after all well-meaning outside efforts to secure a non-racial democracy are perceived to have failed as a consequence of a mixture of ingrained political violence and economic demise. An increased exodus of South African whites under these conditions would heighten the outside disillusionment with a noble experiment that went as sour as Tanzanian socialism or Zambian humanism. Those analysts, like Pierre van den Berghe (1979), who long ago predicted the departure of most whites not only as the most likely development but also the most desirable solution to a colonial problem, would be fully vindicated.

This improbable doomsday scenario aside, there are unique aspects to the Southern African region which are likely to produce different foreign policy responses from Western states than those typical in other Third World regions. Foreign policy formulation both in the US and Canada has always largely amounted to an elite exercise. The general public does not take much interest in foreign developments and particularly in the US is always more preoccupied with domestic politics. Americans, cynics remark, can support the bombing of countries and capitals whose locations they cannot even find on a map.

However, this general ignorance and indifference does not apply to South Africa. Because of past anti-Apartheid mobilization and the easy accessibility by the Western media to an English-speaking state, South Africa is likely to figure more prominently in the future North American public consciousness than any other Third World area, with the exception of Israel. Kith-and-kin relations in Britain and Canada and the concern of Afro-American activists with perceived soul-brothers and sisters in Johannesburg will continue to reinforce a high level of public interest in the former Apartheid state. Dramatically increased tourism could add to this public involvement. While the new South Africa cannot match the emotional support and clout of the Israeli lobby in the US and Canada, the South African activist diaspora, so to speak, far supercedes any other Third World cause in influence and intellectual investment. Fading Apartheid repression is unlikely to wipe out this legacy of past mobilization, even if the so-called anti-Apartheid industry is scaled down or disappears altogether.

South Africa is unique among the decolonizing regions in having spawned a wide international lobby of knowledgeable enthusiasts in the worldwide anti-Apartheid movement. While this network has traditionally been viewed as a committed enemy of the South African state, it could become an effective agent for the reconstruction of the new post-Apartheid nation. The idealism of a professional lobby with connections into the governments and media in virtually every major country of the world could sustain the interest in South Africa long after Apartheid. Unlike Zimbabwe or Namibia where international interest faded with the day of independence, the likely fractious power-sharing and ongoing racial implications in South Africa will not convey the image of a resolved struggle. Since the international lobby takes its cues more than ever from the ANC, how this latent support is activated will depend heavily on the word of Mandela. It may not be too far fetched to envisage the day when the same sanctions lobby actively campaigns for renewed investment as the duty of responsible business in assisting a fledgling democracy. The tragedy may well be that this day has been put off for so long and the interim economic decline and social disintegration has grown so deep that the new South Africa has sunk into violent chaos

beyond even the most enthusiastic rescue efforts of its dedicated supporters.

If these assumptions are correct, they rule out the option of a Southern Africa abandoned among Canadian foreign policy concerns. Quite apart from increased economic ties between the two countries and the importance of the modern South African sector for the development of the Southern African region as a whole, together with renewed South African membership in the Commonwealth, the tortuous past relationship has cemented rather than weakened future Canadian-South African ties and public involvement in shaping them.

Nor are the investment demands of Eastern Europe likely to channel all investment capital in an Eastern rather than Southern direction. Within the emerging trilateral trading blocs, Eastern Europe is increasingly viewed as the primary responsibility of Germany and the European Community. When North American and Japanese capital weighs the advantages and disadvantages of the two regions, South Africa can point to one overwhelming attraction: it possesses a modern infrastructure, a functioning market and a business class with skills which will not be available for a long time in the Soviet Union. The great advantages of Eastern Europe in the form of location, educated labour force, and large pool of scientists are likely to be overshadowed for some time by the organizational deficits of a former command economy. Given the functioning corporate structures in South Africa, together with an attractive climate, scarce mineral resources, and an English-language environment, South Africa is unlikely to be abandoned by all risk capital in favour of Eastern Europe. Much will depend on the perceived political stability of the two regions. Once the transitional political violence has been overcome, South Africa may well score far better.

Unlike Western European states, Canada finds itself under less pressure to rescue Eastern Europe. Canada is less directly affected by Russian refugees and general dislocation than her European allies. This may allow Ottawa to divert more resources to Africa than European states can afford. Together with Australia, Canada may be the only industrialized middle-power that can retain its strong Africa concern,

buffeted by Commonwealth ties, rather than being strained by big power obligations to the East. However, with a further collapse in the former Soviet Union, strong immigrant lobbies, particularly from Canadian Ukrainians, might challenge Canada's spectator role and demand an active involvement at the expense of the more remote Third World. The African diaspora in Canada in particular remains relatively weak and disorganised. With the moral reference point and unifying cause of Apartheid gone, empathy with a self-destructive Africa could fall to the low level of concern that Canadians feel for Arab causes.

This raises the complex issues of the political will in industrialized middle-powers to pursue altruistic internationalist policies. Cranford Pratt (1990) has persuasively sketched the enormous obstacles which the application of cosmopolitan values faces in countries geared to neo-protectionism in order to avoid domestic deindustrialization. Pratt notes the often ignored friction between a social democratic tradition of global solidarity and the simultaneous protection of domestic workers' interests against so-called unfair competition from low-wage countries. So far narrow domestic definitions of national interests have won out against "humane internationalism." Third World countries' access to the affluent country markets, resource and technology transfer, debt relief or constraints on transnational corporations have generally been enacted only to a very limited extent, provided the richer initiators have benefitted themselves or had little choice in avoiding worse and unmanageable conditions. The end of the cold war competition has removed a further constraint of pursuing immediate national economic advantages. The Canadian-South African constellation where a policy of global solidarity coincided with domestic advantage and relatively little cost is unlikely to repeat itself in an ever more competitive world of emerging trading blocs. The humane global components of national cultures, the long-term objectives of international equity and development, are unlikely to survive in an atmosphere of global nationalist revival.

Therefore, Southern Africa as a region outside the major trading blocs in an unfavourable geographic location, can realistically not expect much assistance from its Western colonial mentors. The states of Southern Africa will have to fall back on their own regional cooperation and

individual advantages in utilizing inter-regional developments. Southern Africa may still be a priority for development assistance but it will be a priority within a shrinking pie.

II. RATIONALE AND FORM OF FUTURE INTERVENTION

Human Resource Development

A foreign policy that leads to the expenditure of large amounts of money in another country needs to address clearly why it proposes intervention and to what ends. Causes and goals can range from moral imperatives and lobby pressure at home to securing influence abroad, from saving the target from communism to securing markets for the donor, from enhancing the donors' standing internationally to empowering a weak opposition for humanitarian and pragmatic reasons.

In this web of intertwined reasons—some explicit, others implicit—two clearly defined purposes stand out in the case of current Canadian involvement in South Africa. (1) Canada aims at assisting the transition from Apartheid to democracy in as peaceful and constructive a way as possible. Good faith negotiations between representatives of all political forces are encouraged as the only effective means to secure a new order. (2) Beyond a constitutional settlement, Canada and the Commonwealth are ready to play "as significant a role in the human resource development of post-Apartheid South Africa as they had in the elimination of Apartheid" (*CFM*, New Delhi, September 13-14, 1991).

The new emphasis falls on developing skills for a new civil service culture. An excellent report by the Commonwealth's Expert Committee on Southern Africa sets out a detailed rationale for the training needs of the new South Africa together with imaginative and realistic proposals to finance and implement educational programmes for post-Apartheid skills. There is no need to repeat these well-known needs except to stress their magnitude and urgency. Indeed, as has often been pointed out, the efforts to remove Apartheid pale in comparison with the task of coping with its legacy.

At present, only 2.2 percent of managers in South Africa's top companies are black (SAIRR, Update, July 16, 1991). Although blacks comprise a majority of the present civil service, including homeland bureaucracies, they generally occupy the very lowest positions. Official statistics record that 41 percent of the public service in South Africa (excluding the TBVC states) is African while 39 percent is white. However, of the 2,885 posts in the five top income categories in central state departments and provinces, only 14 were occupied by blacks in 1990 (*Sunday Times*, October 20, 1991). The upper echelons of the state bureaucracy are thoroughly dominated by an Afrikaner cultural ethos.

In addition to being white and Afrikaner in particular, the South African top civil service is almost all male. For example, South Africa has 141 permanent and 11 acting judges. Of those, in 1991 only one is a woman and one is black. It was Canadian appeal court judge Madame Justice Louise Abour who, in a keynote address to the 1991 Bar Council in Durban, reminded the audience: "Pluralism on the Bench not only increases the public's perception that the courts are a fair and responsive forum, it also brings to official adjudication a point of view that would otherwise be absent" (*Sunday Times*, September 15, 1991).

Marinus Wiechers has pointed out a crucial difference from Eastern Europe regarding the transition to a new order: "In Eastern Europe, in doing away with the old policies they are also doing away with the people in government applying these policies. We cannot afford to do the same in South Africa" (*Sunday Tribune*, October 27, 1991). Indeed, the dependency on the old civil service by any post-Apartheid government and the likely retention of tainted institutions and people will be one of the most striking dilemmas of the new order. The formerly disenfranchized simply do not command the skilled human resources to replace a state administration on their own. Created by the Apartheid state and employed for implementing Apartheid, the Apartheid legacy is retained in the very people that are supposed to usher in the anti-Apartheid polity.

Unless effective affirmative action programmes ensure a more representative managerial class, both in the public and private sector effective Apartheid would continue as a nameless condition, despite its legal

elimination. While the South African private sector can finance its own managerial needs in well-endowed Business Schools, it is the neglected area of public administration that needs most attention.¹

The training of members of the deprived majority within South Africa seems both more cost-effective and appropriate for the purpose. Granting scholarships for study abroad made sense when adequate educational facilities for blacks did not exist in South Africa. Apart from specialized graduate studies abroad, foreign educational assistance could now be spent inside the country far more beneficially. Such a reorientation of past programmes would not only achieve a greater impact with limited resources but most likely would also cut down on the brain drain, as fewer foreign students would be living abroad for long periods. The racial composition of the general population and nobody associates compensatory bridging efforts with blackness or lower standards.

On the other hand, there is a case to be made for South African students to study for a period at a Canadian university. The total change of environment, the experience of a new political culture, the opportunity for renewed self-esteem for black students particularly, are not inconsequential for their future leadership roles. Many prominent black returnees speak about their increased self-confidence from having studied abroad. The positive experiences of being in a new setting, free of the stigma of race and all its self-fulfilling expectations, and of being considered an authority on developments in one's country do have

¹ The University of the Witwatersrand introduced a Public Administration stream in its Graduate School of Business only in 1991 and the University of Cape Town has yet to decide where to locate the training of top civil servants. The GSB at UCT however has introduced an innovative Associate in Management (AIM) programme in which black students form the majority. The programme is largely financed by future employers. Instead of a paternalistic all-black uplift effort, the AIM bridging programme creates a genuinely integrated interracial learning experience, particularly for equally unqualified Afrikaner/white students not accustomed to being in a minority. The classroom reflects approximately the racial composition of the general population and nobody associates compensatory bridging efforts with blackness or lower standards. The training of the civil service in South Africa traditionally took place at Afrikaans institutions, while the graduates of English universities almost all went into professions or the private sector. Hence, the past unpreparedness of English institutions for the task of training a new, predominantly black, civil service.

empowering effects. Those who argue the most loudly in favour of cost-effective approaches are all too often members of the privileged group and cannot know these subjective influences of Apartheid and untained education from the perspective of subordinates.

The disbursement of educational assistance, however, takes place within an intense political contest inside South Africa. To receive foreign support or be left out of sponsorship affects the standing of competing black political organizations and their associated institutions and members. Individuals may even choose to join organizations with resources not for ideological reasons but solely for individual advancement. Others are being coerced to join for sheer survival. This happened when Black Consciousness adherents fled South Africa during the late 1970s and found to their surprise that they had to link up with the rival ANC as the only access to scholarships and advancement. A similar informal coercion exists within Natal/KwaZulu where often Inkatha membership remains a precondition for a career in the civil service or even for vital necessities.

Selecting Candidates for Scholarships

The increased focus on compensatory human resource development in the post-Apartheid era requires selection of suitable candidates among many worthy applicants. Scholarships for tertiary education in particular will be in high demand and competition for the limited grants is likely to be fierce. This makes the selection criteria for financial awards an area of intense contest and conflict. Yet, surprisingly, hardly any research has been undertaken to determine the optimal, *i.e.*, most rational and politically least controversial, criteria for financial support of students. The recipients themselves, to our knowledge, have never been asked how they would like to be chosen for advancement. Our small pilot project among 30 senior black students at UWC attempted to gather data on student preferences for selection as well as attitudes towards affirmative action and gender equity.

In a written questionnaire students were asked for guidance on appropriate policy advice regarding the controversial selection issue. Six

distinct options were outlined and the respondents were asked to choose one; they were also asked to give reasons for their choice. Many selected and argued for a combination of several options. The question read:

Many foreign governments give South African university students scholarships and invitations to visit their country. In your opinion, which of the following criteria should be the most important in selections of these students. (Circle one)

Students selected:	%
1) On a nonracial basis, using merit, determined by academic achievement and recommendations.	20
2) On a nonracial basis, using income as a criterion so that less privileged students are given preference.	30
3) On a racial basis, considering only deserving black students in order to compensate for Apartheid discrimination.	20
4) On the basis of population ratios so that all groups are represented proportionally.	5
5) On the basis of political involvement or contributions to community life and public profile, as determined by respective organizations.	20
6) On the basis of a lottery so that all applicants who are university students have an equal chance.	5
7) Other criteria—please specify.	
	100

It was surprising how few of our respondents (20 percent) opted for *racial* affirmative action. Their main argument was that Apartheid deprivation has disadvantaged only black students, who cannot be expected to have the higher qualifications and knowledge necessary for an equal competition. Under such conditions, selection on the basis of achievement and traditional merit would be intrinsically discriminatory, by again penalising Apartheid victims and doubly rewarding its educational beneficiaries. Therefore, these respondents chose option three: that only deserving black students should be considered in order to compensate for Bantu education.

The most popular (30 percent) option favoured rewards to be given on a class basis (option two). The nonracial selection, "using income as a criterion so that less privileged students are given preference," automat-

ically associates "less privileged" with blacks. In popular consciousness and practical reality, this option almost amounts to racial affirmative action, since the overwhelming majority of poor are black. However, few of the black students in the entire sample insisted on excluding white applicants by definition. In this respect, the nonracial ethos seems to have taken hold. It remains the great psychological asset of the anti-Apartheid movement. Many South Africans are wary of the American mistakes. They do not want to implement "reverse Apartheid" or have black-only support associated with lower standards; they have no wish to be certified in paternalistic, politically expedient "crash courses."

Scholarships on the basis of income, it was pointed out, would not only alleviate the racial anxieties of poor whites but also prove pedagogically beneficial for an interracial learning situation. This option also has an attractive socialist tinge. The criterion excludes black students from upper middle-class families, particularly in the Indian and Coloured community, who can well afford to finance the careers of their offspring themselves.

The 20 percent of respondents who chose option five, using community involvement as the main criterion, displayed a strong social conscience. The goal of scholarships, several students stressed, "should be the upliftment of society as a whole, not only the individual." A second line of argument pointed to the financially unrewarding nature of grassroots political activity. Scholarships on this basis would compensate for altruistic community service. A third argument stressed the certainty or greater likelihood of those students returning and contributing skills to the new South Africa. Several respondents suggested that foreign scholarships should be tied to an undertaking of return. None of the students expressed concern about political bias as a factor in the evaluation of the organizational activity of candidates, but several respondents mentioned that community involvement "should not necessarily mean political organization."

Virtually all respondents wanted some element of merit recognized. While only a minority (10 percent) opted for the traditional merit credentials of "academic achievement and recommendations," many of those

favouring racial selection nonetheless noted: "not all blacks and women are deserving." No new ideas emerged about how merit should be defined and decided. Moreover, the question "Who should be responsible for selecting students?" revealed a wide spectrum of preferences among three options: a) foreign donor, b) university authorities, c) community organization. Half of our respondents trust their university, one third their community organization, and only a rather small minority would wish the foreign donor to exercise the right of selection. A last question asked whether "half the places should be reserved for women." Forty percent answered yes and sixty percent no. Unfortunately, the necessarily brief questionnaire was not genderized so that it could not be determined with any certainty whether the above answers coincided with the gender of the respondent. Judging from the contributions in a focus session this seemed not to be the case, since many women voted against a gender quota, but several men supported it.

This brief overview of the debate about optimal selection criteria for university student scholarships reveals no consensus and likely heralds future conflicts about access to this valuable scarce resource. Foreign donors as well as respective South African selection bodies should prepare themselves for being challenged in their very charitable activity. Nothing is apolitical in South Africa and educational careers are no exception.

Foreign Assistance for What?

There has not yet been a real discussion of the impact of external funding on the democratic movement inside South Africa. At present 90 percent of ANC expenses are covered by funds from abroad.²

2 See the confidential "Report of the Office of the Treasurer General," ANC National Congress, Durban, July 1991, which for the first time gives a detailed accounting of all the ANC assets and liabilities at home and abroad. Membership fees cover 5.3 percent of ANC income, donations 3.7 percent and grants 86.6 percent. The total ANC budget in 1990 amounted to SAR 79,731,300 (approximately CAD 34 million). Likewise the South African Council of Churches (SACC) relies on foreign grants for almost 90 percent of its annual budget (*SouthScan*, November 1, 1991). The free-spending council was forced to cut its staff from 120 to 80 after a deficit of R 26 million in 1990/91. Observers expect to see the head office complement at half its current

In one of the few self-critical assessments, Moulana Farid Essack (*Die Suid-Afrikaan*, December 1990/January 1991, 20-23) argues along these lines that external funding "worked against" real democracy rather than ushering it in.

External funding made it even less necessary for us to remain accountable to the local communities and interest groups on whose behalf we acted and spoke. Millions of Rands flooded into the country—and are still flowing in—with little insistence upon strict accounting for their use. Suppression made it impossible to adhere to proper bookkeeping procedures. This absence of accountability worked against the development of organic bonds within our communities, and at the same time, gave rise to a multiplicity of small kingdoms.

Many a promising leader's downfall can be attributed to well-intentioned foreign support which created temptations, irresistible in a sea of poverty, to embark on corruption. With frequent invitations abroad—sometimes traveling first class as people's representatives so as to escape South African second class status—once popular spokespersons who were no longer innocent at home very easily became even more alienated from their communities.

Foreign donors always make a choice with direct political implications when they allocate scarce resources for human developments. In a hotly contested atmosphere, they can choose to be neutral by allocating assistance across the board to all anti-Apartheid forces. Or they can favour one movement over the other; they can chose a politically tainted selection device for scholarships in order to discriminate against a competing outfit with a different orientation; they can back one research group with known political preferences over another equally qualified team with different political sympathies. With enough resources, theo-

size in future after further loss of foreign interest in South Africa. Unlike the situation once facing the working class movement in Europe and North America which had to rely on internal membership contributions, the skewed cash flow to the South African disenfranchised creates its own problems. Obviously, external funding frees leaders from cultivating close links with their constituency. It can also create leaders—by endowment as it were—and tempt them to be less scrupulous than they would be under the tight financial control of the grassroots.

retically, the foreign donors could determine the winners and losers of the South African political contest.

This study argues that it should not be the task of well-meaning outsiders to interfere with the free choice of South Africans. Foreign donors should avoid influencing the outcome of any free South African political contest, either directly or indirectly. Instead, their efforts would be most advantageous in "levelling the playing field" between a deprived majority and a privileged establishment, not taking sides among the deprived. If it is the goal of the intervention to secure competent administrators, then the best persons must be chosen, regardless of their political affiliation. Canadian assistance for political development should be given across the board to all Apartheid victims. The real goal ought to be to help establish the democratic process not to select its winners. However, these self-evident guidelines are not implemented in practice.

It can be shown that many Canadian initiatives are now biased towards the ANC and its allies. In line with ANC attitudes, Canadian efforts ignore the PAC and AZAPO. They despise the Inkatha Freedom Party. The secret funding of Inkatha initiated during the Botha era has not helped this perception and together with the political violence has reinforced a questionable international perception that Inkatha is part of an undemocratic Apartheid system, "opposed to the democratic anti-Apartheid forces" (*CFM*, New Delhi, September 13-14, 1991). This labelling of parties by the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers may well exacerbate political violence by marginalizing one group and elevating others, thereby reinforcing hegemonic temptations all round. If all significant political groups are necessary for a peace accord to last and a political settlement to be reached, should Canadian policy, judged by its own stated goals of enhancing South African democracy, favour the presently strongest party as "a government in waiting?"

In this respect, outside attitudes towards Inkatha or the non-violent sections of the white ultra-right constitute a test case as to whether a policy primarily assists ideologically acceptable organizations or aims at achieving accommodation. A policy interested in reconciliation must necessarily also communicate with ideological foes. The primary aim of

Canadian foreign policy is the peaceful democratization of South Africa. It is not to dispense patronage to political favourites. A good argument can therefore be made that an undemocratic organization needs even more attention in the process of establishing democracy than the democratic parties.

Canadian public opinion and activist groups have largely ignored or dismissed alternatives to the ANC-led Apartheid opposition. Canadian NGOs, particularly CUSO, should have been warned by its mistakes in Rhodesia, where it solidly backed the losing ZAPU. High-ranking Canadian officials are said to have never heard of Mugabe a few months before his ZANU party swept to victory in the 1980 election. While such total surprises are unlikely to occur in a country without a bush war, the South African black mood remains volatile and fluid. The surveys show surprising fluctuations but, above all, are too unreliable and usually too confined to the metropolitan areas to allow any confident prediction of country-wide winners. Just because the PAC's provocative sloganeering about "one settler one bullet" is unpalatable to the non-racial sentiment of its elites, it does not follow that their rhetorical terrorism has no mass appeal.

The non-violent sections of the white right-wing pose an even sharper choice between pragmatic accommodation and moralistic rejection. Wisely, Mandela himself urges that the white right-wing has to be accommodated in the new South Africa, irrespective of how repugnant its beliefs are to the ANC. "We do not want them to remain in the future South Africa as a Renamo-type force. Let us try to reach these people now and assure them that they have nothing to fear from majority rule" (SADC, 30/9/91). Mandela's judicious attitude towards intransigent ideologues would be difficult to put into practice, since neither his constituency nor the militant right-wing would want to promote such an accommodation. The best that can be realistically hoped for would be to isolate the hard core racists but engage the moral ideologues of Afrikaner self-determination who still form the majority in the camp.

Who Qualifies for Foreign Recognition?

With whom should Canada dialogue among the competing forces? Who is eligible for Canadian assistance? A good argument can be made that support should be given directly and openly to all democratic groups in South Africa. The present policy of official non-partisan support of democracy can be criticized on four grounds: (1) it is hypocritical in so far as it is biased toward the ANC although without making this bias explicit; (2) it pays little attention to other democratic parties not in the ANC fold; (3) it leaves allocation of funds to an unnecessarily high degree to the discretion of NGOs and embassy individuals according to vague guidelines while open, direct support could be granted according to clearly established criteria to all eligible parties; and, (4) it opens itself to the charge of outsider determination of winners and losers.

Clearly established criteria for eligibility to receive foreign assistance could encourage South Africans to reconsider grey areas where new practices could begin to take root. Obviously, racist parties of neither the white nor black variety deserve Canadian support, but nonetheless they need to be drawn into the dialogue. In addition to *non-racialism*, explicit support for *multi-party democracy* could be a necessary qualification. Any advocate of a one-party state who restricts opposing views or repeatedly practises intolerance towards competitors would exclude itself from recognition. Thirdly, any group that is not accountable to its members and the public, that does not elect its leadership freely and regularly and does not practise *internal democracy* would also disqualify itself from foreign recognition. The criterion of democratic *accountability* would particularly challenge Inkatha to improve its record. It would not be able to have its leadership approved by acclamation or make it impossible for other political parties to operate in Kwa Zulu.³

3 Compared with the Inkatha procedure at its July 1991 Ulundi Congress where delegates were asked to stand up if they were opposed to Buthelezi's leadership—all 2,200 remained seated—the ANC's secret balloting of nominations from branches at its Durban Congress two weeks earlier was a model of democracy from below.

Clear criteria for assistance could spark open political debate as to whether a grouping qualifies. Politics would still not be a completely free market place where all play with equal chances. It would be a political decision to exclude privileged parties of the establishment in favour of more needy groups to make up for past discrimination. In principle, however, all democratic formations should be eligible for international recognition, whether they are inside or outside the government. The current criteria disqualifying recipients of South African government assistance from support will become obsolete when the ANC officially joins the administration of the land.

Once free elections have taken place, foreign assistance could be allocated in proportion to the electoral strength of each democratic party. This system is used in Germany where each party represented in the Lower House receives proportional funding for political education and development aid, it is then left to the party to decide how to use its allocation.

The Canadian support for Mandela after his release illustrates the dilemmas and contradictions of current rationales. Support for political education can usefully assist diverse communities in preparing for the onset of democracy. For example, all three Canadian federal parties support the "Mandela Fund" in the form of the "Matla Trust" and an associated "Community and Citizenship Education Project"; these aim at the right goals. Although Canada is one of the few Western countries that officially does not give assistance directly to political parties or liberation movements, the all-party endorsement of the Mandela Fund comes as close as possible. External Affairs Minister Joe Clark himself endorsed the drive, as did the Prime Minister. An assessment of Canadian efforts by CUSO workers (Neal, *et al.*, 1990) concludes: "It was a dramatic turnaround for Clark and a new approach for External Affairs Canada, which had, until then, always avoided declaring such frank support for the ANC." A joint statement by the leaders of Canada's three federal parties at the inception of the Mandela Fund on February 11, 1991 states: "It is fitting for Canadians to recognize Mr. Mandela's deep commitment to peaceful negotiation by continuing to provide moral and financial support at this crucial time. The Nelson Mandela Fund offers

an effective way for Canadians to help to establish a non-racial democracy in South Africa." Archbishop Scott in a fundraising letter of June 28, 1991 referred especially to the "*non-partisan*" project of education for democracy.

However, to believe that one can apply foreign donations in a non-partisan manner in a deeply politicized environment may be an illusion. It will inevitably be used by the party which controls the funds for propagating its ideological visions, since it can hardly be expected to finance rivals in what is, after all, a fierce contest. Foreign ANC supporters, too, want to administer the public money that is under their control according to their own political vision. Staff members of CUSO (Neal, *et al.*, 1990) which kept an office in Lusaka, reported in 1990, "while spending only \$50,000 a year of its own funds on liberation support projects CUSO is now administering more than \$800,000 in funds for ANC and SWAPO support projects allocated by CIDA..." The five CUSO staff members advocate "a Canadian policy of explicit solidarity and material support for the ANC" which, in their opinion, "has proven effective in pressuring the South African regime to reform."

The ANC clearly needs and deserves foreign assistance in order to establish itself against an undefeated, powerful establishment. The ANC is the historic leader of the anti-Apartheid opposition and currently appears to be the strongest party (+/- 50 percent) if there were to be a free election tomorrow. The ANC and Mandela are, therefore, key players in the ongoing negotiations and the prospects for reaching a historic compromise. Yet is the current form and focus of assistance the optimal way to reach a peaceful transition?

The belated official Canadian focus on the ANC results from a mixture of motives: recognition of the moderation and pragmatism of ANC policy; support for Mandela personally; the publicity-driven desire to be associated with Mandela's moral stature; the intention to back apparent winners; and the wish to see the negotiation project succeed by not having it falter on an uneducated constituency and uneven playing field. While it is important to avoid the danger of accommodating mere elites who lack solid constituency bases, the one-party focus, however, may be

counter-productive to the inclusive goal of multi-party democracy. It could marginalize other important contenders for power.

The peril comes from groups on the extreme right and left who are opposed to negotiations. In contrast to the neglect of these groups by Canada, the European countries have much more actively searched for new ways through which "dialogue with these sections of the black population which have so far opposed negotiations on a new constitution can be stepped up in the interest of a peaceful transition" (Netherlands Policy Paper on South Africa, 21/12/90). Foreign engagement may entice anti-negotiation groups to moderate their stance just as the Western embrace has encouraged ANC pragmatism. In short, instead of assisting only the converted, much more consideration could be given to those who remain a major threat to the entire peace process itself, including the right-wing.

Merits and Problems of the IDRC Approach

An excellent report by an IDRC financed, fact-finding mission to South Africa in Summer 1991 focussed on the problems of economic policy formulation in the post-Apartheid era. A detailed critical review of the report can point out both the strengths and shortcomings of the prevailing policy approach as they have been identified by one of the most prestigious and internationally acclaimed Canadian institutions.

The IDRC report provides a comprehensive overview of the existing research capacities among economists in South Africa as well as the priority areas for policy formulation. Its thoughtful comments range from tax policy to government expenditure restructuring, housing and infrastructure, employment creation and balance of payment management to rural development and redressing gender imbalances. It makes well considered recommendations for training in economic policy analysis and "major restructuring of some structures of the ANC." The ANC could not have asked for a better outside consultant to assess the organizational weaknesses and shortcomings in its programme.

The IDRC involvement with South Africa was triggered in 1990 when an official in External Affairs suggested that IDRC might wish to respond to Mandela's request to Brian Mulroney about the need within the anti-Apartheid movement for better expertise on economic policy issues; this need would be urgent during the negotiations. In July 1991, IDRC, a publicly funded organization and not an NGO, dispatched a five member mission to South Africa to assess the state of the art in economic expertise in the country and, through local consultation, to determine the needs within economic policy research. The five external members were two Canadian academic economists (Gerry Helleiner of the University of Toronto and John Loxley of the University of Manitoba), a Kenyan research coordinator based in Nairobi (Benno Nolulu) and a senior adviser at IDRC (Marc van Ameringen). The Commission enlisted four full-time South African members, three of whom work for the ANC and one for COSATU, and three part-time South African academics of whom two work closely with COSATU and one with the ANC. The Commission did not consult with the PAC, AZAPO, WOSA or Inkatha, or include among its South African members associates of the National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU), an equally legitimate union federation but with an Africanist orientation.

The report gives no reason as to why only the ANC's Department of Economic Policy (DEP) was consulted about the objectives of the mission. Apparently, as one Committee member suggested (Personal Interview, 25/9/91), Inkatha was too involved with its own affairs and the PAC and NACTU did not have the trained personnel to be useful for inclusion. Such a broader commission would have also undermined the unspoken consensus that, in the words of a participant, "any future South African government will be led by the ANC. Therefore, too much attention to competitors would only distract from the real players." The Commission obviously proceeded from the assumption that "the ANC is a government in waiting" (8) as opposed to a party in negotiations that are likely to lead to a coalition government.

This composition of the group accounts for the explicitly partisan Mission Report "Economic Analysis and Policy Formulation for Post-Apartheid South Africa," issued in August 1991. The 46 page report

identifies as its "principal client" the "anti-Apartheid economics community within South Africa, with particular attention being paid to the ANC." It lists as secondary clients the Canadian government and other potential donor countries that may finance the wide-ranging recommendations, which are now being implemented by donations from various countries.

The report, above all, aims at rectifying the gross imbalances between the resources of the establishment and its opposition in the anti-Apartheid movement. The "anti-Apartheid economics community," however, is narrowly restricted to those who support the policies and strategies of the MDM. The so-called Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) that the report evokes has never been constituted as an organization but came into existence as a code word for the ANC after the United Democratic Front (UDF) was restricted in 1988. Nowhere in the report are competing blueprints of other anti-Apartheid groups even mentioned, let alone seriously discussed. The authors assume without questioning that, "the ANC must be ready for assuming power" (8). Thus, the much broader anti-Apartheid movement is reduced to the historical leader and strongest present component of the struggle.

The report, in its partisan definition of the South African opposition, sets up a false dichotomy between "progressive economists who have undertaken and who continue to undertake policy oriented research of high quality" and "other economists of liberal persuasion" (12). However, the latter are not completely excluded. Provided they operate under the right progressive guidance and supervision, they "could be useful as members of teams or for specific, clearly defined areas of policy" (12).

The liberal economists and social scientists in the Democratic Party, the Black Sash, the Institute of Race Relations, the English-language universities, the mainstream press and even some of the business conglomerates worked for decades in the forefront of the intellectual attack on Apartheid. They resent now being relegated to the status of useful tools by "progressives" who monopolize a self-ascribed label. Hence, the tensions and sceptical distance between those who treat potential

allies as tainted "parts of the system," and liberals who chide the intellectually and politically discredited dogmatism of socialists.

The IDRC report reflects neither these underlying antagonisms nor the intense accompanying ideological debates about competing economic blueprints in South Africa. For example, it is asserted "that a consensus seems to have emerged around a socially efficient interventionist role of the state in the sphere of economics" (28). While this may be the case in many other places in the world, South Africa has produced a particularly high number of unfettered free marketeers. They falsely equate Apartheid with "ethnic socialism" and advocate privatization as the vehicle of non-racial freedom. Rather than being excluded from in future economic policy formulation, they too would have to be brought into the emerging consensus. This necessary historic compromise in a social democratic mixed economy is unlikely to be achieved by downplaying the competing ideological visions, as the IDRC report does by omitting the words "capitalism" and "socialism." The socialists in South Africa are not fooled by the neutral technocratic language of monitoring "the balance between public ownership and indirect state regulation of the private sector" (29).

The explanation for "the dearth of capacity to support leadership in the democratic movement by formulating coherent and viable perspectives on economic policy" (35) lies not only in the legacy of Apartheid education. After all, thirty years of exile with hundreds of scholarships for Apartheid victims in the East and West should have produced a fair core of competent progressive economists, quite apart from the opportunities for black students at the liberal English-speaking universities.⁴

The absence of economic skills in the opposition is also due to an internal "progressive" sentiment and a norm of exile education that studies of "bourgeois economics" were not only a waste of time but a

4 It is overstated to assert, as the IDRC report does, that "under the Apartheid system of separate education, access to training in economics for blacks was confined to so-called ethnic universities" (33), as these exclusionary practices have been defied by all English-language universities since the early 1980s.

"sellout to the system." The ANC now pays the price of keeping mythologies alive in exile rather than preparing itself for administering the country. Likewise, the internal opposition had demonized the state and capital to such an extent that any professional training in its method of operation smacked of treason. Braan Fleisch (*Searchlight South Africa*, 2, 3, July 1991) has aptly described the self-imposed distance from tainted skills:

For those who remained in the country for the intense years of the struggle, there was never even a thought about running, controlling and administering an advanced industrial society. The enemy was business, business methods and business mentality. The state was the enemy. No one wanted to understand how the state ran the country, the principal concern was how the state was used as a mechanism of repression. In place of the state, activists posited a romantic notion about popular participation.

Victoria Brittain, in a nostalgic memorial to the socialist dream, has described the word "progressive" for Southern African activists as meaning "being led by nationalist governments organized on Marxist-Leninist models learned in the schools of eastern Europe, where students from both parties got an education way beyond the dreams of colonial Africa" (*SAR*, July 1991, p. 23). As long as it is still not openly acknowledged within the ANC that this kind of education does not help to solve the South African problem, no well-meaning Canadian economic expertise and capacity training will make much of a difference. Political education within the ANC as well as other movements seems almost as important as the acquisition of managerial skills.

The mission places great emphasis on external expertise to rectify crucial deficits. "The input of an experienced and sympathetic modeller from outside South Africa could make an important and early contribution to the development of an appropriate economic framework" (13). Does South Africa need such assistance? There are various other references to "assistance in the identification of appropriate foreign expertise to meet the identified specialized needs of South African economic research" (44) to recommendations for "periodic meetings among exter-

nal donors, key recipients and objective monitors to coordinate activities" (44).

IDRC has always had a unique and well-established approach of developing and assisting local expertise instead of importing solutions by foreigners from the outside. This useful policy should be particularly stressed in South Africa which already has a modern sector with numerous specialists in most fields of expertise. The emphasis on importing expertise could be construed as giving priority to foreign designs which a member of the same IDRC mission rightly problematizes when he writes elsewhere: "Any consideration of alternatives must start by distancing itself from the present practice of externally imposed solutions" (John Loxley, *SAR*, July 1991).

The IDRC report is perceptively concerned about the huge differential in the research capacity between the establishment and the opposition. The opposition's "is paltry" indeed. However, it is doubtful that this capacity "is not and has not been available to the MDM" (13). In many cases opponents on the left did not want to be tainted by cooperation with the system. In a rare contradiction, the authors themselves later note: "Some state institutions have offered their full cooperation to analysts in the democratic movement" (41). Unconditional access by every legitimate claimant to the information base of state institutions will certainly be ensured in the post-Apartheid order when the ANC becomes part of the government. Rather than setting up expensive parallel research institutions—as the IDRC recommends with the creation of another Macro-Economic Research Group (MERG)—existing capacities could be more sensibly integrated. In the interests of a healthy national economy, the hundreds of economic specialists in the country could be encouraged to cooperate rather than work in isolation in separate institutions for different goals.

The IDRC authors would disagree with the idea of assistance to a struggling field of skills across the board, because they have a much more specific and partisan-political goal in mind: "Immediate support from sympathetic governments and agencies for the purpose of strengthening the capacity of the DEP (Department of Economic Planning of the

ANC) to perform its critical functions *in support of the ANC leadership*" (43). The coordinator of the proposed institution "would be answerable to a small Steering Committee, including senior representatives of the democratic movement, notably ANC and COSATU" (37). Even the desired location will be restricted by its "need for proximity to the ANC headquarters" (39). Once such a close relationship and dependency has been established, the proclaimed "standards of academic integrity and independence" (12) would be difficult to retain. The "independent" experts would then function as party economists in support of a particular economic blueprint. There is not much wrong with such a commitment to a specific policy as long as its partisan nature is acknowledged and not hidden behind neutral claims for supporting independent expertise.

In conclusion, "taking sides" was an appropriate and necessary position during the time of Apartheid. With normal politics now being established in a post-Apartheid era, the same partisan commitment of outsiders interferes with party competition by favouring one over the other. It cannot be the goal of Canadian foreign policy to set itself up as the arbiter in an ideological contest. Its only aim must be to assist the democratic process. Canadian policy should foremost be interested in establishing a broad legitimacy for the democratic rules themselves. It should not attempt to manipulate outcome by choosing winners and losers. Were it to take sides, as many well-meaning interventions at present do, Canadian policy would continue a colonial tradition of liberal paternalism that knows what is good for the "natives" without letting the inhabitants themselves decide what they need. Naturally, the defenders of the partisan commitment will argue that they do so on the explicit advice of the ANC as the strongest opposition movement. Were the rivals to become the majority, presumably Canadian foreign policy would then want to get in bed with them. However, this would amount to a position of opportunism rather than principle. To exclusively curry favour with the leadership of the majority may or may not be sound advice in terms of long-term political influence, but it is unconvincing as a moral position.

The programme and strategy of a sponsored group should only be judged as to whether it is compatible with the goal of democracy as well as national interests, regardless of whether the recipient has majority support. Canadians obviously would not want to assist a majority fascist or terrorist party or even a left totalitarian party that has as its declared goal the abolition of democracy in favour of a one-party-state. However, as long as any party operates on the basis of generally recognized democratic principles and within a legitimate constitution, it should be eligible for Canadian assistance, irrespective of majority support.

By supporting the ANC only, progressive Canadians not only take the side of the oppressed but prefer a specific programme of reconstruction to rival blueprints. The ANC itself has never claimed, as SWAPO did, to be the *sole*, authentic voice of the people. Indeed, there are many sober voices outside the ANC, both to the left of it and the political right that can claim as legitimately to represent segments of the excluded and poor, albeit not with the same mass support at present. The implicit assumption that only the ANC speaks for "the broad masses" could be compared with the NDP's claim to represent "the ordinary Canadian."

Canada should also resist attempts to be drawn into moves to impose internationally acceptable formula on South Africa and instead encourage only good faith negotiations. A settlement freely negotiated by the South African parties themselves—even if it takes longer and encounters frequent setbacks—will in the end prove more durable than any solution into which the parties have been dragged against their will. This also applies to proposals to set up binding arbitration by international bodies. Unless the adversaries voluntarily agree to avail themselves of such opportunities, the mere international prestige of the arbiter will not suffice to make the antagonists comply in the long run, as the failure of the Eminent Persons Group in 1986 has clearly shown.

Nevertheless, outside bodies, including Canada, will be increasingly expected to pass judgement and bestow legitimacy on competing domestic blueprints. It is in this realm of what is acceptable and what fails in international opinion that the Canadian government, NGOs and individual academics can play an important role. However, to be taken seriously

by all sides as a reasonable and acceptable referee, presupposes not being identified as an uncritical partisan in a dispute. In a post-Apartheid South Africa, more than partisan commitment is required from outsiders. By communicating with all parties, outsiders best act as facilitators for peaceful change. Their partisan commitment to the victims of the past may still be needed to level the playing field and empower the historically deprived, but this noble policy should extend to all weak parties.

III. NEGLECTED AREAS OF FOREIGN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

Apart from the obvious focus on human resource development through varied assistance in the educational field and the emphasis on human rights, multi-party democracy, and peace-keeping as preconditions for good government, there seem to be four specific priorities for outside assistance in South Africa and by extension in the region as a whole. The significance of the problems in these four neglected realms is outlined without always offering specific advice for intervention. However, in all four areas Canada would be able to make a realistic, valuable, and more forceful contribution. These are: (1) professional policing, (2) low-cost housing, (3) women's equality and birth control, (4) AIDS education, and (5) tourist development.

Professional Policing

While the integration of MK and the SADF has been discussed at great length, little attention has been given to the reform of the police in a post-Apartheid society. Yet the police remain the cutting edge of state power in daily encounters with challengers. Political transformation would be meaningless without an institutional change of police culture. Merely exchanging personnel, a gradual Africanization of the police as in Zimbabwe and Namibia, without a corresponding redefinition of their role could easily replace unprofessional white with equally unprofessional black policing.

Therefore, it seems necessary that a future police force is well trained, well-educated and well-paid. Enhancing the prestige of the police and attracting more competitive candidates by paying them better remains an

urgent task. The new police would also need to be carefully screened to weed out psychologically ill-equipped candidates. The "personality" of police candidates should be made the decisive selection criterion. Such screening needs to be undertaken at regular intervals, just as dangerous cars are taken off the road in periodic technical tests. The costs of retiring or retraining unsuitable police personnel are outweighed by the potential damage done to the fragile social fabric by reckless so-called defenders. It would also seem necessary to establish an independent complaints board where citizens could safely lodge grievances against unfair police treatment. Such a board or ombudsperson must have the power and the duty to refer complaints to a court, for prosecution and compensation.

In a comprehensive review of the intra-white controversy about the proper role of the SAP, Ronald Weitzer (1991) concluded that the "few rotten apples" approach does not address the lack of professional training, selection and recruitment based on universalistic norms. The absence of citizens' control of the police through independent monitoring and complaints-investigating agencies, according to this author, "inflate police morale, but they also help to perpetuate traditional attitudes and practices."

Anthea Jeffery (1991) in her study on riot policing has proposed to replace the present riot police with a special multi-party "national peace guard" that together with a multi-party monitoring committee would ensure order during the fragile transition. Combined with more representative recruitment, clearer legal guidelines and accountability for the police as well as professional training in communication skills and community involvement, the South African police could be transformed from a partisan force serving one section to a more widely respected, impartial community police.

The demonization of police and army officers overlooks that most in their ranks are proud professionals to carry out the orders of a legitimate government in power. Authoritarian characters are always also conformists. To be sure, "military intelligence" may be a contradiction in terms. But most professional officers and policemen conceive of themselves foremost as technocrats rather than committed counter-ideologues. There-

fore, the appeal to depolitize the forces instead of using them opportunistically to uphold unpopular policies remains the most sensible approach.

The ANC call to establish people's self-defence units under Umkhonto guidance and control could turn out to be a double-edged sword. As private armies and power bases for local warlords, they would exacerbate the existing tensions. However, they could also function as the only feasible way in which a moderate political leadership could direct and discipline its anarchic following and restore a semblance of order. This seems to have been the intent of the organizers. An ANC booklet⁵ exhorts: "Umkhonto cadres, particularly ex-prisoners and those due to return from exile, must play a leading and active role in the establishment of the defence structures." The writers emphasize "firm political direction" and the rooting of units in their communities. An ANC internal police and army under the control of exiles and former prisoners would obviously strengthen this group's tenuous hold over unfamiliar and often hostile terrain. As long as the ANC leadership is committed to end the out-of-control violence with tolerance for opposing parties, such units may well be in the short-term interests of peace. On the other hand, once weapons and training spread, they could well result in greater carnage and aggression towards dissenters. No state can afford to lose the monopoly of coercion without destabilizing itself. A better qualified professional police force in which the ANC units were fully integrated, would seem the less risky option. Private armies are easier to establish than to control. In short, ANC self-defence units would provoke other party militia and South Africa would be on the way to becoming another Lebanon.

Rather than blindly supporting the ANC's militarist wing, the international community could initiate and finance a buy-back-weapons programme. The proliferation of illegal guns in South Africa and neighbouring countries endangers any negotiated peace. Since law enforcement re-

5 ANC, *For the Start of Our Lives. Guidelines for the Creation of People's Self-Defence Units*, 1991.

mains ineffective in a radically politicized environment, material incentives seem to be the only feasible way to reduce the spread of deadly weapons. As land mines are cleared up after a war, so other weaponry has to be collected and destroyed as a legacy of the past and a guarantee of future peace in the region.

Low-Cost Housing

Successful social-democratic experiments with worker's self-help schemes in various countries around the world have yet to be emulated in South Africa. For example, Quebec's legendary labour leader Louis Laberge formed Corvéé Habitation, a fund to which construction workers pay 15 cents of their hourly wage, and which provides mortgages at 3 percent below prime. So far more than 50,000 workers have borrowed from the programme to buy houses they built. In 1984, the Quebec Federation of Labor launched the Fonds de solidarité as an investment fund that buys into business to ensure union jobs. To date, it is estimated that the \$170m in 90 projects saved 20,000 jobs. Similar successful union controlled enterprises on a much larger scale are Germany's *Neue Heimat* to build houses in bomb-damaged areas. Singapore's *Provident Fund* solved a massive housing crisis by a forced saving scheme under state auspices. The reluctance of South Africa's organized labour to engage in similar schemes is only partly due to its organizational weakness and relative infancy. The flirtation with capitalism that all these endeavours, from credit unions to housing funds represent, is deeply resented in South Africa.

The planned housing subsidies by the Independent Development Trust Finance Corporation (IDTFC), a subsidiary of the IDT, appropriately target the squatter sections of South African society. Only low income families qualify for a free serviced site for which individual title is transferred. In dispensing loans, employers are used to administer the loan scheme for their staff, provide education on loan terms, and establish workers' loan committees that decide the criteria for granting credit. Thus an individual without collaterals can secure some cash to build a basic house. Like the saving associations (*stokvels*) which operate in the

townships, the innovative scheme also uses peer group pressure to ensure that creditors meet their commitments.

The housing backlog was estimated at 1.2 million homes in 1990 with a new demand of 174,000 homes against an actual supply of 25,000. Since 60 percent of black households cannot afford a home worth more than R12,500 (\$5,500), they necessarily have to fall back on informal shack dwelling. Hence, the popularity of the partly funded new housing scheme whose pilot projects were several times oversubscribed. Ironically, the sensible loan schemes did not receive full cooperation from the ANC or from state institutions or private developers who saw their previous role undercut by the subsidies. On the ANC side, the IDT attempt to borrow abroad encountered fierce initial opposition among anti-Apartheid groups in Europe. Only Mandela's endorsement of the endeavour could appease the opposition.

Women's Equality and Birth Control

There are few so-called Western countries where the status of women is still locked into the traditional mould as much as in South Africa. Half-naked bodies adorn the front pages of even serious papers. Feminist debate is in its infancy. Child care facilities are underdeveloped. A women's movement is confined to a few privileged university lecturers and other professionals. This applies to all political movements, and the few female executives in progressive organizations complain as intensely about chauvinist treatment as the lone female member of the National Party caucus. While some outstanding South African women have achieved worldwide reputations—from dozens of honorary doctorates for Helen Suzman or Winnie Mandela to the Nobel prize for Nadine Gordimer—and while specific women's organizations have been in the forefront of political activism—witness the Black Sash or the independent initiatives of African women in the Durban beerhall boycotts in the 1950s to the strikes in the 1980s—the public realm remains the domain of one gender only. Of 170 working group members of the first CODESA meeting, only three were women. Among the advisors, the number of women is slightly higher, amounting to a mere 5 percent. After five hours of heated debate, the 1991 ANC national conference

scrapped a draft proposal that 30 percent of the 50 ordinary NEC posts should be allocated to women. The majority of the 90 percent male delegates repeated the well-known arguments against affirmative action although they all supported it in principle: women elected in a quota system would have a diminished status if they did not win their seats in an open contest; they asserted it was entrenching an undesirable form of "group rights" in the organization.

Widespread wife battering and sexual abuse constitute hidden events with only a few cases being reported and comparatively few resources being committed to shielding and healing the victims. This is particularly the case in the black communities where patriarchal customs reinforce female exploitation and submission. Abortion on demand, for example, remains a taboo and illegal. In the area of birth control, men generally insist on practising papal prescriptions of procreation without even being followers of the pope. In an empirical survey about leisure activities and opportunities of township youth, one surprising result stands out on the perceived "major problems for young people": 65 percent mention teenage pregnancy before unemployment (37 percent) and education and training (31 percent).⁶

The consequences of unwanted children and unsafe abortions for the society at large and the emancipation of African women in particular remain unacknowledged. If a society lags so far behind in elementary preconditions for the social development of half of its population, it becomes an obvious option for foreign assistance to encourage some changes, notwithstanding the political sensitivity and controversial nature of the issues.

Development assistance, at present, is not linked to population policies. Western campaigns of tying aid to human rights could serve as a model for similarly encouraging African states to introduce modern birth control options. This would help to free women as the most exploited

6 Valerie Moeller, "Lost Generation Found," an *Indicator SA* Issue Focus, Durban: University of Natal, May 1991.

segment of African societies and establish their minimal human rights of control over their own bodies. Moreover, a good case can be made that democratic rights at large are impossible to ensure when ever-increasing population density exacerbates poverty and environmental destruction. Yet the indifference of aid donors towards population policies is astonishing. While the taboo is understandable in Apartheid South Africa where Pretoria politicized the demographic ratios,⁷ the domestic and international complacency on the issue in the rest of Southern Africa cannot be excused. Respect for indigenous values and sentiments is misplaced when the consequences lead to the direct degradation of the female population and to indirect societal disintegration in the absence of traditional survival conditions.

Unfortunately, the underdeveloped feminist tradition in South Africa, together with the cultural and racial gender divide, hamper the trends that have elsewhere most effectively influenced birth rates. Witwatersrand sociologist Jacklyn Cock,⁸ a participant in the April 1989 Harare meeting of 55 women from inside South Africa with 25 exiles from ANC missions abroad, noted: "Throughout the meeting there was an emphasis on women's role as mothers. We women are the producers of children. We go through the nine months, the feeding period, the fears and anxieties." In this focus, women's traditional maternal role contrasts sharply with the more feminist priorities of middle-class white progressives. "Attempts to formulate a shared oppression often floundered on biologicistic reasoning."⁹ Indeed, given the different social backgrounds of both groups in this dialogue, any common oppression would have been highly artificial, the shared abhorrence of Apartheid notwithstanding.

7 It is probably for this reason that Mamphela Ramphele's and Francis Wilson's comprehensive Carnegie study *Uprooting Poverty* (1989) does not even discuss birth control in South Africa. Yet while there is a slow decline in the African birth rate due to delayed urbanization and slow material improvements in South Africa, the same cannot be said for the rest of the continent.

8 Jacklyn Cock, *Weekly Mail*, April 28, 1989, p. 17.

9 *Ibid.*

It is tragic that political tensions have so far prevented addressing of this most significant determinant of quality of life. In other Third World countries the issue is at least debated and various "solutions" are tried. While it is true that high birth rates are the consequences of poverty and not its cause, it is also true that the lot of squatter women would be considerably improved if they were to have more control over their lives. In the urban setting children have long lost their function as protection for old age and illness, as they are for peasants. However, because birth control is generally frowned upon and also associated with state designs to disown the excluded majority of its silent weapon, most progressive organizations avoid offering crucial assistance. Although South Africa is not overpopulated by international standards, unchecked population growth further hampers the life-chances of the poor. In short, once the rate of population growth consistently exceeds the rate of economic growth, all development efforts will remain futile. Moreover, the burgeoning population negatively affects the environment and inevitably destroys the natural habitat, unless state policies intervene. It is in this area where the post-Apartheid South Africa could take a leaf out of the successful development politics of South Korea, Singapore or China. While South Africa cannot repeat the repressive labour policies that facilitated the dramatic take-off of the Pacific Rim countries which were without a strong union movement in the 1960s and 1970s, it could use many incentives of their model of birth control.

AIDS Education

An area where Canada could make a difference in saving thousands of lives without much financial outlay is AIDS education. Compared with Central and East Africa, South Africa has operated both with a time lag in actual AIDS cases, but more so with a lag in credible behaviour modification programmes and general awareness. Years after such campaigns were launched elsewhere throughout the world, they remained a taboo in South Africa. Not a single senior white or black politician had touched on the subject on television or public speeches until October 1990 when the Minister of Health, Rita Venter, announced cabinet approval of a committee to boost prevention. Business research and medical evidence has indicated an alarming spread of the HIV virus

since the mid 1980s, first among the white homosexual population and later even more so among black heterosexuals. Virginia van der Vliet (*Frontline*, April 1991) put the available data succinctly: "Sober medical research findings suggest that given present levels of infection and the current eight to nine months doubling time, 6 percent of the black population aged 15-60 might be HIV positive by 1991 and this could rise to 18 percent by 1992." When a fifth of the black population is condemned to almost certain death—millions more than Apartheid ever killed—why does the anti-Apartheid campaign inside and outside the country remains silent?

Like everything else, AIDS awareness in South Africa quickly fell victim to politics. Blacks saw it as a "white man's disease." The ANC journal *Sechaba* questioned "why 'such a deadly virus should suddenly spring from nowhere' and pointed to the possibility of the viruses being developed in the secrecy of the laboratories of many imperialist countries" (quoted by van der Vliet, *op. cit.*). Right-wing whites, on the other hand, privately welcomed the "natural" correction of differential growth rates or, at most, deplored the devastating impact on the labour force. Among conservatives it became established wisdom that many returning ANC exiles from African training camps were infected. When the mining houses introduced AIDS testing for migrant workers, the unions and the ANC did not go beyond the obvious by pointing out that the South African social conditions facilitated the spread of the disease. Similar to Zimbabwe until 1990, AIDS remained a taboo subject.

The multi-faceted Canadian activity in South Africa shared in this silence. Unlike the US, which in 1991 contributed R605,000 towards AIDS education in black townships, Canada, apart from a low-profile Oxfam effort and useful SAETF training projects in Canada, did not initiate a public discussion on the controversial and sensitive topic in South Africa itself. Yet as a respected outside agent with a wealth of experience on the issue, Canada would have been in an ideal position to voice its concern and advice early on, irrespective of politics or stifling traditions.

Despite increased awareness of AIDS in Southern Africa, and noble resolutions about AIDS education passed at political meetings, there is still a widespread taboo against facing the crisis. For example, even the 1991 final CHOGM communique does not mention the word, but vaguely lists "communicable diseases" second last among a host of other problems. Yet the World Health Organisation estimates that there are six million African adults on the continent who have been infected by HIV, of whom a million have developed full blown AIDS. HIV+ newborns are likely to reverse the decline in child mortality rates. Safety tests for blood products have not been introduced everywhere in Southern Africa. AIDS education is in its infancy, even in South Africa.

For South Africa alone, Jonathan Broomberg, Malcolm Steinberg and Patrick Masobe predict 5.2 million HIV+ cases and 666,000 cumulative AIDS deaths by the year 2000; 7.4 million HIV+ cases and 2.9 million cumulative deaths by 2005; and 8.2 million HIV+ cases and 6.6 million cumulative deaths by 2010.¹⁰ Grania Christie (1991) discusses contingent predictions with a 30 percent maximum infection rate in the total population, translating into a 60 percent rate among workers by 1995.

Not only the migrant workers' system but also traditional polygamy—where common-law wives have no legal rights or control over their own sexuality—encourages the spread of AIDS. Adelaide Magwaza (*The Condenser*, 1991), a psychologist at UDW, reports a survey of black women in one of the squatter camps around Durban, where 60 percent of the interviewed were either the second or third common-law wife. "Although they were aware of the danger of AIDS, they were unwilling to discuss AIDS and protective sex with their husband for fear they would either lose financial support or lose the husband to his other common-law wives."

Sex education does not form a compulsory part of the South African school curriculum and is inhibited by the strictures of both its Calvinist Christian National Education and African tradition. Yet AIDS education

10 Cited in R.W. Johnson, "Aids in South Africa," *LRB*, 12/9/91.

as part of a broader health and life skills training would have to start in primary school, if the behavioural basis of the epidemic is to be changed. All employers should institute an AIDS counselling programme. Trainers could be sent into each factory to educate and demonstrate AIDS prevention techniques and counsel behavioural changes. Emphasis should be placed on peer group counselling. A similar mandatory programme could be enacted for all schools. Counselling must also include traditional healers (sangomas). A black medical doctor¹¹ who has written a book on alternative health care systems estimates that 80 percent of black patients first visit a traditional healer, who is usually spurned by western medicine as a "witchdoctor."

The ANC refusal to have its repatriated exiles from high-risk areas in Africa tested for HIV, may well have the effect of further spreading the disease in South Africa. Mandatory testing would have been one of the few areas where an emulation of Cuba's management of its soldiers in Angola would have made eminent sense. However, the politicization of AIDS understandably prevented many precautionary measures. For example, the ANC-supporting weekly *New Nation* (July 12-18, 1991) published allegations by former police operative Ronald Bezuidenhout that he was instructed by the CCB to transport four AIDS infected "askaris" to spread the virus in Soweto and East Rand townships. But even if the allegations are untrue, as the police maintained, they reinforced the perception among blacks that the state was responsible for the spread of the disease.

Tourist Development

Canada could contribute expertise to the development of a green tourism belt from Kenya to South Africa. This labour-intensive service industry is likely to grow dramatically since the region has the largest and most diverse natural wild life parks in the world. Joint initiatives by the National Parks Boards of Kenya, Tanzania, Botswana, Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa could link the Kruger National Park with

11 M.V. Gumedde, 1990, *Traditional Healers*, Johannesburg: Skotaville. "

the Okavango Delta, the Etosha Pan, the Victoria Falls, the Serengeti Park and Kenya's Masai Mara Nature Reserve as various legs of overseas tourist tours. Exchanges between Canadian park rangers and African game wardens would assist in the development of high professional standards of wildlife conservation as well as in planning for the more problematic aspects of mass tourism in light of experiences elsewhere. As long as the considerable revenue from the expanding industry could be guaranteed to benefit the local population and not only the tour operators, African tourism could be the most effective force for environmental conservation in some of the last authentic large wilderness areas on the planet. Instead of an ever increasing disastrous expansion of cattle grazing and deforestation, tourist dollars could offset destructive sources of income with sustained development in a gradually extending parks system. A precondition for the success of the plan would be not to resettle the local population but integrate them as beneficiaries with vested interests in a restructured, self-sufficient vast environmental protection zone in which national boundaries become as irrelevant for tourists as they are for big game.

With proper management schemes, rural people can benefit from wildlife within their area through licensed hunting and animal craft production, as already practiced in Botswana and Zimbabwe. This would also ensure optimal protection from poaching. There would therefore be no need to ban the sale of ivory, as was imposed in 1989 by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), because of poor management of elephants and rhinoceros herds in East Africa. The ivory cartel of the better managed Southern African countries will have to prove that its controversial trade both protects wildlife and also benefits the rural population.

8. REGIONAL RELATIONS, DEVELOPMENT POLICIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS

"South Africa is no longer an uncomplicated source of foreign policy options and economic relations." — F. van Zyl Slabbert, 1991.

"South Africans need not fear that they will be forgotten or ignored by the international community in the years ahead." — Joe Clark, Ottawa, 17 April 1991.

With the disappearance of Apartheid as a "moral reference point" in the international community, Southern Africa will be in danger of being increasingly marginalized in world affairs and the global economy. Already more Western capital is flowing into the Second than into the entire Third World. Should the West turn its back on a strategically downgraded region, the forging of intra-regional models of development becomes even more crucial. Whether the new South Africa can shed its sub-imperial role and take its destabilized hinterland into a new development phase without dominating it economically, whether a regional common market can develop, whether South Africa will be exclusively preoccupied with its own restructuring, and which regional organizations are most effective in avoiding marginalization and access to other markets—all these unresolved questions bear directly on the lifechances of 120 million people in the 11 sovereign states that comprise Southern Africa.

For the Southern African region three long-term options present themselves: (1) the disintegration of SADCC with the domestic situation in each country determining its relations with South Africa, (2) SADCC being strengthened through South African membership without the individual states losing their political sovereignty, and (3) a Southern African

regional union being established with far reaching economic integration, followed by a shared sovereignty.

In the academic literature, judgements on SADCC differ. Peter Vale (1991:217) concludes: "Judged not only by African but by world standards, SADCC has been a remarkably successful experiment." This may be so, if one uses member cooperation as a yardstick. However, in terms of SADCC's initial goal of delinking the region from the Apartheid economy and achieving a greater degree of self-reliance, the project has been a dismal failure. Christopher Coker (1991:286) rightly states "SADCC's attempt to create an alternative system has not succeeded." Indeed the level of intra-regional trade has fallen to a meagre 5 percent. Dan O'Meara (1988) in an assessment of the costs and impact of destabilization in 1988 concluded that South Africa has achieved most of its aims in Mozambique. "SADCC's original vision of steadily reduced economic dependence on South Africa has been shattered." The alternative regional transport system on which this independence strategy was built, namely the outlets through Mozambique, have been severely disrupted by the war. The historical asymmetrical interdependency of the region has been maintained in its infrastructural links (roads, railways), trade, patterns of labour migration and capital flows. With the balance of trade heavily running in South Africa's favour and South Africa's exports to Southern Africa and the rest of the continent increasing dramatically, the economic integration of the region into the industrial heartland of the South is proceeding apace. What the Apartheid state only partially achieved through military and diplomatic coercion—the submission of nominally sovereign neighbours under its self-proclaimed regional power status—the unrestricted economic penetration will finally seal.

South Africa already dominates the region militarily and economically. The relationship of SADCC states with South Africa varies only in the degree of captivity: from a total captive like Lesotho to the relative independence of Angola whose economy is nonetheless increasingly drawn into the South African orbit of mining expertise. Mozambique, on the other hand, has been so devastated by a South African sponsored civil war that the once thriving Portuguese outpost has become the poorest

nation in the world, reliant on US \$1.6 billion a year in foreign aid which constitutes 74 percent of its budget. Table 12 speaks for itself in highlighting South Africa's dominance.

Table 12
SADCC Countries and South Africa—Some Basic Indicators 1989

	Population mm	Area 000 sq. km.	GDP/Cap US \$	GDP US \$	GDP Growth Rate
Angola	9.2	1,247	470	4,32	0.6
Botswana	1.3	562	2,216	4,88	5.7
Lesotho	1.8	30	87	0,14	-2.1
Malawi	8.4	118	160	1,31	4.1
Mozambique	14.3	802	136	1,89	5.3
Namibia	1.6	823	1,290	1,66	0.6
Swaziland	0.7	17	936	1,66	4.6
Tanzania	28.3	945	105	2,97	3.3
Zambia	7.2	753	250	1,80	0.1
Zimbabwe	10.0	391	580	5,80	4.5
SADCC Total	82.7	5,708	282	23,30	
South Africa	35.9	1,100	2,437	87,50	

Source: South Africa International, April 1991, p. 219, and SADCC Annual Progress Reports, 1989-90.

This dependency is not entirely one-sided. The economic future of the Witwatersrand depends on the Lesotho Highland's water scheme. Electricity from the Cahora Bassa project offers a more effective supply than problematic nuclear power stations. Above all, the South has long imported foreign mine labourers whose number has declined to 200,000 which is still 37 percent of the total mine force. Nevertheless, South Africa could largely dictate the terms of its outside involvement. It contributes 75 percent of the total GNP of Southern Africa. Its per capita GDP is more than seven times that of the average for the 10 SADCC countries. Only Botswana, due to its mineral exports, has a similar per capita GDP to South Africa. In the four World Bank categories of development level, mainly determined by per capita income, South

Africa ranks among the "upper middle-income developing countries" together with Algeria, Hungary, Argentina and Yugoslavia.

The interdependence between South Africa and the frontline states is now commonly recognized, if only in South Africa through its power to draw unwanted economic migrants from its neighbours and further afield. This is no longer confined to miners or unskilled workers or refugees from Mozambique. Like a magnet, the post-Apartheid state already attracts doctors from Ghana and teachers from Zimbabwe and Swaziland who can expect much higher wages and better working conditions than in their own countries. South Africa resembles the United States on the African continent. It is reasonable to ask whether a relationship that is so asymmetrical can also be mutually beneficial. The bigger partner will insist on those solutions to problems that serve only its interests. Therefore, SADCC proposals of creating a single regional market with the "progressive removal of barriers to the free movement of people and capital in the region" would have to be implemented at the expense of South African jobseekers. Likewise, the scarce domestic investment capital will be needed in the productive sector of the South African economy. If foreign capital is interested at all, it will look to the industrial heartland rather than the periphery of the region.

The reconstruction of the South African economy will undoubtedly preoccupy South Africa and overshadow development assistance to neighbours. Nonetheless, Mandela has repeatedly stated that South Africa would not forget that "these countries have paid heavily in human and material costs for their support of our struggle." Mandela's assurance that "regional obligations" will be taken into account when designing the development process, however, may turn out to be better described as a good intention than a realistic policy. Just because the ANC will be the dominant party in government does not mean that it can afford to neglect the interests of its own constituency. Illegal foreign Africans can be expected to be as welcome in the new South Africa as Mexican immigrants in the US or Algerians in France. Skin colour will not engender solidarity. Even the long support of the ANC by the frontline states may not shield their governments from disillusionment about the treatment of their nationals or the non-appearance of the expected South

African concessions. Some frontline states may even welcome restrictions on the likely massive southward migration in order to counter the brain drain.

Van Zyl Slabbert (1991) has speculated that "South Africa is going to strive to be a major recipient, rather than donor, of aid" during the period of reconstruction. Thus, the poorer Southern African countries will compete for assistance with the richer South. Sooner or later a sensible choice has to be made of where to focus scarce resources. One strategy considers South Africa an essentially first world society and high-income area, compared with the rest of Africa. The poverty and underdevelopment inside the country is viewed as a problem of the privileged, domestic first world sector rather than the outside world. Just as West Germany has assumed sole responsibility for its impoverished part in the former GDR, so the new nonracial government, in this view, has both the resources and sole duty to realize its promise of a prosperous democracy. Donor agencies should invest in the Polands of Africa and not in its Germany. Given the huge discrepancy in accumulated wealth between South Africa and its devastated neighbours, this policy aims at solidarity with the really poor. It advocates abandoning the new South Africa to itself and concentrating on those who need assistance most. This approach considers its main duty completed: it has helped to defeat Apartheid and lay the preconditions for autonomous development with minimal foreign assistance in the future. Instead the SADCC countries would need to be boosted in order to prevent future South African economic domination and ensure mutually beneficial regional cooperation.

Should donor agencies adopt this reasoning they would clearly be overlooking an alternative that could be called the Common Market option. Under this scenario, the new South Africa would join SADCC, whose infant industries would need protection from being swamped by the developed South. On the other hand, the comparatively higher labour costs in South Africa, due to strong unions, may well lead to an exodus of manufacturing industries, similar to the North American trend *vis-à-vis* Mexico.

The Common Market option views South Africa as the crucial platform for the rescue and development of the Southern African region as a whole. The industrialized South would be the centre to drive its vast periphery out of poverty. This engine needs a strong kickstart, lest it stalls and its potential is wasted. It has to take into account the risk that South Africa itself could become overwhelmed by its internal development problems. Instead of South Africa's first world sector pulling its third world up, the Apartheid legacies of impoverishment and political instability would push the affluent islands down. Unlike Germany, the ratio between the two sectors is different, with the underdevelopment in South Africa being the dominant feature. Therefore, the new South Africa needs all the more assistance in order to be able to play its vital development in the region. This approach considers South Africa as the vital key to reversing the decline elsewhere.

This strategy clearly has the support of the private as well as the public sector in South Africa, eager to penetrate the markets to the North, to establish airline links and integrate power grids. Long before the impediments of Apartheid and sanctions had been removed, South African capital quietly secured its footholds in "hostile territory." The Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA) has successfully financed projects in Mozambique, Lesotha, Swaziland and Malawi. It established links with the 18-state Lusaka-based Preferential Trade Area (PTA), the African Development Bank and SADCC, whose own Development Fund never took off. It is likely that foreign donors also place their trust increasingly in the regional powerhouse rather than its dependent beggars. Doug Anglin (1991:20) has astutely pointed out that "in the past, much of the very substantial financial support accorded SADCC has been politically motivated conscience money intended to compensate for the reluctance of some donors to confront Apartheid directly." In the absence of that motivation and the lack of tangible progress, significant development assistance can be expected to be diverted to what Anglin calls "the latest trendy target for external aid."

Some EC members argue that the policy of continued, and accelerated Western involvement with South Africa could be confined to the transition period of five to ten years until the worst scars of Apartheid have

healed. Urgent breakthroughs in the crucial areas of housing, education, and health care require the commitment of more resources and outside skills until South Africa has achieved a more equitable distribution for normal development.

In order to make a settlement work through the tangible benefits of economic growth, economic concessions by the international community are a vital precondition. This includes preferential access for South African agricultural products to European Community Markets through South Africa's acceptance into the Lome convention as an underdeveloped country. North American markets are less important for South Africa because of transport costs. However, Canada could play a crucial advocacy role within the G7 group and with the US in particular, in having some of the debts of the New South Africa written off and others rescheduled on favourable terms. Among the SADCC countries in particular, debt repayment should be strictly linked to the ability to pay. As a rule, no country can afford to waste more than 20 percent of its export earnings in debt servicing if it wishes to retain at least some economic autonomy.

Measures to deal with the debt crisis now feature prominently at most international meetings. The Baker Plan of 1985, the Toronto Terms of 1988, and the Brady Initiative of 1989 on commercial bank debts, have not solved the burning issue. Despite an abundance of suggested remedies, the African countries' obligations continue to grow. For the whole of Africa the debt burden of \$228 billion in 1991 equals roughly the continent's entire Gross Domestic Product. Many African countries spend about 30 percent of their export earnings on interest payments. Small in comparative global terms, the African debt, nonetheless, paralyzes development programmes in most countries.

A Commonwealth Finance Ministers Meeting held in Trinidad and Tobago in September 1990 linked substantial debt relief with structural adjustment programmes among 20 of the world's poorest countries, mostly in sub-Saharan Africa. Canada is committed to seeking a wider eligibility of countries beyond the criteria of less than US \$600 per capita earnings and more than 25 percent of export earnings spent in servicing

debt. Africa's middle-income states also face serious debt problems. The Trinidad terms cover only \$18 billion of the \$228 billion owned by African countries. Declining terms of trade, little growth in export demand and drought continue to hamper African development. African trade liberalization programmes have so far not been reciprocated with less protectionism and less trade discrimination among the industrialized countries. Abolishing trade barriers and opening access to the markets of the First World remains the single most important measure of development assistance. With a mounting debt burden and disagreement among the creditors as to how to tackle it, the problem threatens to jeopardize even the structural adjustment programmes that are now carried out by more than 40 African countries.

The Commonwealth, including South Africa as a member again within the next few years, benefits its 50 states through automatic access to built-in preferential bilateral trade agreements and tariffs. Its diverse programmes in education, health, and technical assistance link the poorer parts usefully with the advanced members. Therefore, the Commonwealth will also be cherished as a transmission belt for development aid and expertise. Symbolic Commonwealth cohesion that formerly relied on a common Apartheid foe, will be replaced by instrumental advantages for its diverse members, as the common colonial heritage recedes. The membership of Namibia, which has never been a British Colony, as well as the Commonwealth observer status for Mozambique and Angola confirm this trend.

It reflects poorly on many African states that they used Apartheid as a diversion from their own human rights abuses instead of upholding a better record to combat Apartheid. Without the South African scapegoat, the spotlight will now fall increasingly on human rights abusers elsewhere. It can be hoped that the large-scale outside effort to combat Apartheid has set a precedent in further undermining the outdated doctrine of national sovereignty. How a state treats its citizens does not concern it alone, when a "public minimum" of human rights is violated. The sacred doctrine of non-intervention into the domestic affairs of a sovereign state, which consecutive Canadian governments religiously followed, has been increasingly challenged. The end of the Cold War has

facilitated the success of the international community in confronting Apartheid or protecting the Kurds in Iraq, irrespective of the objections of sovereign governments.¹

Once NGOs and other foreign institutions become discreet allies of one party only, this cozy relationship would militate against the role of forceful human rights monitoring. Public criticism is viewed as betrayal by old friends, and the long-standing relationship is jeopardized. Foreign support bodies have to choose their role carefully. Unconditional and partisan supporters may increase their influence with a ruling elite with whom they have a valuable inside track. However, the increased influence often has to be bought with an acquiescence to violations of wider moral principles. Canadian and Commonwealth stances are no exceptions to such predicaments. This double standard discredits Commonwealth stances unnecessarily with the rejoinder: "Look who speaks."

A more universalistic rather than a more pragmatic approach towards democratic deficiencies could be a worthy reorientation for Canadian foreign policy. It would be the logical continuation of the strong moral stance adopted towards Apartheid South Africa. The new approach could resemble the policy of "Amnesty International" that castigates violations regardless of ideological or political alliances. This universalistic focus on inviolate principles would also appeal to a Canadian public whose sense of justice has been sharpened by the debate on South Africa. It could draw on support from a wide political spectrum, including traditional conservatives and left-liberals alike. "No business with dictators" and "No aid to oppressive governments," would obviously be opposed by those who benefit from "business as usual"; the sanctions against South Africa had its detractors for the same reason. But as long as a universalistic civil rights policy is consistently applied, the overwhelming majority of Canadians would be attracted by such a moral high

1 For a useful overview of this debate by authors who could not then envisage the post-cold war constellation see, R.O. Matthews and C. Pratt (eds.), *Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy*, Kingston and Montreal: Queens University Press 1988, particularly Chapter Three by Kim Richard Nossal.

ground, the necessary pragmatic contact with dictators on a governmental level notwithstanding.

There should be no reason to caution against international intervention on the grounds that for Canadian policymakers to do so "would be to give up the ability to rebuff attempts at the extraterritorial application of US law to the many transnational corporations operating in Canada" (Nossal, 1988:52). The two cases of US interference in Canada and Canadian activism in South Africa are distinctly different in principle. In the one case, interference with commercial relations are for the advantage of outside owners; in the other case, basic human rights are protected or restored for no utilitarian reasons. On the one hand a concern of the international community at large is acted upon; on the other the interests of one state *vis-à-vis* its subjects or interests in another state motivate action.

With the exception of Malawi where a senile maverick dictator and his clique hold the country in thrall, all SADCC countries have made some progress towards democratization. Zambia's one-party rule since independence in 1972 has been overthrown by Frederick Chiluba in free multi-party elections in November 1991. Mugabe's Zimbabwean African National Union-Patriotic Front is wavering in its stated preference for one-party rule. Zimbabwe's problems do not lie in race relations, since the government has always courted the 4,000 white commercial farmers who own almost half of the country's fertile land. Mugabe's relationship with his critics, on the other hand, is often characterized by heavy-handed measures, be it against dissident students, union leaders or journalists. Journalists of the few private weeklies and monthly magazines are accused of disloyalty and sabotaging the state because they refuse to toe the line of the mainstream papers, controlled by the parastatal Mass Media Trust. The outlets of the Trust, established to convert the capitalist monopoly into "ownership by the people" on independence, act as praise singers. In Tanzania, Julius Nyerere's successor, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, set up a presidential commission with a year long mandate to study the matter, and the ruling party has opened itself to new organizations and participants from an emerging civil society.

After 16 years of civil war in Angola, national elections are scheduled for fall 1992 and the US sponsored truce seems to be holding. Namibia, always the political laboratory for Pretoria, displays moderation and reconciliation as guiding policy. Successive military regimes in Lesotho exist at the mercy of South Africa but will have to liberalize as soon as a new South African government comes into existence. Botswana has always been a comparative political model. Even Swaziland's young King Mswati III, after returning from an annual two-month seclusion demanded by custom at the end of 1991, has declared that he is determined to forge ahead with a process that may strip him and his courtiers of absolute power. The exception to the emerging peace and political conflict resolution is Mozambique where peace talks sponsored by Italian bishops and other interested parties have made only slow progress since 1990.

Mozambique deserves closer attention because it was here that Pretoria's counter-revolutionary strategy and the commitment to alternative development clashed most decisively. FRELIMO, more so than the MPLA because of proximity, challenged the Apartheid state ideologically through its commitment to nonracial socialism as well as by providing transit facilities to ANC guerrillas. The destabilization by South African-sponsored Renamo also forced other frontline states to use South African harbours as outlets and tightened Pretoria's stranglehold on Zimbabwe through "transport diplomacy." How successful the strategy was can be seen in the 70 percent capture of inland traffic by South Africa in the late 1980s, compared with 20 percent in the 1960s (Anglin, 1991:9). By forcing Mozambique into the Nkomati accord in March 1984, Pretoria had hoped that its diplomatic acceptance by a self-declared Marxist-Leninist state would also lead to wider legitimacy in the rest of the continent and, through recognition in Africa, more open access elsewhere in the world.

Renamo, a movement without an ideology, has yet to be systematically analyzed. It distinguishes itself from other peasant rebellions in that it was conceived and sustained from outside—initially from Rhodesia. In this respect Renamo differs from UNITA. However, it has now acquired a life of its own. Despite continued outside assistance from

elements in South African military intelligence, Kenya, Malawi and private Brazilian, Portuguese and US backers, the rebels would not have acquired the foothold in the countryside had FRELIMO not engaged in forced resettlement, and tried to abolish the system of traditional chiefs and "non-progressive" rural traditions, including religion. The errors of a socialist regime that builds its vision on the subjugation of its subjects have been aptly described by the French ethnographer Christian Geffray in his book "*La cause des armes au Mozambique.*" In several areas, particularly in Nampula, the Renamo forces were invited by local chiefs as protection against Frelimo schemes.

FRELIMO alienated large segments of its previously supportive constituency particularly through its attempts to suppress religious instruction which the state considered divisive. Although many Muslims among the Ajawa people in Niassa had initially joined the nationalists and most Protestants (Weslyan Methodists, Scandinavian Independent Baptists, the Swiss Mission and The Church of Nazarene) were always opposed to the colonial regime—several of the first FRELIMO leaders, including Mondlane, came from Protestant missions—since the early 1970s, the Marxist-Leninist inspired drive to create an atheist "new man," managed to deprive the regime of major segments of its rural constituency. The Catholic bishops' opposition to reeducation camps, corporal punishment and public floggings, the Muslims' resentment of the prohibition of Azan (call to prayer from the Mosques) and Machel's desecration of a mosque by not removing his shoes—all paved the way for domestic and foreign support of Renamo. The late Samora Machel himself once identified "Catholic ex-seminarians" as the most influential elements in the Renamo leadership.

Under President Chissano, FRELIMO has long tolerated religion. In 1987 Chissano even visited the Vatican and then welcomed the Pope in Mozambique in 1988. FRELIMO returned confiscated church properties and asked the Pope for assistance in solving the Mozambiquan dilemma. But, in a contradictory message, Chissano also called the bishops traitors because their pastorals had urged a dialogue between FRELIMO and Renamo.

At its Sixth Congress in August 1991, FRELIMO corrected the under-representation of the central provinces of Manica and Sofala as well as the most populous provinces of Zambezia and Nampula where 50 percent of the national population resides. FRELIMO's 160-member central committee is also comprised of 36 percent women, probably the highest ratio anywhere in Africa. Whether the increasingly dominant technocrats whom Chissano brought into government can give concrete meaning to the new 'social-democratic' policies of the party in the face of continued opposition by the ideologues of the old line remains to be seen. Arrests of prominent politicians for a planned coup d'état in June 1991 indicates resistance to the capitalist policies of Chissano, despite his overwhelming reformist mandate.

The government label of "bandits" for all Renamo forces denies that there is discipline and organization among the opponents. The evidence indicates significant measures of control and disciplinary order among Renamo along hierarchical lines. A strata of *mujeebas* (policemen) manage the civilian population in the vicinity of a camp. In a Renamo zone, civilians and combatants alike are severely penalized if they do not obey orders or if they attempt to escape from a control area. In so-called "tax areas," civilians are exploited through forced labour for Renamo, while in control zones "civilians are used for farming, sexual favours and for meal cooking" (*Southscan*, October 18, 1991). While most published reports highlight how much the movement terrorizes the population, there is also evidence of severe disciplinary action against combatants who commit unauthorized brutalities. Together with the fact that Renamo was able to honour its signed agreements in the past—for example the 1989 deal with Malawi not to attack the Nacala corridor—the large-scale atrocities therefore seem to have been planned rather than the results of anarchic banditry. Observers point to banditry as a separate problem resulting from the general breakdown of law and order, very much as in South Africa. "Government soldiers, Renamo combatants and freelance looters have all been witnessed to participate in actions of banditry in recent years" (*Southscan*, October 18, 1991).

Some form of UN intervention would now seem an urgent need to end a war which has cost nearly 900,000 lives and made millions of people

refugees as well as causing unmeasurable material damage. Pressure by Renamo's backers has to be brought to bear on the organization to participate in UN supervised elections rather than holding out for a powersharing deal. Perhaps South African interest in gaining international legitimacy could be utilized as an incentive for Pretoria to pressure Renamo into a lasting ceasefire and negotiations for a political settlement, if the international community were to signal a tradeoff for South African collaboration. Mandela's suggestion to enact legislation that makes support for Renamo a punishable offence could be adopted in South Africa but would have to be supplemented by intervention with Renamo's other supporters.

The removal of external sponsorship for the violence of Renamo obviously remains a priority. However, if Renamo reflects many dormant conflicts in what has been described as a "desocialized society" in which robbing and begging have become ways of life, then the resolution of the conflicts may well be out of reach of any government or any conference table of diplomats. In this respect Mozambique, together with Peru or Lebanon, represents models of extreme state disintegration which so far have defied the traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution.

The unresolved Mozambiquan war, together with the looming right-wing threat in South Africa, would seem the only justifications left for military expenditures among the frontline states. There could be major cuts in defence spending once the South African threat of destabilization has been removed and internal strife resolved. Nobody would threaten the democratic frontline states. They could even abandon their defensive name. For example, it is inexplicable why Botswana, with a tiny airforce of less than two dozen old planes, would want to spend nearly 20 percent of its GNP on a massive \$350 million air base near Molopolele, 130 km north-west of Gabarone except as a US-sponsored listening base. Similarly, the call by the first SWAPO Congress in Namibia to increase the size of the defence force and to consider the establishment of an air force and navy for the country of 1.3 million makes little sense except for control of the rich fishing grounds off the Namibian coast. Cuts in defence would save a major foreign currency commitment. If countries

insist on keeping large armies, their abolition could be made a precondition for access to IMF-WB loans.

Many of the international NGOs and other Southern African support groups find themselves in the difficult process of redefining their role from an anti-South African stance to a constructive pro-development position. Particularly among the more socialist-inclined activists, the pro-capitalist policies of erstwhile socialist comrades have strained solidarity. "This is not the future we aligned ourselves to ten or twenty years ago," mourns Toronto academic John Saul in exasperation over the embrace of a "new entrepreneurial bourgeoisie," by FRELIMO and MPLA officials (*Southern Africa Report*, July 1991). Soon, an ANC in government will be denounced by former supporters in similar terms as having abandoned a noble dream in favour of becoming a new parasitic ruling class.

The lament by international supporters who don't have to live the dream in the midst of immediate threats to survival smacks of condescending eurocentrism. It implicitly denies the black leaders the wisdom to devise their own policies. Nor are they supposed to learn from past mistakes. Instead they are presented anew as victims, defeated by IMF and World Bank structural adjustment programmes against their will. The corruption, waste and inefficiency of command economies in an underdeveloped environment is seldom blamed for its collapse. On the contrary, one reads in a Canadian anti-Apartheid journal (*Southern Africa Report*, July 1991), a conspiracy theory according to which the very success of the good example made it a threat to the larger powers. The promising socialist model, therefore, had to be removed. "We were never going to be allowed to succeed" is the new rationalization for dismal failures that cannot be attributed only to outside destabilization. Although the devastating effect of the South African-inspired assault on the infrastructure in the frontline states, to the tune of an estimated \$60 billion damage, must never be forgotten, the unacknowledged point remains that the indigenous armies of destabilization would not have found such fertile ground, had the FRELIMO and MPLA governments themselves not prepared it by alienating the peasant population through arrogant policies. A democratic order in Angola and Mozambique, in-

stead of the one party Marxist-Leninist regimes, would have allowed its opposition space and influence and thus prevented the accumulation of exploitable frustration in the first place.

South African destabilization rubbed salt into festering wounds. It eliminated all attempts to initiate recovery by dealing further blows to an ailing polity in Mozambique and Angola. However, Renamo and Unita destabilization *alone* cannot be blamed for the failure, as has become the conventional wisdom. Tanzania, which had no counter-revolution devastating the country, nevertheless ruined its own anti-colonial revolution, albeit with little direct loss of life. This occurred despite massive outside assistance and worldwide goodwill towards Nyerere's austere leadership. Nor can unfavourable terms of trade and dependencies from a colonial economy explain this series of failures exclusively. For example, the inherited dependency of the Zambian economy on the world price of copper clearly played havoc with economic planning in this country when the copper price fell rapidly. But Zambia's corrupt one-party regime, with a well-intended but weak president, also hid its own planning failures behind the blame of the colonial heritage. When South East Asian states with a similar colonial legacy and dependency were able to shake off the yoke through an export-led growth path in basic consumer goods, there was little reason why African states outside the direct Apartheid orbit should fall so far behind. The cultural cohesion of the Asian models does not explain the gap nor can a differential resource base be cited, since many Asian success stories took place in resource-deprived countries. A major reason for the difference lies in the state policies adopted for development since independence.

In the predicament of sheer physical survival of the masses of African people in several bankrupt frontline states, structural adjustment programmes of the IMF and World Bank are now considered recolonization. Canadian economist John Loxley (1991) argues that "structural adjustment is a new form of imperialism in Third World Countries." The more stringent conditionality the bank demands for new loans undoubtedly undermines economic sovereignty. But real sovereignty for most African artificial entities called states—created around the export of a commodity within a colonial economy—never existed beyond the symbols in the

first place. This nominal sovereignty must not be confused with independence. Nominally, sovereign they are, independent they are not. The freedom to choose among themselves who will govern their affairs or at least to be ruled by indigenous elites was much celebrated. It could hardly hide, however, the constraints on the freedom of the new leaders. Several made the crucial mistake of aligning themselves with the wrong side in the Cold War in order to escape the constraints. Their role as proxies in a larger conflict exacerbated their dependency on foreign sponsors in a polarized conflict and fragmented their countries to the point of disintegration. The first fatal weakening had already occurred when the new Mozambiquan and Angolan ruling groups encouraged the departure of their 400,000 colonial residents with all their skills. The Portuguese colonial crime of not allowing an educated indigenous professional class to emerge was only exacerbated by the self-destructive expulsion.

However, there exists ample evidence, beginning with Zimbabwean independence in 1980 to the Namibian decolonization ten years later, that the anti-colonial victors have learned the lessons of co-existence. Tragically, however, at the very time when African leaders attempt to democratize, the new order becomes discredited by the unpopular economic measures associated with the correction of past mistakes. Nonetheless, South Africa promises to be the crowning success of a remarkable turnaround toward a historic accommodation. The future of the sub-Saharan region as well as the prospects of racial conciliation worldwide depend on the opening of the Apartheid mind and its black and white beneficiaries making a success of the historic compromise.

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SELECTED SOUTHERN AFRICAN
JOURNALS AND NEWSLETTERS

We used a variety of specialized periodicals on South African current affairs in addition to the South African press, especially The Cape Times, Sunday Times, Sunday Tribune, Financial Mail and the general international news interpretations such as can be found in Manchester Guardian Weekly, New York Review of Books, London Review of Books, The Economist, Die Zeit or Der Spiegel. Our annotated bibliography aims both at a critical review as well as a guide for the less specialized reader.

Africa Analysis (167 Kensington High Street, London W86SH, U.K.). A fortnightly rather expensive bulletin on financial and political trends in the whole of the continent. Good for stock brokers, trade analysts and authors of risk studies.

Africa Confidential (Computer Posting, 120/126 Lavender Ave., Mitcham, Surrey CR43HP, U.K.) is probably the most widely-read and best informed fortnightly newsletters with an unfortunate focus on personalities rather than the interests and social forces they represent.

Africa Insight (P.O. Box 630, Pretoria 0001). Quarterly of the Pretoria Africa Institute with useful articles on countries to the north which only now come into a closer focus from the South.

Canadian Journal of African Affairs, published by the Canadian African Studies Association. This journal has established a reputation for solid refereed articles and reviews of the continent. Bi-lingual and sometimes rather academic.

CSIS Africa Notes (Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Suite 400, 1800 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., 20006). A monthly briefing paper on a topical African issue that is of interest to American policy makers, ably selected by veteran Africanist Helen Kitchen.

Democracy in Action (IDASA, Hill House, 1 Penzance Road, Mowbray 7700). A bi-monthly newsletter of the Institute for a Democratic Alternative that increasingly develops into a jargon-free yet sophisticated forum for political education. It cherishes accessible debates about South African political problems of the day.

Development Southern Africa (Box 784433, Sandton 2146). Quarterly of the Development Bank of Southern Africa with traditional economists, social workers and Afrikaner public administration specialists dominating the debate.

Die Suid-Afrikaan (Breestraat 215, Cape Town 8001). An influential voice of liberal Afrikaner intellectuals, founded by Hermann Giliomee and now edited by André du Toit. High analytical quality combined with a sense of the burning issues of the day.

New Era. (P.O. Box 1161, Cape Town 8000). A lively and light political magazine in the broad ANC mould, covering topics from farm labour, oppression of women, state atrocities and violence to cultural events and international developments.

Focus Africa. The Inter-Church Coalition on Africa publishes a bi-monthly Toronto-based newsletter which focuses heavily on Southern Africa. ICAAF is a Canadian ecumenical coalition, comprising the national church organisations of the Anglican, Lutheran, Mennonite, Presbyterian, United and Catholic faiths, as well as the Redemptorist Fathers and Scarborough Foreign Mission.

Front File (37 Fairhazel Gardens, London NW63QN, U.K.). One of the better of several London-based monthly commentaries on South African developments by veteran journalist Stanley Uys. Often reprints crucial information from obscure sources. Ceased publication in 1992.

Frontline (Box 32219, Braamfontein 2017), an unpredictable and generally entertaining monthly by maverick editor Denis Becket who sometimes hits on little noticed contradictions of South African life.

Indicator South Africa (Centre for Social and Development Studies, University of Natal, Durban, 4001). An informative, non-propagandistic and jargon-free quarterly monitor of South African political, urban and rural, and economic trends with up-to-date statistics and pithy analyses.

Journal of Contemporary African Studies a bi-annual interdisciplinary journal, previously published by the Pretoria Africa Institute and now by Rhodes University, is the more voluminous emulation of the reputable *Journal of Modern African Studies*, with thorough scholarly contributions.

Leadership (P.O. Box 1138, Johannesburg 2000). A glossy advertisement for a more enlightened corporate culture with superb photographs and a good nose for trendy politics and lifestyles.

Mayibuye (P.O. Box 61884, Marshalltown, 2307). The monthly journal of the ANC and successor of *Sechaba*, published in exile. Mostly mobilizing contributions with which the leadership tries to keep its bewildered constituency on course.

Monitor, edited by Rory Riordan in Port Elizabeth (P.O. Box 13197, Humewood 6013, 19 Clyde Street, Central Port Elizabeth, 6001) publishes three editions per year on glossy paper with stunning photographs. It is a poorer but more political version of *Leadership* with a heavier focus on human rights issues and more in-depth interviews and fewer corporate topics.

Politikon, the journal of the South African Political Science Association with solid academic analyses of both South African problems and general issues of the discipline.

Race Relations News is the quarterly official journal of the liberal South African Institute of Race Relations (P.O. Box 31044, 2017 Braamfontein). It is equally critical of human rights abuses by the government and liberation movements and in easily accessible style defends the traditional liberal values of pluralism and democratic tolerance. Summa-

ries of the Institutes' research and speeches generally convey a valuable non-partisan overview of the South African conflict.

Reality (P.O. Box 1104, Pietermaritzburg 3200). A combative and refreshing voice of the handful of moral liberals left in South Africa. Not shy to criticise the regime and the ANC alike from a genuine commitment to individual freedoms and human rights.

SA Labour Bulletin (P.O. Box 3851, Johannesburg 2000). The only consistent account and analysis of union struggles since the emergence of independent unions in the early 1970s. More praxis than theory oriented, it is nevertheless not an in-house organ but a sympathetic, factual observer of and commentator on the plurality of trends and events in the labour sphere.

Searchlight South Africa (14 Talbot Ave., London N20LS), a little known Trotskyite journal founded by Baruch Hirson who not only knows the activist history from the inside but crusades against the shortcomings of the ANC and its Stalinist SACP ally.

Social Dynamics (Centre for African Studies, University of Cape Town, Rondebosch 7700). An academic social science journal, typical of the genre with the occasional brilliant article or book review amidst a majority of dull, esoteric and jargon-laden treatises.

South Africa International (P.O. Box 7006, Johannesburg 2000). A quarterly of the South Africa Foundation, the big business lobby that has become ever more sophisticated in its broad range of authors and topics of relevance to South African socio-economic development. The journal, together with the Foundation's newsletter, comes free to interested subscribers of the professional kind.

Southern Africa Report (427 Bloor Street W., Toronto, M5S 1X7). A strident bi-monthly Canadian voice of John Saul, deploring the capitalist-racist collusion in the world and longing for the days of the original FRELIMO. Well informed on Mocambique, but predictable on South African events.

Southern Africa Report (P.O. Box 261579, Excom 2023, South Africa) A weekly airmail bulletin by veteran liberal journalist Raymond Louw with perceptive summaries of selected events and separate commentary by the editor on similar liberal principles as *Southscan*. Weak on economic trends, but strong on human rights issues.

Southern African Review of Books, an excellent bi-monthly paper in the format of the *New York and London Review of Books* that focuses not only on the South African debates in literature and art in the broadest sense but is equally valuable for its *avant-garde* political controversies. Edited by historian Rob Turrell from London and now published by the Centre for Southern African Studies at the University of the Western Cape.

Southscan (P.O. Box 724, London N165RZ, England). One of the most informative, comprehensive and also, for individual subscribers, least expensive newsletters with equal economic and political foci, slightly biased towards ANC interpretations.

Task Force on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility—Annual Report (129 St. Clair Avenue West, Toronto, M4V 1N5). A wide-ranging and well-researched overview of corporate crimes and irresponsibilities in the Third World, from the environment and military industries to Third World debt. More sanctions and pressure are advocated *vis-à-vis* South Africa.

The South African Communist (P.O. Box 1027, Johannesburg 2000). The theoretical quarterly of the SACP billed "as a forum for Marxist-Leninist thought," mostly of the orthodox kind.

The Weekly Mail (P.O. Box 260425, Excom 2023) is probably still the most lively, though not unbiased, source of rich details about the darker and lighter sides of living in the Apartheid land. Could do with more serious analysis and is in danger of sliding into a tabloid after Apartheid has faded away.

Transformation (c/o Economic History Department, University of Natal, 401 Durban). A quarterly, rather modest, semi-academic journal of the broad independent left, covering similar ground as *Work in Progress* but with more careful selection of in-depth articles and commentary. Essential reading for understanding the intra-left debates.

Work in Progress (Southern African Research Service, P.O. Box 32716, Braamfontein 2017). A fine example of radical, left non-jargon analysis in the tradition of critical democratic socialism. Essential reading for understanding the intricacies of the intra-left debate.

Adam and Moodley's analysis probes the competing political forces in the ongoing South African transition and assesses the prospect of democratic success or failure. It also traces the historical record of Canadian policy toward South Africa and speculates about the functions and background of a surprisingly activist policy by Canada's conservative government. The authors argue that developments in South Africa are widely misunderstood, even by informed policy makers. Public opinion abroad applies popular stereotypes of violent tribalism or false colonial analogies, and the personality cult surrounding Mandela and the accolades accorded de Klerk have romanticized and personalized a conflictual relationship. By aiming at the hidden reality beyond the pious resolutions and public posturing, Adam and Moodley contribute to a more nuanced understanding of South Africa today.

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